

**Colombia:  
Country Focus**

# **Country Focus**

**Colombia**

**December 2025**



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# Acknowledgements

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- Belgium: Centre for Documentation and Research (Cedoca), Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (CGRS)
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- Sweden: Unit for Migration Analysis, Swedish Migration Agency

Additionally, Colombia expert Jeremy McDermott was engaged as an external reviewer. Mr. McDermott is the co-director and co-founder of Insight Crime, with over two decades of experience reporting from Latin America. A retired military officer, he became a war correspondent working in the Balkans, the Middle East, and then Colombia, including for the BBC, the Daily Telegraph, and The Economist. He specialises in drug trafficking, organised crime and conflict in Colombia. His organisation, Insight Crime, is a think tank that seeks to deepen and inform the debate about organised crime and citizen security in the Americas through reporting, analysis, investigations, and policy on challenges in the region.





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## Disclaimer

This report was written according to the [EUAA COI Report Methodology \(2023\)](#). The report is based on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.

The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost care within a limited timeframe. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist.

Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular application for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position.

'Refugee', 'risk' and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.

Neither EUAA nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained in this report.

On 19 January 2022, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) became the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA). All references to EASO, EASO products and bodies should be understood as references to the EUAA.

The drafting of this report was finalised on 14 November 2025. Any event taking place after this date is not included in this report. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in the methodology section of the Introduction.



## Glossary and abbreviations

Term	Definition
<b>ACLED</b>	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
<b>ACSN</b>	Autodefensas Conquistadores de la Sierra Nevada (Conquering Self-Defense Forces of the Sierra Nevada)
<b>AFP</b>	Acuerdo Final para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una Paz estable y duradera (2016 Final Agreement for Ending Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace)
<b>AGC</b>	Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia). AGC is also known as Clan del Golfo, Urabeños, Clan Úsuga; criminal armed group having historic links to paramilitary groups
<b><i>Alerta Temprana</i></b>	Early Warning. A communication used by the Office of the Ombudsperson to alert the national government on imminent risks to certain profiles or geographical areas.
<b>APM</b>	Anti-personnel mines
<b>AUC</b>	Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia); far-right paramilitary and drug trafficking organisation that later demobilised and some groups fragmented and were later recycled into other armed groups such as the AGC
<b>AUN</b>	Autodefensas Unidas de Nariño (Self-Defence Forces of Nariño)
<b>BACRIM</b>	A label created by the Colombian government for criminal bands or gangs that include recycled former paramilitary groups but that lack any apparent political agenda; also <i>bandas criminales</i>
<b><i>banda</i></b>	Organised criminal group, sometimes used interchangeably with <i>combo</i> ; depending on the context, can mean a small gang or a higher-level grouping in the gang hierarchy



<b><i>Bandas criminales</i></b>	See <i>also</i> BACRIM
<b>CAI</b>	Centros de Atención Inmediata (Immediate Reaction Centres); local police units
<b><i>campesino</i></b>	Small-scale farmer or peasant
<b>CDF-EB</b>	Comandos de la Frontera-Ejército-Bolivariano; sub-group of FARC aligned with the Coordinadora Nacional del Ejército Bolivariano; most commonly known as Comandos de La Frontera (Border Command) (formerly La Mafia)
<b>CED</b>	Convention on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
<b>CEDAW</b>	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
<b>CERD</b>	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
<b>CERREM</b>	Comité de Evaluación del Riesgo y Recomendación de Medidas (Risk Evaluation and Recommendation Committee)
<b>CESCR</b>	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
<b>CEV</b>	Comisión para el Esclarecimiento de la Verdad, la Convivencia y la No Repetición (Truth Commission)
<b>CGP</b>	Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacífico (Guerrilla Coordinator Front for the Pacific); a FARC dissident group
<b>CGR</b>	Contraloría General de la República (Office of the Comptroller General)
<b>CIA</b>	US Central Intelligence Agency
<b>CTREP</b>	Circunscripciones Transitorias Especiales de Paz (Special Transitory Peace Seats Electoral Districts)





<b>CMW</b>	Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
<b>CNEB</b>	Coordinadora Nacional del Ejército Bolivariano (National Coordinator of the Bolivarian Army). A FARC dissident group that split from Segunda Marquetalia.
<b>CNGS</b>	La Comisión Nacional de Garantías de Seguridad (National Commission on Security Guarantees)
<b>CNTI</b>	La Comisión Nacional de Territorios Indígenas (National Commission on Indigenous Territories)
<b>COCE</b>	Comando Central; Central Command of the ELN
<b>combo</b>	A term used to mean a gang
<b>Comunas</b>	A common name used to refer to neighbourhoods in Medellín
<b>Comunes</b>	Name of the political party formed by the FARC-EP after their demobilisation and transition into politics in 2017. The party was originally called FARC, Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común (Revolutionary Alternative Common Force), but the name was changed to Comunes in 2021 to rebrand itself and avoid usage of the FARC acronym associated with the armed group
<b>COP</b>	Colombian pesos
<b>CPRD</b>	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
<b>CRC</b>	Convention on the Rights of the Child
<b>CTI</b>	Cuerpo Técnico de Investigación (Judicial Police Corps for Investigations; separate from the police, although with judicial police powers)
<b>DINAL</b>	Dirección Nacional (National Directorate); ELN
<b>DRC</b>	Danish Refugee Council
<b>ELN</b>	Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army)





<b>EMBF</b>	Estado Mayor de Bloques y Frentes (General Staff of Blocks and Fronts), a FARC dissident group that started out as EMC, led by alias 'Calarcá'.
<b>EMC</b>	Estado Mayor Central (Central General Staff, a FARC dissident group, led by alias 'Iván Mordisco'.
<b>EPL</b>	Ejército Popular de Liberación (Popular Liberation Army), a formerly Maoist/leftist armed group that demobilised in 1991 which became the criminal group called Los Pelusos. Referred to as EPL in this report.
<b>ERW</b>	Explosive Remnants of War
<b>ESMAD</b>	Escuadrones Móviles Antidisturbios (Mobile Anti-Disturbance Squadron); Riot police within the Colombian National Police
<b><i>Falsos positivos</i></b>	False positives; killings carried out by state security forces who falsely reported civilians as guerrillas; mostly occurring in 2002-2006
<b>FARC dissidents</b>	Also called FARC-EP dissidents, post-FARC groups, Ex-FARC mafia; formed by former FARC members who did not sign on to the 2016 peace accord between FARC-EP and the government or later broke away
<b>FARC-EP</b>	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army); left-wing Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group that fought against the state of Colombia for 52 years until the 2016 Peace Agreement
<b>FCS</b>	Frente Comuneros del Sur; an ELN dissident group
<b>FGN</b>	Fiscalía General de la Nación (Office of the Attorney General)
<b>First Front</b>	FARC dissident structure also called Joint Eastern Command, Bloque Oriental; it now includes factions that were under the command of Gentil Duarte; led by Iván Mordisco; referred to in this report as First Front (commonly called EMC).





<b>FLIP</b>	Fundación para la Libertad de Prensa (Freedom of the Press Foundation)
<b>GAO</b>	Grupo Armado Organizado (Organised Armed Group), defined as an armed actor in the civil conflict under Colombian law
<b>GAULA</b>	Grupos de Acción Unificada por la Libertad Personal (Unified Action Groups for Personal Freedom)
<b>GBV</b>	Gender-based violence
<b>GDCO</b>	Grupos de Delincuencia Común Organizada (Criminal Groups), groups dedicated to criminal activities such as thefts, street-level drug trafficking, homicides, and extortion
<b>GDO</b>	Grupo Delictivo Organizado (Organised Criminal Group), organised criminal groups with transnational reach dedicated to illicit activities such as drug trafficking
<b>Gentil Duarte</b>	A leader of the EMC dissident faction of the FARC-EP which refused to adhere to the 2016 peace accord (joined after Iván Mordisco, who has always led the group). Killed in May 2022.
<b><i>gota a gota</i></b>	‘drop by drop’ informal, very high-interest loans offered by loan sharks; often managed by armed or criminal groups
<b>GPC</b>	Global Protection Cluster
<b>HRD</b>	Human rights defender
<b>IACHR</b>	Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
<b>ICCPR</b>	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Second Optional Protocol
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross
<b>IDMC</b>	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
<b>IDP</b>	Internally displaced person





<b>Indepaz</b>	Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz (Institute of Studies for Development and Peace Studies)
<b>INMLCF</b>	Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses (National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences)
<b>JAC</b>	Juntas de Acción Comunal (Community Action Board. There are local community action groups that go down to parochial level in Colombia)
<b>JEP</b>	Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (Special Jurisdiction for Peace)
<b>La Oficina de Envigado</b>	The Office of Envigado, an urban organised crime structure initially founded by Pablo Escobar in Medellín
<b>La Terraza</b>	Organised crime gang in Medellín, historically part of the Oficina de Envigado
<b>Los Caparrapos</b>	Also called Los Caparros but referred to as Los Caparrapos in this report; a paramilitary successor spin-off group of the AGC that broke away in 2017
<b>Los Pelusos</b>	Also called EPL, a formerly Maoist group turned criminal organisation; referred to as EPL in this report.
<b>Los Puntilleros</b>	Paramilitary successor group with roots in AUC
<b>Los Rastrojos</b>	Paramilitary successor group formerly called Rondas Campesinas Populares
<b>Mafia Sinaloa</b>	Mafia Sinaloa is a former incarnation of the Border Command FARC-dissident group CDF-EB; local Colombian criminal group made up of members of La Constru and FARC
<b><i>megabandas</i></b>	Venezuelan crime syndicates such as the Tren de Aragua gang
<b><i>mestizo</i></b>	A person of mixed Indigenous-Spanish origin
<b>Military target</b>	A term used by armed groups or the state to demarcate a person deemed to be an opponent (objetivo militar)





