



Briefing on the Situation of the Hazaras in Afghanistan

Since the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) established itself as a new actor in the Afghan conflict from 2016 onwards, the Hazara population of Afghanistan became one of the ISKP's main targets. Despite various efforts by the Afghan state to improve the security of Hazaras, the ISKP repeatedly succeeded in carrying out attacks aimed at them. Since the Taliban came to power in August 2021, nothing has changed in this regard. The Taliban have proved unable to guarantee the security of Hazaras. On the contrary, there have even been renewed attacks by the Taliban themselves which had previously decreased in the years before 2021. At present, it cannot be said with certainty whether these attacks are a result of Taliban policy or individual acts by single commanders based on their long-standing resentment towards Hazaras.

The Hazaras are the third largest ethnic group among the various peoples of Afghanistan, accounting for about 9 % - 15 % (there are only estimates), and are almost exclusively followers of Shiite Islam (Twelver Shia) in a predominantly Sunni country.¹ They are easy to identify, as they have Central Asian Mongolian features. According to historic accounts, the name Hazara derives from the Persian term hazar for "thousand", which in turn is associated with the thousand-strong units of Genghis Khan's Mongol army. According to this controversial theory an army unit of thousand men was left behind by the Mongol warriors of Genghis Khan's second son Chagatai after they conquered the area of present-day Afghanistan around 1300. This unit may then have established a mixed race population with Tajik women.² However, since the term Hazara has been used for many heterogeneous groups throughout history, this can only be considered one theory among many. The exact origin remains disputed.³

Their main settlement area in Afghanistan is the centrally located Hazarajat (mainly mountainous and inhospitable⁴ it includes parts of Bamiyan, Ghor, Daikundi, Wardak, Ghazni and Logar provinces), as well as the cities of Mazar-e Sharif, Kunduz, Kandahar, Kabul (Dasht-e Barchi district) and Herat (Haji Abbas, Jebrael districts). The national ring road goes around Hazarajat. In addition to Dari, the Hazaras speak a Persian dialect called Hazaragi, which in part still contains loan words from Mongolian.⁵

¹ EASO: Afghanistan Country Focus 01/2022, p. 40

² Genetic studies and, in part, the proper names of the Hazara tribes in Afghanistan and Pakistan speak in favour of a Mongolian origin. See: Creasy, Jennifer (2009): The religious identity of the Hazaras of Afghanistan and modern-day Pakistan, Thesis University of Glasgow. p. 18; Zerjal, Tatiana et al. (2003): The genetic legacy of the Mongols, American journal of human genetics vol. 72, 3: p. 717-21.

³ BFA (2016): Staatendokumentation Dossier - AfPak: Stammes- und Clanstruktur (in German)

⁴ In winter, the region is often cut off from the rest of the country due to snowfall, see: Khalid, Sakhi: Heavy Snowfall in Bamiyan Blocks Access to Ghor and Daikundi, in Hasht-e Subh, 03.01.2022

⁵ Mousavi, Sayed Askar (1998): The Hazaras of Afghanistan, p. 24

According to one theory, this could be a result of the intermarriage between Mongolian warriors and Tajik women, who in turn spoke Persian.⁶

Around 1900, the Afghan Emir Abdur Rahman committed genocide against the Hazaras in Afghanistan following an uprising among them, with two-thirds of the Hazara population ending up enslaved, expelled or killed.⁷ Before the genocide, the Hazaras settled in much larger regions of what is now Afghanistan.⁸ Since then, large parts of them have also settled in Pakistan (Hazara town in Quetta, Hazara region) or Iran (about 500,000 mainly in Golshar near the city of Mashad). Due to this exodus and their Shiite religion, the Hazaras also maintain close relations with Iran, even though they are often considered second-class citizens there. Since many of them live precariously in Iran, it is not difficult for the Iranian government to recruit them to fight against the Islamic State (IS) in Syria. There is a separate brigade called Liwa Fatemiyoun, which consists only of Afghan Hazaras.⁹ Partly because of this direct involvement of the Hazaras in Iran's war against IS in Syria, they have become direct targets of the local IS offshoot Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) in Afghanistan (see below)¹⁰

