

Etiopien

Sikkerhedssituationen



Udlændinge- og
Integrationsministeriet

Udlændingestyrelsen

Nærværende notat skal ikke anses som udtømmende og skal læses i sammenhæng med andet tilgængeligt COI-materiale om emnet.

Notatet indeholder ikke anbefalinger til praksis, og indholdet kan ikke ses som et udtryk for Udlændingestyrelsens holdning.

Endvidere konkluderer notatet ikke på, hvilken afgørelse, der skal træffes. Terminologi anvendt i notatet bør ikke ses som et udtryk for et bestemt juridisk standpunkt.

Notatet er en syntese af de anvendte kilders udsagn, dvs. den kombinerer oplysninger fra forskellige kilder og samler den relevante information i forhold til læserens COI-behov og samler den relevante information tematisk til et overordnet helhedsbillede af det pågældende emne i stedet for at liste alle kilder eller citere information kilde efter kilde.

© 2022 Udlændingestyrelsen

Udlændingestyrelsen
Farimagsgade 51A
4700 Næstved
Danmark

Tlf.: 35 36 66 00
us.dk

Februar 2022

Alle rettigheder tilhører Udlændingestyrelsen.
Udgivelsen kan frit hentes på us.dk/landeoplysninger
Udlændingestyrelsens udgivelser kan frit citeres med tydelig kildegengivelse.

Sammenfatning

I november 2020 anklagede Etiopiens premierminister, Abiy Ahmed, *Tigray People's Liberation Front* (TPLF) for at have angrebet og erobret en militærbase i Tigray. Premierministeren beordrede herefter den etiopiske hær til at igangsætte en militæroffensiv i Tigray-regionen. I løbet af efteråret 2021 rykkede TPLF længere ind i Afar- og Amhara-regionerne.

I november 2021 kom TPLF så tæt på hovedstaden Addis Ababa, at den føderale regering erklærede national undtagelsestilstand i Etiopien i seks måneder. Regeringens mobilisering og modoffensiv satte en stopper for den betydelige fremrykning, som tigrayske styrker og TPLF havde opnået, hvilket resulterede i, at TPLF trak alle sine styrker ud af både Amhara- og Afar-regionerne i slutningen af december 2021.

Nabolandet Eritrea bekræftede for første gang, at eritreiske styrker har deltaget i krigen i Tigray-regionen i april 2021. Selvom Eritrea officielt bekendtgjorde, at de ville trække de eritreiske styrker ud af Tigray i juni 2021, var der i februar 2022 fortsat eritreiske tropper udstationeret i det vestlige Tigray for at støtte Amharas styrker.

Der er omkring 9,4 millioner etiopiere i det nordlige Etiopien, der havde behov for humanitær hjælp i november 2021, og behovet vil være 40 % højere i 2022, end det var i 2021. De store skader på infrastrukturen i Afar, Amhara og Tigray har haft store negative konsekvenser for befolkningens adgang til basale tjenesteydelser, herunder sundhed, vand og uddannelse.

I Tigray-regionen er den humanitære situation særligt vanskelig. Dette skyldes, at nødhjælpen kun i begrænset omfang kan komme ind i regionen, idet de føderale og lokale myndigheder har indført en blokade af Tigray. Væsentlige sundhedsydelser er nu på så lavt niveau i Tigray-regionen, at Tigrays største hospital har bedt om akut hjælp for at afværge yderligere tab af menneskeliv.

Det estimeres, at der er omkring 1,8 millioner internt fordrevne i Tigray-regionen, 1 million i Amhara-regionen og 334.196 i Afar-regionen. UNHCR har intensiveret indsatsen over for internt fordrevne markant i Nordetiopien.

Der har været et højt niveau af forfølgelse af etniske minoriteter i Etiopien de sidste to år. Der har været rapporter om, at de etiopiske myndigheder er gået målrettet efter forskellige etniske, politiske og religiøse grupper.

Dog har forfølgelsen af etniske tigrayere været værst. De etiopiske myndigheder i Addis Ababa har vilkårligt tilbageholdt og mishandlet tusindvis af etniske tigrayere. Anholdelserne af tigrayere er kommet i bølger i november-december 2020, juli 2021 og igen efter undtagelsestilstanden i november 2021. Civile fra Tigray-regionen er blevet angrebet og dræbt, og tilbageholdte er blevet udsat for tortur, sult og manglende adgang til lægehjælp.

Det anslås, at befolkningen i Tigray er på ca. 5,7 millioner, og tigrayere udgør omkring 7 % af den samlede befolkning i Etiopien. Da det officielle sprog i Etiopien er amharisk, taler de fleste tigrayere både tigrinsk og amharisk.

Etniske tigrayere har vanskeligt ved at forlade landet via fly. Dog har andre civile etiopiere uden problemer kunnet flyve ind og ud af de etiopiske lufthavne, inklusive Bole lufthavn i Addis Ababa.

Indholdsfortegnelse

Sammenfatning.....	1
1. Introduktion, afgrænsning og forbehold.....	3
1.1 Adgang til kilder i Etiopien.....	4
2. Forkortelser	5
3. Kort over det nordlige Etiopien	6
4. Baggrund for konflikten.....	7
5. Den militære situation – udviklingen fra marts 2021.....	9
5.1 Eritreas rolle i Tigray-regionen	12
6. Menneskerettighedssituationen i Etiopien	14
6.1. Overgreb på civilbefolkningen i Oromia-regionen	14
6.2. Overgreb på civilbefolkningen i Amhara-regionen.....	15
6.3 Overgreb på etniske tigrayere uden for Tigray-regionen.....	16
6.4 Overgreb på civilbefolkningen i Tigray-regionen.....	17
6.4.1. Tigrayere, der søger tilflugt i andre regioner i Etiopien.....	18
7. Den humanitære situation generelt i Etiopien	19
7.1 Den humanitære situation i Tigray-regionen	20
7.2 Internt fordrevne	21
8. Udbredelsen af tigrinsk i Etiopien	23
9. Adgang til lufthavne i Etiopien	25
10. Litteraturliste	27
11. Bilag 1: Interviewede kilder	33
International Crisis Group, Senior Analyst for Ethiopia.....	33
International NGO	39
Ethiopian political analyst.....	47
12. Bilag 2: Terms of Reference.....	56

1. Introduktion, afgrænsning og forbehold

Dette notat har til formål at beskrive de nuværende sikkerheds- og menneskerettighedsforhold i Etiopien med fokus på tiden fra marts 2021 til januar 2022¹, herunder baggrunden for den igangværende konflikt samt den humanitære situation, ikke mindst i Tigray-regionen. Derudover vil notatet fokusere på situationen for tigrinskaltende i landet og adgangen for civile til lufthavne i Etiopien.

Notatet er udarbejdet i overensstemmelse med EASO's (nu EUAA) retningslinjer for rapporter vedrørende lantedokumentation (Country of Origin Information, COI).²

Notatet er baseret på åbne, skriftlige kilder. Der er gjort brug af forskningsbaserede rapporter og akademiske artikler udgivet af internationale COI-enheder i Europa, internationale og lokale nyhedsmedier samt mundtlige interviews med tre udvalgte kilder over Skype.

Kilderne blev orienteret om formålet med interviewet og informeret om, at deres udtalelser ville blive inkluderet i et offentligt tilgængeligt notat. Interviewnoterne blev sendt til kilderne til godkendelse med mulighed for at ændre, kommentere og rette deres udtalelser.

Kilderne blev adspurgt om, hvordan de helst ville refereres i notatet. To ud af tre kilder anmodede om at være anonyme. Alle kilder refereres i rapporten efter deres egne ønsker.

I rapporten er der lagt vægt på at præsentere kildernes synspunkter så præcist og transparent som muligt. Udtalelser fra de interviewede kilder er tilgængelige i bilag 1. Af hensyn til læservenlighed, transparens og nøjagtighed har interviewnoterne i bilag 1 fået fortløbende numre, som anvendes i notatet, når der henvises til interviewnoter i fodnoterne.

Notatet er udarbejdet på baggrund af en Terms of Reference (ToR) (se bilag 2), der afspejler behovet for opdateret COI-viden om situationen i Etiopien. ToR er udarbejdet med inputs fra asylkontorerne og Flygtningegenævnet.

Opmærksomheden bør henledes på, at situationen i Etiopien er ustabil og let omskiftelig. Derved kan oplysninger om den konkrete situation i Etiopien hurtigt blive forældede, hvorfor de spørgsmål, der behandles i dette notat, løbende bør opdateres og ses i sammenhæng med andet tilgængeligt materiale.

Det er inden for det givne kildemateriale og notatformat ikke muligt at afdække alle facetter af forholdene i Etiopien, og notatet bør derfor ikke ses som udtømmende. Dette notat indeholder ikke anbefalinger om policy og kan derfor ikke tages til indtægt for et bestemt syn på, hvad asylpraksis skal være. Terminologi anvendt i notatet bør ikke ses som et udtryk for et bestemt juridisk standpunkt.

Dette notat blev færdiggjort den 9. februar 2022.

¹ For information vedrørende begivenheder, der fandt sted før marts 2021, se Udlændingestyrelsen, *Ethiopia: Political opposition parties – recent developments*, marts 2021, [url](#)

² EASO (EUAA), *EASO Country of Origin Information Report Methodology*, juni 2019, [url](#)

1.1 Adgang til kilder i Etiopien

Læseren skal være opmærksom på, at det er vanskeligt at få adgang til pålidelige kilder i Etiopien på grund af den væbnede konflikt, der begyndte i november 2020. For det første betyder den nuværende sikkerhedssituation, at det er yderst vanskeligt at indhente informationer ved at befinde sig i felten.³ To af de tre kilder, der er blevet interviewet til dette notat, oplyste, at de ikke har adgang til Etiopien lige nu. De udfører deres arbejde uden for landet.⁴

For det andet er der få neutrale kilder blandt personer med viden om politiske og sikkerhedsmæssige spørgsmål i Etiopien. De er ofte enten pro-regeringskilder eller pro-oppositions-kilder. Den nuværende sikkerhedssituation besværliggør indhentning af troværdige informationer om sikkerhedshændelser ved fysisk tilstedeværelse i de berørte områder.⁵

Real-time rapportering har ikke været muligt under de nuværende forhold. Menneskerettighedsobservatører, rapporter og medieundersøgelser er blevet stadig mere begrænset i løbet af de seneste par år. Myndighederne har gentagne gange afbrudt adgang til internet og telekommunikation, mens notatet blev udarbejdet.⁶

Det er i særdeleshed vanskeligt at få adgang til oplysninger om situationen i Tigray-regionen, hvor en hel region er blevet mere eller mindre afskåret fra resten af verden. Adgang til internettet har været afskåret siden begyndelsen af konflikten i november 2020. Telefonlinjer er blevet genoprettet midlertidigt i nogle måneder visse steder, men selv da har netværksforbindelsen været ustabil.⁷ Siden juni 2021 har der været en fuldstændig nedlukning af alle føderale tjenesteydelser i regionen. Den eneste internetadgang i Tigray er således via satellitforbindelser leveret af FN-organisationer samt kommunikationsenheder benyttet af regionalregeringen.⁸ Meget af dette udstyr er imidlertid blevet fjernet eller ødelagt, og der er derfor kun få aktører, der har adgang til satellitkommunikation.⁹

³ Ethiopian political analyst: 1

⁴ International NGO: 9; ICG: 1

⁵ Ethiopian political analyst: 1

⁶ International NGO: 1; ICG: 2

⁷ International NGO: 2


⁸ ICG: 4

⁹ International NGO: 11-12

2. Forkortelser

AI	Amnesty International
AP	Associated Press
ARC	Asylum Research Centre
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
COI	Country of Origin Information
DW	Deutsche Welle
EASO	European Asylum Support Office
EUAA	European Union Agency for Asylum
EDF	Eritrean Defence Force
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defence Force
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons/Internt fordrevne
OHCHR	Sekretariatet for FN's højkommisær for menneskerettigheder
OLA	Oromo Liberation Army
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
TDF	Tigray Defence Forces
TPLF	Tigray People's Liberation Front
UNHCR	FN's Flygtningehøjkommisariat
UN OCHA	FN's Kontor for Koordinering af Humanitære Anliggender
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDOS	Det amerikanske udenrigsministerium
VOA	Voice of America
WFP	FN's Verdensfødevareprogram

3. Kort over det nordlige Etiopien



Kilde: Political Geography Now, authors: Evan Centanni and Djordje Djukic, *Ethiopia War Map: Tigray Rebel Advance on Capital & Control Today* (Nov. 2021/Jan. 2022), 25. januar 2022, [url](https://www.polgeonow.com)

4. Baggrund for konflikten

Dette afsnit giver et kort overblik af de vigtigste begivenheder, der førte til den igangværende konflikt i Etiopien.

Etiopien er et østafrikansk land med en befolkning på omkring 108 millioner indbyggere. Landet er sammensat af over 80 forskellige etniske grupper, der taler mere end 100 forskellige sprog.¹⁰ Oromoer udgør den største etniske gruppe i Etiopien (34,4 %), dernæst kommer amharer (27 %), mens tigrayer og somaliere hver udgør omkring 6 % af befolkningen.¹¹

Fra 1991 til 2018 blev Etiopien ledet af den politiske koalition ved navn *Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front* (EPRDF). Kernen af EPRDF bestod af *Tigray People's Liberation Front* (TPLF). I denne periode spillede tigrayerne en dominerende rolle i etiopisk politik, sikkerhed, økonomi og samfundsliv. EPRDF blev kritiseret af omverden for at stå i spidsen for en repressiv stat, hvor myndighederne ikke respekterede politisk opposition eller menneskerettighederne. I 2018 trådte premierminister Hailemariam Desalegn tilbage efter massive protester mod EPRDF og TPLF, og i april 2018 valgte et flertal af etniske amharer og oromoer inden for EPRDF Abiy Ahmed som premierminister. Dette afstedkom afslutningen på næsten 30 år med TPFL som dominerende aktør i etiopisk politik.¹²

I marts 2020 udskød den føderale regering i Etiopien det planlagte parlaments- og regionalvalg, der oprindeligt skulle finde sted i august 2020. Den officielle begrundelse var et ønske om at inddæmme spredningen af Covid-19.¹³

I september 2020 eskalerede situationen, da den TPFL-dominerede regionalregering i Tigray besluttede sig for at afholde valg i Tigray uden tilladelse fra den føderale regering. Dette resulterede i, at etiopiske lovgivere skar ned på overførslen af økonomiske midler til Tigray.¹⁴ TPLF vandt valget med 98,2 % af stemmerne. I en tv-transmitteret tale udtalte premierminister Abiy Ahmed, at de føderale myndigheder ikke ville gribe ind i Tigray, men erklærede, at de føderale myndigheder ikke betragtede valget som legitimt.¹⁵

I november 2020 anklagede Abiy Ahmed TPLF for at have angrebet og overtaget en etiopisk militærbase i Tigray. Disse anklager førte til, at Abiy Ahmed den 4. november 2020 beordrede en national militæroffensiv sat ind i Tigray.¹⁶ Den føderale regering erklærede dertil undtagelsestilstand i seks måneder. TPLF nægtede ansvaret for angrebet og sagde, at angrebet var et påskud fra den føderale regerings side for at invadere.¹⁷

Konflikten fortsatte med, at den føderale regering udførte luftangreb mod mål i Tigray, og TPLF-styrker affyrede raketter mod hovedstaden i nabolandet Eritrea. Der har siden 1998 været spændinger mellem Eritrea og Tigray.¹⁸ Tusindvis af flygtninge strømmede ind i Sudan, og FN advarede om mulige krigsforbrydelser i

¹⁰ Udlændingestyrelsen, *Ethiopia opposition groups: Recent developments*, januar 2020, [url](#), p. 5; Britannica, *Ethiopia: Ethnic groups and languages*, u.å., [url](#)

¹¹ Udlændingestyrelsen, *Ethiopia opposition groups: Recent developments*, januar 2020, [url](#), p. 5

¹² Landinfo, *Etiopia: Sikkerhet og humanitære forhold i Tigray*, 23. september 2021, [url](#), p. 11

¹³ Reuters, *Ethiopia rejects Tigray region's call for election, citing pandemic*, 24. juni 2020, [url](#)

¹⁴ The New York Times, *Why Is Ethiopia at War With Itself?*, 14. december 2021, [url](#)

¹⁵ Landinfo, *Etiopia: Sikkerhet og humanitære forhold i Tigray*, 23. september 2021, [url](#), p. 12

¹⁶ DW, *The conflict in Tigray, Ethiopia*, 17. august 2021, [url](#)

¹⁷ Al Jazeera, *Eight months of Ethiopia's Tigray conflict: A timeline*, 4. maj 2021, [url](#)

¹⁸ DW, *Once enemies, Ethiopia and Eritrea ally against Tigray*, 29. november 2020, [url](#)

Tigray.¹⁹ I februar 2021 oplyste Amnesty International (AI), at eritreiske soldater havde dræbt ”*hundredvis af civile*” i november 2020 i byen Axum i Tigray.²⁰ I mange måneder benægtede lederne i både Etiopien og Eritrea tilstedeværelsen af eritreiske styrker i Tigray.²¹

¹⁹ Al Jazeera, *Eight months of Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict: A timeline*, 4. maj 2021, [url](#)

²⁰ AI, *Ethiopia: Eritrean troops’ massacre of hundreds of Axum civilians may amount to crime against humanity*, 26. februar 2021, [url](#)

²¹ Al Jazeera, *Eight months of Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict: A timeline*, 4. maj 2021, [url](#)

5. Den militære situation – udviklingen fra marts 2021

Det følgende afsnit afdækker den militære udvikling, der er foregået i de berørte regioner i Etiopien siden marts 2021. Afsnittet belyser de fremrykninger og retræter, som de respektive aktører i konflikten har gennemgået, navnlig i regionerne Oromia, Amhara, Afar og Tigray. Der er især fokus på de seneste drone- og luftangreb, der har kostet civile livet i flere byer. Dertil omhandler afsnittet Eritreas rolle i konflikten.