<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organisation
<b>NSAG</b>	Non-State armed groups
<b>OAS</b>	Organization of American States
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>OFAC</b>	US Office of Foreign Assets Control
<b>OFPRA</b>	Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides (French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons)
<b>OHCHR</b>	UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
<b>ONIC</b>	Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia
<b>Pares</b>	Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (Peace and Reconciliation Foundation), a Colombian NGO that studies violence
<b><i>Paros armados</i></b>	Armed strikes or stoppages carried out by illegal armed groups
<b>PDET</b>	Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial (Development Plans with a Territorial Focus) <i>prefer</i> Territorially Focused Development Programmes
<b>PGN</b>	Procuraduría General de la Nación (Office of the Inspector General)
<b><i>Plan pistola</i></b>	The systematic targeting and assassination of state security forces, often by offering a cash bounty for each killing. This strategy is used by illegal armed groups to terrorise law enforcement, assert territorial control, and retaliate against government offensives
<b>PNC</b>	Policía Nacional de Colombia (National Police of Colombia)
<b>PNIS</b>	Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos Ilícitos (National Comprehensive Programme for the Substitution of Illicit Crops)





<b>RELE</b>	OAS' Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión (Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights)
<b>RSF</b>	Reporters Sans Frontières
<b>RUV</b>	Registro Único de Víctimas (Single Registry of Victims)
<b>sapo</b>	An informant
<b>SAT</b>	<i>Sistema de Alertas Tempranas</i> (Early Warning System); government alert system for risks of human rights violations; run by the Office of the Ombudsperson
<b>sicario, sicariato</b>	'Hitman'; hired assassin, often linked to criminal or armed groups – who carries out targeted killings for payment as part of organised violence or territorial control claims
<b>Sinaloa Cartel</b>	Mexican drug cartel
<b>SIVIGE</b>	Sistema Integrado de Información de Violencias de Género
<b>SIVJRN</b>	Sistema Integral de Verdad, Justicia, Reparación y No Repetición (Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition) created by the 2016 peace accord with the FARC
<b>SM</b>	Segunda Marquetalia (Second Marquetalia). A dissident faction of FARC-EP which broke away from the 2016 peace accord in 2019
<b>TPS</b>	Temporary Protection Status
<b>UARIV</b>	Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas del Conflicto Armado (Unit for the Attention and Integral Reparation of Victims)
<b>UBPD</b>	Unidad de Búsqueda de Personas Dadas por Desaparecidas (Unit for the Search for Persons Deemed Disappeared)
<b>UNCAT</b>	United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment





<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNOCHA</b>	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>UNP</b>	Unidad Nacional de Protección (National Protection Unit)
<b>UNVMC</b>	United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia
<b>USDOS</b>	United States Department of State
<b><i>vacunas</i></b>	'Taxes,' 'rents,' or 'protection fees' charged by armed groups through extortion





# Introduction

This EUAA COI Country Focus report on Colombia is intended to provide an overview of the key relevant issues for the assessment of applications for international protection, updating the [EUAA COI Country Focus: Colombia](#) published in December 2022. The report provides an overview of the armed conflict, peace process and status, main illegal armed and criminal groups, key security developments and dynamics in Colombia during the reference period, and an overview of main targeted profiles and mechanisms for state protection, as well as information on relocation.

## Methodology

### Defining the terms of reference

The terms of reference for this report were based on an update of the 2022 report, with input from national asylum authorities of EU+<sup>1</sup> and IGC-participating countries,<sup>2</sup> who had the opportunity to comment on the proposed report ToR. The terms of reference to be addressed in this Country Focus report which can be found in [Annex 2: Terms of Reference](#). The reference period for this report is 1 January 2023 to 1 December 2025 but also includes general information to provide background and contextual information on the current situation. The drafting period finished on 14 November 2025, peer review occurred between 17 to 21 November 2025, and additional information was added to the report as a result of the quality review process during the review implementation up until 2 December 2025. The report was internally reviewed subsequently. This report was finalised on 15 December 2025.

### Collecting information

This report is based on publicly available information in electronic and paper-based sources gathered through desk-based research. It also contains information from oral sources with ground-level knowledge of the situation in Colombia who were contacted for this report. For security reasons, oral sources are anonymised unless they have chosen to be named in relation to the organisation represented.

### Quality control

This report was written by the EUAA COI Sector in line with the [EUAA COI Report Methodology \(2023\)](#) and the [EUAA COI Writing and Referencing Style Guide \(2023\)](#). The report has been peer-reviewed by COI experts from Belgium, France, Sweden, and The Netherlands. Jeremy McDermott, expert on Colombian criminality and armed groups, was also engaged as an external reviewer. Some comments made by the external expert reviewer on the content or to address information gaps have been integrated into this report and are cited as such. All the comments from reviewers were reviewed and were implemented to the extent

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<sup>1</sup> EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland

<sup>2</sup> IGC participating states are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.



possible under time constraints. Some peer reviewers read both Spanish and English and were able to assess the quality of the sources used.

## Sources

Publicly available sources in English and Spanish have been consulted across a range of types, such as:

- international organisations: United Nations organisations such as UN Verification Mission in Colombia (UNVMC), UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), and UN Security Council; Organisation of American States (OAS) and its Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR);
- internationally based civil society organisations who conduct human rights monitoring with a focal point in Colombia such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International (AI), Frontline Defenders;
- Colombian government institutions such as the Victims Unit, Ombudsperson's Office, Attorney General's Office, Ministry of Defence, Special Jurisdiction for Peace, Truth Commission;
- local and international think tanks and analytical organisations that monitor and report on conflict, armed groups, crime, and human rights, including the situation of ethnic groups, women, and children/youth in Colombia, such as: Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP), Pares, Somos Defensores, Indepaz (Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz), International Crisis Group, Insight Crime, and the Washington Office of Latin America (WOLA);
- European and other governmental publications that report on human rights in Colombia;
- news media from both Colombian and international sources.

## Oral sources

In addition to using publicly available documentary sources, oral sources were contacted for this report based on their field knowledge of the situation of conflict in Colombia. Some sources who were interviewed chose to remain anonymous for security reasons. Sources were assessed for their background, publication history, reputability, current ground-level knowledge and experience, seriousness of their research, and recognition of their credentials by peers, the media, and international bodies. Oral sources are described in the bibliography in [Annex 1: Bibliography](#).

## Map data

EUAA has provided several maps within this report that are based on reporting by organisations such as FIP, Pares and ACLED. It is important to note that the information and methodologies used to create illustrative maps of illegal armed actors, of violent acts, and of conflict areas, among other indicators, vary according to the source and their methodology. In Colombia, illegal armed groups do not follow a set pattern of presence strictly bound by municipal, departmental or national geopolitical borders; on the contrary, due to the fluidity of



conflict dynamics and their capacity to adapt, illegal armed actors may have a deeper impact on certain areas than in others, even within a same municipality or department. Readers should understand such maps in light of each source's methodology and read them in context with the information provided on the security situation.

## Research challenges

Colombia has dozens of active armed groups and hundreds of active local gangs. This report highlights only the main categories and groups, but there are many localised sub-groups or smaller factions which are too numerous to cover in detail within the page and time constraints of the current report. Additionally, armed groups frequently change names or composition; for example, as the conflict dynamics shift, leaders are killed, or groups merge or hybridise. Information presented in this report captures only a snapshot in time and space. It aims to highlight only the most significant groups to illustrate general dynamics and trends; local situations in Colombia are highly variable and under constant change. This cannot account for all specific local conditions.

Obtaining consistent statistical information on human rights violations, crime, and conflict in Colombia is difficult, due to the multitude of actors gathering information using different methodologies and definitions. Information on violations such as homicides, displacement, confinement, recruitment, targeted killings and other human rights abuses has been provided from a selection of key sources from the government, the UN, and civil society in Colombia. However, within these sources, discrepancies between local reporting on exact numbers arise due to differences in the approaches mentioned. Hence, it is not always possible to provide harmonised figures but rather an overall picture of key trends. Due to the nature of the conflict, research and tracking of civilian deaths and homicides in Colombia is not statistically clear among sources. This can be because of differences in how forms of violence/victimisation are defined, or because of the difficulties establishing whether deaths are related to armed conflict or criminality, as well as whether victims are civilians or combatants. The Colombian National Institute for Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences (INMLCF, Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses), which is one of the government entities that tracks homicides, defines homicides as being when a person kills another, without distinguishing a motive.<sup>3</sup> Colombia's post-conflict Truth Commission defines people killed within the armed conflict as homicides, but does not distinguish civilian from combatant deaths. This report presents information on homicides and civilian impacts such as displacement and confinement from a variety of sources with varying methodologies; the intention is to provide an overall picture, not a singular truth about the situation.

## Note on terminology

This report uses various terms to refer to different illegal armed and criminal groups. There is a plethora of such armed groups and splinter factions, particularly within the dissident groups which split from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo). Illegal armed actors in Colombia are highly fluid, reconfiguring according to the constant competition for resources,

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<sup>3</sup> Colombia, IMNLCF, Forensis: Datos Para La Vida 2020, April 2022, [url](#), p. 85





territories, and profits from illegal economies, among other factors. This report reflects the most common umbrella terms used as of publication date:

1) the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC, Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia) have their genealogy in the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC, Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia), a right-wing paramilitary organisation. AGC is also known as El Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC) (Gaitanista Army of Colombia), Clan del Golfo (Gulf Clan), Los Urabeños, or Clan Úsuga. For the sake of readability and consistency, references to this group in the report generally use the term AGC;

2) 'Guerrilla' groups refer to those of left-wing insurgent origin, but typically now meaning the National Liberation Army (ELN, Ejército de Liberación Nacional) since the FARC-EP demobilisation;

3) 'Post-FARC dissident' groups, which are also called FARC dissident groups, either splintered from the FARC-EP during the peace process or abandoned the reincorporation process after signing the 2016 Peace Agreement. Both continue their armed activities on a more criminal basis;

4) 'Criminal groups' is a term used to refer to those that are essentially organised crime groups and gangs that have no particular political heritage;

5) 'Illegal armed groups' is an umbrella term used in the report to include armed actors other than state security forces such as those already described (AGC, ELN, FARC dissident groups, gangs, etc.).