The political organisation Hizb-e Wahdat, a Shiite party in Afghanistan supported by Iran, is dominated by the Hazaras. In 1989, it united the various fragmented Hazara groups.¹¹ Its founder, Abdul Ali Mazari, was captured and killed by the Taliban in 1995.¹² When the Taliban took power in 2021, their leaders Mohammad Mohaqiq and Karim Khalili fled to Pakistan.¹³ A statue of Mazari in Bamiyan province (central Hazarajat) was allegedly destroyed by the Taliban immediately after the takeover in August 2021. The Taliban denied any destruction, but nevertheless erected a Koran replica in place of Mazari's statue shortly after and renamed Mazari Square into "Military Street".¹⁴

Between 1900 when the genocide against them was committed and 1978, the Hazaras were marginalised. During the Russian occupation from 1979 onwards, there was more independence and inclusion for them.¹⁵ During the civil war for the capital Kabul from 1989 onwards, the Hazaras as well as the newly founded Hizb-e Wahdat were civil war parties themselves and ended up committing crimes and killings as well. However, they were severely decimated by the Rabbani government in the so-called Afshar massacre in Kabul in 1993. During the Taliban's first term from 1996 -2001, the Taliban cracked down on the Hazaras. In August 1998, the Taliban killed 2 000 Hazaras in Mazar-e Sharif.¹⁶ Preceding that the Hazaras had themselves committed a massacre against the Taliban.

⁶ Creasy, Jennifer (2009): The religious identity of the Hazaras of Afghanistan and modern-day Pakistan, Thesis University of Glasgow, p. 22

⁷ Ibrahimi, Niamatullah (2017): The Hazaras and the Afghan State: Rebellion, Exclusion and the Struggle for Recognition, Hurst Pub., p. 74

⁸ Ibid. p. 33

⁹ Such a brigade also exists for Pakistani Hazaras and is called Liwa Zainebiyoun. See: Frontline: What Is the Fatemiyoun Brigade and Why Does It Make the Taliban Nervous? 20.07.2021; Smyth, Philip: Iran's Afghan Shiite Fighters in Syria, Policy Analysis, PolicyWatch 2262, Washington Institute 2014; AREU (2005): Return to Afghanistan? A Study of Afghans Living in Mashhad, Islamic Republic of Iran; Feroz, Emran (2014): Afghan refugees in Iran: second-class citizens, in Qantara of 11.06.2014

¹⁰ Adili, Ali Yawar: A Community Under Attack: How successive governments failed west Kabul and the Hazaras who live there, article from 17.01.2022 in Afghanistan Analyst Network (AAN)

¹¹ Troxler-Gulzar, Corinne (2009): Afghanistan: Hezb-e Wahdat/Harakt-e Islami, Auskunft der SFH Länderanalyse (in German)

¹² Amnesty International: Kreislauf der Angst, article from 15.11.2021 (in German)

¹³ Al Jazeera: Pakistan says US Afghan troop withdrawal is 'logical conclusion', 16.08.2021

¹⁴ France24: Taliban replace statue of Hazara leader in Bamiyan with Koran, 11.11.2021

¹⁵ Ibrahimi, Niamatullah (2017): The Hazaras and the Afghan State: Rebellion, Exclusion and the Struggle for Recognition, Hurst Pub. p. 119

¹⁶ Ibid. p. 178; Maley, William (2021): On the Return of Hazaras to Afghanistan, Australian National University, 09.10.2021.