Den 27. april 2021 meldte FN om ”*active hostilities*” i de centrale, østlige og nordvestlige dele af Tigray,²² og allerede en måned efter opfordrede USA’s præsident, Joe Biden, til våbenhvile og til at indstille menneskerettighedskrænkelserne i Etiopien. Få dage efter deltog 10.000 etiopiere i en anti-amerikansk demonstration i Addis Ababa for at fordømme Joe Bidens udtalelser om konflikten i Tigray.²³

En fortsat eskalering af kampene førte den 28. juni 2021 til et vendepunkt i konflikten, da den føderale regering erklærede ensidig våbenhvile. De føderale tropper²⁴ trak sig tilbage fra Tigray, mens TPLF nærmede sig Mekelle. TPLF genindtog efterfølgende kontrollen med store dele af Tigray-regionen, mens konflikten ekspanderede og spredte sig til naboregionerne Afar og Amhara.²⁵

Mens TPLF rykkede længere ind i Afar og Amhara, opfordrede premierminister Abiy Ahmed civile til at gribe til våben for at bremse de tigrayske styrkers (TDF’s)²⁶ fremrykning mod Addis Ababa.²⁷

I den sidste halvdel af oktober 2021 udførte den føderale hær en række luftangreb mod TPLF-mål i byerne Mekelle og Agbe, hvor sendemaster og TPLF-udstyr blev ødelagt. Tre børn blev ifølge FN-kilder citeret i en artikel udgivet af France24 dræbt i angrebene, mens der var flere sårede.²⁸ Ifølge en talsmand for den føderale regering blev et produktionsanlæg til våben angrebet i Mekelle, mens et militært træningscenter og et artilleridepot skulle være blevet angrebet i Agbe. Dette er dog blevet bestridt af TPLF, som anklagede den føderale regering for at gå efter civile mål.²⁹ Ifølge den føderale regering blev militære mål for TPLF i byerne Mai Tseberi og Adwa angrebet den 24. oktober 2021. TPLF udtalte, at der i forbindelse med angrebet ikke var meldinger om tilskadekomne, og ingen mål skulle eftersigende være blevet ramt.³⁰

TPLF’s hurtige fremrykning fortsatte dog på trods af de føderale luftangreb, og oprørere fra Tigray og Oromia meddelte, at de havde erobret byerne Dessie og Kombolcha i Amhara-regionen den 30. -31. oktober 2021.³¹ I Kombolcha befandt TPLF sig lige knap 380 km fra hovedstaden Addis Ababa. TPLF’s fremmarch og erobringer

²² Al Jazeera, *Eight months of Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict: A timeline*, 4. maj 2021, [url](#)

²³ BBC, *Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict: Tens of thousands attend anti-US rally*, 30. maj 2021, [url](#)

²⁴ De føderale tropper har det officielle navn Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF)

²⁵ USAID, *Ethiopia – Northern Ethiopia Crisis*, 30. december 2021, [url](#), p. 7; Al Jazeera, *Eight months of Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict: A timeline*, 4. maj 2021, [url](#)

²⁶ Tigray Defence Forces (TDF) er en samlet betegnelse for alliancen mellem TPLF, regionalregeringen i Tigray og andre grupper, partier og individer uden for TPLF

²⁷ DW, *Ethiopia’s premier urges civilians to join fight against Tigrayan forces*, 10. august 2021, [url](#)

²⁸ France24, *UN suspends humanitarian flights to Ethiopia’s Tigray after air strikes*, 23. oktober 2021, [url](#)

²⁹ Africanews, *Tigrayan rebels claim Ethiopian town Kombolcha*, 1. november 2021, [url](#)

³⁰ Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, *Briefing Notes Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum and Migration*, 25. oktober 2021, [url](#), pp. 5-6

³¹ Africanews, *Tigrayan rebels claim Ethiopian town Kombolcha*, 1. november 2021, [url](#)

afstedkom, at den føderale regering den 2. november 2021 erklærede national undtagelsestilstand i Etiopien i seks måneder.³²

Flere oromoer støttede op om de tigrayske styrker og den væbnede oprørsbevægelse *Oromo Liberation Army* (OLA),³³ idet de ifølge en etiopisk politisk analytiker ikke mente, at Abiy Ahmed varetog deres interesser. De afventede de tigrayske styrkers ankomst til Oromia-regionen, hvor de herefter ville støtte tigrayernes opgør med Abiy Ahmeds regering.³⁴

I slutningen af november og begyndelsen af december 2021 påbegyndte den føderale regering en kontraoffensiv, der resulterede i, at regeringen generobrede Lalibela, Dessie og Kombolcha. Premierminister Abiy Ahmed erklærede kort efter, at hans styrker ville trække sig tilbage til hovedstaden. Tigrayske styrker generobrede herefter atter Lalibela.³⁵

Regeringens mobilisering og modoffensiv satte en stopper for den betydelige fremrykning, som tigrayske styrker og TPLF havde opnået. Tigrays styrker led alvorlige tilbageslag på slagmarken de sidste uger i december 2021.³⁶ På trods af at regeringen ikke har bekræftet det, mener flere analytikere, at Abiy Ahmed har taget kontakt til producenter af billige droner i udlandet. Satellitoptagelser fra Etiopien viser angiveligt en kinesisk fremstillet Wing Loong-drone.³⁷ Der har dertil været rapporter om, at den føderale regering skulle have anmodet Tyrkiet om Bayraktar TB2-droner.³⁸

Ifølge oplysninger i en artikel udgivet i januar 2022 har nye fotografier vist missilfragmenter fra en tyrkisk drone, der blev anvendt af den føderale regering i et luftangreb, der dræbte 58 civile, som søgte ly på en skole.³⁹ Iranske droner er også blevet spottet i Semera lufthavnen i Afar-regionen,⁴⁰ og der har desuden været meldinger om luft- og droneangreb i byerne Alamata, Mekelle, Korem og Maychew i Tigray-regionen mellem den 17. og 24. december 2021.⁴¹

I slutningen af december 2021 oplyste en talsmand for TPLF, at de tigrayske styrker havde trukket alle deres styrker ud af både Amhara og Afar.⁴² Mens lederskabet i Tigray hævdede, at de trak sig tilbage for at åbne muligheden for forhandlinger, fastslog regeringen i Addis Ababa, at det var deres kontraoffensiv, der havde presset de tigrayske styrker tilbage. Den 22. december 2021 udtalte den føderale regering, at man ikke ville presse sig længere ind i Tigray for at besejre modstanden der.⁴³ Der har dog på trods af dette været rapporter om fortsatte kampe og angreb begået af den føderale regering i Tigray samt droneangreb i den

³² UNHCR, *Regional Update #24: Ethiopia Emergency Situation*, 2. november 2021, [url](#), p. 1

³³ For yderligere information om OLF og OLA se Udlændingestyrelsen, *Ethiopia Political opposition parties – recent developments*, marts 2021, [url](#), p. 8

³⁴ Ethiopian political analyst: 11-12

³⁵ Ahram Online, *Timeline: Ethiopia's brutal war*, 18. december 2021, [url](#)

³⁶ ICG, *A Rare Chance for Peace in Ethiopia*, 23. december 2021, [url](#)

³⁷ Al Jazeera, *UAE air bridge provides military support to Ethiopia gov't*, 25. november 2021, [url](#)

³⁸ Politico, *Evidence from civilian bombing in Ethiopia points to Turkish drone*, 25. januar 2022, [url](#)

³⁹ Politico, *Evidence from civilian bombing in Ethiopia points to Turkish drone*, 25. januar 2022, [url](#)

⁴⁰ Al Jazeera, *How armed drones may have helped turn the tide in Ethiopia's war*, 10. december 2021, [url](#)

⁴¹ UNHCR, *Ethiopia Emergency Situation*, 5. januar 2022, [url](#), p. 1

⁴² Reuters, *Tigray forces withdraw from neighbouring Ethiopian regions –spokesman*, 20. december 2021, [url](#)

⁴³ ICG, *A Rare Chance for Peace in Ethiopia*, 23. december 2021, [url](#); ICG: 6; Ethiopian political analyst: 8

vestlige del af Oromia-regionen og i Oromia-specialzonen i Amhara-regionen i slutningen af december 2021.⁴⁴

Den føderale regering har efter den tigrayske tilbagetrækning løsladt en række fanger, herunder højtstående tigrayske og oromo personer.⁴⁵ Ifølge ICG er højtstående personer fra TPLF og den regionale regering dog ikke blandt de løsladte.⁴⁶ Den føderale regerings kommunikationskontor udsendte en erklæring i forbindelse med løsladelsen af fangerne, hvor der stod, at "nøglen til varig fred er dialog."⁴⁷

Premierminister Abiy Ahmed har i forbindelse med fangeløsladelserne opfordret til national dialog, men en sådan dialog står over for flere udfordringer. Dels har Abiy Ahmed ekskluderet nøgleaktører som TPLF og OLA fra en mulig dialog, og dels er der nye rapporter om et stigende antal føderale droneangreb i Tigray-regionen, som angiveligt har kostet 17 civile livet mellem den 10. og 14. januar 2022. Der er meldinger om, at mindst 56 civile blev dræbt i et luftangreb mod en lejr for internt fordrevne i Tigray, hvoraf størstedelen af ofrene var kvinder, børn og ældre personer, der var blevet tvangsfordrevet fra det vestlige Tigray.⁴⁸ Den føderale regering har afvist at skulle stå bag angrebene og har i stedet peget på TPLF som aktørerne bag.⁴⁹ Sekretariatet for FN's højkommissær for menneskerettigheder (OHCHR) melder om mindst 108 civile drab i Tigray forårsaget af droneangreb i perioden 1.-14. januar 2022.⁵⁰

I midten af januar 2022 blev der rapporteret om igangværende kampe i det sydlige og østlige Tigray, mens Amhara-styrker kontrollerede den vestlige del af regionen. Eritreiske tropper var også til stede i flere byer og langs grænseområderne, hvor tigrayere stadig blev udsat for overgreb.⁵¹

Den 21. januar 2022 udtalte de føderale troppers vicehærchef, Abebaw Tadesse, at der ikke vil blive fred i Etiopien, før TPLF er blevet elimineret. Tadesse uddybede, at de føderale styrker har været i gang med at forberede sig, og at de vil gå ind i Mekelle og eliminere TPLF, idet forhandling er udelukket.⁵²

Ifølge en etiopisk politisk analytiker er Amhara-nationalister ikke interesserede i en fredlig løsning på konflikten. Tværtimod er eliterne i Amhara og visse medlemmer af den føderale regering interesserede i at tage kontrol over Tigray og inkorporere regionen som en føderalt styret region.⁵³

Den 26. januar 2022 annoncerede den føderale regering sin beslutning om at ophæve undtagelsestilstanden, der blev indført den 2. november 2021.⁵⁴ Regeringens forslag blev godkendt af parlamentet den 15. februar 2022.⁵⁵

⁴⁴ International NGO: 14; International NGO: 18

⁴⁵ ICG: 7; Reuters, *Ethiopia frees opposition leaders from prison, announces political dialogue*, 8. januar 2022, [url](#)

⁴⁶ ICG: 7

⁴⁷ Reuters, *Ethiopia frees opposition leaders from prison, announces political dialogue*, 8. januar 2022, [url](#)

⁴⁸ International NGO: 14; Al Jazeera, *'More than a dozen killed' by Ethiopian drone attack in Tigray*, 11. januar 2022, [url](#)

⁴⁹ DW, *Ethiopia at crossroads as drone attacks worsen Tigray crisis*, 14. januar 2022, [url](#)

⁵⁰ OHCHR, *Press briefing notes on Ethiopia*, 14. januar 2022, [url](#)

⁵¹ International NGO: 13

⁵² Reuters, *Ethiopian army planning to 'eliminate' Tigrayan forces - military official*, 23. januar 2022, [url](#)

⁵³ Ethiopian political analyst: 10

⁵⁴ Security Council Report, *Ethiopia: Meeting under "Any Other Business"*, 27. januar 2022, [url](#)

⁵⁵ Al Jazeera, *Ethiopia parliament votes to lift state of emergency early*, 15. februar 2022, [url](#)

5.1 Eritreas rolle i Tigray-regionen

Den 16. april 2021 bekræftede Eritrea for første gang i et brev til FN's sikkerhedsråd, at landets styrker har deltaget i krigen i Tigray-regionen. Eritrea meddelte ligeledes, at landet ville påbegynde tilbagetrækningen af sine styrker i Etiopien.⁵⁶ Den 27. april 2021 rapporterede AFP imidlertid, at eritreiske soldater havde blokeret og plyndret fødevarehjælp i Tigray.⁵⁷

I maj 2021 udsendte Amnesty International (AI) en udtalelse om massakren i byen Axum, der fandt sted i november 2020. Ifølge AI's kilder dræbte eritreiske soldater hundredvis af mænd i Axums gader.⁵⁸ Af udtalelsen fremgik det, at AI havde indsamlet bevismaterialer, der peger på, at størstedelen af de dræbte var ubevæbnede civile. Dette står i kontrast til en pressemeddelelse vedrørende efterforskningen af massakren, der blev udgivet af den etiopiske rigsadvokat den 10. maj 2021. Pressemeddelelsen fastslog, at ofrene var TPLF-krigere, der havde angrebet eritreiske styrker med base i bjergene i Axum. Ifølge AI's kilder fandt mange af drabene sted i private hjem under ransagninger, hvor eritreiske soldater slog samtlige mandlige tilstedeværende ihjel uanset alder.⁵⁹

Den 28. juni 2021 annoncerede den føderale regering en ensidig våbenhvile i Tigray, der blev efterfulgt af tilbagetrækningen af *Eritrean Defence Forces* (EDF) og *Ethiopian National Defense Force* (ENDF) fra Tigray med undtagelse af de vestlige og sydlige dele af regionen.⁶⁰ TPLF konstaterede, at EDF-styrkerne kun havde trukket sig tilbage fra de sydlige og centrale dele af Tigray.⁶¹

De eritreiske troppers tilstedeværelse i Tigray blev reduceret i juni 2021, om end de opretholdt en militær tilstedeværelse langs de omstridte områder Welkait, Tsegede og Humera i den vestlige del af Tigray, der grænser op til Sudan. Tropperne blev stationerede der til støtte for Amhara-militserne og Amhara-specialstyrkerne, således at de tigrayske styrker ikke kunne overtage områderne.⁶² Eritrea har en strategisk interesse i at forhindre, at tigrayerne får adgang til de sudanesiske grænser og dermed er i stand til at skabe en form for forsyningslinje.⁶³

Der har eksisteret en alliance mellem Amhara-specialstyrkerne, Amhara-militserne samt Fano-grupperingen,⁶⁴ fordi de har haft ét fælles mål om at bekæmpe de tigrayske styrker. Den føderale regering og regionalregeringen i Amhara har givet dem en stiltiende godkendelse til at forfølge dette mål.⁶⁵

⁵⁶ Al Jazeera, *Eritrea confirms its troops are fighting in Ethiopia's Tigray*, 17. april 2021, [url](#)

⁵⁷ France24, *Eritrean troops block, loot food aid in Tigray: documents*, 27. april 2021, [url](#)

⁵⁸ AI, *Ethiopia: The Need for an Independent International Investigation of the Axum Massacre*, 13. maj 2021, [url](#)

⁵⁹ AI, *Ethiopia: The Need for an Independent International Investigation of the Axum Massacre*, 13. maj 2021, [url](#), p. 2

⁶⁰ EHRC/OHCHR, *Joint Investigation into Alleged Violations of International Human Rights, Humanitarian and Refugee Law Committed by all Parties to the Conflict in the Tigray Region of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia*, 3. november 2021, [url](#), p. 21

⁶¹ Landinfo, *Etiopia: Sikkerhet og humanitære forhold i Tigray*, 23. september 2021, [url](#), p. 19

⁶² Ethiopian political analyst: 19; ICG: 9

⁶³ ICG: 10

⁶⁴ Fano er en paramilitær gruppe bestående af unge fra Amhara-regionen

⁶⁵ Ethiopian political analyst: 27-28

Ifølge en etiopisk politisk analytiker har Eritrea samarbejdet med den føderale regerings efterretningstjenester. Abiy Ahmed har angiveligt selv givet tilladelse til, at eritreerne måtte udføre efterretningsarbejde i Etiopien. På baggrund af dette skulle eritreerne, ifølge kilden, være forholdsvis aktive i Addis Ababa og efterretningssektoren.⁶⁶ Det har ikke været muligt at verificere disse oplysninger fra anden side.