## Structure and use of the report

This report is intended to capture a general overview of the main issues relevant to international protection in the assessment of claims from Colombia. The report is structured to facilitate the consideration and logical assessment of claims for international protection, providing a general introduction to the country, followed by key issues of importance on the conflict, civilian impacts, state protection, and humanitarian issues:

- Chapter 1: provides a brief overview of recent developments in 2023-2025 summarising and introducing the main findings of the report.
- Chapter 2: provides an overview of the legal and political situation, including demographics and migration profile, system of government, political developments, and international legal instruments that Colombia has ratified.
- Chapter 3: provides an update on the security situation in Colombia, including conflict dynamics and main areas of dispute, main armed and criminal group groups, and current peace initiatives, including the status of the 2016 Peace Agreement and initiatives undertaken in the framework of President Petro's Total Peace, an ambitious project to bring an end to Colombia's six-decade civil conflict.
- Chapter 4: concerns the impact of the violence on civilians and on the human rights dimension. The main issues such as civilian deaths, homicides, extortion, explosive violence, displacement and confinement forced recruitment and other issues are covered, as well as general human rights issues such as prison conditions.





It also provides information on main categories of profiles of individuals who are often targeted for harm, such as social leaders, victims of extortion, former FARC combatants, among others.

- Chapter 5: provides information on the main institutions of the state responsible for justice, human rights, and responses to crime, including the main mechanisms available for those victimised by armed and illegal groups.



# Maps



Map 1. Colombia<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> UN, Colombia, 1 March 2026, [url](#)



# 1. Overview of developments 2023-2025

On 24 November 2016, a final peace agreement was signed in Bogotá between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP) resulting in the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement, officially ending decades of armed conflict with the country's largest Marxist guerrilla group. However, multiple internal armed conflicts persist, and violence remains a serious concern, with an estimated 9 million victims from the long conflict. The Special Jurisdiction for Peace (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, JEP),<sup>5</sup> set up as part of the 2016 FARC peace agreement,<sup>6</sup> has opened several major cases, including crimes by the FARC state forces, paramilitary groups, and the 'false positives' scandal involving over 6 200 civilians killed and falsely labelled as guerrillas. Although around 13 000 – 14 000 FARC-EP members demobilised and 90 % have upheld the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement, over 400 signatories have been killed since 2016—many reportedly by dissident groups. The peace deal also included rural development plans and crop substitution programs, but key commitments, particularly under President Iván Duque's administration (2018–2022), were not fulfilled, contributing to ongoing violence and insecurity.<sup>7</sup> In August 2022, Gustavo Petro became Colombia's first left-wing president. His administration was elected on a platform promising 'Total Peace' (Paz Total) and garnered support from groups such as Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, teachers, students, trade unions, and the LGBTIQ community. Although Petro's administration has faced significant challenges in fulfilling campaign promises, these groups have continued to support him.<sup>8</sup> The national government's Total Peace efforts, primarily reflected in the signing of six governmental decrees that established bilateral ceasefires between the government and the Conquering Self Defense Forces of the Sierra Nevada (Autodefensas Conquistadores de la Sierra Nevada, ACSN), Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia, AGC<sup>9</sup>), Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central, EMC), Second Marquetalia (Segunda Marquetalia, SM), Border Commands (Comandos de la Frontera, CF), and the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN), resulted in not only persistent armed conflict but in even intensified conflict in some areas of the country.<sup>10</sup> For more information, see [Section 3.3.2](#) on 'Total Peace' Plan.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported that, due to the fragmentation and reconfiguration of armed groups, and an unstable situation, they classify that there are currently eight non-international armed conflicts occurring within the country, as of March 2025.<sup>11</sup> The most enduring security problem faced by Colombia is the limited reach of the state's control and an absence of any monopoly of violence. Illegal armed groups have operated and expanded in these regions since the early twentieth century, underpinning the persistence of armed violence in Colombia. Their concentration in areas such as the Pacific coast, eastern plains, Amazon region, southwestern Andes, and border zones, reflects both

<sup>5</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 27

<sup>6</sup> McDermott, J., content added during peer review, 19 November 2025

<sup>7</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 27

<sup>8</sup> El País, Maestros, indígenas, afros: los movimientos sociales mantienen su apoyo a Petro pese a las desilusiones, 29 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>9</sup> The AGC are also known as the Gulf Clan (Clan del Golfo) or Los Urabeños. InSight Crime, Gaitanistas – Gulf Clan, 18 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>10</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Los Contrastes de la Realidad Humanitaria, 2024, [url](#), p. 87

<sup>11</sup> ICRC, Humanitarian Challenges 2025 – Colombia, April 2025, [url](#), p. 10



geographic isolation and their strategic value for illicit economies and conflict-related activities, including cocaine, arms trafficking, and gold. The current dynamics in 2025 illustrate a reconfiguration of violence following the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement, as remaining groups compete to fill the resulting power vacuum.<sup>12</sup> Violence included homicides, forcible recruitment of children and youth, threats and extortion, mobility restrictions, and harm caused by explosive devices, mainly in rural areas.<sup>13</sup> Patterns of expansion, territorial control, and competition/coexistence between armed and criminal groups continued – mainly the AGC, EMC, SM, and ELN – resulting in armed clashes, security challenges, social control, confinements, and forced displacement. In urban areas, groups have increased their presence via outsourcing to smaller local criminal gangs and organised crime groups in strategic areas, while major cities like Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, Sincelejo, and Cúcuta have become 'criminal mobility corridors' for illicit economies, moving drugs, supplies, weapons, and financing to major armed groups.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, despite having a national democratic framework, violence tends to rise during the periods preceding and following presidential and congressional elections. This trend relates to a phenomenon underlying violence against public officials and social leaders characterised by sources as 'subnational authoritarianism'—that is, the reliance on violent, coercive and hierarchical practices to preserve local political monopolies and control.<sup>15</sup>

In the first half of 2025, Colombia experienced a sharp rise in violence related to armed conflict,<sup>16</sup> driven by fragmenting, competing, and expanding criminal and armed groups vying for territory and control over illicit economies,<sup>17</sup> with approximately 1.45 million people affected—over four times more than the same period in 2024.<sup>18</sup> Mass displacement, restrictions on civilian movement, killings, and deaths from violence were also on the rise.<sup>19</sup> Mass displacements occurred every three days on average, and over 500 people were confined daily, with the Pacific region being the most affected. New areas of concern emerged in the Amazon-Orinoquía region, while departments like Chocó, Cauca, Guaviare, and Norte de Santander accounted for 84 % of victims. Compounding the crisis, natural disasters continued to impact regions already suffering from conflict, particularly Antioquia, Nariño, Arauca, and Amazonas.<sup>20</sup>

Despite notable progress in Colombia over the past decade—including the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement, the country's largest guerrilla group—humanitarian needs continued to grow.<sup>21</sup> ICRC indicated that in 2025, the humanitarian situation 'deteriorated considerably' beyond the situation in 2024, and that 2025 was the worst year of the past decade in terms of consequences for civilians.<sup>22</sup> At least 250 000 Colombians have 'suffered from the

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<sup>12</sup> DeJusticia, Correspondence with EUAA, 3 November 2025

<sup>13</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Los Contrastes de la Realidad Humanitaria, 2024, [url](#), p. 87

<sup>14</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Los Contrastes de la Realidad Humanitaria, 2024, [url](#), p. 87

<sup>15</sup> DeJusticia, Correspondence with EUAA, 3 November 2024; Albarracín, J. et al., Local competitive authoritarianism and post-conflict violence. An analysis of the assassination of social leaders in Colombia, *International Interactions*, Vol. 49, No. 2, [url](#), p. 261

<sup>16</sup> UNOCHA, Informe de Tendencias e Impacto Humanitario en 2025 | Datos acumulados entre enero - junio de 2025, 24 July 2025, [url](#); France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 27; Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Los Contrastes de la Realidad Humanitaria, 2024, [url](#), pp. 21-24

<sup>17</sup> New Humanitarian (The), Colombia's surge in armed violence: How did we get here?, 31 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>18</sup> UNOCHA, Informe de Tendencias e Impacto Humanitario en 2025 | Datos acumulados entre enero - junio de 2025, 24 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>19</sup> New Humanitarian (The), Colombia's intensifying conflict in three graphs, 30 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>20</sup> UNOCHA, Informe de Tendencias e Impacto Humanitario en 2025 | Datos acumulados entre enero - junio de 2025, 24 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>21</sup> UNOCHA, Colombia, n.d., [url](#); EU, ECHO, Colombia, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>22</sup> ICRC, Colombia : 2025 set to be the decade's worst year in humanitarian terms, 30 July 2025, [url](#)



humanitarian consequences of the conflict' in 2023, including due to forced displacement, confinements, threats, homicides, landmine explosions, and forced recruitment.<sup>23</sup> Colombia's situation remains complex, with an acute and multi-dimensional humanitarian crisis driven by the territorial expansion of armed non-state actors, the increasing effects of climate-related disasters, worsening socio-economic vulnerabilities, and the integration needs of over 2.9 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants.<sup>24</sup> In recent years, due to the expansion of armed groups, intensifying territorial disputes between splinter factions, increased social control, recruitment of children and youth, sexual violence and explosive hazards, among others, the situation worsened for civilians.<sup>25</sup> According to the EU Commission's European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, 'the humanitarian impact continues to exceed the response capacity of government entities and humanitarian partners in several parts of Colombia,' and as a result an estimated 9.1 million people were projected to require humanitarian assistance in 2025 and will depend on complementary support from humanitarian actors.<sup>26</sup> Violence from situations of conflict has resulted in forced displacements and confinements of communities over the years, especially for Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities.<sup>27</sup> Gaps in assistance persisted due to lack of resources and security conditions limiting humanitarian access, mostly related to threats and violence against personnel, armed clashes and the enforcement of armed lockdowns and mobility restrictions affecting operations.<sup>28</sup> Recurring violence, lack of state presence and the absence of protection guarantees in areas to which previously displaced persons have returned to, is a growing concern.<sup>29</sup>