Additionally the Taliban destroyed the famous Buddha statues in Bamiyan, which were one of the biggest tourist attractions in the country.¹⁷ In April 2022, the Taliban leader who is assumed to have destroyed the Buddha statues is advocating for the caves and the area where the Buddha statues once stood to once again become a World Heritage Site.¹⁸

After the republic was founded in 2001, the previously marginalised Hazaras experienced a significant improvement of their situation.¹⁹ For the first time in Afghanistan's history, the 2004 constitution allowed Shia law to be applied between Shiites in private matters.²⁰ Hazara leader Karim Khalili was appointed as vice president (2004-14).²¹ However, Hazaras became the primary target of major attacks in Afghanistan since the formation of the ISKP in January 2015.²² The ISKP has also regularly attacked rallies in previous years to mark the anniversary of Mazari's death (see above).²³ The ISKP has not claimed responsibility for two particularly brutal attacks against Hazaras on 12 May 2020 on a maternity ward of the MSF hospital in Dasht-e Barchi (23 dead and 23 injured) and on 8 May 2021 on the Sayed al-Shuhada girls' school in Dasht-e Barchi (85 dead and 216 injured), even though the attacks fit its pattern.²⁴ Despite its assurances to improve the security situation in West Kabul, the former government under President Ghani failed.²⁵

Since the Taliban took power in August 2021, the situation of the Hazaras has not changed much in this respect. According to a report by the Afghanistan Analyst Network (AAN) of 17 January 2022, attacks against the Hazaras initially declined briefly after the takeover, only to increase steadily again from September 2021 onwards. Despite assurances by the Taliban to fight the ISKP rigorously, the latter is still capable of carrying out large and small attacks against the Hazaras (as well as the Taliban and the civilian population). The Taliban tend to downplay the threat or censor media coverage of ISKP attacks in order to keep up a positive image instead of improving the security situation of the Hazaras.²⁶ Shortly before an attack on 15 October 2021 aimed at a Shia mosque in Kandahar, IS declared in an editorial on its weekly publication Al-Naba on its Telegram channel that it was targeting Shias "from Baghdad to Khorasan". The editorial specifically mentions the Shia Hazaras in Afghanistan, saying that they are allies of Iran and will fight for it along with its allies against the IS (see Liwa Fatemiyoun above).

¹⁷ Euronews: 20 years after destruction of the giant Buddhas: Taliban back in Bamiyan, 03.10.2021

¹⁸ Rasa, M. Shaker: Taliban Rebels in Bamiyan: Coal and Wood Sellers to Evacuate Historical and Cultural Sites, in Hasht-e Subh 20.04.2022

¹⁹ Jacinto, Leela: Afghanistan's minority Hazaras see gains of past two decades 'falling apart', in France24 of 23.08.2021

²⁰ Ibrahim, Niamatullah (2017): The Hazaras and the Afghan State: Rebellion, Exclusion and the Struggle for Recognition, Hurst Pub. p. 3

²¹ Ansar, Massoud: Ex-VP Khalili Warns Against Further Attacks on Hazara Community, in Tolonews from 13.06.2021

²² On 23.07.2016, a bomb attack by the ISKP on a protest rally in Kabul killed 85 Hazara and injured 413. On 21.11.2016, an ISKP attack on a mosque in Kabul killed 40 people and injured 74. On 20/11/2017, there was an ISKP bomb attack on a mosque in Dasht-e Barchi, killing 69 and injuring 60. Other ISKP attacks with many dead and injured Hazaras followed on 27/12/2017 (Tebyan Cultural Center), 21/03/2018 (Kart-e Sakhi Shrine), 22/04/2018 (Tazkira Issuing Point), 15/08/2018 (Mawud Tutoring Center), 05/09/2018 (Maiwand Wrestling Club), 24/10/2020 (Kawar-e Danesh Tutoring Center).

²³ Salaam Times: ISIS attack kills dozens at Mazari ceremony in Kabul, 06.03.2020

²⁴ Adili, Ali Yawar: A Community Under Attack: How successive governments failed west Kabul and the Hazaras who live there, article from 17.01.2022 in Afghanistan Analyst Network

²⁵ میشوند دخیل امنیت تأمین در مردم کابل؛ غرب امنیتی طرح جزییات: حسینی عبدالاحمد in Hasht-e Subh from 12.06.2021

²⁶ Khalid, Sakhi: Suicide Attacks on Hazara Community Escalate Alarming As Taliban Rejects ISKP Threat in Afghanistan in Hasht-e Subh 29.04.2022

ISKP attacks in West Kabul often hit educational institutions or targeted civilian passenger vehicles, especially Town Ace minivans, which are favoured by young, educated and working Hazaras.²⁷ It is possible that young Hazaras are particularly targeted. Attacks are no longer taking place exclusively in the ISKP core area around Nangarhar, Kunar and Kabul provinces, but across Afghanistan.