Der har været rapporter om, at eritreiske tropper under den igangværende konflikt har deltaget i massakrer på civile, stået bag systematisk plyndring, gjort sig skyld i voldtægter og udført tortur i Tigray-regionen.⁶⁷ Ifølge en international NGO var eritreiske styrker til stede i Mekelle og Axum, hvor de var involveret i en af de største offentligt rapporterede massakrer, som de angiveligt udførte sammen med de føderale tropper.⁶⁸ Internt fordrevne personer har beskrevet en systematisk indsats fra EDF-styrkerne om at påføre mest mulig skade på etniske trigrayere i de områder, som EDF kontrollerer.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Ethiopian political analyst: 19

⁶⁷ ICG: 9

⁶⁸ International NGO: 25; ARC, *Ethiopia: The Situation in Tigray*, november 2021, [url](#), p. 52

⁶⁹ USDOS, *Sanctioning Eritrean Military Leader in Connection with Human Rights Abuse in Ethiopia*, 23. august 2021, [url](#)

6. Menneskerettighedssituationen i Etiopien

I det følgende afsnit belyses de overgreb, der har fundet sted på etniske grupper i de konfliktramte regioner i Etiopien og i Tigray-regionen specifikt. Der bliver bl.a. fokuseret på etnisk profilering af tigrayere uden for Tigray-regionen, den tilspidsede konflikt mellem oromoer og amharer samt massearrestationer af etniske grupper i flere byer i landet, herunder i hovedstaden Addis Ababa.

Ifølge en etiopisk politisk analytiker har alle involverede parter begået overgreb under den nuværende konflikt. Den føderale regering, specialstyrker fra Amhara og eritreiske styrker har begået overgreb i Tigray-regionen i konfliktens tidlige faser, mens tigrayske styrker og deres allierede har begået overgreb i Amhara og Afar i konfliktens senere faser.⁷⁰

Der har været et højt niveau af forfølgelse af etniske minoriteter i Etiopien de seneste to år. Der har været rapporter om, at embedsmænd på forskellige niveauer er gået målrettet efter forskellige etniske, politiske og religiøse grupper.⁷¹ Derudover har den føderale regering slået hårdt ned på uafhængig og kritisk rapportering om situationen i Tigray-regionen og også på dem, der har rapporteret om konflikten mere generelt.⁷²

6.1. Overgreb på civilbefolkningen i Oromia-regionen

Efterhånden som volden eskalerede, blussede historisk forankrede spændinger op mellem oromoer og amharer. I november 2015 samledes folk i store demonstrationer i Oromia, efter den føderale regering planlagde at ekspandere sin administrative magt ind i Oromia-regionen. Oromoerne protesterede imod, hvad de opfattede som fortsat marginalisering og forfølgelse fra den føderale regerings side.⁷³ Tusindvis af civile er blevet arresteret, og flere hundrede er blevet dræbt siden optøjerne begyndte i 2015.⁷⁴

Forskellige oromo-aktivister og oromo-aktører er blevet forfulgt af føderale regeringsstyrker. Især i de østlige og vestlige dele af Oromia-regionen er personer blevet arresteret og fyret fra deres stillinger i den offentlige sektor.⁷⁵ I den østlige del af regionen er mange politiske aktivister blevet retsforfulgt og anklaget for at have forbindelser til Jawar Mohammed, som er en oppositionsaktivist fra Oromia, der blev løsladt fra fængsel i januar 2022.⁷⁶

Efter drabet på oromo-sangeren Hachalu Hundessa i slutningen af juni 2020, udbrød der atter store protester i Oromia-regionen samt i byerne Addis Ababa, Harar og Dire Dawa.⁷⁷ En international NGO har, før konflikten i Tigray, dokumenteret vilkårlige massearrestationer af oromoer i Oromia efter drabet på Hachalu.⁷⁸

⁷⁰ Ethiopian political analyst: 59

⁷¹ Ethiopian political analyst: 38

⁷² International NGO: 39

⁷³ DW, *Hundreds killed since start of Oromo protests*, 12. november 2016, [url](#)

⁷⁴ AI, *Amnesty International Report 2020: Ethiopia*, 8. april 2021, [url](#)

⁷⁵ Ethiopian political analyst: 39-40

⁷⁶ Ethiopian political analyst: 40

⁷⁷ BBC, *Hachalu Hundessa: 'Eighty-one killed' in protests over Ethiopian singer's death*, 1. juli 2020, [url](#); AI, *Amnesty International Report 2020: Ethiopia*, 8. april 2021, [url](#)

⁷⁸ International NGO: 21

Ud over konflikten i Tigray-regionen er spændingerne nu også høje i Oromia-regionen, hvor en konflikt mellem de føderale myndigheder og oromo-nationalister i de seneste måneder er eskaleret. Den væbnede oppositionsgruppe *Oromo Liberation Army* (OLA) er en afgørende aktør i denne konflikt, som tog fart, efter at oppositionspartierne i regionen boykottede valget i midten af juni 2021. OLA var tidligere den væbnede fløj i oprørsgruppen *Oromo Liberation Front* (OLF).⁷⁹ I dag er OLF et registret politisk parti, selvom store dele af lederskabet er blevet fængslet, hvorimod OLA udgør hjørnestenen for oprørsstyrkerne i Oromia. I maj 2021 klassificerede den føderale regering OLA som en terrororganisation.⁸⁰ En international NGO beskriver, at OLF-medlemmer ikke har fået en retfærdig rettergang, bl.a. fordi de har været holdt i isolation i lang tid.⁸¹

I takt med at konflikten blev udvidet til også at omfatte Oromia-regionen, har OLA allieret sig med styrkerne i Tigray-regionen.⁸² Konflikten har ført til en føderal modaktion, som har resulteret i vilkårlige drab begået af den føderale regering og Oromias regionale regering. Ligeledes har der været en stigning i arrestationer og luftangreb.⁸³

6.2. Overgreb på civilbefolkningen i Amhara-regionen

I april 2021 var der meldinger om vold i den sydlige del af Amhara-regionen. Her blev navnlig Oromia-specialzonerne⁸⁴ i regionen udsat for angreb. Disse områder er hovedsageligt befolkede af etniske oromoer. Dertil blev civile fra etniske grupper, der bor på begge sider af grænsen mellem Amhara og Oromia, udsat for angreb, der i vid udstrækning blev drevet af grupper, der krævede mere jord og magt. Angrebene var et forsøg på at fordrive folk, der blev anset som *outsidere*.⁸⁵

Minoritetsgruppen Qemant, der primært befinder sig i Gondar-området i Amhara-regionen, er blevet forfulgt af den regionale regering. Qemanterne har krævet regionalt selvstyre i Amhara, hvilket har ført til en væbnet konflikt mellem Qemant-aktivister og regionale styrker, hvor civile qemanter er blevet forfulgt.⁸⁶

Også Agaw-minoriteten er blevet udsat for forfølgelse i Amhara, hvor de har kæmpet for autonomi og lige rettigheder. Agaw-aktivister har etableret deres egen væbnede fløj grundet frygten for blive forfulgt af den føderale regering. En kilde har oplyst, at der imidlertid ikke er set troværdig information om forfølgelse eller chikane fra den føderale regerings side.⁸⁷

I april 2021 var der også sammenstød ved grænsen mellem Afar- og Somali-regionerne, hvor mere end 100 mennesker blev dræbt.⁸⁸ I august og september 2021 rapporterede HRW om, at Amhara-beboere i byerne Chenna og Kobo blev voldtaget og henrettet uden rettergang af tigrayske oprørere.⁸⁹

⁷⁹ For yderligere information om OLF og OLA se Udlændingestyrelsen, *Ethiopia Political opposition parties – recent developments*, marts 2021, [url](#), p. 8

⁸⁰ ICG: 18

⁸¹ International NGO: 20-21

⁸² ICG, *Ethiopia's Civil War: Cutting a Deal to Stop the Bloodshed*, 26. oktober 2021, [url](#)

⁸³ ICG: 19

⁸⁴ Specialzonerne i Oromia-regionen er zoner, der omkranser Addis Ababa

⁸⁵ Al Jazeera, *Why is ethnic violence surging in Ethiopia?*, 19. april 2021, [url](#)

⁸⁶ Ethiopian political analyst: 41

⁸⁷ Ethiopian political analyst: 42-43

⁸⁸ Al Jazeera, *Why is ethnic violence surging in Ethiopia?*, 19. april 2021, [url](#)

⁸⁹ HRW, *World Report 2022 – Ethiopia*, 13. januar 2022, [url](#)

En international NGO beskriver endvidere, at kritiske journalister, der har rapporteret om regeringens fejlslagne politik i Amhara-regionen siden december 2021 har været udsat for arrestationer.⁹⁰

Derudover nævnte en etiopisk politisk analytiker en sag mod muslimske minoriteter tilbage i 2020, hvor en moske blev brændt ned af nogle ungdomsgrupper. Efterfølgende tog myndighederne ungdomsgruppernes parti, angiveligt fordi de agerede mod muslimske civile i Gojjam-området i Amhara.⁹¹

6.3 Overgreb på etniske tigrayere uden for Tigray-regionen

Tigrayere er blevet beskrevet i meget opildnende retorik fra højeste politiske niveau. Premierminister Abiy Ahmed selv har omtalt tigrayske civile negativt,⁹² og han har derudover omtalt TPLF som ukrudt, kræft og sygdom, som skulle udryddes, hvilket har skabt grobund for omfattende overgreb på Tigray-befolkningen.⁹³

Tigrayere har været udsat for overgreb i Amhara-regionen begået af de regionale styrker.⁹⁴ Siden TPLF genvandt terræn i Tigray-regionen i juni 2021, har mange tigrayere i andre dele af Etiopien frygtet at forlade deres hjem, idet personer med tigraysk oprindelse risikerer anholdelse uden nødvendigvis at have en tilknytning til TPLF.⁹⁵

Siden november 2020 er tusindvis af etniske tigrayere uden for Tigray-regionen, men i særdeleshed i Addis Ababa, blevet udsat for anholdelser, indefrysninger af bankkonti, tvangslukninger af tigrayske virksomheder og afskedigelser fra deres arbejdspladser.⁹⁶ Anholdelserne af tigrayere er kommet i bølger i november-december 2020, juli 2021 og igen efter undtagelsestilstanden i november 2021.⁹⁷ Ifølge Associated Press (AP) er en række tigrayere blevet tilbageholdt i Addis Ababa, idet deres id-kort viste, at de var fra Tigray eller på grund af, at de talte tigrinsk.⁹⁸

Ifølge HRW har de etiopiske myndigheder i Addis Ababa vilkårligt tilbageholdt og mishandlet tusindvis af etniske tigrayere, der er blevet deporteret fra Saudi Arabien.⁹⁹ Ifølge kilden er der fra de etiopiske myndigheders side sket en stigning i profilering, vilkårlige tilbageholdelser samt tvungne forsvindinger af etniske tigrayere i forbindelse med tilbagetrækningen af de føderale styrker fra Tigray og den efterfølgende udvidelse af konflikten til naboregionerne.¹⁰⁰

Tidligere tilbageholdte tigrayere, som HRW har talt med, melder om krænkende adfærd og vold udøvet af de føderale myndigheder.¹⁰¹ Den føderale regering i Etiopien har afvist anklagerne som udokumenterede.¹⁰² En

⁹⁰ International NGO: 39

⁹¹ Ethiopian political analyst: 47

⁹² International NGO: 35

⁹³ The Times, *Genocide fears after Ethiopian PM vows to crush 'weeds' of Tigray*, 19. juli 2021, [url](#)

⁹⁴ Ethiopian political analyst: 45

⁹⁵ African Arguments, *Tigrayans in Ethiopia fear becoming "the next Rwanda"*, 12. juli 2021, [url](#)

⁹⁶ Ethiopian political analyst: 44

⁹⁷ International NGO: 56

⁹⁸ AP, *'Purely ethnic profiling': New wave of Tigrayans detained*, 13. juli 2021, [url](#)

⁹⁹ HRW, *Ethiopia: Returned Tigrayans Detained, Abused*, 5. januar 2022, [url](#)

¹⁰⁰ HRW, *Ethiopia: Returned Tigrayans Detained, Abused*, 5. januar 2022, [url](#)

¹⁰¹ HRW, *Ethiopia: Returned Tigrayans Detained, Abused*, 5. januar 2022, [url](#)

¹⁰² VOA, *Ethiopia Dismisses Accusations of Abusing Repatriated Tigrayans from Saudi Arabia*, 6. januar 2022, [url](#)

international NGO har oplyst, at det føderale politi i november 2021 kidnappede 100 tigrayerere fra en af detentionsfaciliteterne i Addis Ababa. Tigrayerne blev ført til Jimma i Oromia-regionen, hvor nogle af dem blev tvunget til at arbejde på kaffefarme uden løn.¹⁰³

Der har været meldinger om fortsatte arrestationer af tigrayerere i Addis Ababa, Gondar, Bahir Dar og andre byer. OHCHR anfægter retmæssigheden af arrestationerne, idet det frygtes, at politiet påberåber sig bestemmelserne i landets undtagelsestilstand til at ransage og tilbageholde personer uden en arrestordre.¹⁰⁴ Tigrayerne er blevet arresteret grundet mistanke om tilknytning eller støtte til TPLF.¹⁰⁵ Ifølge en kilde er nogle af disse blevet løsladt igen.¹⁰⁶

6.4 Overgreb på civilbefolkningen i Tigray-regionen

Amnesty International og HRW har i en fælles erklæring anklaget sikkerhedsstyrker fra Amhara for vold og drab af civile tigrayerere i den vestlige del af Tigray-regionen.¹⁰⁷ Civile, der har forsøgt at flygte fra de pågældende voldsramte områder, er blevet angrebet og dræbt. Tilbageholdte er blevet udsat for tortur, sult og manglende adgang til lægehjælp.¹⁰⁸

Ifølge en lokal tigraysk kilde er de amhariske styrker gået målrettet efter tigrayske mænd i kampdygtig alder i byen Humera i Tigray-regionen. Lokale tigrayerere har berettet om etnisk udrensning, men det har været vanskeligt at bekræfte disse forhold grundet den afbrudte telekommunikation i Tigray-regionen.¹⁰⁹ Der er også vidnesbyrd om, at amhariske styrker er gået fra dør til dør, og hvis en person var tigrayer, blev vedkommende enten dræbt eller arresteret.¹¹⁰

Mange af de overgreb, der er blevet dokumenteret i det vestlige Tigray mod etniske tigrayerere, er hovedsageligt blevet begået af Amhara-militsgruppen kaldet Fano.¹¹¹ Denne militsgruppe har arbejdet sammen med den føderale regering og specialstyrker fra Amhara i Tigray-regionen.¹¹²

Der har været meldinger om gengældelsesaktioner og overgreb mod personer, der deltog i den tigrayske overgangsadministration i regionen fra november 2020 til juni 2021.¹¹³

¹⁰³ International NGO: 33

¹⁰⁴ OHCHR, *Press briefing notes on Ethiopia*, 16. november 2021, [url](#); Landinfo, *Etiopia: Utvikling siden august 2021*, 12. november 2021, [url](#), p. 6

¹⁰⁵ OHCHR, *Press briefing notes on Ethiopia*, 16. november 2021, [url](#)

¹⁰⁶ Ethiopian political analyst: 56

¹⁰⁷ HRW, *Ethiopia: New Wave of Atrocities in Western Tigray*, 16. december 2021, [url](#); DW, *Tigray: New wave of abuse in Ethiopia, rights groups report*, 16. december 2021, [url](#)

¹⁰⁸ HRW, *Ethiopia: New Wave of Atrocities in Western Tigray*, 16. december 2021, [url](#)

¹⁰⁹ BBC, *Ethiopia's Tigray crisis: Fleeing for fear of new ethnic conflict*, 16. juli 2021, [url](#)

¹¹⁰ BBC, *Ethiopia's Tigray crisis: Fleeing for fear of new ethnic conflict*, 16. juli 2021, [url](#)

¹¹¹ Fano er en paramilitær gruppe bestående af unge fra Amhara-regionen

¹¹² International NGO: 43; Ethiopian political analyst: 25

¹¹³ International NGO: 53; EHRC/OHCHR, *Joint Investigation into Alleged Violations of International Human Rights, Humanitarian and Refugee Law Committed by all Parties to the Conflict in the Tigray Region of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia*, 3. november 2021, [url](#), p. 38

Den 22. juni 2021 blev mindst 64 personer dræbt og mindst 180 såret i et luftangreb på et marked i byen Togoga i Tigray. Ifølge The Guardian viste billeder fra stedet omfattende civile tab. En talsmand for den etiopiske hær bekræftede efterfølgende, at militæret udførte angrebet i Togoga, men at målet var oprørskrigere.¹¹⁴

6.4.1. Tigrayere, der søger tilflugt i andre regioner i Etiopien

Ifølge en senioranalytiker fra ICG forlod en række tigrayere i starten af konflikten Tigray-regionen, især dem med flere ressourcer, og de søgte tilflugt i Addis Ababa. Det er ikke set, at tigrayere søger tilflugt i naboregionerne under konflikten. Afar-regionen er præget af et vanskeligt klima med høje temperaturer. Derudover er det en fattig, tyndt befolket region. Derfor er det umiddelbart ikke et godt sted at søge hen som internt fordreven.¹¹⁵

En international NGO har oplyst, at civile tigrayere ikke kan bevæge sig ud af Tigray-regionen, og de har derfor ikke mulighed for at søge tilflugt i andre dele af Etiopien.¹¹⁶ En etiopisk politisk analytiker har oplyst, at indtil Tigray kom under belejring, flygtede mange tigrayere til Sudan, hvis de havde mulighed for at forlade regionen.¹¹⁷

Med hensyn til Amhara-regionen har den regionale regering under konflikten gjort krav på dele af Tigray-regionen, hvilket har ført til en stor og bekymrende forringelse af forholdet mellem ikke blot Amharas og Tigrays politiske eliter, men også mere bredt i de to samfund. Derfor vil man finde fjendtlighed mellem disse to befolkningsgrupper. Især i betragtning af den generelle vanskelige situation, som lokalbefolkningen oplever, er villigheden til at modtage internt fordrevne derfor meget begrænset. En senioranalytiker ved ICG vurderede på den baggrund, at tigrayere nok alligevel ville føle sig tryggere inde i selve Tigray, selvom levevilkårene der er særdeles vanskelige.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴ The Guardian, *Scores killed in Ethiopian airstrike on Tigray market*, 24. juni 2021, [url](#)

¹¹⁵ ICG: 33

¹¹⁶ International NGO: 52

¹¹⁷ Ethiopian political analyst: 54

¹¹⁸ ICG: 32

7. Den humanitære situation generelt i Etiopien

Dette afsnit beskriver de humanitære konsekvenser, som konflikten i Etiopien har medført for befolkningen. Der bliver særligt kigget på behovet for akut nødhjælp, adgangen til fødevarer og basale tjenesteydelser, infrastrukturelle problemer samt sundhedssystemet i de berørte regioner. Derudover afdækkes den kritiske situation i Tigray-regionen specifikt, idet manglende adgang til regionen har bl.a. forhindret humanitære operationer i at blive gennemført. Afslutningsvis vil der være en gennemgang af situationen for internt fordrevne personer i de berørte områder.