UNOCHA commented that Petro's administration has made significant policy strides and demonstrated a 'proactive commitment' to advancing the Total Peace efforts by fostering dialogues and ceasefires with certain non-state armed groups. However, 'despite these commendable efforts, Colombia still grapples with overlapping persistent humanitarian challenges, especially in areas affected by internal armed conflict and ongoing disasters which has constrained State presence and capacity. While some progress has been made in reduction in violence from armed confrontations because of cease-fire agreements, concerns about child recruitment, gender-based violence, landmine contamination, displacement, mobility and access restraints persist in areas affected by the presence of non-state armed groups. Current trends suggest the continuation of mass emergencies and related humanitarian needs.'<sup>30</sup>

Lastly, Colombia has been regarded as a pioneer in protecting human rights defenders with the creation of a protection programme in 1997.<sup>31</sup> However, the state lacks a comprehensive protection policy for human rights defenders, and relies on the UNP to guarantee the security of persons-at-risk.<sup>32</sup> The Petro administration made 'concerted efforts' to address violence against social leaders and human rights defenders,<sup>33</sup> and as described in this report, Colombia

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<sup>23</sup> EU, ECHO, Colombia, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>24</sup> EU, ECHO, Colombia, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>25</sup> ICRC, Humanitarian Challenges 2025 – Colombia, April 2025, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>26</sup> EU, ECHO, Colombia, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>27</sup> EU, EEAS, 2023 EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World, 29 May 2024, [url](#), p. 288;

UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 December 2024, [url](#), para. 39; ICRC, La situación humanitaria en Colombia ha seguido deteriorándose en 2024, 3 July 2024, [url](#)

<sup>28</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2025/419), 27 June 2025, [url](#), para. 36

<sup>29</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2025/419), 27 June 2025, [url](#), para. 36

<sup>30</sup> UNOCHA, Colombia, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>31</sup> Wesche, P., Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, [url](#), p. 324

<sup>32</sup> OAS, IACHR, Observaciones Preliminares: Visita in loco a Colombia 15-19 abril 2024, [url](#), pp. 5-6

<sup>33</sup> EU, EEAS, 2023 EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World, 29 May 2024, [url](#), p. 265





has a number of policies, mechanisms, and laws to prevent abuses against profiles of targeted persons such as human rights defenders, former combatants and other individuals at risk; however, implementation of these measures is often 'poor'. Colombia also has more than 14 relevant laws and decrees and 18 institutional bodies involved in protecting human rights defenders. The government's strategy has 'primarily focused on physical security of individuals at risk,' but has evolved to take 'greater account of prevention and accountability.'<sup>34</sup> In April 2025, the JEP also commented that in relation to precautionary protection measures for former combatants, the existing protection measures have limited effects.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Wesche, P., Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, [url](#), p. 324

<sup>35</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary General, 27 June 2025, [url](#), para. 35





## 2. Legal and political situation

### 2.1. Demographics and migration profile

The population of Colombia in 2025 was estimated at 53.06 million.<sup>36</sup> For 2023, an estimated 7.6 % of the population were Afro-descendant, Black, Raizal, or Palenquero; a further 4.1 % were Indigenous, and 88.3 % of the population were listed as not having an ethnic group,<sup>37</sup> which encompasses those who are Mestizo (mixed race people of indigenous/white heritage) and White.<sup>38</sup> Colombia is considered an upper middle-income economy<sup>39</sup> and it is member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).<sup>40</sup> The country, however, has one of the highest income inequality levels in the world.<sup>41</sup> High levels of poverty,<sup>42</sup> unemployment, and informal employment are also a challenge.<sup>43</sup> Colombia has one of the highest numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world.<sup>44</sup> According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), there were 7.3 million IDPs in Colombia at the end of 2024.<sup>45</sup>

Colombia is an origin, transit, and destination country of asylum-seekers and migrants.<sup>46</sup> Since the signing of the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement, Colombians have made increasing applications for international protection in Europe, rising from 1 050 in 2016<sup>47</sup> to 43 280 in 2022, 63 211 in 2023, and down again to 51 529 in 2024. Recognition rates for Colombians remained low, but varied from 6 % in 2022, to 7 % in 2023, and 5 % in 2024.<sup>48</sup> US immigration measures have decreased the number of migrants transiting through Colombia towards North America.<sup>49</sup> In 2024, Colombia reported 400 612 irregular migrants transiting through the country, with main nationalities including Venezuela (302 185), Ecuador (22 785), and Haiti (17 329), and others such as China, India, Vietnam, and Bangladesh.<sup>50</sup> Between January and October 2025, the number was 129 656, with main nationalities being from Venezuela (17 681), Peru (103), Ecuador (99), and Chile (26).<sup>51</sup> Panamanian authorities reported that the number of Colombians crossing through the Darién Gap was 17 529 in 2024<sup>52</sup> and 189 between January and September 2025; in both years, Colombians were the second highest

<sup>36</sup> Colombia, DANE, ¿Cuántos somos?, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>37</sup> Colombia, DANE, Resultados para población negra, afrodescendiente, raizal y palenquera: Encuesta Nacional de Calidad de Vida (ECV) 2023, 14 November 2024, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>38</sup> US, CIA, The World Factbook: Colombia, 30 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>39</sup> World Bank (The), Data for Colombia, Upper middle income, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>40</sup> OECD, Colombia, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>41</sup> EC, International Partnerships – Colombia, n.d., [url](#); World Bank (The), World Bank Poverty Report Highlights Persistent Inequalities in Colombia, 3 December 2024, [url](#)

<sup>42</sup> HRW, World Report 2025 – Colombia, 16 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>43</sup> Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2024 Country Report – Colombia, 2024, [url](#), p. 4

<sup>44</sup> UNHCR, Emergency appeal: Colombia emergency, December 2024, [url](#); IDMC, Colombia, 14 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>45</sup> IDMC, Colombia, 14 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>46</sup> FIP, ¿Colombia está dejando de ser atractiva para los migrantes venezolanos?, 28 May 2024, [url](#); Colombia, Reunión Informal de la Plenaria de la Asamblea General: Reporte Bienal del SG sobre la implementación del Pacto Global sobre Migración, 5 December 2024, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>47</sup> EU, EC, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Seventh Report Under the Visa Suspension Mechanism (COM(2024) 571 Final, 6 December 2024, [url](#), pp. 47, 48, 49

<sup>48</sup> EUAA, EPS data as of 3 February 2025

<sup>49</sup> InSight Crime, La desaceleración del flujo de migrantes en Colombia aprieta ganancias del tráfico de personas, 13 March 2025, [url](#); El País, Un éxodo a la inversa: cerca de un centenar de migrantes regresa cada día a Colombia desde Estados Unidos y México, 20 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>50</sup> Colombia, Migración Colombia, Migración en Tránsito Irregular, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>51</sup> Colombia, Migración Colombia, Migración Irregular en Tránsito, 15 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>52</sup> Panama, Migración, Tránsito irregular por Darién 2024, [url](#), p. 2



nationality after Venezuelans.<sup>53</sup> Migrants attempting to cross the Darién Gap encounter abuses and human rights violations,<sup>54</sup> including extortion, human trafficking, kidnapping, and sexual/physical violence.<sup>55</sup> Organised crime groups such as the Gulf Clan control migration routes in and out of Colombia via the Darién Gap and Ecuador.<sup>56</sup>

In 2021, Colombia was commended by the UN in its response to the unprecedented migration of millions of Venezuelans over its borders by offering them a regularisation scheme.<sup>57</sup> The Temporary Protection Status (TPS) is a mechanism that was established by the Colombian government in 2021 and grants Venezuelans access to essential goods and services as well as formal and legal employment under equal conditions.<sup>58</sup> There were more than 2.815 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants living in Colombia as of December 2024.<sup>59</sup> According to data published by the Government of Colombia as of 22 January 2025, 2 133 071 TPS permits have been authorised and there were a further 2 574 000 pre-registrations.<sup>60</sup> Some Venezuelans encountered stigmatising narratives and acts of xenophobia.<sup>61</sup>

## 2.2. System of government

Colombia is a federal republic with a democratic representative political system and a clear division of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches.<sup>62</sup> It is governed by the Constitution of 1991.<sup>63</sup>

### 2.2.1. Branches

The President and Vice-President are elected by direct universal suffrage by absolute majority. The Legislative branch is made up of the Congress (166 representatives) and the Senate (102 representatives), both of which are elected to four-year terms.<sup>64</sup> In 2023, Colombia elected Gustavo Petro, the first left-wing president in its history.<sup>65</sup>

The judiciary is made up of four high courts: the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), for ordinary jurisdiction matters; the Constitutional Court (Corte Constitucional), for matters of constitutionality; the Higher Council of the Judiciary (Consejo Superior de la Judicatura), which deals with the conduct of judicial officials and conflicts of jurisdiction; and

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<sup>53</sup> Panama, Migración, Tránsito irregular por Darién 2025, [url](#), p. 2

<sup>54</sup> Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024 – Colombia, 2024, [url](#)

<sup>55</sup> EU, EEAS, 2023 EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World, 29 May 2024, [url](#), p. 265;

InSight Crime, GameChangers 2024: Crime Cashes in on Migration Boom, 26 December 2024, [url](#)

<sup>56</sup> InSight Crime, GameChangers 2024: Crime Cashes in on Migration Boom, 26 December 2024, [url](#); WOLA, Migrants in Colombia: Between government absence and criminal control, 20 June 2024, [url](#)

<sup>57</sup> UN, News, La ONU elogia la decisión de Colombia de dar protección temporal a los 1,7 millones de venezolanos residentes en el país, 8 February 2021, [url](#)

<sup>58</sup> UN, Implementation and socialization of the Temporary Protection Statute for Venezuelan Migrants (ETPV in Spanish) and Law 2136 of 2021 for the regulation and orientation of the Comprehensive Migration Policy (PIM) of the Colombian State, 26 September 2024, [url](#)