The first ISKP attack against Hazaras after the Taliban came to power in 2021 occurred on 18 September 2021 in Dasht-e Barchi (Kabul, Police District 13), in which two people were injured.²⁸ An ISKP attack on the Shia Sayed Abad Mosque in Kunduz on 08 October 2021 left 50 dead and 100 injured.²⁹ A week later on 15 October 2021, ISKP explosives detonated in the largest Shia mosque in the city of Kandahar killing 47 and injuring 70.³⁰ On 13 November 2021, a magnetic bomb explosion aimed at a Town Ace minivan in Dasht-e Barchi killed six civilians and injured at least seven others.³¹ On 17 November 2021, there was another explosion aimed at a Town Ace minivan in Dasht-e Barchi, killing two and injuring six.³² On 25 December 2021, the mullah of the Shia Imam Ali Mosque in Kandahar city was attacked with a knife, leaving him and three others injured.³³ On 10 December 2021, West Kabul was again the target of three explosions with at least two Hazaras dead and four injured.³⁴ On 24 January 2022, an ISKP attack occurred in the Hazara neighbourhood of Haji Abbas in Herat city, killing seven and injuring ten.³⁵ A bomb attack by ISKP on 1 April 2022 in the Hazara neighbourhood of Jebrail in Herat city at a sports field killed 12 young men and injured 25.³⁶ At least 26 young Hazaras were killed and many others injured in two attacks in Kabul on 19 April 2022 at the largest school for boys in Dasht-e Barchi (Abdul Rahman Shahid School) and another educational institution. The ISKP did not claim responsibility for the attack although it was carried out according to a pattern resembling that of ISKP.³⁷ Another attack followed in Dasht-e Barchi on 21 April 2022, in which two children were injured. There was equally no claim of responsibility.³⁸ On the same day, there was an ISKP attack on a Shiite mosque in Mazar-e Sharif with 30 dead and 80 injured.³⁹ Unidentified gunmen shot dead five Hazara passengers on Samangan highway in Dara-e Suf Bala district of Balkh province on 26 April 2022.⁴⁰ On 25 April 2022, due to the devastating series of attacks by ISKP against Hazaras in Afghanistan, Iran offered to help the Taliban in fighting ISKP.⁴¹

²⁷ Adili, Ali Yawar: A Community Under Attack: How successive governments failed west Kabul and the Hazaras who live there, article from 17.01.2022 in Afghanistan Analyst Network

²⁸ Twitter: Etilaatroz tweet from 18.09.2021

²⁹ است بلند قندوز در تلفات آمار افغانستان؛ هزارهای بر هدفمند حملات ادامه می: امیری سکینه in Etilaatroz of 18 Meezaan 1400 (10.10.2021)

³⁰ Al-Jazeera: Deadly explosion hits Shia mosque in Afghanistan's Kandahar, article from 15.10.2021

³¹ گذاشت جا به زخمی شماری و گرفت را روزنامهنگار یک جان کابل غرب در انفجاری in BBC Persia on 13.11.2021

³² گذاشت جا بر زخمی پنج و کشته دو کابل غرب در شیعهنشین محله در انفجار Responsibility for Blasts in Kabul in Hasht-e Subh from 18.11.2021.