FN's fødevarereprogram (WFP) estimerede i november 2021, at ca. 9,4 millioner etiopiere i det nordlige Etiopien havde behov for humanitær hjælp. I Amhara-regionen alene estimeres det, at 3,7 millioner mennesker har brug for akut nødhjælp. Behovet for nødhjælp i Etiopien forventes af WFP til at blive endnu større i 2022.¹¹⁹

Ifølge beregninger fra FEWS NET¹²⁰ vil behovet for humanitær hjælp være 40 % højere i 2022, end det var i både 2021 og 2016, hvor man havde følgevirkningerne efter tørken i 2015. Specielt den nordlige del af Etiopien estimeres at blive hårdt ramt, da disse områder har været hårdt påvirket af den igangværende konflikt. I de sydlige pastorale områder vil en forlænget tørkeperiode ligeledes bidrage til den humanitære krise i Etiopien.¹²¹

Den igangværende konflikt i den nordlige del af Etiopien har reduceret indkomstmulighederne – og derved adgangen til fødevarer – for de lokale beboere i dette område markant. FEWS NET mener, at fødevarerpriser i de berørte områder er steget med over 300 % sammenlignet med prisniveauet, før konflikten brød ud.¹²²

Ifølge UN OCHA står humanitære organisationer over for en række sikkerhedsmæssige, administrative såvel som operationelle udfordringer i det nordlige Etiopien.¹²³ Der har været et stort antal angreb på nødhjælpsarbejdere. Flere er blevet beskyldt for at have forbindelser til TPLF, og der var stor fjendtlighed over for nødhjælpsarbejdere, der forsøgte at få hjælp frem i Amhara- og Afar-regionerne.¹²⁴

Skader og ødelæggelser af den offentlige infrastruktur på grund af konflikten på tværs af Afar, Amhara og Tigray har haft en stor indvirkning på befolkningens adgang til basale tjenesteydelser, herunder sundhed, vand og uddannelse.¹²⁵

¹¹⁹ WFP, *Millions more in need of food assistance as a direct result of conflict in Northern Ethiopia, says WFP*, 26. November 2021, [url](#)

¹²⁰ The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), er en udbyder af tidlig varsling om akut fødevarerikkerhed rundt om i verden. FEWS NET er grundlagt af United States Agency for International Development (USAID), FEWS NET - Famine Early Warning System Network (Author), *Ethiopia Food Security Alert December 22, 2021*, 22. december 2021, [url](#)

¹²¹ FEWS NET - Famine Early Warning System Network (Author), *Ethiopia Food Security Alert December 22, 2021*, 22. december 2021, [url](#)

¹²² FEWS NET - Famine Early Warning System Network (Author), *Ethiopia Food Security Alert December 22, 2021*, 22. december 2021, [url](#)

¹²³ UN OCHA, *Ethiopia - Northern Ethiopia Humanitarian Update, Situation Report*, 13. januar 2022, [url](#)

¹²⁴ International NGO: 47

¹²⁵ UN OCHA, *Ethiopia - Northern Ethiopia Humanitarian Update, Situation Report*, 13. januar 2022, [url](#)

Konflikten har betydet, at millioner af børn ikke har haft mulighed for at uddanne sig i over et år i nogle områder. I Amhara-regionen for eksempel er 4.107 skoler (3.823 grundskoler og 284 sekundære skoler), der tegner sig for 42 % af skolerne i regionen, angiveligt totalt eller delvist beskadiget og plyndret ifølge en indledende vurdering fra det regionale uddannelsesbureau. Mere end 1,9 millioner børn og 116.939 lærere er direkte berørt som følge heraf.¹²⁶

Hvis man kigger på konfliktens indvirkning på sundhedssystemet, er mindst 40 hospitaler, 453 sundhedscentre og 1.850 små sundhedsklinikker¹²⁷ blevet beskadiget og/eller plyndret i Amhara-regionen. I Afar-regionen er 91 sundhedsenheder (1 hospital, 23 sundhedscentre og 67 små sundhedsklinikker) blevet plyndret og beskadiget pr. 16. december 2021.¹²⁸

Strøm- og telekommunikationsafbrydelser påvirker fortsat den konfliktramte befolkning samt de humanitære operationer i det nordlige Etiopien. Dog er der set forbedringer i bl.a. de amhariske byer Bahir Dar og Debre Berhan, hvor adgangen til mobildata blev gendannet.¹²⁹

7.1 Den humanitære situation i Tigray-regionen

Om end den humanitære situation i Etiopien ser ud til at være generelt kritisk, så peger alt på, at situationen er værst i Tigray-regionen.¹³⁰ Dette skyldes bl.a., at en betydelig del af befolkningen oplever alvorlig fødevareremangel, og flere end 100.000 sulter.¹³¹ Nødhjælpen kommer kun i begrænset omfang ind i regionen, fordi de føderale og lokale myndigheder har indført en blokade af Tigray, der stadig i ultimo januar 2022 bliver håndhævet.¹³² Lufthavnene i Tigray er lukket for kommerciel trafik, og alle adgangsveje til regionen er kontrolleret af de føderale styrker og deres allierede.¹³³ (For mere information om adgang til lufthavne, se [#9. Adgang til lufthavne i Etiopien](#)).

Der er sket en massiv reduktion af handel og i føderale tjenesteydelser inden for telekommunikation, bankvirksomhed og elektricitet i Tigray-regionen.¹³⁴ Dertil kommer en udbredt mangel på kontanter, brændstof og forsyninger, hvilket har medført, at myndighederne er blevet nødt til at reducere eller fuldstændig suspendere humanitære operationer i regionen. Dette efterlader millioner af mennesker uden tilstrækkelig adgang til livreddende hjælp.¹³⁵

Samlet set er 1.338 lastbiler kørt ind i Tigray-regionen mellem den 12. juli og den 14. december 2021, hvilket udgør mindre end 12 % af de nødvendige forsyninger for at opfylde de humanitære behov i regionen. Fortsatte kampe i Afar-regionen har, ifølge WFP, været årsag til, at den eneste forsyningsrute ind i Tigray er blevet spærret.¹³⁶ Det skyldes, ifølge en etiopisk politisk analytiker, at militser eller føderale styrker ikke har haft

¹²⁶ UN OCHA, *Ethiopia - Northern Ethiopia Humanitarian Update, Situation Report*, 13. januar 2022, [url](#)

¹²⁷ Disse små sundhedsklinikker udgør de mindste sundhedsenheder ud på landet og er kun bemandede af sygeplejerske og jordemødre. De har typisk ikke en læge til rådighed.

¹²⁸ UN OCHA, *Ethiopia - Northern Ethiopia Humanitarian Update, Situation Report*, 13. januar 2022, [url](#)

¹²⁹ UN OCHA, *Ethiopia - Northern Ethiopia Humanitarian Update, Situation Report*, 13. januar 2022, [url](#)

¹³⁰ FEWS NET - Famine Early Warning System Network (Author), *Ethiopia Food Security Alert December 22, 2021*, 22. december 2021, [url](#)

¹³¹ Landinfo, *Etiopia: Sikkerhet og humanitære forhold i Tigray*, 23. september 2021, [url](#), p. 5

¹³² Landinfo, *Etiopia: Sikkerhet og humanitære forhold i Tigray*, 23. september 2021, [url](#), pp. 29-30; ICG: 15

¹³³ Landinfo, *Etiopia: Sikkerhet og humanitære forhold i Tigray*, 23. september 2021, [url](#), pp. 29-30

¹³⁴ ICG: 14-15

¹³⁵ UN OCHA, *Ethiopia - Northern Ethiopia Humanitarian Update, Situation Report*, 13. januar 2022, [url](#)

¹³⁶ International NGO: 13

interesse i, at nødhjælpskonvojer skulle nå frem til Tigray. Derfor er sådanne konvojer blevet opsnappet og brugt til lokale behov.¹³⁷

Ifølge myndighederne i Tigray forventes fødevarerikigheden at blive forværret i 2022 givet sandsynligheden for op til 50 % reduktion i høsten i løbet af den næste høstsæson på grund af mangel på gødning. Gødning til landmænd leveres normalt omkring januar måned, så landmændene kan begynde at plante deres afgrøder.¹³⁸ Oveni dette skal lægges, at selve krigen har haft en stor negativ indvirkning på fødevarerproduktionen i regionen.¹³⁹

Manglen på humanitær bistand i Tigray-regionen har også betydet, at eritreiske flygtninge i to lejre i den sydlige del af regionen ikke har modtaget den nødvendige assistance.¹⁴⁰

Væsentlige sundhedsydelse er nu på så lavt niveau i Tigray-regionen, at Ayder Referral, der er det største fungerende hospital i Tigray, sendte et brev ud til alle partnere den 30. december 2021, hvor de bad om akut hjælp til at afværge yderligere tab af menneskeliv. Brevet understregede manglen på basal medicin og medicinsk udstyr og bemærkede, at hospitalet nu har måttet ty til udløbet medicin og genbrug af medicinske handsker for at fortsætte med at behandle patienter. Hospitalspersonalet har ikke fået løn de seneste syv måneder.¹⁴¹

Tigray-regionen har oplevet en massiv afbrydelse i adgangen til grundlæggende sociale ydelser såsom uddannelse og sundhed.¹⁴² Mere end 1.000 skoler er blevet beskadiget eller plyndret. Skolerne har brug for reovering eller rydning af eksplosive anordninger.¹⁴³

Den 23. januar 2022 annoncerede den føderale regering, at man samarbejder med FN og Internationalt Røde Kors (ICRC) om at facilitere daglige humanitære flyvninger. Den 24. januar 2022 leverede FN's humanitære lufttjeneste (UNHAS) 3,5 tons medicinske forsyninger og udstyr til Tigray-regionen. Det er en mængde, der er tilstrækkelig til omkring 35.000 mennesker. Den 26. januar 2022 leverede ICRC medicinske forsyninger til Mekelle for første gang siden september 2021.¹⁴⁴

7.2 Internt fordrevne

Inden konflikten startede mellem TPLF og de føderale myndigheder, husede Etiopien allerede 2-3 millioner internt fordrevne personer. De havde forladt deres hjem, som var et resultat af de voldelige handlinger, der havde fundet sted i regionerne Oromia, Benishangul-Gumuz og Amhara.¹⁴⁵

Ifølge UNHCR estimeres det, at der er omkring 1,8 millioner internt fordrevne i Tigray-regionen, 1 million i Amhara-regionen og 334.196 i Afar-regionen. IOM estimerer, at der i juni til juli 2021 var i alt 4.171.550 internt fordrevne personer i hele Etiopien.¹⁴⁶ UNHCR har markant opskaleret tilstedeværelsen og indsatsen

¹³⁷ Ethiopian political analyst: 62

¹³⁸ UN OCHA, *Ethiopia - Northern Ethiopia Humanitarian Update, Situation Report*, 13. januar 2022, [url](#)

¹³⁹ ICG: 14

¹⁴⁰ International NGO: 45

¹⁴¹ UN OCHA, *Ethiopia - Northern Ethiopia Humanitarian Update, Situation Report*, 13. januar 2022, [url](#)

¹⁴² ICG: 15

¹⁴³ UN OCHA, *Ethiopia - Northern Ethiopia Humanitarian Update, Situation Report*, 13. januar 2022, [url](#)

¹⁴⁴ Security Council Report, *Ethiopia: Meeting under "Any Other Business"*, 27. januar 2022, [url](#)

¹⁴⁵ ICG: 29

¹⁴⁶ IOM, *ETHIOPIA NATIONAL DISPLACEMENT REPORT 9 Site Assessment Round 26 & Village Assessment Survey Round 9 June — July 2021*, 24. september 2021, [url](#), p. 2

over for internt fordrevne i Tigray-, Afar- og Amhara-regionerne. Disse operationer er dog fortsat alvorligt hæmmede af følgevirkningerne af den igangværende konflikt, som inkluderer mangel på kontanter, brændstof og telekommunikation.¹⁴⁷

Omkring 35.000 internt fordrevne har modtaget hjælp til frivilligt at kunne vende tilbage til deres oprindelsessteder fra fire internt fordrevne områder i Amhara, mens et betydeligt antal internt fordrevne har formået at vende tilbage uden hjælp. Det anslås, at mindst 200.000 fordrevne mennesker er vendt tilbage til deres hjem i løbet af december 2021 til januar 2022.¹⁴⁸

De fleste lejre for internt fordrevne i Afar-regionen, inklusive Erebti, Brahale og Talalak, modtager meget lidt eller ingen nødhjælp. Omkring 23.000 internt fordrevne fra Hadelela og Samurobi Woredas¹⁴⁹ er frivilligt vendt tilbage til deres respektive hjem. Dog bliver hjemvendte internt fordrevne udfordret af manglende infrastruktur og levebrød, der begge er blevet ødelagt under kampene.¹⁵⁰

Usikkerheden i fødevarerforsyningen er udbredt i områder, hvor de internt fordrevne vender hjem til. Dette skyldes til dels mangel på adgang til markeder og pengestrømme. I mellemtiden er et stort antal internt fordrevne blevet fordrevet fra Shiket i Afar siden 20. december 2021 på grund af igangværende kampe, og de søger nu tilflugt i udkanten af Mekelle, Aragure, Milazat, Laham, Wajrat Esra, Adigdom, Hintalo og Samre i Tigray-regionen.¹⁵¹

Derudover har den føderale regering taget et initiativ, hvor myndighederne har søgt støtte internationalt til landets internt fordrevne, især fra den etiopiske diaspora. Dele af den etiopiske diaspora kom efterfølgende til Etiopien og har bistået de internt fordrevne fra især Amhara og Afar.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁷ UNHCR, *Regional Update #27 Ethiopia Emergency Situation*, 5. januar 2022, [url](#)

¹⁴⁸ UN OCHA, *Ethiopia - Northern Ethiopia Humanitarian Update, Situation Report*, 13. januar 2022, [url](#)

¹⁴⁹ Woreda er en administrativ enhed i Etiopien. Etiopien består af fire administrative niveauer: regionale stater (regioner), zoner, woreda og kebele, hvor kebele er den mindste administrative enhed.