<sup>59</sup> Colombia, Migración Colombia, Informe de migrantes venezolanas(os) en Colombia a diciembre 31 de 2024, 10 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>60</sup> Colombia, Estatuto Temporal de Protección para Migrantes Venezolanos – ETPV, 28 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>61</sup> Indepaz, La estigmatización en Colombia: una estrategia de guerra, November 2024, [url](#), p. 4; FIP, Doce barreras para la inclusión de jóvenes migrantes en Colombia, March 2025, [url](#), p. 12

<sup>62</sup> OAS, Sistema Legal Colombiano, n.d., [url](#), p. 1

<sup>63</sup> OAS, Sistema Legal Colombiano, n.d., [url](#), p. 1

<sup>64</sup> OAS, Sistema Legal Colombiano, n.d., [url](#), p. 1

<sup>65</sup> EU, EEAS, 2023 EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World, 29 May 2024, [url](#), p. 265;

Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2024 Country Report – Colombia, 2024, [url](#), p. 3



the Council of the State (Consejo de Estado), which deals with administrative litigation.<sup>66</sup> The following is the breakdown of the justice system:<sup>67</sup>




Figure 1: Structure of the judiciary system<sup>68</sup>

Two additional jurisdictions are the 'special jurisdictions', which includes the Jurisdicción de las Comunidades Indígenas ('indigenous jurisdiction'), which covers indigenous territories and is carried out by indigenous authorities under the Constitution and the laws of Colombia, and the La Jurisdicción de Paz ('peace jurisdiction'), which is carried out by justices of the peace to address community conflicts.<sup>69</sup>

The Office of the Attorney General (Fiscalía General de la Nación, FGN) is the institution of the judiciary with administrative and budgetary autonomy responsible for carrying out criminal investigations and the prosecution of crimes committed in the country.<sup>70</sup> The National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences (Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses, INMLCF) is the agency responsible for providing technical and scientific support to prosecutors, judges, judicial police, and other authorities, through the collection of evidence and the provision of expert legal medicine and forensic advice.<sup>71</sup> For additional information, see [Section 5](#) on state institutions and access to justice.

## 2.2.2. State security forces

State security forces consist of the military (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and the National Police of Colombia (Policía Nacional de Colombia, PNC).<sup>72</sup> The number of troops in the armed forces varies according to the source, with the CIA Factbook indicating that in 2025 the number was 260 000.<sup>73</sup> The Ministry of Defence indicated that in 2022, the Army had over 174 000 troops

<sup>66</sup> OAS, Sistema Legal Colombiano, n.d., [url](#), p. 2

<sup>67</sup> Colombia, Función Pública, Rama Judicial, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>68</sup> Graphic created by EUAA based on: Colombia, Función Pública, Rama Judicial, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>69</sup> Colombia, Rama Judicial, n.d., [url](#), pp. 5-6

<sup>70</sup> Colombia, Rama Judicial, n.d., [url](#), pp. 12-14

<sup>71</sup> Colombia, Rama Judicial, n.d., [url](#), p. 17

<sup>72</sup> Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa, Estructura, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>73</sup> US, CIA, The World Factbook: Colombia, 30 September 2025, [url](#)





and in 2025, the number increased to over 181 000.<sup>74</sup> The National Police has about 180 000 personnel.<sup>75</sup>

### 2.2.3. Oversight Institutions

The Public Ministry is exercised mainly by the Office of the Inspector General (Procuraduría General de la Nación, PGN), as well as the Office of the Ombudsperson (Defensor del Pueblo) and Municipal Ombudspersons (Personerías Municipales).<sup>76</sup> The PGN carries out investigations against public servants and civilians managing state resources.<sup>77</sup> The PGN has competency over the jurisdictions of administrative litigation, constitutional, the Higher Council of the Judiciary, administrative authorities, police authorities, and in different areas, including penal, penal military, civil, environmental, agrarian, family, and labour.<sup>78</sup>

The Office of the Ombudsperson is the entity responsible for 'defending, promoting, and protecting human rights, guarantees and freedoms of the inhabitants of the national territory and of Colombians residing abroad, against illegal, unjust, unreasonable, negligent or arbitrary acts, threats or actions by any authority or private individuals'.<sup>79</sup> The Office of the Ombudsperson receives complaints regarding the violation of human rights and humanitarian international law by state officials, and advocates before competent authorities for a proper investigation into these violations.<sup>80</sup> For additional information, see Section [5.3](#) on the Office of the Ombudsperson.

Municipal Ombudspersons act as the Public Ministry at the municipal level, advocating for the promotion and protection of human rights and the public interest, and the oversight of municipal public servants.<sup>81</sup> Municipal Ombudspersons receive complaints regarding the violation of political or civil rights and social guarantees, and advocate before competent authorities for a proper investigation into these violations.<sup>82</sup>

The Office of the Comptroller General (Contraloría General de la República, CGR), is the 'highest fiscal control body of the State. As such, its mission is to ensure the proper use of public resources and assets and to contribute to the modernization of the State'.<sup>83</sup>

## 2.3. Political developments

In July 2025, former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez was found guilty of witness tampering and procedural fraud and was sentenced to 12 years of house arrest.<sup>84</sup> The judge ruled that Uribe Vélez ordered third parties to manipulate incarcerated witnesses to testify in his favour after being accused in 2012 by opposition Senator Iván Cepeda of having links to paramilitary

<sup>74</sup> Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa, "El Ejército tiene más de 181 mil efectivos. No hay debilitamiento en las Fuerzas Militares": MinDefensa, 1 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>75</sup> Colombia, PNC, Staff figures, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>76</sup> Colombia, Constitución Política de Colombia, 1991, [url](#), Art. 118

<sup>77</sup> Colombia, PGN, Objetivos y Funciones, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>78</sup> Colombia, PGN, Objetivos y Funciones, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>79</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Conoce nuestra entidad, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>80</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Portafolio de Servicios y Procedimientos Administrativos (OPAS), Versión 4 – 2024, 2024, [url](#), p. 6

<sup>81</sup> Colombia, Función Pública, ABC del Personero Municipal, n.d., [url](#), p. 3

<sup>82</sup> Colombia, Función Pública, ABC del Personero Municipal, n.d., [url](#), p. 3

<sup>83</sup> Colombia, Ministerio del Interior, Contraloría General de la República, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>84</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 9





organisations.<sup>85</sup> On 21 October 2025, the High Tribunal of Bogotá absolved Uribe Vélez of the charges in a second instance ruling and quashed the first instance decision.<sup>86</sup>

The electoral calendars for Congress and President were open in March 2025.<sup>87</sup> Elections for Congress are scheduled for 8 March 2026, and for President and Vice-President, on 31 May 2026.<sup>88</sup> On 26 October 2025, left-wing coalition Historic Pact carried out its presidential primaries, nominating Senator Iván Cepeda, with 65.13 % of the votes, as its presidential candidate.<sup>89</sup> Centre-to-right wing parties are in consultations to establish a coalition and nominate a presidential candidate.<sup>90</sup>

President Petro's popularity has been plummeting in recent years due to the failure to consolidate the 'Total Peace' plan with various illegal armed groups, the stalling of social and economic reforms, rising crime, and the security situation, particularly in the remote areas of the country.<sup>91</sup> On 24 October 2025, the US government designated President Gustavo Petro to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)'s sanctions list 'for having engaged in, or attempted to engage in, activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a significant risk of materially contributing to, the international proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of production'. President Petro's wife and First lady, Veronica Alcocer; his son, Nicolas Petro Burgos, and Colombia's Minister of the Interior, Armando Benedetti, were also designated.<sup>92</sup> This came after the decertification of Colombia by the US.<sup>93</sup>

In 2024, there were over 3 800 demonstrations in Colombia, mostly about labour disputes (21 % of the protests), access to public services (16 %), right to education (15 %), lack of investment or state presence (9 %), right to life, liberty, integrity and security of the person (8 %), transportation (7 %), access to health, environment, gender violence, land and housing, among others (3 % to 5 % each).<sup>94</sup>

### 2.3.1. Political violence in the context of the 2026 elections

According to the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation (Fundación Paz y Reconciliación, Pares), a Colombian think tank that promotes human rights and produces research on country conditions with a focus on peace and security, between 8 March and 9 October 2025, 109 cases of political violence were recorded in the country, including 11 killings, 33 attacks, 61 cases of threats, and four cases of kidnapping.<sup>95</sup> Pares reported that among those killed were

<sup>85</sup> BBC News, El Tribunal Superior de Bogotá absuelve a Álvaro Uribe de todos los cargos en Colombia: qué pasa ahora, 21 October 2025, [url](#); El País, El caso contra Álvaro Uribe, paso a paso: de la acusación de paramilitarismo a la absolución por soborno a testigos y fraude procesal, 21 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>86</sup> BBC News, El Tribunal Superior de Bogotá absuelve a Álvaro Uribe de todos los cargos en Colombia: qué pasa ahora, 21 October 2025, [url](#); El País, El caso contra Álvaro Uribe, paso a paso: de la acusación de paramilitarismo a la absolución por soborno a testigos y fraude procesal, 21 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>87</sup> Colombia, PGN, Presidencia y Congreso 2026, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>88</sup> Colombia, Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, Procesos electorales 2026, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>89</sup> Colombia, Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, Avance 69 – Presidencia, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>90</sup> Infobae, Alianza política de partidos de derecha prepara una ofensiva electoral: Abelardo de la Espriella podría ser clave, 5 November 2025, [url](#); Semana, Llegó la hora de la verdad: ¿será posible una unión para derrotar al petrismo en las elecciones de 2026? Estos son los detalles desconocidos de lo que está pasando, 8 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>91</sup> Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), p. 10

<sup>92</sup> US, Department of the Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Colombian President Gustavo Petro and His Support Network, 24 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>93</sup> McDermott, J., content added during peer review, 19 November 2025