³³ Adili, Ali Yawar: A Community Under Attack: How successive governments failed west Kabul and the Hazaras who live there, article from 17.01.2022 in Afghanistan Analyst Network

³⁴ گرفت بر عهده را کابل غرب در شخصی خودروهای به حملات مسئولیت داعش Kabul - Details Not Yet Available in Hasht-e Subh from 10.12.2021

³⁵ Khalid, Sakhi: ISKP Claims Responsibility for a Deadly Attack in Herat in Hasht-e Subh on 24.01.2022

³⁶ Rasa, Mohammed Shaker: The Death Toll of Explosion in Jibraiel Township, Anjil District, Herat Rises to Five in Hasht-e Subh dated 06.04.2022; Tolonews tweet on Twitter: The death toll of the blast in PD 12 of Herat city has risen to 12 dated 01.04.2022 ; Twitter tweet on @ZohalAzra dated 01.04.2022.

³⁷ Rasa, Mohammed Shaker: Explosions Hit West of Kabul, Hazara Dominated Area, the Taliban Do not Allow Reporters to Cover in Hasht-e Subh dated 19.04.2022

³⁸ Tagesschau.de: Dead in explosion in Mazar-i-Sharif from 21.04.2022

³⁹ Rasa, M. Shaker: Explosion in a Shiite Mosque in Mazar-e-Sharif Leaves 30 Casualties and 80 Injured in Hasht-e Subh dated 21.04.2022

⁴⁰ Rasa, M. Shaker: Unidentified Gunmen Shot Dead Five Hazara Passengers on Samangan Highway in Hasht-e Subh dated 27.04.2022

⁴¹ Rasa, M. Shaker: Iran: Taliban Incapable to Establish Peace, Iran to Step Forward to Fight ISKP in Hasht-e Subh dated 25.04.2022

On 28 April 2022, two bomb blasts on minivans in Mazar-e Sharif city killed nine people and injured 13 others. The victims were mainly Shia Hazaras and the ISKP claimed responsibility for the attack.⁴² The Taliban interior minister has repeatedly played down the threat to the Hazara population by ISKP.⁴³

In addition, the Taliban themselves are also taking action against the Hazara community (arrests and killings), partly because they are strongly associated with the former government. Since October 2021, the former head of the women's prison in Herat has been missing and is probably detained by the Taliban.⁴⁴ Despite their promise to grant a general amnesty, on 30.08.2021, the Taliban killed 13 Hazaras in Daikundi province who were trying to flee from Kahor village/Khidir district, including 11 soldiers and a 17-year-old girl.⁴⁵ In late September 2021, the Taliban also forced more than 740 Hazara families out of their homes and off their land in Daikundi province (Kendir and Tagabdar districts).⁴⁶ On 13 January 2022, two Hazara girls were shot dead by the Taliban in Kabul (Dasht-e Barchi).⁴⁷ Since the Taliban took power, at least 25 people, including former army soldiers and civilians, have been killed and four children injured in Ghor province. Among them were many Hazaras.⁴⁸ On 13 March 2022, a former soldier (Hazara) was shot dead in Ghor.⁴⁹ On 14 April 2022, Taliban members tortured a travelling Hazara in Firuzkoh town for not fasting during Ramadan (although this is allowed according to Shia law).⁵⁰

While there were many Hazara representatives in the Afghan parliament in the old republic (such as Sima Simar, Mohammad Mohaqiq, Vice President Karim Khalili, etc.), there are only two Hazaras in the current Taliban cabinet, Second Deputy Minister of Health Dr Hassan Ghyasi and Deputy Minister of Economy Abdul Latif Nazari.⁵¹ A Hazara, Maulavi Mahdi, who is a Taliban member, was also appointed as head of intelligence in Bamiyan.⁵² However, when he advocated for the education of Hazara women, the Taliban transferred him to Kabul at the end of January 2022 and replaced him with the Uzbek commander Qari Bilal.⁵³ Other people close to Mahdi were also dismissed from their positions.⁵⁴ Women and Hazaras in particular have been systematically removed from public positions since the Taliban took power.⁵⁵ In Bamiyan province, the director and vice-chancellor of the university, both Hazaras, have been removed.⁵⁶

⁴² Lalzoy, Najibullah: ISIS Claims Responsibility for Twin Blasts in Mazar-e-Sharif in Khaama Press, 29.04.2022; Khalid, Sakhi: Suicide Attacks on Hazara Community Escalate Alarmingly As Taliban Rejects ISKP Threat in Afghanistan in Hasht-e Subh, 29.04.2022