¹⁵⁰ UN OCHA, *Ethiopia - Northern Ethiopia Humanitarian Update, Situation Report*, 13. januar 2022, [url](#)

¹⁵¹ UN OCHA, *Ethiopia - Northern Ethiopia Humanitarian Update, Situation Report*, 13. januar 2022, [url](#)

¹⁵² Ethiopian political analyst: 57-58

8. Udbredelsen af tigrinsk i Etiopien

Den seneste folketælling i Etiopien fandt sted i 2007. Derfor baserer de nuværende opgørelser over Etiopiens befolkning sig på en fremskrivning af denne, hvorfor der er tale om store usikkerheder. Det anslås, at befolkningen i Tigray er på ca. 5,7 millioner.¹⁵³ Tigrayere udgør omkring 7 % af den samlede befolkning i Etiopien, og antallet af tigrinsktalende etiopiere vil være meget lig dette.¹⁵⁴

Over 90 % af befolkningen i Tigray anslås at være tigrayere, der taler tigrinsk.¹⁵⁵ Tigrinsk er det officielle sprog i Tigray-regionen.¹⁵⁶ Det officielle sprog i Etiopien er amharisk, hvorfor de fleste tigrayere er tosprogede og taler både tigrinsk og amharisk.¹⁵⁷ Nogle tigrayere er ikke flydende i amharisk, og man vil nemt kunne skelne en tigrayer fra en amharer grundet tigrayerens accent, medmindre at tigrayeren er født og opvokset uden for Tigray.¹⁵⁸

TPLF's fremtrædende rolle i de seneste 20 år på nationalt plan har medført en relativ stor spredning af tigrayere på tværs af Etiopien. Derfor vil man finde tigrayere og tigrinsktalende folk mange steder i Etiopien.¹⁵⁹

Tigrinsk er også det mest udbredte sprog i Eritrea¹⁶⁰, men der er betydelige forskelle i accent og sprogbrug i det tigrinsk, man taler i Tigray.¹⁶¹ I Addis Ababa bor der også eritreere, der taler tigrinsk med eritreisk accent.¹⁶² Det estimeres i en opdateret rapport fra UNHCR, at der i december 2021 befandt sig 156.297 eritreiske flygtninge i Etiopien.¹⁶³ En etiopisk politisk analytiker har udtalt, at der er mange eritreiske spioner og efterretningsofficerer i Addis Ababa, men at disse ikke udgør et helt lokalsamfund. Ifølge kilden vil tigrinsktalende civile i hovedstaden derfor sandsynligvis være tigrayere.¹⁶⁴

Traditionelt findes der personer af oromo-afstamning i Raya-distriktet i Tigray, der gennem tiden har tilegnet sig amharisk eller tigrinsk som modersmål.¹⁶⁵

¹⁵³ Landinfo, *Etiopia Sikkerhet og humanitære forhold i Tigray*, 23. september 2021, [url](#), p. 10

¹⁵⁴ Ethiopian political analyst: 66

¹⁵⁵ Landinfo, *Etiopia Sikkerhet og humanitære forhold i Tigray*, 23. september 2021, [url](#), p. 10

¹⁵⁶ Holland, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Thematic Country of Origin Information Report on Tigray 2021*, 31. august 2021, [url](#), p. 44

¹⁵⁷ ICG: 36; Ethiopian political analyst: 67

¹⁵⁸ Ethiopian political analyst: 67

¹⁵⁹ ICG: 35

¹⁶⁰ ICG: 35; Holland, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Thematic Country of Origin Information Report on Tigray 2021*, 31. august 2021, [url](#), p. 43

¹⁶¹ Holland, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Thematic Country of Origin Information Report on Tigray 2021*, 31. august 2021, [url](#), p. 43; International NGO: 31

¹⁶² ICG: 35

¹⁶³ UNHCR, *Ethiopia: Country Refugee Response Plan. January 2020 – December 2021, Updated for 2021*, n.d. 2021, [url](#), p. 8

¹⁶⁴ Ethiopian political analyst: 67

¹⁶⁵ Holland, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Thematic Country of Origin Information Report on Tigray 2021*, 31. august 2021, [url](#), p. 43

Ifølge en rapport fra det hollandske udenrigsministerium taler Afar-mindretallet i det østlige Tigray også tigrinsk ud over deres eget regionale sprog. Det samme skulle være gældende for de to mindre befolkningsgrupper iroberne og kunamerne.¹⁶⁶

I grænselandet mellem Tigray og Afar og mellem Tigray og Amhara kan man finde et stort antal mennesker, der tale begge regionale sprog.¹⁶⁷ Tigrinsktalende amharer bor primært i de sydlige og vestlige dele af Tigray-regionen.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁶ Holland, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Thematic Country of Origin Information Report on Tigray 2021*, 31. august 2021, [url](#), p. 44

¹⁶⁷ ICG: 34

¹⁶⁸ Ethiopian political analyst: 64

9. Adgang til lufthavne i Etiopien

Etniske tigrayere har vanskeligt ved at forlade landet via fly. Dog har andre civile etiopiere uden problemer kunnet flyve ind og ud af de etiopiske lufthavne, inklusive Bole lufthavn i Addis Ababa med undtagelse af lufthavnene i Tigray, der er lukket for kommerciel trafik.¹⁶⁹

Der har været undtagelser for, hvem der har fået adgang til lufthavne i Addis Ababa. Det har navnlig været vanskeligt for tigrayere at forlade landet gennem Bole lufthavn. Mange har forsøgt, men de er blevet nægtet tilladelse fra myndighederne i Addis Ababa.¹⁷⁰ ICG's senioranalytiker var ikke bekendt med lignende behandling af andre etniske grupper såsom oromoer eller amharer.¹⁷¹

Nogle personer er blevet sat på den føderale regerings liste over, personer der har forbud mod at udrejse. En etiopisk politisk analytiker har oplyst, at størstedelen af de sortlistede personer er etniske tigrayere, idet den føderale regering i månedsvis er gået målrettet efter netop disse personer.¹⁷²

Mens de tigrayske styrker var rykket ind i Amhara-regionen, var de fleste lufthavne i regionen ude af drift, og der var ingen adgang til dem. Efter at de tigrayske styrker blev drevet ud af regionen, er flyvninger fra Amhara-regionen blevet genoptaget. Det samme er gældende i Afar-regionen.¹⁷³

Ifølge en etiopisk politisk analytiker har der indtil januar 2022 ikke været klare beviser på, at en person ved indrejse i Etiopien gennem Bole lufthavn ville blive anholdt alene på baggrund af, at personen var etnisk tigrayer.¹⁷⁴ Dog er tigrayere og oromoer blevet anholdt for forbindelser, eller mistanke om forbindelser, til TPLF eller OLA.¹⁷⁵

Som det fremgik tidligere, har de etiopiske myndigheder i Addis Ababa vilkårligt tilbageholdt og mishandlet tusindvis af etniske tigrayere, der er blevet deporteret fra Saudi Arabien.¹⁷⁶ De føderale myndigheder har også pågrebet deporterede tigrayere i lufthavnen i Semera i Afar-regionen. Disse personer blev overført til detentionsfaciliteter i Afar eller det sydlige Etiopien.¹⁷⁷

Medarbejdere hos Ethiopian Airlines har oplyst, at det er blevet stadig sværere for tigrayere at forlade Etiopien lovligt via fly. Ifølge disse medarbejdere har flere tigrayere forsøgt at forlade landet via fly fra Bole lufthavn i Addis Ababa, men grundet deres etnicitet er de blevet nægtet adgang. Ved kontrolposter i lufthavnen har flere passagerer fået tjekket pas inden afrejse, og hvis de var født i Tigray eller havde et tigraysk navn, er de blevet nægtet udrejse fra Etiopien.¹⁷⁸ Flere tidligere medarbejdere er flygtet fra Etiopien ombord på de

¹⁶⁹ ICG: 12; Landinfo, *Etiopia: Sikkerhet og humanitære forhold i Tigray*, 23. september 2021, [url](#), p. 36; Ethiopian political analyst: 31

¹⁷⁰ ICG: 12

¹⁷¹ ICG: 13

¹⁷² Ethiopian political analyst: 32-33

¹⁷³ Ethiopian political analyst: 29

¹⁷⁴ Ethiopian political analyst: 35

¹⁷⁵ Ethiopian political analyst: 36; International NGO: 38

¹⁷⁶ HRW, *Ethiopia: Returned Tigrayans Detained, Abused*, 5. januar 2022, [url](#)

¹⁷⁷ HRW, *Ethiopia: Returned Tigrayans Detained, Abused*, 5. januar 2022, [url](#); International NGO: 32

¹⁷⁸ CNN, *Ethiopian Airlines employees are fleeing the country by hiding in the planes they work on*, 31. januar 2022, [url](#)

fly, hvor de arbejdede som flybesætning. Nogle besætningsmedlemmer flygtede, da deres fly landede i eksempelvis Europa eller USA, mens flere teknikere gemte sig i flyenes lastrum. De søgte herefter asyl i flyenes destinationslande.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁹ CNN, *Ethiopian Airlines employees are fleeing the country by hiding in the planes they work on*, 31. januar 2022, [url](#)

10. Litteraturliste

- African Arguments, *Tigrayans in Ethiopia fear becoming “the next Rwanda”*, 12. juli 2021, <https://africanarguments.org/2021/07/tigrayans-in-ethiopia-fear-becoming-the-next-rwanda/>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022
- Africanews, *Tigrayan rebels claim Ethiopian town Kombolcha*, 1. november 2021, <https://www.africanews.com/2021/11/01/tigrayan-rebels-claim-ethiopian-town-kombolcha/>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022
- Ahram Online, *Timeline: Ethiopia's brutal war*, 18. december 2021, <https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/446690.aspx>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022
- Al Jazeera, *Eight months of Ethiopia's Tigray conflict: A timeline*, 4. maj 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/4/six-months-of-ethiopias-tigray-conflict-a-timeline>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022
- Al Jazeera, *Eritrea confirms its troops are fighting in Ethiopia's Tigray*, 17. april 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/17/eritrea-confirms-its-troops-are-fighting-ethiopias-tigray>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022
- Al Jazeera, *Ethiopia parliament votes to lift state of emergency early*, 15. februar 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/15/ethiopia-parliament-votes-to-lift-state-of-emergency>, tilgået 15. februar 2022
- Al Jazeera, *How armed drones may have helped turn the tide in Ethiopia's war*, 10. december 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/12/10/how-armed-drones-may-have-helped-turn-tide-in-ethiopia-conflict>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022
- Al Jazeera, *'More than a dozen killed' by Ethiopian drone attack in Tigray*, 11. januar 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/11/ethiopian-drone-strike-kills-17-on-day-of-biden-abiy-call>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022
- Al Jazeera, *UAE air bridge provides military support to Ethiopia gov't*, 25. november 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/25/uae-air-bridge-provides-military-support-to-ethiopia-govt>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022
- Al Jazeera, *US, EU warn of influx of Eritrean troops in Ethiopia's Tigray*, 25. august 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/25/us-eu-influx-eritrea-troops-ethiopia-tigray>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022
- Al Jazeera, *Why is ethnic violence surging in Ethiopia?*, 19. april 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/19/why-is-ethnic-violence-surg-ing-in-ethiopia>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022
- AI, *Amnesty International Report 2020: Ethiopia*, 8. april 2021, <https://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/ethiopia/>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022
- AI, *Ethiopia: Eritrean troops' massacre of hundreds of Axum civilians may amount to crime against humanity*, 26. februar 2021, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/02/ethiopia-eritrea-troops-massacre-of-hundreds-of-axum-civilians-may-amount-to-crime-against-humanity/>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

AI, *Ethiopia: The Need for an Independent International Investigation of the Axum Massacre*, 13. maj 2021, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/AFR2541142021ENGLISH.pdf>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

AP, *'Purely ethnic profiling': New wave of Tigrayans detained*, 13. juli 2021, <https://apnews.com/article/africa-race-and-ethnicity-racial-injustice-b1a97f2569592f499565bfb6e673dc3d>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

ARC, *Ethiopia: The Situation in Tigray*, november 2021, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2063462/Ethiopia_COI_Report_November_2021_Final.pdf, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

BBC, *Ethiopia's Tigray conflict: Tens of thousands attend anti-US rally*, 30. maj 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57298019>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

BBC, *Ethiopia's Tigray crisis: Fleeing for fear of new ethnic conflict*, 16. juli 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57818673>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

BBC, *Hachalu Hundessa: 'Eighty-one killed' in protests over Ethiopian singer's death*, 1. juli 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53243325>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

Britannica, *Ethiopia: Ethnic groups and languages*, u.å., <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ethiopia/Settlement-patterns>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, *Briefing Notes Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum and Migration*, 25. oktober 2021, <https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Behoerde/Informationszentrum/BriefingNotes/2021/briefingnotes-kw43-2021.pdf?blob=publicationFile&v=2>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

CNN, *Ethiopian Airlines employees are fleeing the country by hiding in the planes they work on*, 31. januar 2022, <https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/31/africa/ethiopia-airlines-tigray-stowaways-cmd-intl/index.html>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

DW, *Coronavirus outbreak hinders run-up to Ethiopia elections*, 1. april 2020, <https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-outbreak-hinders-run-up-to-ethiopia-elections/a-52856329>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

DW, *Ethiopia at crossroads as drone attacks worsen Tigray crisis*, 14. januar 2022, <https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopia-at-crossroads-as-drone-attacks-worsen-tigray-crisis/a-60418585>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

DW, *Ethiopia's premier urges civilians to join fight against Tigrayan forces*, 10. august 2021, <https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopias-premier-urges-civilians-to-join-fight-against-tigrayan-forces/a-58822214>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

DW, *Hundreds killed since start of Oromo protests*, 12. november 2016, <https://www.dw.com/en/hundreds-killed-since-start-of-oromo-protests/a-36369836>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

DW, *The conflict in Tigray, Ethiopia*, 17. august 2021, <https://www.dw.com/en/the-conflict-in-tigray-ethiopia/a-58886256>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

DW, *Tigray: New wave of abuse in Ethiopia, rights groups report*, 16. december 2021, <https://www.dw.com/en/tigray-new-wave-of-abuse-in-ethiopia-rights-groups-report/a-60151844>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

EASO (European Asylum Support Office), *EASO Country of Origin Information Report Methodology*, juni 2019, https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2019_EASO_COI_Report_Methodology.pdf, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

EHRC/OHCHR, *Joint Investigation into Alleged Violations of International Human Rights, Humanitarian and Refugee Law Committed by all Parties to the Conflict in the Tigray Region of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia*, 3. november 2021, <https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2063259/OHCHR-EHRC-Tigray-Report.pdf>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

FEWS NET - Famine Early Warning System Network, *Ethiopia Food Security Alert December 22, 2021*, 22. december 2021, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Ethiopia-Alert-20211222_cleanv2.pdf, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

France24, *Eritrean troops block, loot food aid in Tigray: documents*, 27. april 2021, <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210427-eritrean-troops-block-loot-food-aid-in-tigray-documents>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

France24, *UN suspends humanitarian flights to Ethiopia's Tigray after air strikes*, 23. oktober 2021, <https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20211023-un-suspends-humanitarian-flights-to-ethiopia-s-tigray-after-air-strikes>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

The Guardian, *Scores killed in Ethiopian airstrike on Tigray market*, 24. juni 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/24/ethiopian-airstrike-tigray-market>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

Holland, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Thematic Country of Origin Information Report on Tigray 2021*, 31. august 2021, <https://www.government.nl/documents/reports/2021/08/31/thematic-country-of-origin-information-report-on-tigray-2021>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

HRW, *Ethiopia: New Wave of Atrocities in Western Tigray*, 16. december 2021, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/12/16/ethiopia-new-wave-atrocities-western-tigray>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

HRW, *Ethiopia: Returned Tigrayans Detained, Abused*, 5. januar 2022, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/01/05/ethiopia-returned-tigrayans-detained-abused>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

HRW, *World Report 2022 – Ethiopia*, 13. januar 2022, <https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2066492.html>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

ICG, *A Rare Chance for Peace in Ethiopia*, 23. december 2021, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-of-africa/ethiopia/rare-chance-peace-ethiopia>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

ICG, *Ethiopia's Civil War: Cutting a Deal to Stop the Bloodshed*, 26. oktober 2021, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-of-africa/ethiopia/b175-ethiopias-civil-war-cutting-deal-stop-bloodshed>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

IOM, *ETHIOPIA NATIONAL DISPLACEMENT REPORT 9 Site Assessment Round 26 & Village Assessment Survey Round 9 June — July 2021*, 24. september 2021, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Ethiopia%20National%20Displacement%20Report%209%2C%20Round%2026%20-%20June%20-%20July%202021.pdf>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

Landinfo, *Etiopia: Sikkerhet og humanitære forhold i Tigray*, 23. september 2021, <https://landinfo.no/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Etiopia-temanotat-Sikkerhet-og-humanitaere-forhold-i-Tigray-23092021-1.pdf>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

Landinfo, *Etiopia: Utvikling siden august 2021*, 12. november 2021, <https://landinfo.no/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Etiopia-respons-Utvikling-siden-august-2021-12112021.pdf>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

The New York Times, *Why Is Ethiopia at War With Itself?*, 14. december 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/article/ethiopia-tigray-conflict-explained.html#link-65fde574>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

OHCHR, *Press briefing notes on Ethiopia*, 16. november 2021, <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=27816&LangID=E>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

OHCHR, *Press briefing notes on Ethiopia*, 14. januar 2022, <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=28026&LangID=E>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

Political Geography Now, authors: Evan Centanni and Djordje Djukic, *Ethiopia War Map: Tigray Rebel Advance on Capital & Control Today (Nov. 2021/Jan. 2022)*, 25. januar 2022, <https://www.polgeonow.com/2022/01/tigray-war-map-november-2021-2022.html>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

Politico, *Evidence from civilian bombing in Ethiopia points to Turkish drone*, 25. januar 2022, <https://www.politico.eu/article/evidence-civilian-bombing-ethiopia-turkish-drone/>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

Reuters, *Ethiopian army planning to 'eliminate' Tigrayan forces -military official*, 23. januar 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-army-planning-eliminate-tigrayan-forces-military-official-2022-01-22/>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

Reuters, *Ethiopia frees opposition leaders from prison, announces political dialogue*, 8. januar 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-releases-opposition-party-leader-2022-01-07/>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

Reuters, *Ethiopia rejects Tigray region's call for election, citing pandemic*, 24. juni 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/ethiopia-politics-tigray-idAFL8N2E150K>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

Reuters, *Tigray forces withdraw from neighbouring Ethiopian regions –spokesman*, 20. december 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/tigray-forces-withdraw-neighbouring-ethiopian-regions-spokesperson-2021-12-20/>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

Security Council Report, *Ethiopia: Meeting under "Any Other Business"*, 27. januar 2022, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2022/01/ethiopia-meeting-under-any-other-business-2.php?utm_me

[diu=email&utm_campaign=27%20January%202022%20Campaign%201&utm_content=27%20January%202022%20Campaign%201+Ver-sion+A+CID_ff8f2720b278670325884090a5773157&utm_source=Email%20Newsletter&utm_term=Ethiopia%20Meeting%20under%20Any%20Other%20Business](https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/abiys-pledge-to-crush-weeds-of-tigray-raises-fears-of-genocide-in-ethiopia-sx0xkqb2v), tilgået den 9. februar 2022