<sup>94</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, En 2024 aumentaron los conflictos sociales en Colombia: un 87% más que en el año 2023, 27 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>95</sup> Pares, Tercer Informe de Violencia Político- Electoral, 23 October 2025, [url](#), pp. 4, 6





politicians from Democratic Centre (Centro Democrático), MAIS Party, Historic Pact (Pacto Histórico), and Conservative Party.<sup>96</sup> The departments with the highest number of cases of political violence within the same reference period were Cauca (12 cases), Antioquia (8), Valle del Cauca (8), and Norte de Santander (6).<sup>97</sup> The most common profiles victims of political violence cases were councillors (52 cases), mayors (23), and public servants (18).<sup>98</sup> Main perpetrators included FARC dissident groups (17 cases), Gulf Clan (2), and unknown actors (82).<sup>99</sup> According to the Office of the Ombudsperson, main political violence targeted profiles for the upcoming elections in 2026 include pre-candidates, candidates, supporters, collaborators, members or leaders of political parties or movements, opposition movements and coalitions, social or grassroots movements participating in politics, ethnic minority organisations, election observers, human rights defenders and social leaders, victims of the armed conflict in political participation, signatories of the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement, and journalists.<sup>100</sup> The Office of the Ombudsperson also indicated that critical areas of political violence for the upcoming elections include the Catatumbo region (Norte de Santander), Pacific coastal areas of Nariño and Cauca, Antioquia, Caquetá, lower Putumayo, and Arauca.<sup>101</sup>

Members of the opposition have questioned President Petro for the lack of security guarantees for the opposition ahead of the 2026 elections.<sup>102</sup> The following are among instances of political violence as reported by sources:

- On 11 August 2025, Senator and presidential hopeful Miguel Uribe Turbay died after being shot during a political rally in Bogotá in June 2025.<sup>103</sup> Uribe Turbay was a prominent member of the Democratic Centre party and was seeking the party's nomination for the 2026 presidential elections.<sup>104</sup> Nine individuals have been arrested in connection with the attack.<sup>105</sup> Authorities attributed the attack to FARC dissident group Segunda Marquetalia.<sup>106</sup> El Tiempo reported that the FGN is exploring two hypotheses: that the killing was carried out as a show de force for the next elections, or that Uribe Turbay was killed by a faction of Segunda Marquetalia to take over the leadership of the illegal armed group.<sup>107</sup> Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted within the time constraints of this report.

<sup>96</sup> Pares, Tercer Informe de Violencia Político- Electoral, 23 October 2025, [url](#), pp. 3-4

<sup>97</sup> Pares, Tercer Informe de Violencia Político- Electoral, 23 October 2025, [url](#), p. 10

<sup>98</sup> Pares, Tercer Informe de Violencia Político- Electoral, 23 October 2025, [url](#), p. 14

<sup>99</sup> Pares, Tercer Informe de Violencia Político- Electoral, 23 October 2025, [url](#), p. 15

<sup>100</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana 013-2025, 22 September 2025, [url](#), p. 21

<sup>101</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana 013-2025, 22 September 2025, [url](#), p. 108

<sup>102</sup> El Espectador, “Exigimos garantías al gobierno Petro”: oposición tras atentado a exconcejal en Arauca, 30 September 2025, [url](#); Infobae, Oposición culpó a Gobierno Petro del ataque al carro de campaña de Abelardo de la Espriella: “No atiende los llamados”, 14 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>103</sup> BBC NEWS, Teenager who shot Colombian senator sentenced to seven years, 28 August 2025, [url](#); UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 4

<sup>104</sup> BBC NEWS, Teenager who shot Colombian senator sentenced to seven years, 28 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>105</sup> El País, Una nueva captura refuerza la hipótesis de que la Segunda Marquetalia planeó el magnicidio de Miguel Uribe Turbay, 28 October 2025, [url](#); La Silla Vacía, Fiscalía maneja dos hipótesis sobre magnicidio de Miguel Uribe Turbay, 3 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>106</sup> El País, Una nueva captura refuerza la hipótesis de que la Segunda Marquetalia planeó el magnicidio de Miguel Uribe Turbay, 28 October 2025, [url](#); swissinfo.ch, Fiscalía colombiana acusa a dos presuntos autores del magnicidio del senador Uribe Turbay, 6 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>107</sup> In La Silla Vacía, Fiscalía maneja dos hipótesis sobre magnicidio de Miguel Uribe Turbay, 3 November 2025, [url](#)





- On 13 October 2025, a vehicle belonging to the regional coordinator of Homeland Defenders Movement (Movimiento Defensores de la Patria) in Arauca department was incinerated by unknown assailants.<sup>108</sup>
- On 30 September 2025, the bullet-proof vehicle of former Democratic Centre councillor for Saravena, Arauca, Luis Naranjo, was attacked by six heavily armed assailants when he was leaving his house. During the attack, which is reportedly the fourth registered against Naranjo and is attributed to the ELN, two of Naranjo's bodyguards were grievously wounded.<sup>109</sup>

## 2.4. International legal instruments

Colombia is a member of the UN, the Organization of American States (OAS), and has ratified both regional and international human rights instruments, including the following conventions:<sup>110</sup> Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Second Optional Protocol aiming to the abolition of the death penalty (ICCPR); Convention on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR); International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW); Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and Optional protocols; and Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CPRD).<sup>111</sup>

Colombia has also ratified the American Convention on Human Rights, which also establishes the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR).<sup>112</sup> Colombia is a State Party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and the Cartagena Declaration, which expands the definition of 'refugee' by incorporating additional grounds including generalised violence and foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.<sup>113</sup> In terms of domestic law upholding these obligations, Article 93 of the Constitution indicates that all treaties and international conventions that recognise human rights and prevent their violation prevail over domestic legislation.<sup>114</sup>

The Constitution guarantees under Article 13 that 'all individuals are born free and equal before the law, shall receive equal protection and treatment from authorities, and shall enjoy the same rights, freedoms, and opportunities without any discrimination on account of gender,

<sup>108</sup> swissinfo.ch, Incendian un vehículo decorado con la imagen de un precandidato presidencial colombiano, 14 October 2025, [url](#); Infobae, Oposición culpó a Gobierno Petro del ataque al carro de campaña de Abelardo de la Espriella: "No atiende los llamados", 14 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>109</sup> Infobae, Atentado contra exconcejal del Centro Democrático: dos de sus escoltas quedaron gravemente heridos, 30 September 2025, [url](#); swissinfo.ch, Al menos dos escoltas heridos deja un atentado contra un exconcejal en el este de Colombia, 30 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>110</sup> IJRC, Colombia Factsheet, 15 February 2018, [url](#)

<sup>111</sup> OHCHR, UN Treaty Database – Colombia, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>112</sup> OAS, IACHR, What is the I/A Court H.R., n.d., [url](#)

<sup>113</sup> UNHCR, Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, 1984, [url](#)

<sup>114</sup> Colombia, Constitución Política de Colombia, 1991, [url](#)





race, national or family origin, language, religion, political opinion or philosophy'.<sup>115</sup> Anti-discrimination legislation (Ley 1482) was passed in 2011 prohibiting racism and discrimination for reasons of nationality, sex, sexual orientation, under penalty of imprisonment for 12 to 36 months or fines.<sup>116</sup> Additionally, Article 58 (3) of the Penal Code (2000) provides for aggravated circumstances in the punishment of crimes on the grounds of 'race, ethnicity, ideology, religion, or beliefs, sex or sexual orientation, or any illness or disability of the victim'.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> Colombia, Constitución Política de Colombia, 1991, [url](#)

<sup>116</sup> Colombia, Ley 1482 de 2011, 2011, [url](#)

<sup>117</sup> Colombia, Código Penal, 2000, [url](#)





### 3. Security situation

The security situation and conflict dynamics vary widely in Colombia. This report provides a brief, high-level overview of the main areas of dispute, key groups involved, and overview of types of violence occurring in the reference period. It is not possible to provide an exhaustive picture of the conflict dynamics in every dimension of Colombia.

Sources indicated that illegal armed groups have increased their presence in the country, including in remote areas.<sup>118</sup> The expansion is closely related to the profit-seeking of these groups from illegal economies such as drug trafficking and illegal mining.<sup>119</sup> Sources reported that, according to a July 2025 military intelligence report, illegal armed groups have expanded territorial presence in recent years and, in some areas, they also forge alliances to control profits from illegal economies such as drug trafficking, illegal mining, and extortion,<sup>120</sup> as well as to coordinate to evade authorities and security operations.<sup>121</sup> There were also examples of high profile attacks in urban areas in 2025 such as in August 2025 with two large attacks attributed to FARC dissident factions: a car bomb attack in Cali that killed 6 and injured 60 people and a drone attack on a police helicopter outside of Medellín, that killed at least 12 people.<sup>122</sup>

In July 2025, Reuters reported that, according to a government internal security report, illegal armed groups have increased the number of combatants and expanded their territorial control in the last three years, despite government efforts to negotiate ceasefires under the 'Total Peace' plan.<sup>123</sup> According to the report, combatants increased from around 15 000 in mid-2022 to over 21 950 in June 2025.<sup>124</sup> In November 2025, El Tiempo reported that according to another intelligence report, the number of combatants of illegal armed groups increased to over 25 200.<sup>125</sup>

Illegal armed actors are accused of committing human rights violations against civilians, including forced displacement, land dispossession, restrictions on the freedom of movement, killings, targeted killings, threats, forced recruitment, and use of antipersonnel mines.<sup>126</sup> In a number of areas of the country, illegal armed groups have established forms of social and territorial control that resemble parallel governance schemes, with the monopoly of justice,

<sup>118</sup> Reuters, Colombian armed groups have expanded during Petro's presidency, report finds, 8 July 2025, [url](#); HRW, World Report 2025 – Colombia, 16 January 2025, [url](#); Pares, ¿Plomo es lo que viene?: Balance y retos de la política de paz total 2022-2024, 2024, [url](#), pp. 7, 45, 221