⁴³ Khalid, Sakhi: Suicide Attacks on Hazara Community Escalate Alarmingly As Taliban Rejects ISKP Threat in Afghanistan in Hasht-e Subh from 29.04.2022

⁴⁴ Al: Afghanistan: Taliban authorities must reveal Alia Azizi's whereabouts, 21.01.2022

⁴⁵ Al: Afghanistan: Security forces of the former Afghan government extrajudicially killed, dated 05.10.2021

⁴⁶ Situation of human rights in Afghanistan - Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (A/HRC/49/24) (Advance Unedited Version) of 04.03.2022, p. 12 "Forced evictions".

⁴⁷ Lalzoy, Najibullah: Girl gunned down in Taliban's check post in Kabul in Khaama Press from 15.01.2022; Al-Jazeera: Taliban arrests fighter who shot dead Hazara woman at checkpoint, from 19.01.2022; Majumdar, Anwesha: Afghanistan: Women Protest In Kabul Against The Killing Of 2 Hazara Women in Republic World from 17.01.2022

⁴⁸ سقوط از پس خونین روزهای ۲۵ دسستم حکومت؛ سقوط از پس خونین روزهای ۲۵ دسستم حکومت in Etilaatroz from 29 Hoot 1400 (20/03/2022).

⁴⁹ Aamaj News: A former soldier shot dead in Ghor from 13.03.2022

⁵⁰ Khalid, Sakhi: Taliban Rebels Publicly Humiliate a Shiite Traveler for Not Fasting in Ghor in Hasht-e Subh dated 14.04.2022

⁵¹ Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara representatives included: Taliban expand cabinet to 'make' it inclusive in The News 22.09.2021; Lalzoy, Najibullah: A none-Taliban figure, Abdul Latif Nazari appointed as Deputy Minister of economy in Khaama Press 25.12.2021

⁵² Raghavan, Sudarsan: The Taliban is trying to win over Afghanistan's Shiites with a 33-year-old Hazara emissary. But many question the group's sincerity, in Washington Post from 01.11.2021

⁵³ زدند کنار بامیان استخبارات ریاست سمت از را مجاهد مهدی مولوی طالبان in Etilaatroz from 07 Dalwa 1400 (27.01.2022).

⁵⁴ شدند بازداشت بامیان در طالبان توسط پیشین نظامی یک و مهدی مولوی دستیار بهشمول نفر چهار in Etilaatroz of 28 Hamal 1401 (17.04.2022).

⁵⁵ "گرفتهاند دست روی تازه روش کارمندان جمعی برکناری برای طالبان"؛ "سمتی تعینات و قومی پاکسازی" in Etilaatroz of 24 Dalwa 1400 (13.02.2022).

⁵⁶ است اصل کارمندان تبدیلی و برکناری بطالبان ادارات؛ در "قومی تصفیہی" ادامہی in Etilaatroz of 25 Dalwa 1400 (14.02.2022).

Hazara female students had torn down Taliban posters at an event there on 01 April 2022 because the Taliban had invited them to a women's rights meeting under false pretenses.⁵⁷ On 2 April 2022, the Taliban arrested 11 of these female students.⁵⁸ Three of them were released on 8 April 2022, but Human Rights Watch expresses concern about the fate of the seven women who remain in detention.⁵⁹ On 6 April 2022, two former members of the NDS were arrested by the Taliban in Bamiyan.⁶⁰ On 16 April 2022, the Taliban had detained a former member of the security forces and two others in Bamiyan.⁶¹ On 25 April 2022, the Taliban intelligence agency arrested Asghar Yousefi, the manager of Gholghola Hotel on charges of possession of weapons in Bamiyan province.⁶² Earlier, on 21 February 2022, Mullah Mohammad Shireen, a Taliban commander in Bamiyan province, had warned - without giving further details - of resistance activities with foreign support in Bamiyan. 1 500 troops were deployed to the province.⁶³ Other sources claim that the Taliban want to get rid of anti-Taliban forces under this pretext and are thus carrying out arrests and disarming the population.⁶⁴ On 24 March 2022, the Taliban's regional virtue ministry in Bamiyan province issued official decrees banning women who do not wear full-face veils (burqas) from entering government buildings. Male civil servants will not be allowed to shave their beards and will have to wear a turban at work. Previously, these regulations were only unofficially in place. Anyone who violates them is to face severe consequences.⁶⁵