The Times, *Genocide fears after Ethiopian PM vows to crush ‘weeds’ of Tigray*, 19. juli 2021, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/abiys-pledge-to-crush-weeds-of-tigray-raises-fears-of-genocide-in-ethiopia-sx0xkqb2v>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

Udlændingestyrelsen, *Ethiopia opposition groups: Recent developments*, januar 2020, https://us.dk/media/9946/coi_report_ethiopia_opposition_groups_recent-develop_jan_2020.pdf, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

Udlændingestyrelsen, *Ethiopia Political opposition parties – recent developments*, marts 2021, https://us.dk/media/9949/coi_report_ethiopia_political_opposition_parties_mar_2021.pdf, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

UNHCR, *Ethiopia: Country Refugee Response Plan. January 2020 – December 2021, Updated for 2021*, n.d. 2021, <https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Ethiopia%20CRP%202020-2021.pdf>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

UNHCR, *Ethiopia Emergency Situation*, 5. januar 2022, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Ethiopia%20Emergency%20Situation%20External%20Updates%2005%20January%202022.pdf>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

UNHCR, *Regional Update #24: Ethiopia Emergency Situation*, 2. november 2021, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Ethiopia%20Emergency%20Situation%20Regional%20Update%20%2324%20-%2002%20November%202021.pdf>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

UNHCR, *Regional Update #27 Ethiopia Emergency Situation*, 5. januar 2022, <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/unhcr-regional-update-27-ethiopia-emergency-situation-05-january-2022>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

UN OCHA, *Ethiopia - Northern Ethiopia Humanitarian Update, Situation Report*, 13. januar 2022, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situation%20Report%20-%20Ethiopia%20-%20Northern%20Ethiopia%20Humanitarian%20Update%20-%2013%20Jan%202022.pdf>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

USAID, *Ethiopia – Northern Ethiopia Crisis*, 30. december 2021, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2021_12_30%20USG%20Northern%20Ethiopia%20Crisis%20Fact%20Sheet%20%233.pdf, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

USDOS, *Sanctioning Eritrean Military Leader in Connection with Human Rights Abuse in Ethiopia*, 23. august 2021, <https://www.state.gov/sanctioning-eritrean-military-leader-in-connection-with-human-rights-abuse-in-ethiopia/>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

VOA, *Ethiopia Dismisses Accusations of Abusing Repatriated Tigrayans from Saudi Arabia*, 6. januar 2022, <https://www.voanews.com/a/ethiopia-dismisses-accusations-of-abusing-repatriated-tigrayans-from-saudi-arabia-/6385397.html>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

WFP, *Millions more in need of food assistance as a direct result of conflict in Northern Ethiopia, says WFP*, 26. November 2021, <https://www.wfp.org/news/millions-more-need-food-assistance-direct-result-conflict-northern-ethiopia-says-wfp>, tilgået den 9. februar 2022

11. Bilag 1: Interviewede kilder

International Crisis Group, Senior Analyst for Ethiopia

11 January 2022, Skype interview

Access to information

1. The source is working outside of Ethiopia, as it is difficult to get into Ethiopia at this time. The source obtains information on Ethiopia through publicly available material and has maintained contact with Ethiopian officials including diplomats. However, there has been quite limited conversations with the federal authorities at this time, since the war began. Furthermore, it is quite difficult to contact officials in the Tigray region.
2. The source is in contact with foreign diplomats, humanitarian and development workers, journalists and activists as well as directly with victims of persecution and participants in the ongoing conflict when possible. Although, this could be quite difficult due to the restrictions of telecommunications and blackouts of internet in the country.
3. There have been communication blackouts in Ethiopia for a while including shutdown of the internet. These measures are used by the authorities in times of high tension, in areas of ongoing insecurity as for example in western Oromia.
4. However, the situation in Tigray is slightly different. Ever since Tigray fell into a constitutional dispute with the government and subsequently into war, there has been a total shut down of federally provided services including telecommunications. This was not the case when the federal government established an interim administration in Tigray from December 2020 to June 2021. However, when the federal government left Tigray at the end of June 2021, there has been a complete shutdown of all federal services. Thus, the only internet access in Tigray is through satellite connections provided by UN agencies or devices that the Tigray government seems to have established.

Status of the violent conflict – developments since March 2021 – January 2022

5. Prior to the withdrawal of Tigrayan troops from the other regional states, which occurred in December 2021, active large scale hostilities occurred, primarily in the Amhara region. Thus, the withdrawal has meant that there is no fighting of that type anymore in those parts of Amhara.
6. There has been an appeal by the Tigrayan leadership to the international community to take action of various sorts; the Tigrayan leadership has also expressed at least some rhetorical commitment to an undefined form of peace process. In response, the Ethiopian federal authorities have decided to not fully seek to occupy the Tigray region, although federal forces did go into the southern part of Tigray, which is an area of disputed claims by Amhara elements mainly.

7. A number of prisoners have been released by the federal government, which is another encouraging sign including senior Tigrayan figures. However, senior government officials have not been released at the outset of the war, or senior members of the TPLF. The senior figures who were released were believed to be veterans.
8. There are still fairly significant fighting going on around the borders of Tigray. There has been fighting to the east at the Tigrayan capital Mekelle and the eastern city of Abela on the Afar border, but also in the area of the southern border around the towns of Alamata towards the city of Kobo in the northern part of Amhara. The situation is rather unclear at the present moment (January 2022). Also on the southern border heading to the west there has been ongoing fighting partly between a combination of federal and Amhara forces on the one side and Tigrayan forces on the other side. Although, there seems to be a lull in the fighting, there are no signs of direct talks or formal process of negotiation or even mediation going on between the parties at this time. The source opined that this could be seen as encouraging signs, although it could just be temporary.

What is the military role of Eritrea in the conflict in Tigray region?

9. According to this source, Eritrea was a very important military ally of the federal government. Eritrea entered the war shortly after it began and has played a major role in the initial removal of the TPLF from power in the Tigray region and in efforts to try to gain control over the region. There were very credible reports of the Eritrean troops engaging in massacres on Tigrayan civilians as well as a very systemic looting and sexual violence taking place in Tigray conducted by Eritrean troops.
10. The Eritrean presence in Tigray region was reduced in June 2021 just before the federal withdrawal from the region. However, they have maintained a military presence in Tigray in the area that borders Sudan, which was taken over by Amhara Region in the beginning of the war. Eritrea has a strategic interest in preventing that the Tigrayans get access to the Sudanese borders and thereby be in a position to create some form of supply line. Furthermore, there is a disputed territory in the north of Tigray where Eritrean forces also are present. The source noted that the Eritrean forces were working together with Amhara and federal forces in these areas.
11. The source noted that there has been allegations recently by the Tigrayan leadership that, Eritreans have been involved in aggressive action in the disputed area on the Tigray-Eritrean border that is still occupied by Eritrean troops. However, it was not quite clear what the current status was.

Access to airports

12. This interlocutor advised that it has been difficult for Tigrayans to be able to leave the country through Bole Airport in Addis Ababa. Previously, plenty of Tigrayans were trying to exit the country, but they were prevented in doing so by the authorities.

13. When asked if ethnic minorities other than Tigrayans could leave the country the source advised that he was not aware of similar treatment of for example Oromo or Amhara persons in terms of denial of permission to travel.

The humanitarian situation in Tigray region

14. One of the major issues concerning the humanitarian situation has clearly been the isolation of Tigray, which has involved massive restrictions on humanitarian access to the region, but also a massive reduction on trade and in federal service. Furthermore, the region has suffered from the war itself, which also has led to interruptions in the agriculture production in the region.
15. The Tigray region has seen a massive interruption in access to basic social services such as education, but also destruction of health facilities in Tigray by Eritrean and various elements of federal troops. There has also been interruption in federally provided services as in telecommunications, banking and electricity. This obviously creates a very difficult situation for the Tigray population. This was compounded by the restrictions on aid access, which are still ongoing.

The humanitarian situation in other regional states of Ethiopia

16. As the Tigray forces moved out of Tigray in July 2021, there was also isolation and disruption of services and normal economic activity in various parts of Amhara. There was a lot of allegations of looting by Tigray forces. However, the source noted that it was difficult to assess the credibility of such allegations at this point in time and whether these actions were as sustained and systemic as it occurred in Tigray. There could be a kind of tit-for-tat by the allegations, but certainly places that the Tigray forces occupied in Amhara were cut off for various reasons, which again creates a very difficult humanitarian situation for the residents in these areas.
17. There was also a lot of displacement in Amhara and Afar as the Tigray forces went on the offensive, so the massive humanitarian problem is a consequence of this political situation and conflict. Ever since the war began this is also seen in the Oromia Region as a result of the insurgency there has been going on there and sort of accompanying political violence and the arrest of opposition members, harassment, closure of offices, which has been going on now for a couple of years. This situation got worse in Oromia with the insurgency movement increasing in scope.

The Human rights situation in general

18. The source stated that it was important to distinguish between the OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) and the OLA (the Oromo Liberation Army). The OLF is a registered political party, although the leadership was mostly jailed. However, OLF's former armed wing OLA now constitute the cornerstone of the insurgent forces in Oromia. The OLA is also classified as a terrorist organisation by the government.
19. The insurgency by the OLA has increased in scope and popularity in Oromia, has led to a more ruthless counter-insurgency operation including arbitrary killings by state security forces mostly by Oromia regional forces, but also an increase in arrests and airstrikes. The latter seem increasingly to be hitting civilian targets in Tigray, but there are also use of air power in Oromia and allegations of civilian deaths.
20. On 2 November 2021, the Ethiopian government enacted a national state of emergency, which was a response to the Tigray advances. This led to a huge sweep of arrests of Tigrayan and Oromo civilians

merely on suspicion of support for these classified terrorist organisations. Thousands of people were detained, some of them were kept in pretty terrible conditions. However, it is hard to assess the scale to these arrests at this moment. Although it seems clear that the authorities were targeting Tigrayan civilians, but also a significant degree at Oromos as well.

21. Besides the political violence, insurgent problems and the government response to that, Ethiopia has also had major inter-communal problems, which has led to attacks on civilians, killings of civilians and mass displacement as well. Although, this has primarily been a problem fairly recently on the Oromia-Amhara border, but also in the Benishangul-Gumuz region, which has seen violence between ethnic Gumuz and Amhara communities and others, which has led to the killing of Amhara civilians and the displacement of Amhara people as well. So this has also been a part of the current political-driven violence.

State protection

22. A lot of what is happening in Ethiopia is insurgency activity so often the state is not just a party but also a perpetrator of the violence. Therefore, a lot of the problems, repression of rights and the harms, etc. are caused by the state as a product of its security operations.
23. There are some sorts of bright spots in terms of reporting. The Ethiopian Human Rights commission is relatively independent, and their reporting of abuses and maltreatment of prisoners is a good sign. Furthermore, there are some signs of judicial independence, some judges try to do their best in terms of not simply carrying out the will of the authorities. However, since the state of emergency was introduced there has been a huge increase in arbitrary detention and detention without charge or due process. The source concluded that state protection in this perspective was not present.

Persecutions of ethnic minorities

24. Officially in some of the government's statements there is a debate of the role of ethnicity and the ethnic character of the administrative areas and the ethnic nature of the political parties. So for example the authorities including the attorney general will say that the TPLF is an ethnic party and also they are mostly responsible for Ethiopia's ethnic politics so as an unfortunate by-product of being at war with the TPLF that has led to something that can be portrayed or perceived as an ethnic character to the arrests of Tigrayans.
25. By January 2022, the threshold for unacceptable political activity has been increasingly lowered. So the arrested Tigrayans are mostly not people who are members of the TPLF or actively engaged in the rebellion. They are not even necessarily accused of providing materials and support for the armed resistance. They are just suspected of undefined support. Therefore, it is an increasingly meaningless distinction between ethnic profiling and arrests on an ethnic basis.
26. It is also important to look at the nature of the conflict between the federal government and the Tigray government. It is a very serious civil war involving possible 100,000s of deaths. So this nature has led to a particular draconian approach to anyone suspected of collaboration with that armed resistance led by the leaders of Tigray's government.
27. The Oromia problem is to some extent a continuation of the political discontent of Oromia that really surged in 2015 and sustains large scale anti-government protests, which contributed to the political

change in 2018. This discontent led up again in what has become a very sustained way of dissatisfaction of Oromo political constituencies with the management of the transition and the way that their demands to the new government not were met by the authorities of the federal government and the Oromia government. This has led to an increasing problematic rebellion in the authorities' perspective. Therefore, there will be an increase of repression of Oromo civilians as a result of that. However, it is not quite at the same level of seriousness as what could be described as a civil war in the north.

28. Other civilians have clearly been suffering, however, it is not a result of this sort of vertical violence – state vs. other actors. It is more the result of a horizontal violence or inter-communal problems – as the consequences for Amhara and Afar civilians of the Tigray offensive from July until December 2021.

Situation for IDPs

29. The source did not have extensive knowledge on IDPs in Ethiopia. However, it was reported the around 2-3 million people were being displaced way before the war, as a result of violence in Oromia, Benishangul-Gumuz and Amhara.
30. Then there is around 2 million people assessed to be displaced inside of the Tigray region alone as a result of the current conflict. Furthermore, there is 60,000 people who have fled to Sudan. There has been clear difficulties in providing aid satisfactory in the Tigray region, due to the continuing conflict and restrictions on humanitarian activity as a consequence of the conflict. Furthermore, there has been large displacement as a result of the Tigray offensive.
31. The source was not clear about the current number, let alone the conditions for the IDPs in Ethiopia at this point in time. The source stated, however, that it constituted a massive problem and does not look like it is going away any time soon.
32. The Tigrayans would probably not seek refuge in other regions in Ethiopia as for example Amhara. The Amhara government has claimed parts of the Tigray region as its own, which has led to a large and worrying increase in deterioration in relations between not just Amhara and Tigray political elites but also more broadly. Therefore, one will find a lot of hostility between these two population groups. Especially given the general difficult circumstance that everyone is experiencing, the willingness to cater IDPs as a host community is therefore very limited. On the other side, Tigrayans would probably feel safer inside Tigray anyway, despite how difficult the circumstances are.
33. That being said some Tigrayans did leave the region, especially those with more resources and coming to Addis Ababa. However, we have not seen large numbers moving in to Amhara, despite how difficult the conditions are in Tigray, they will be worrying about their safety, and a lack of willingness for host communities to accept them anyway. The same goes for Afar region. Afar region is a quite difficult environment, it is a very hot, quite poor region and quite sparsely populated. So it is not a great place to end up as an IDP.

Description of Tigrinya-speaking Ethiopians

34. The vast majority of Tigrinya-speaking persons live inside of the Tigray region. It is unclear how many that are living in Tigray, but it is about 6 million. The vast majority of the people in Tigray will speak

Tigrinya. In the border areas one will find plenty of persons speaking both languages. So on the Tigray-Afar border one will have people with an ethnicity that will not be that distinct and they will mostly speak both languages. The same will be seen at the Amhara-Tigray border, where people have more of a composite identity, which of course raises political questions in itself.

35. Furthermore, Tigrinya is the most widely spoken language in Eritrea and the language of the ruling class in the country. There are also plenty of Eritreans in Addis Ababa as well. As a natural historic process and maybe partly because of the TPLF's pre-eminence over the past few decades on the national level this had led to relatively large spread of Tigrayans across Ethiopia, seeking business opportunities etc. Therefore, one will find Tigrayans and Tigrinya-speaking people in many places in the country.
36. The working language of the federal government is Amharic so almost all Tigrayans will also speak Amharic, which means that almost all Tigrayans would be bilingual.

International NGO

Skype interview, 18 January 2022

Access to information

1. The space for human rights monitoring, reporting and media investigations has once again been increasingly restricted over the past few years. There have been repeated shutdowns in communications under the Abiy administration – a number of shutdowns, which the source first reported on in early 2020 and again in June and July 2020 in the Oromia region. This region has been the site of insurgency and counter-insurgency operations since 2019.
2. Shutdowns of communications was taken to a completely new scale in the context of the Tigray conflict where an entire region, has been more or less cut off. Access to the internet has been cut-off since the beginning of the conflict in November 2020. Phone lines were restored temporarily for a few months in certain places and even then network connectivity was sporadic. Lines have now been cut-off for seven months again (since June 2021). In terms of real time reporting, the source informed that they are not speaking about an environment where it is possible to do real time reporting.
3. The source was travelling to Sudan to speak to refugees that were initially fleeing into Sudan with the purpose of examining the situation in the Tigray-region in particular. Security forces in Ethiopia along the shared border have blocked routes and/or attacked those seeking to flee from to Sudan from Tigray since late 2020/early 2021, so the source explains that they have only been seeing a trickle of people displaced.
4. The source also saw communication lines being temporarily and sporadically cut-off in the Amhara region, so they were also trying to document what was happening in Amhara by speaking to communities and displaced communities affected by the fighting there, but it was very difficult because telecommunications kept being shut on and off.
5. By and large, the restrictions imposed by the authorities do appear to be from the federal government, but there have definitely been moments where there have been incidents of fighting and possible attacks on communication lines by other warring parties, which could have contributed to these shutdowns.
6. Since June 2021, it has been very difficult to get a detailed insight into what is happening in Tigray and flight from the region has been limited.
7. In the Amhara region, communication lines seem to be functioning in most of the region now.
8. In the Oromia region, there have continuously been moments where the communication was not very good and/or has been cut off. According to the source, communications are never really good in Ethiopia, but you do see moments where there is a concerted effort because it is just impossible to get through.