<sup>119</sup> Reuters, Colombian armed groups have expanded during Petro's presidency, report finds, 8 July 2025, [url](#); HRW, World Report 2025 – Colombia, 16 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>120</sup> Infobae, Estas son las zonas en las que hay alianzas entre grupos armados de Colombia: Fuerzas Militares revelaron objetivos del accionar, 30 October 2025, [url](#); Caracol, Estas son las zonas más críticas en cuestión de alianzas de grupos armados ilegales en Colombia, 30 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>121</sup> Infobae, Estas son las zonas en las que hay alianzas entre grupos armados de Colombia: Fuerzas Militares revelaron objetivos del accionar, 30 October 2025, [url](#); Caracol, Estas son las zonas más críticas en cuestión de alianzas de grupos armados ilegales en Colombia, 30 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>122</sup> BBC News, At least 18 killed and dozens injured in separate Colombia attacks, 22 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>123</sup> Reuters, Colombian armed groups have expanded during Petro's presidency, report finds, 8 July 2025, [url](#). See also: HRW, World Report 2025 – Colombia, 16 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>124</sup> Reuters, Colombian armed groups have expanded during Petro's presidency, report finds, 8 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>125</sup> El Tiempo, Desde 2022, los grupos armados sumaron 10.000 nuevos integrantes: así fue el comportamiento año tras año, 4 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>126</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 23; UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in Colombia: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 22 January 2025, [url](#), paras. 18, 19, 20, 26, 76



authority, and local economies, through the use of systematic violence, including threats, targeted killings, forced displacement, and massacres.<sup>127</sup> According to Pares, illegal armed groups are creating social organisations to coopt community programs and drive away community organisations and human rights defenders.<sup>128</sup> Sources reported that illegal armed groups conduct surveillance via electronic communications and community networks, and plan armed actions with information collected through these channels.<sup>129</sup> Members of the security forces have also been assassinated in the course of their duties, with 146 cases reported between January-September 2025, an increase from 64 in 2024 and 69 in 2023.<sup>130</sup>

The UN reported in September 2025 that attacks by armed groups have been increasing in recent months.<sup>131</sup> Violence in areas such as Catatumbo (Norte de Santander), Bolívar, Cauca, and Arauca remained complex.<sup>132</sup> According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), between January and August 2025, it recorded over 1 200 attacks against civilians, affecting over 85 000 civilians; 659 armed actions, affecting 7500 people; and 342 instances of use of explosive devices, affecting over 6 500 people.<sup>133</sup>

Period	Category	Location / Actor	Armed actions
2023	Departments / regions	Cauca	188
		Caribbean region	174
		Antioquia	114
		Catatumbo	87
		Arauca	75
	<b>Total</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>1 047</b>
2024	Departments / regions	Cauca	240
		Caribbean region	164
		Antioquia	118
		Arauca	81
		Catatumbo	71
	<b>Total</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>1 067</b>
	Illegal armed groups	General Staff of Blocks and Fronts (EMBF)	367
		Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC)	177
		National Liberation Army (ELN)	112
		National Coordinator of the Bolivarian Army (CNEB)	41
		ACSN	19
January–May 2025	Departments / regions	Catatumbo	140
		Cauca	96
		Caribbean region	67
		Antioquia	63
		Arauca	39
	<b>Total</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>603</b>
	Illegal armed groups	EMC & General Staff of Blocks and Fronts (EMBF, combined)	179
		National Liberation Army (ELN)	162
		Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC)	65
January–July 2025	Departments	Cauca	126
		Antioquia	67
		Norte de Santander	64
		Valle del Cauca	50
		Nariño	45
		Bolívar	43

<sup>127</sup> Indepaz, ¿Control social o dictadura local?, 1 December 2024, [url](#); UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in Colombia: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 22 January 2025, [url](#), paras. 11-12

<sup>128</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 23

<sup>129</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 23; Infobae, Una guerra diaria desde el cielo, esta es la cifra de ataques con drones en el suroccidente colombiano, 15 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>130</sup> Colombia, Seguimiento a indicadores y resultados operacionales (16 October 2025), September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>131</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 10

<sup>132</sup> Verdad Abierta, Paz Total: ¿un paso adelante y dos atrás?, 21 April 2025, [url](#); El Colombiano, Hay 12 frentes activos de confrontación entre actores armados: Informe de Federación Nacional de Departamentos, 28 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>133</sup> UNOCHA, Colombia: Informe de situación humanitaria 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), p. 2



Table 1: Armed actions by illegal armed groups in Colombia (2023-2025), 18 June 2025<sup>134</sup>

The areas most affected by violence tended to be those formerly controlled by the FARC-EP,<sup>135</sup> with a significant presence<sup>136</sup> and contested resources such as coca crops and illegal mining.<sup>137</sup> These areas include Antioquia, Norte de Santander, Bolívar, Cauca, La Guajira,<sup>138</sup> Chocó, Nariño, Putumayo, Caquetá, Guaviare, Meta, Valle del Cauca,<sup>139</sup> and Arauca.<sup>140</sup>

Sources noted the increasing use of drones by illegal armed groups to conduct surveillance and attacks against state security forces and/or other illegal armed groups.<sup>141</sup> Drones are reportedly commercial crafts modified to drop explosives.<sup>142</sup> In July 2025, for example, FARC dissident groups launched a drone against the police station of Santander de Quilichao, Cauca, killing a female police officer and injuring two others, and in rural Jamundí, Valle del Cauca, a drone attack against a local community left two children injured.<sup>143</sup> Semana reported that, according to the Colombian military, 252 attacks with drones were documented in the country between January and July 2025, an average of 1.29 drone attacks per day.<sup>144</sup> In October 2025, the army indicated that in the previous year-and-a-half, over 350 drone attacks were reported, which left 15 state security forces killed and 170 wounded.<sup>145</sup> Most drone attacks have taken place in Cauca, particularly in Argelia (30 attacks), El Tambo (29), and Suárez (22).<sup>146</sup> According to the army, in March and April 2025, three members of the army and two civilians were killed by drones in Norte de Santander.<sup>147</sup> France24 quoted a representative of Vivamos Humanos, a Colombian NGO that advocates for human rights in the Catatumbo area, as indicating that there are no records of drone attacks directed exclusively against civilians, but civilians have been the collateral victims of these attacks that sometimes are launched against areas with high population density, killing and wounding civilians and

<sup>134</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), pp. 17, 19, 22; Pares, Explosivos y drones: El repertorio de violencia que reconfigura las afectaciones de la Fuerza Pública, 2025, [url](#)

<sup>135</sup> Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2024 Country Report — Colombia, 2024, [url](#), p. 6; swissinfo.ch, La región colombiana del Catatumbo, un territorio a merced de los grupos armados, 21 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>136</sup> McDermott, J., content added during peer review, 19 November 2025

<sup>137</sup> Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2024 Country Report — Colombia, 2024, [url](#), p. 6; swissinfo.ch, La región colombiana del Catatumbo, un territorio a merced de los grupos armados, 21 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>138</sup> Infobae, Estas son las zonas en las que hay alianzas entre grupos armados de Colombia: Fuerzas Militares revelaron objetivos del accionar, 30 October 2025, [url](#); El Espectador, Este es el mapa de alianzas y confrontaciones entre los grupos armados en Colombia, 30 October 2025, [url](#); UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 32

<sup>139</sup> Infobae, Estas son las zonas en las que hay alianzas entre grupos armados de Colombia: Fuerzas Militares revelaron objetivos del accionar, 30 October 2025, [url](#); El Espectador, Este es el mapa de alianzas y confrontaciones entre los grupos armados en Colombia, 30 October 2025, [url](#); ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA.

<sup>140</sup> El Colombiano, Hay 12 frentes activos de confrontación entre actores armados: Informe de Federación Nacional de Departamentos, 28 January 2025, [url](#); ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA.

<sup>141</sup> Infobae, Una guerra diaria desde el cielo, esta es la cifra de ataques con drones en el suroccidente colombiano, 15 July 2025, [url](#); El Espectador, Drones de guerra: así operan los grupos colombianos la nueva arma que siembra terror, 24 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>142</sup> DW, Ejército de Colombia presenta su primer batallón de drones, 11 October 2025, [url](#); swissinfo.ch, Colombia presenta su primer batallón de drones para combatir grupos armados, 11 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>143</sup> MSN, Horror en Cauca: disidencias lanzaron explosivos desde un dron y mataron a una patrullera de la Policía en Santander de Quilichao, 11 July 2025, [url](#); Semana, Esta es la aterradora cifra de ataques con drones de las disidencias contra la fuerza pública en el Cauca, Valle y Nariño, 15 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>144</sup> Semana, Esta es la aterradora cifra de ataques con drones de las disidencias contra la fuerza pública en el Cauca, Valle y Nariño, 15 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>145</sup> DW, Ejército de Colombia presenta su primer batallón de drones, 11 October 2025, [url](#); swissinfo.ch, Colombia presenta su primer batallón de drones para combatir grupos armados, 11 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>146</sup> Semana, Esta es la aterradora cifra de ataques con drones de las disidencias contra la fuerza pública en el Cauca, Valle y Nariño, 15 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>147</sup> France24, Drones: una nueva amenaza en el conflicto armado en Colombia, 3 July 2025, [url](#)



destroying houses.<sup>148</sup> In July 2024, a FARC dissident group dropped an explosive from a makeshift drone over a football field in Argelia, Cauca, killing a 10-year-old boy and injuring 10 others while they were playing on the field.<sup>149</sup>

The security situation in ethnic communities, including Afro-descendants and indigenous, remained a 'serious concern' due to human rights violations and armed actors' disruption of their traditional way of life through restrictions on freedom of movement, the imposition of curfews, and heightened surveillance, including the erosion of cultural practices, customary governance structures and the communities' ability to exercise their constitutional right to autonomy.<sup>150</sup> The Awá, in Ricaurte, Nariño, represent a particular concern due to attacks and threats against them.<sup>151</sup> In August 2025, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) also included the indigenous Emberá Dobida, Emberá Chami, Emberá Katío, Emberá Wounnan, Zenú, and Tule, as well as Afro-descendant communities in Chocó.<sup>152</sup>