Parts of the Hazara population particularly in Behsud/Maidan Wardak, along with the National Resistance Front (NRF) of the Tajiks from Panjshir province, have resisted the Taliban. The Behsud Resistance Front (BRF, also called Jabha-ye Moqawamat) under the Hazara general and popular hero Abdul Ghani Alipour (also called Qomandan Shamshir) has been part of the resistance since its founding in 2015. It operates throughout Hazarajat and was explicitly formed to defend the hazara population against the ISKP, the Taliban and the nomadic Kuchi Pashtuns, who are currently partly responsible for driving out Hazaras out of their homes and occupying their property.⁶⁶ General Alipour had already criticised the Ghani government between 2018 and 2021 because he felt that he and the Hazaras had not been defended enough by the Afghan armed forces against the Taliban.⁶⁷ On 17 January 2022, the Taliban raided BRF arms depots in Wardak province.⁶⁸ Hazara politician Zulfikar Omid is said to be leading a second resistance front in Daikundi province. Omid, like Alipour, is said to have allied himself with the National Resistance Movement (NRF) against the Taliban.⁶⁹

⁵⁷ Etilaatroz from 15 Hamal 1401 (04.04.2022). *نمیدھیم را زنان نام از سوءاستفاده فرصت کسی هیچ برای بامیان در دانشجو دختران*

⁵⁸ Rasa, Mohammed Shaker: Taliban Rebels Arrest 11 Women in Bamiyan Province in Hasht-e Subh dated 08.04.22

⁵⁹ The Print: Human Rights Watch calls for inquiry into fate of female protestors detained by Taliban, 10.04.22

⁶⁰ Rasa, Mohammed Shaker: Taliban Arrests Two Former Forces of NDS in Bamiyan Province in Hasht-e Subh dated 06.04.22

⁶¹ Rasa, Mohammed Shaker: Taliban Rebels Arrest a Former Security Force and 2 others in Bamiyan in Hasht-e Subh dated 16.04.22

⁶² Khalid, Sakhi: Taliban Arrests the Manager of the Gholghola Resort in Bamiyan in Hasht-e Subh dated 25.04.22

⁶³ Salam Watander: 1500 fresh troops deployed to Bamiyan, 22.02.22; Rasooli, Shirshah: Groups Seek to Destabilize Bamiyan, Says Commander in Tolonews, 21.02.22

⁶⁴ Etilaatroz from 03 Hoot 1400 (22.02.2022). *کردند مستقر بامیان در نظامی نیروی صدها طالبان*

⁶⁵ Khalid, Sakhi: Taliban Issue New Decrees, Banning Hijabless Women's Entrance into Public Institutions in Hasht-e Subh dated 24.03.2022

⁶⁶ EASO COI Query Response: Information on the establishment of Jabha-ye Moqawamat (Resistance Front) armed group dated 25.06.2019; Rasa, Mohammed Shaker: Nomads and the Villagers Unresolved Issues: Nomads Enter Jaghori and Malistan Districts, Ghazni in Hasht-e Subh dated 24.04.2022

⁶⁷ Nikzad, Khaled: Alipour Calls for Probe, Threatens to Trap Govt Forces in Behsud in Tolonews 03.02.2021

⁶⁸ Tweet Bakhtar News Agency: Video: Security forces have discovered a number of weapons and ammunition related to Alipour, an irresponsible armed commander from Behsoud district of Maidan Wardak province, dated 17.02.22

⁶⁹ Guckelsberger, Florian: Was die Schiiten in Afghanistan jetzt befürchten, in Zenith from 07.09.2021 (german)

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