9. The source informed that they do not have access to Ethiopia right now. They are doing all of their work remotely in this very restricted context.
10. One of the important things the source has been looking at is what is affecting the Tigrayan community outside of conflict affected areas. There has been mass arrests. Even if you manage to contact people over the phone, people are quite scared to speak, so they have to use Signal. People have moved off Whatsapp. People are very worried about using Whatsapp, so there has been a shift also, from using prime to using safe modes of communication. They also use satellite imagery when they can, but satellite imagery in itself is not enough to really understand what is going on on the ground, so they need as much as possible to back that up through testimonies.
11. Asked about satellite phones, the source informed that one of the issues has been that a lot of this equipment has been removed over time. That has been one of the problems humanitarians have faced in Tigray; there have been massive restrictions on what communication equipment they have been able to bring in.
12. When the federal government forces were pulling out of Tigray, they destroyed what equipment was in place in Mekelle in particular – that affected the UN. There are agencies, mainly the UN, which has created a situation where INGOs are quite dependent on the UN to be able to communicate, but there are certain agencies which have access to internet. For example, as we speak of what is going on in the hospitals in Tigray as a result of the affected siege which is still in place there. So some people do have access to satellite communication mechanism but it is a very small number of actors.

Status of the violent conflict – developments since March 2021 – January 2022

13. It is hard to get real time information. The source is receiving reports of ongoing fighting in southern and eastern Tigray. They know that in western Tigray there are still Amhara forces controlling that area and Eritrean forces in certain towns where Tigrayans remaining in the area continue to face abuse. There are reports of a significant build-up of Eritrean forces along the border areas. Along the eastern border areas of Tigray, there are reports of fighting in Afar which according to WFP's last statement from last week is one of the main reasons why there is now a restriction on access on the only supply route into Tigray which goes through Afar. Supposedly, because there has been more skirmishes along that route and convoys are not able to enter. No convoy has entered since mid-December 2021, though humanitarian assistance has been limited by the Ethiopian government along that route prior to the latest bouts of insecurity.
14. While there was the announcements by the Tigrayans, that they were pulling out their forces back into Tigray, there definitely does seem to be ongoing government attacks, skirmishes and fighting in spots of places. The most worrying trend as we speak, in terms of the conflict dynamics, are the airstrikes in Tigray. Just in the last few weeks of January 2022, strikes hit a refugee camp and the neighbouring town and also a strike which hit an internally displaced site. The site was hosting people who had recently been forcibly displaced by what was the latest wave of mass atrocity in western Tigray. Those who were in the IDP site, which were then struck (the source does not know if it

was a drone, a mix, or another type of airstrike) where at least 59 civilians were killed. These were mainly women, children of young age, and elderly people who had been forcibly displaced from western Tigray.

15. What the source found from November through to mid-December 2021 was that those categories were forcibly displaced from western Tigray zone into central Tigray, and Tigrayans found to be of fighting age ended up in detention. Tigrayans in Western Tigray have been swept up in waves of arrests where they faced horrific conditions in these detention facilities in western Tigray, which is also a very worrying location because there is no international humanitarian access there at the moment.
16. In terms of the conflict dynamics, it is shifting, but in terms of risks to civilians it is very difficult to see significant improvements. Maybe some improvements in the Amhara region of individuals who potentially can return home but the big question at the moment is, what are they returning to? How much destruction has there been in rural and even urban areas? We are hearing of significant destruction in North and South Wollo of civilian infrastructure, hospitals, schools. It is too early for the source to say, but in Tigray the humanitarian situation is not getting any better at all.
17. The source informed that there does seem to be fighting going on in Afar since at least mid-December where communities, both Afar and Tigrayans in the area have reportedly been displaced. In addition to the ongoing government-imposed restrictions, that is the reason why the supply routes, according to WFP, have been affected, but there has been fighting in Afar in recent weeks. There has been no humanitarian convoy since the 15th of December 2021 allowed into Tigray along the only supply route which is currently, or was, working.
18. The source has not received any reports regarding fighting in Amhara. There have been some reports of drone strikes in western Oromia region, and in the Oromia special zone of the Amhara region. One in particular which reportedly resulted in quite high civilian casualties. Drone strikes outside of Tigray have been happening in late 2021.
19. The source thinks it is too early to talk about negotiations after the retreatment of TPLF troops and release of political opposition prisoners and some Tigrayan detainees. The source believes there is a moment of hope on the diplomatic side, but there is also an understanding that there have been promises and potential moments before which have not led to much. As long as the drone strikes continue and as long as the siege is in place, as long as civilians are being killed from the strikes, this is not an area in which the source had the most insight into, but it does not seem entirely positive.
20. There has been lots of waves of arrests. Some of the high level politicians that were released in the last few weeks were arrested during the post-Hachalu events, but there are some of those who are still detained – the OLF leadership are still detained, and there is no clarity of why they are still being detained. They were arrested as early as February 2021, and continued to be at the same time as several other Oromo opposition figures, including Jawar Mohammed.
21. Serious due process concerns were documented. The OLF detainees in particular were probably facing more due process violations than the others. They were being moved from jurisdictions to

jurisdictions, they were held incommunicado for a long time. This on the heels, mass arbitrary arrests of Oromos in Oromia following post-Hachalu which continued in the months after post-Hachalu.

22. The source has now seen the profiling arrests of Tigrayans in the last fourteen months, so there has not been massive releases of what could be considered political detainees.
23. It was not the first time - this was already seen in October 2019 after Jawar Mohammad reportedly faced a security incident in Addis Ababa that led to massive protests in Oromia and massive violence as well. The government response already back then had been one of excessive force against protesters and mass arrests of a lot of Oromos. So these trends have been increasing since 2019.

What is the military role of Eritrea in the conflict in Tigray region?

24. The role of Eritreans in Ethiopia has not been the focus so far, because it is not very clear how active they are, but there are quite credible reports of significant military build-up along the borders with the Tigray region. They are known to be present in western Tigray.
25. However, the source stated that they were very present throughout Tigray during the conflict, during the height, the first nine months of the conflict, despite the government's claims that they were not even there. They were without doubt in Mekelle. Research including on Axum, where they were involved in one of the largest publicly reported massacre in the conflict, also shows that they were doing joint operations with the federal government. There is no doubt about the partnership in the conflict itself.
26. There is a difference in accent between the Tigrayans and the Eritreans. Although, they speak the same language – Tigrinya – you can tell who is an Eritrean and who is a Tigrayan from the way they speak.

Access to airports

27. As of January 2022, the source cannot really give a sense of the situation at the airport for civilians. One of the trends they saw from very early on were Tigrayans from all walks of life – people who could afford to leave the country – academics, PhD students, who were being stopped from traveling. That has come up again in the more recent state of emergency and restrictions.
28. There was a bit of confusion as to who is being stopped at the airport, at what level – it does not seem to always be at the same kind of checkpoint of the airport. Stops by different Ethiopian guards and intelligence officers appear take place in a variety of locations, inside the airport, outside of the airport, or just before getting on the flight. It seems to happen at different moments, but it is a trend that has been seen since the beginning of the conflict.
29. The source is not sure about the situation concerning entry into Ethiopia. In relations to profiling of the people who were not allowed to exit the country, the source does not have enough information.

30. Those who were denied exit were not automatically being detained then. The source does not believe that they have documented a case in which a person was denied exit at Bole airport in Addis Ababa and were automatically detained and ended up in broader mass arrests in informal former detention facilities throughout the country. The source says that this does not mean that it has not happened.
31. The source informed about another situation of Tigrayan deportees from Saudi Arabia. They were being arrested upon return in the initial transit centres where, in theory, they would spend two or three days and then get released.
32. Over the summer of 2021 these transit facilities were becoming detention facilities. Those who had managed to leave the transit facilities in the pre-July period were then detained outside on their way to Tigray. They were detained in Afar and some were taken to Afar, to Semera, others were taken to the southern nations, completely different parts of Ethiopia, and have been detained since.
33. In one of the reception centre facilities in Addis Ababa in late November, federal police had actually abducted a hundred of the Tigrayans from that facility and taken them to Oromia, to Jimma; some who had then ended up being forced to work without pay on coffee farms there.
34. Tigrayan deportees, did not know of other ethnicities being detained along with Tigrayans, so none of them were kept at these facilities in Addis Ababa or outside. So does that mean that Oromos were potentially detained in other facilities, or detained once they returned to Oromia, the source cannot say. They did not investigate that.

Human rights situation in Ethiopia in general

35. Tigrayans in particular were described in very inciting rhetoric from the highest levels. The Prime minister himself has explicitly talked about Tigrayan civilians in a negative way as well.
36. The tendency to target Tigrayans by the authorities imply that a lot of Tigrayans are being removed from their position at the job marked. Not only in the security apparatus of the government but also in civil service. Tigrayans from all walks of life have been put on extended leave or basically being fired from their employment. Tigrayans have been profiled and had their businesses shut down. Some who were swept in mass detentions have lost their jobs or employment while in detention.
37. The situation in the Oromia-region were not good prior to November 2020. The source had continued to receive very worrying reports of large-scale arbitrary arrests, summary executions and also incidents and reports of individuals who were executed by government forces. In one incident, a 17 year old from the town of Dembi Dolo in Western Oromia was executed in broad daylight. The perpetrators were believed to be a mixture of federal and regional forces as Oromia still is under command post rule.

38. The trends do not appear to have improved in any shape or form in Oromia. However, in the immediate aftermath of the state of emergency the source was receiving reports of Oromos being arrested as well, as the state of emergency was not only against the TPLF, which were proscribed as a terrorist group, but also against the OLA.
39. Independent or critical reporting on the Tigray region, and even the conflict more generally, from international journalists and Ethiopian journalists, who had an international outreach, has been restricted by the government. This is a trend that has been ongoing during the conflict. Since December 2021, there has been broader arrests of critical journalists, who have been reporting on government policies in the Amhara region.
40. Regarding the government's attacks on particular communities, the space, in which reporting or criticism of government actions against many communities has become increasingly shrinking and it is risky for journalists to report on government's attacks.
41. There is evidence of serious targeting of ethnic minorities. In Oromia, during bouts of violence, the Amhara community were targeted in this violence but not only. There was also certain profiles of individuals, for example people who were wealthy/ property owners of different ethnic backgrounds, and also schools were targeted in Oromia. There has been attacks on both individuals from these communities but also massive attacks on their properties as well.
42. One of the important changes in Ethiopia, which is effecting the security of everyone is the rise of regional security forces, which are allowed under the Ethiopian constitution. However, the security forces have become very powerful, militarised actors in recent years and raises questions of command and control, allegiances to certain communities in a whole range of places notably in the Amhara, Somali, Oromia and now Tigray regions.
43. Furthermore, there has been a rise of militia groups in Ethiopia. A lot of the abuses that were documented in Western Tigray against ethnic Tigrayans are by several but mainly one Amhara militia group called the Fano. This group has been trained and armed for several years, have been accused of carrying out acts of violence against minority communities in the Amhara region, and have also been linked to the regional security forces. Fano has also been working with the federal and Amhara regional government forces at least in the Tigray region.

IDPs

44. The impact of the effective siege on Tigray has had an impact on access to services provided for sexual survivors in the Tigray region. Furthermore, medical doctors and humanitarian workers have explained the lack of cash and fuel in the region has had an enormous impact on humanitarian work more generally, which also have had an impact on the situation for IDPs living in Tigray.
45. The lack of humanitarian aid going into Tigray also means that Eritrean refugees who are still stuck in the two camps in Southern Tigray are not getting sufficient assistance either, and it means the millions of reported IDPs in Tigray, including hundreds of thousands forcibly displaced from Western Tigray, are not getting assistance either.

46. The humanitarian space in Ethiopia has never been very wide. It was always very controlled, all assistance was going through government structures, the government had very much a say over programming and where it happened and how the aid was described.
47. However, in many ways we have seen a real shrinking of humanitarian space. That has been due to direct attacks on humanitarians. A number of humanitarians has been killed during the conflict. There has been a high level of attacks on humanitarians including accusations of them being “linked” to the TPLF etc. All this has obviously effected the space in which the humanitarian work is happening. This was especially something that was seen in the first few month when the conflict spread into the Amhara and Afar regions. There was a lot of hostility towards humanitarians, who were trying to expand in these areas.
48. Access to assistance for displaced communities, which is estimated to millions in the Amhara and Afar region is also affected by these broader attacks, including both by the federal government but also by regional authorities.
49. It is difficult to make comparisons of the needs of the displaced. There is no doubt that the scale of the abuses faced during the first nine months of the conflict in Tigray against civilians will have had a significant impact on the real needs in terms of services for sexual violence survivors and services for civilians who have been injured in the conflict.
50. The source was still trying to get a sense of the scale of abuse in the Amhara region, and all that will obviously feed into the needs of the displaced communities. However, according to an ICRC press release of 17 January 2022, the humanitarians have managed to get better access to the Amhara region, although, they were finding evidence of significant destruction of health infrastructure. This was a quintessential element of the way warring parties fought in Tigray by destroying health infrastructure.
51. There are clear signs now of significant damage to health infrastructure in the Amhara region as well. This is evidently going to impact the humanitarian response for the displaced there as well.
52. Tigray civilians cannot move out of the region, so Tigrayans will not be able to seek refuge in other parts of Ethiopia. In terms of Amhara region, the source has not seen any significant movement from this region other than to Addis Ababa. Amhara communities living in other regions, including Benishangul Gumuz and Oromia have been displaced to Addis Ababa or to Amhara region. This interlocutor opined that individuals who had relatives in Addis Ababa and who could move had already moved. However, the source had no sense of the scale of such movements at the present moment.

Human rights in Tigray region

53. One of the reported abuses was reprisals and abuses against individuals that had taken part in the interim administration. That is something the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission has reported on. However, we did not get a good sense of the scale of that.
54. It is very difficult to get a real sense of what is going on in Tigray, as the telecommunications are down and people cannot leave the region.

Tigrayans outside of Tigray

55. The arrests of Tigrayans has been enormous in Addis Ababa, but arrests have taken place in other parts of the country, including Benishangul Gumuz, Southern Nations, Nationalities and People's Region, and arrests and potential killings of Tigrayans living in the Amhara region. The arrests of Tigrayans have happened all over the country and throughout the conflict.
56. The arrests were coming in waves, so in November-December 2020 and July 2021 and again after the November 2021 State of Emergency Tigrayans in Addis Ababa were detained in a whole range of facilities including informal facilities and private properties being used for detention.
57. Within this context one will also find staff who were working for the diplomatic community and UN staff being arrested. No one was really protected from potentially ending up in these arrests. One of the trends was a lot of arrests at places of work including at private companies.
58. Relatives were scared of going to detention facilities to try and identify their loved ones, because people were also being arrested, when they went to detention facilities. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in the last two weeks (mid-January 2022), people who had been released had been so because they have paid quite significant bribes.
59. Furthermore, there is very limited access for monitors to the formal and more informal detention facilities, however, some actors have access to such facilities.

Ethiopian political analyst

25 January 2022, Skype interview

Access to information

1. According to this source, reliable sources of information in Ethiopia can be difficult to access mainly because of two things:
 - a. First, many sources with knowledge of political and security issues in Ethiopia are quite biased. They are either pro-government sources or pro-opposition i.e. pro-TPLF/TDF, OLA or opposition political parties sources as well. None of these can be reckoned as a credible source.
 - b. Second, even when a researcher wishes to go to the field and talk directly to real people, the security situation will not allow you to gather that kind of information at the moment (as of January 2022).
2. The source was in contact with a number of contacts/informants across regions of Ethiopia. These informants come from different backgrounds. They know them through formal and informal connections, and they have managed to obtain some level of confidence about the kind of information they provide to them. When the source gets information from an informant, they will crosscheck it, so that they do not just depend on one informant. They see what others say about the same issue etc. Only then can they take specific information as a credible information. Unless they do that, they can talk about that information, but they always qualify it by saying that it is important information, although, they are not very confident about its veracity.
3. The source is very careful about information, which leads to a very important issue. When it comes to what is happening in the Tigray region as we speak now, it has been very difficult to get to the heart of the matter. There exists a lot of news and reports about Tigray – some of them are credible, most of them are not – but they cannot send data collectors to Tigray at the present moment. It has been increasingly difficult for the source to get information outside, other than what is being reported publicly to the international community. They hear a lot about what is going on in Tigray, but credible information is quite limited.
4. On the other hand, the source had more credible information about the political leadership, like TDF and TPLF activities – information about what the leadership is saying, what they think etc. The TPLF leaders have had connections with some very important institutions and personalities. They know these personalities in these organisations, so they get information from them as well. When it comes to the humanitarian situation in Tigray, it is quite different.
5. The source advised that TPLF is the political party that was the hegemon of the Ethiopian state over the last 27 years. After 2018, TPLF has been the ruling party of the Tigray region in the northern part of Ethiopia. After the war, it transformed itself into something else. There was an alliance between TPLF, the regional ruling party, other parties, groups, and individuals outside TPLF against the federal government. This alliance is what is called the TDF (the Tigray Defence Force).

6. The source confirmed that one thing that unifies all of these elements and forces is their hostility towards the federal government of Ethiopia, and of course the Isaias regime in Eritrea as well. When it comes to entirely political matters, there could be significant differences among themselves.
7. When Abiy Ahmed talks about TPLF, he usually means TDF as well.

Status of the violent conflict – recent developments

8. In December-January, the federal forces managed to drive TPLF/TDF out of Amhara and Afar regions. As of 25 January 2022, the government has an upper hand in Amhara and Afar, however, they decided not to go into Tigray region itself.
9. The source had an important and confidential discussion with a senior official in the Prosperity Party, the ruling party of Ethiopia in the beginning of January 2022. He informed the source that the government analysed the advantages and disadvantages of going into Tigray. Finally, he told the source that they decided to stay at the border between Tigray and Amhara. He also informed the source that they would look for ways and means of ending this conflict peacefully. That was the decision at the time – that the government would be interested in ending this war in some way.
10. Then the secretary added two important points: there were two challenges to that peaceful resolution of the conflict. The first challenge, he said, is that the Amhara nationalists are not very happy about ending this war peacefully. The Amhara elites and part of the members of the federal ruling party are very much against this idea. It is important to stress that the Prosperity Party has Amhara members as well. They, instead, want the federal government to go into Tigray, annihilate and destroy TDF, take control of Tigray, and incorporate Tigray as one part of a federally governed region.
11. The second challenge they faced, according to a senior official in the Prosperity Party, is that they do not really know how to change the public opinion about the war. Now there is massive support for the war in Addis Ababa and in Amhara region. According to the source's informants, the Oromos are very silent because they believe that this is not their war to fight.
12. However, the Oromo public was also divided. Some of them thought that this was not their war, so they do not care about who wins. They believe that neither TDF nor the federal government would uphold their interests, and therefore they did not care about it at all.
13. On the other hand, there are Oromos, who supported TDF and OLA, mainly because they hated Abiy and his government, as they thought Abiy was there to dismantle the federal structure, which was believed to have empowered the Oromo public. Therefore, they believed that supporting OLA and TDF would be in their interest. They were waiting for the moment when TDF would come closer to Oromia and be further mobilised to support its incursion into Oromia against Abiy's government.

14. Very interesting and complex political dynamics were at play. There is OLA, which is still armed and active, and the government is now targeting OLA operatives close to Oromia. The war is now shifting towards Oromia as well. The general Oromo public has a bit more careful attitude when it comes to TPLF. Many of them may not be supportive of Abiy, but they are a bit more cautious.
15. Even though Abiy is Oromo himself, opinions are severely divided about him because many Oromos, not all of them, do not consider him a genuine Oromo. One reason is that he is half Oromo, half Amharan. The second reason is that they acknowledge that he is Oromo, but they accuse him of not entertaining Oromo cause. They accuse him of working for the Amhara interests, not the Oromo interests. They consider him as a sell-out.
16. The source opined that the government has decided at the highest level to end this war, but it is facing significant challenges. One can see the implications of these challenges in everyday news. In the state news for example, one would see all sorts of contradictions. On the one hand, they talk about peace and dialogue, and on the other hand, they still accuse the TPLF of terrorism, human rights violations, and that the federal government will go after them and never take a break until it is destroyed. It is a very contradictory and inconsistent narrative about TPLF, which reflects the internal division in the party on the one hand, and the fear the party has for public opinion on the other hand.

The military role of Eritrea in the conflict in Tigray region

17. Eritrea is a very important actor in this war for practical purposes. Eritrea was involved in the planning of this war before the war. Abiy and Isaias were very much in touch, the source estimated that they had been in contact for months if not for a year prior to the war, where they planned the war etc.
18. After the start of the war, Eritrean troops massively entered into Tigray region to fight against the TDF. They fought for months until they withdrew after a while. After they officially withdrew, some interesting developments have happened. One interesting development is that Eritreans stopped fighting directly, but they dispatched their troops and stationed them in western Tigray. At the present moment, Eritrean troops are stationed along the western Tigrayan front. This is the disputed lands Welkait, Tsegede and Humera. These three regions are disputed between Amharas and Tigrayans. The source has credible information that Eritrean troops are stationed somewhere there in support of Amhara militia and Amhara Special Forces just to preserve that area so that the TDF would not overrun them.
19. The second very important development is that Eritreans have infiltrated federal government intelligence; the source has heard this from several credible sources. Because they are formally in alliance with Abiy's government, he has given them a green light to come in and do some sort of intelligence work. Therefore, the Eritreans are quite active in Addis Ababa as the source has heard, but they are quite active in the intelligence sector as well.
20. The third information which is not confirmed, although, the source has heard it from different sources, is that Eritreans were involved in one of the later rounds of fighting in the Afar region. In

Afar region there was a heavy fighting between TDF and the Afar militia, perhaps with a strong support from Eritrean Afaris (which they have yet to confirm from another independent source).

21. So Eritrea has been involved in this war, either directly or indirectly, through supporting either Afar militias or Amhara militias, in addition to its direct involvement in fighting the TDF in the early stages of the war.
22. When talking about negotiations and dialogue, the source is hearing that Abiy is somehow worried about Isaias' opinion about this. They are hearing some information that Isaias may not be very happy about the negotiations, if they happen of course. One important challenge perhaps, which the source did not mention before, could come from Eritreans, from Isaias' way.
23. Eritrean troops are also directly connecting, or in touch, with Amhara militias – bypassing the federal government. Isaias now has two cards inside Ethiopia; one is the federal government, which is a formal alliance, and then Isaias also has connections with Amhara militias, which is not official, but a very important card Isaias can play.
24. Asked whether the Amhara region is in some sort of opposition to the federal government, the source replied that Amhara region is now in deep political anarchy. There are all sorts of armed groups inside Amhara; the Amhara Special force, which is the formal police force although they are special forces and hence organised for special missions. In this case, it is to fight against the TDF.
25. Then there is the Fano structure, which is a semi-formal paramilitary group, which was disbanded after the 2019 high-level assassination in the Amhara region, but now that the TDF expanded into Amhara, the Fano was resuscitated. They were asked to come together and regroup to fight against the TDF by forming an alliance with the federal government and the Amhara Special forces.
26. The third is militia forces in Amhara region. These are newly mobilised and ill-trained forces. Most of them are peasants or youths from urban areas in Amhara who are mobilised specially for this purpose of fighting the TDF.
27. All of these forces have now coalesced because they have one single goal; that is to fight against the TDF. The regional government is not necessarily controlling all these forces, especially the Fano movement. The Fano is controlled by youth groups that are somehow independent from the regional government, or even from the federal government.
28. The federal government and the regional government have given them a tacit approval to operate as they have a common enemy. The federal government is now very careful about the Fano because in the long run, they could pose a potential threat for the federal government. They are somehow independent from the federal government, and even from the regional government of the Amhara region. In this term, the Eritrean government is now in alliance, not with the regional government of Amhara, but elements in the Amhara non-state armed groups.

Access to airports

29. When the TDF was expanding into Amhara, some of the airports in Amhara region, especially in the Wello regions of Amhara, were out of service. There was not accessibility at all. Nobody would use an airport while there was a raging civil war going on in Amhara, especially in the Wello region.
30. The TDF were not given access to any flight facility at the time. The TDF also stopped flights in the areas where they controlled. Now that the TDF is driven out of Amhara and Afar, flights are now resuming in the Wello region. Flights are now quite active.
31. The same thing applies to the Afar region. Flights have resumed properly. In Addis Ababa, the Bole airport is working. Any “normal” citizen can have access to all the airports at present.
32. There were some exceptions to this accessing of airports. Some blacklisted individuals were on the government list of people who are barred from traveling. They were flagged. Most of them used to come from the Tigray ethnicity. The source personally knows some people who wanted to travel out of Ethiopia. They went to Bole airport, which is the major airport in Addis Ababa, and they were told to go back because they were not allowed to fly. They waited in the capital for weeks, and then they were cleared to take their flight.
33. Most of the flagged people were Tigrayans. Tigrayans were being targeted by the federal government. This has been going on for months now.
34. The source was aware of different parts of the country where mainly Tigrayans were being incarcerated. The source advised however, that many of the imprisoned Tigrayans are now being released. The source knows some of them personally and has met them and was told about their experiences in what has been described as so-called “concentration camps”. In the recent past, there were many restrictions on flights.
35. When asked about whether a person would be arrested on the spot when entering the country in Bole airport just for being Tigrayan, the source informed that there has not been a clear example to prove that. The source opined that because there are people now who are labelled as terrorists, people would be labelled as having connections with terrorists.
36. The source would assume that if these people come to Bole airport and try to come into Addis Ababa, they would be arrested. The source confirmed that the arrests would be on assumptions on some kind of connection to TPLF or OLA. If they can prove that a person has some kind of connection, or if they suspect a person of this, that could be enough. That was exactly how some Tigrayans were being arrested.

Human rights situation in Ethiopia in general

37. The situation for ethnic minorities can be divided into two parts:
 - a. Persecution by the government
 - b. Persecution by non-state actors

38. There has been massive levels of persecution of ethnic minorities in Ethiopia for the past two years. There has been reports of government officials at different levels have been targeting different ethnic groups, political groups and religious groups.
39. In Oromia, different Oromo actors and activists have been persecuted by government forces. Some of them arrested; some of them fired from their official positions especially in the eastern and western parts of Oromia.
40. In the western part of Oromia, for obvious reasons, because Oromos were suspected of having connections with the OLA. In the eastern part of Oromia, persecutions took place, especially since the death of Hachalu, the Oromo Musician, in 2020, due to a possible connection to the opposition to the government and connection with Jawar Mohammed, a well-known Oromo oppositional activist, who has been released from prison in January 2022. Many Oromo political activists have been prosecuted and accused of having connections with Jawar Mohammed.
41. In Amhara region, the source mentioned a very important minority group called *Qemant*, who primary lives in the Gondar area in Amhara Region. There has been persecutions of the Qemant people by the regional government. The Qemants have demanded regional autonomy within the Amhara regional state. This struggle has been ongoing for years. The regional government was not willing at first to comply with these demands. However, later the government went on accepting some of the Qemant's demands. It ended up in armed friction between Qemant activists and the Amhara regional state, which was followed by persecution against Qemant civilians as well.
42. Furthermore, there has been complaints by Agew activists of persecutions. Agew is the ethnic group in Amhara region. The Agaw people were fighting for autonomy within the Amhara region but also for equal and group rights, which led to persecution by the Amhara regional authorities against Agaw activists.
43. However, after the TPLF expanded into the Amhara region, the Agaw minority group established their own armed wing to fight against the regional and federal forces. This meant that when the government has taken back all those lands that were occupied by the TPLF, the Agaw activists are now fearful of being harassed by the government. Although, the source noted that they have not seen any credible information about persecution or harassment by the government, but it is indeed a fear amongst the Agaw people.
44. The single most important case of persecution by the government is against the Tigrayans. This is quite visible. Especially in Addis Ababa, where massive numbers of Tigrayans were targeted, arrested, harassed and persecuted.
45. According to the source, the persecution of Tigrayans happened both outside and inside of Tigray region. The source advised that in Amhara region there has also been quite active persecutions

against Tigrayans by Amhara regional forces.

46. When the federal government recaptured territory from TPLF, the Fano forces retaliated against some civilians, whom they accused of collaborating with TPLF. Although, the source noted that the Fano forces was a non-state actor and hence not a part of the government forces.
47. In 2020, there has also been religious persecutions in Ethiopia. The source mentioned an example against Muslim minorities, where a mosque was burned by some youth groups. Afterwards, according to informants, state actors aligned with these youth actors and acted against Muslim civilians in the Gojjam, Amhara region.

Protection

48. When asked if there has been some kind of possibility for civilians to seek state protection from non-state actors, the source replied that this has been very difficult.
49. The Fano forces for example have been persecuting those people they thought have collaborated with the TPLF in the recaptured areas, mainly in some parts of south Wollo and in the special Oromo zone in the Amhara Region, where a minority of Oromos were targeted and accused of collaborating with OLA or TDF.
50. The government is not protecting Oromo minorities, nor can the TDF protect them. OLF will protect their own supporters, and as a result, civilians are exposed to persecution of different kinds.
51. Non-state actors like the Fano forces are persecutors without any possible protection for the civilians and, on the other hand, when the government persecuted civilians in Addis Ababa, the Tigrayans had nowhere to go. There is no clear protection for civilians either in Amhara, Oromia or in Addis Ababa.
52. According to this interlocutor, a civilian who lives around an area, where there is an active armed group, and the person supports that armed group, then that armed group can protect that person from government persecution. This means that there are non-state actors providing protection to their supporters in a particular region.
53. The source also mentioned an example where the Agaw minority inside Amhara region now may be perceived as a possible target by some Amhara armed groups. However, now that the Agaws have an armed group themselves, claiming to fight for them and their cause, this armed group might provide some level of protection to these individuals around the areas where the group is active. The same scheme applies to OLA in western Oromia. However, the source opined that the non-state actor protection was not a reliable protection, as the war is still ongoing (as of January 2022).

IDPs

54. The Tigrayans in Tigray region, who were able to leave the region, have fled to Sudan. Now many thousands of Tigrayans are living in Sudan. However, Tigray were subsequently put under siege, and as of 25 January 2022 still is under siege, which means that Tigrayans have nowhere to go. It is quite difficult for Tigrayans to leave the region. Up north is Eritrea, where one cannot get in, to the west there is Eritrean forces together with government and Amhara forces. Towards the east is Afar, which is again hostile territory and south is Amhara, another hostile territory.
55. This has resulted in a massive humanitarian crisis inside Tigray region raging from starvation to health and medical crisis etc.
56. Many Tigrayans living in Addis Ababa have been put in jails, although some of them have been released recently. They are going back to their families.
57. In regards to other IDPs, Amhara IDPs and Afar IDPs, the source opined that those IDPs enjoyed some kind of government protection, although not adequate, given the intensity of the problem – the government is providing these IDPs shelters and food. Furthermore, the government started an initiative recently, where they were calling for support internationally – especially from the Ethiopian diaspora.
58. The Ethiopian diaspora were invited to come to Ethiopia during the Christmas. They came to Ethiopia and started to help these IDPs, many from Amhara and Afar. However, the situation is still dire and the IDPs are still suffering from starvation, as the support is not adequate, given the magnitude of the crisis.

Status on humanitarian situation

59. In Amhara and Afar regions, the humanitarian situation is not good. According to several credible sources, all parties in this conflict have committed atrocities. The federal government, Amhara special forces, the Eritrean government committed atrocities inside Tigray region in the early face of the war, and the TDF and its allies committed atrocities in Amhara and Afar in the later stage of the war.
60. The humanitarian crisis has deteriorated in Northern Ethiopia. Both in Tigray and north Tigray lands, especially in Afar region, where the local population has been experiencing harassments, killings, starvation, rapes, etc.
61. Now in the recaptured areas, the federal government is trying to provide aid to those who suffered under TDF especially in the Amhara and Afar regions. However, the source stressed that the aid was not near enough, compared to what is needed.
62. In regards to the humanitarian situation in the Tigray region, there is literally no access to government supported humanitarian aid. Therefore, there is an acute humanitarian crisis in Tigray at this

moment (January 2022). The last convoy with humanitarian aid into Tigray arrived in December 2021. As every convoy has to pass through TDF hostile territories, which means that any militia or paramilitary force including perhaps government forces would not be happy to see such convoys with aid going into Tigray and provide aid service. Therefore, such convoys have been intercepted and forced to be used for local needs.

Description of Tigrinya-speaking Ethiopians

63. In Ethiopia, when a person speaks Amharic, one cannot really tell their place of origin in relation to Ethiopia. This is due to the status of the Amharic language. Amharic is called the working language of the federal government, although in practice, Amharic is the national language of Ethiopia.
64. When a person speaks Tigrinya, then one can be quite sure, that this person is Tigrayan. There are of course some small communities of Amharas living inside Tigray region, who speak Tigrinya. These Amharas will primarily live in the southern part of Tigray, but one could also find such persons in the western part of Tigray region, in the contested lands. These persons would identify themselves as Amharas or Wolkaites, although they speak Tigrinya. However, the source noted that this was exceptions to the rule.
65. In this regard, Tigrayans constitute around seven percent of the total population of Ethiopia and thus the number of Tigrinya-speaking Ethiopians would be very similar to this.
66. The source elaborated that most Tigrayans besides speaking Tigrinya also speak Amharic. However, some Tigrayans could have some problems of fluency in Amharic. According to this source, one can easily tell a Tigrayan from their accent, unless that Tigrayan is born and raised outside Tigray.
67. The Eritreans in Addis Ababa are also likely to speak Tigrinya, however, the number of Eritreans in the capital is very low. There are credible reports about the presence of Eritrean spies Eritrean spies and intelligent officers in Addis Ababa. However, such Eritreans do not make up a whole community in Ethiopia. Therefore, Ethiopian civilians in Addis Ababa speaking Tigrinya will most probably be Tigrayans.

12. Bilag 2: Terms of Reference

Ethiopia: Security situation – recent developments 2022

- Status of the violent conflict – developments since March 2021 – January 2022
 - o Military role of Eritrea in the conflict in Tigray region
 - o Access to major airports in Ethiopia

- Human rights situation in Ethiopia in general
 - o Persecution of ethnic minorities in Ethiopia (Amhara, Oromo, Afar)
 - o The situation for IDPs, including Tigrayans, in terms of access to taking refuge in other Ethiopian regions

- Human rights situation in Tigray
 - o Humanitarian situation in Tigray
 - o Possibilities for Tigrayans of taking refuge in other Ethiopian regions
 - o Persecution of Tigrayans inside and outside of Tigray

- Brief description of Tigrinya-speaking Ethiopians
 - o Number of Tigrinya speaking Ethiopians out of the Ethiopian population as a whole
 - o Number of Tigrinya speaking Ethiopians out of the Tigray population in particular