Between January and August 2024, 889 people were victims of intra-urban displacement in Medellín, particularly from *Comunas* 13, 1, 7, 8, and 3.<sup>153</sup> Homicide numbers in Medellín have decreased over the years in part due to a 'sophistication' in the commission of criminal activities, which are mostly selective and relying upon parallel governance of areas of Medellín.<sup>154</sup> Colombian think tank Ideas For Peace Foundation (Fundación Ideas para la Paz, FIP) similarly indicated that violence is no longer committed massively as in the past due to the transformation of the conflict which currently focuses in certain zones that are disputed among illegal armed groups and less with state security forces.<sup>155</sup> ACLED reported that 'civilians face less deadly but more pervasive violence during Petro's presidency.'<sup>156</sup>

On 11 September 2025, the EU Parliament voted to include FARC dissident groups and the ELN in the list of terrorist organisations.<sup>157</sup>

### 3.1. Main armed and criminal groups

The Colombian armed forces classify illegal armed groups in three categories: *Grupo Armado Organizado* (GAO, Organised Armed Group), which are groups that emerged after the demobilisation of the AUC,<sup>158</sup> as well as other major armed groups such as the ELN or the Gulf Clan (AGC/EGC).<sup>159</sup> GAO is the main figure of armed group in Colombia, meaning the State

<sup>148</sup> France24, Drones: una nueva amenaza en el conflicto armado en Colombia, 3 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>149</sup> France24, Drones: una nueva amenaza en el conflicto armado en Colombia, 3 July 2025, [url](#); El Colombiano, Él era Dilan Camilo Erazo, el niño que murió en medio de ataques con explosivos de las disidencias en Cauca, 24 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>150</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 58; Rutas del Conflicto, En Colombia, indígenas denuncian que crimen organizado y petroleras impactan los ríos sagrados de los pueblos indígenas Siona e Inga, 4 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>151</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 58

<sup>152</sup> OHCHR, Indígenas y Afrodescendientes en el Chocó se enfrentan a graves ataques que afectan su pervivencia física y cultural, 20 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>153</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), pp. 160-161

<sup>154</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 161

<sup>155</sup> FIP, Menos muertos, más afectados: evolución de la violencia contra civiles en Colombia, 3 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>156</sup> ACLED, Civilians in Colombia face less deadly — but more pervasive — violence during Petro's presidency, 17 February, 2025, [url](#)

<sup>157</sup> DW, Eurocámara aborda "Paz Total" colombiana con una resolución, 11 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>158</sup> Colombia, PNC, Sistema Nacional de Lucha contra el Crimen Organizado, n.d., [url](#), pp. 15-21

<sup>159</sup> EL PAIS, El ultimátum del ELN al Gobierno se cumple sin una salida a la vista, 23 August 2023, [url](#)

recognises it as an organised structure with capacity for territorial control, but does not recognise the political nature of the group.<sup>160</sup> *Grupo Delictivo Organizado* (GDO, Organised Criminal Group), organised criminal groups with transnational reach dedicated to illicit activities such as drug trafficking; and *Grupos de Delincuencia Común Organizada* (GDCO, Criminal Groups), groups dedicated to criminal activities such as thefts, street-level drug trafficking, homicides, and extortion.<sup>161</sup>

FIP created a graphical illustration of the mutation and evolution of organised crime in Colombia since the 1980s (see below).<sup>162</sup> FIP explained that links between the different generations of organised crime groups have transformed these organisations, creating a ‘criminal learning process’ that has altered how they operate. Hierarchical, centralised, and personality-driven structures like the large cartels no longer exist. Today, they are more like federations, and in some cases, networks often operating through alliances or subcontracting with other groups to avoid detection. There is no single leader; tasks are compartmentalised and distributed to prevent the capture of one individual from disrupting the business. Criminal networks today operate in a fragmented, flexible, and decentralised way, allowing rapid adaptation to state actions. The networked model of organised crime involves multiple actors with varying territorial reach—national, regional, local, or micro-local—who collaborate in drug trafficking, illegal mining, smuggling, extortion, and human trafficking; while maintaining their operational autonomy and collaborating indirectly with international cartels.<sup>163</sup>




Figure 2: Evolution of armed groups and criminal organisations in Colombia<sup>164</sup>

<sup>160</sup> Indepaz, El acuerdo entre el Gobierno y el Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia: ¿un paso hacia la paz o un riesgo de impunidad?, 19 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>161</sup> Colombia, PNC, Sistema Nacional de Lucha contra el Crimen Organizado, n.d., [url](#), pp. 15-21

<sup>162</sup> FIP and El Diálogo, Colombia, Mutaciones del crimen organizado, September 2025, [url](#), pp. 9-11

<sup>163</sup> FIP and El Diálogo, Colombia, Mutaciones del crimen organizado, September 2025, [url](#), pp. 9-11

<sup>164</sup> FIP and El Diálogo, Colombia, Mutaciones del crimen organizado, September 2025, [url](#), p. 9

### 3.1.1. Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC)

AGC, also known as Gulf Clan (Clan del Golfo) or Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC), is one of the most powerful illegal organisations in Colombia, with over 14 000 combatants and present in 316 municipalities in 24 out of the country's 32 departments, including Antioquia, Córdoba, Chocó, Sucre, Bolívar, Atlántico, Magdalena, Valle del Cauca, Nariño, Meta and Casanare and nearby localities.<sup>165</sup> Human Rights Watch indicated that as of June 2024, the Gulf Clan had presence in 392<sup>166</sup> of Colombia's 1 104 municipalities.<sup>167</sup> AGC emerged from the demobilisation of the AUC in 2006<sup>168</sup> and currently consists of 34 criminal structures consolidated around six blocks, up from 22 Fronts.<sup>169</sup>

AGC operates a mixed structure, with a central hierarchy and regional franchises that operate with certain level of autonomy, facilitating its expansion and control over territories and revenues over illicit economies, as well as military response to local threats.<sup>170</sup> According to Pares, AGC is 'highly adaptable' to regional and local environments.<sup>171</sup>

AGC engages in armed confrontations with ELN and FARC dissident groups to dispute illicit economies, often causing displacements, killings, and threats in local communities.<sup>172</sup> It also engages in drug and arms trafficking, illegal mining, trafficking of migrants, money laundering, control over medicines and alcohol, and extortion of both legal and illegal economic activities.<sup>173</sup> AGC seeks to dominate strategic real estate important for the export of drugs such as stretches of the Pacific and Atlantic coastlines, internal movement corridors within the country and the border with Venezuela and borders with Panama in the Darién Gap and Venezuela.<sup>174</sup> According to Pares, AGC carries out armed stoppages (*paros armados*), the systematic targeting and assassination of state security forces (*plan pistola*),<sup>175</sup> restrictions to the freedom of movement, and confinements in order to exert political pressure or exert authority in areas of influence.<sup>176</sup> The AGC is accused of crimes comprising forced recruitment, including of minors, and of exerting social control in areas of influence.<sup>177</sup>

According to Pares, between January 2023 and May 2025, AGC was involved in 514 armed actions, including armed clashes with other illegal armed groups and state security forces, confinement, forced displacement, and threats and killings of social leaders.<sup>178</sup>

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<sup>165</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), pp. 100-103; France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 34

<sup>166</sup> HRW, World Report 2025 – Colombia, 16 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>167</sup> McDermott, J., content added during peer review, 19 November 2025

<sup>168</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 34; Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 102

<sup>169</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 102

<sup>170</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 102

<sup>171</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 106

<sup>172</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), pp. 103, 106; InSight Crime, La renovada guerra por el centro de la cocaína en Colombia, 20 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>173</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 104; InSight Crime, Gaitanistas – Gulf Clan, 18 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>174</sup> McDermott, J., content added during peer review, 19 November 2025

<sup>175</sup> The systematic targeting and assassination of state security forces, often by offering a cash bounty for each killing. This strategy is used by illegal armed groups to terrorize law enforcement, assert territorial control, and retaliate against government offensives. Miami Herald, Wave of police killings in Colombia copies drug lord Pablo Escobar's terror tactics, 6 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>176</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 105

<sup>177</sup> Verdad Abierta, Paz Total: ¿un paso adelante y dos atrás?, 21 April 2025, [url](#); France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 52

<sup>178</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), pp. 111-112



In February 2025, the government announced the establishment of a negotiation table with the AGC, but the illegal armed group indicated that the conditions for negotiations were not in place.<sup>179</sup> In March 2025, the government restarted bombardments against the AGC after the group killed four soldiers during an ambush in Segovia, Antioquia.<sup>180</sup> However, on 18 September 2025, the first round of talks between the AGC and the government began in Doha (Qatar). Both parties agreed to engage a process of socio-judicial peace talks, with five piloting municipalities for peace implementation in Antioquia and Chocó, where the group is strongly present.<sup>181</sup>

The AGC has been recruiting former combatants of the FARC-EP, the ELN, as well as former military personnel<sup>182</sup> as fighters<sup>183</sup> and instructors.<sup>184</sup> It has also expanded corruption networks within the Armed Forces to prevent military actions, obtain intelligence, and detect informants.<sup>185</sup>

### 3.1.2. Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)

The ELN is Colombia's last active guerrilla group,<sup>186</sup> and is made up of 8 main fronts and 33 sub-structures that are present throughout the country.<sup>187</sup> ELN's structure functions as a federation where the fronts have some autonomy and independence in their operations and financial management.<sup>188</sup> ELN has a military as well as a political leadership body,<sup>189</sup> the Central Command (Comando Central, COCE), which takes the most important decisions for the organisation, and the National Directorate (Dirección Nacional, DINAL), which is made up of 23 representatives elected by the eight fronts and consist of a commander, a political chief, and a military chief.<sup>190</sup> According to the Ministry of Defense, in 2024 the ELN had between 2 300 and 2 800 combatants<sup>191</sup> and up to approximately 3 000 combatants according to several non-official sources, suggesting that it could be higher.<sup>192</sup> Sources indicated that the ELN has become a 'binational' army, with footing in both Colombia and Venezuela and that, later, the ELN became an 'instrument of power' used by Venezuela to influence on Colombia.<sup>193</sup>

<sup>179</sup> Verdad Abierta, Paz Total: ¿un paso adelante y dos atrás?, 21 April 2025, [url](#); Verdad Abierta, Paz Total: ¿un paso adelante y dos atrás?, 21 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>180</sup> Verdad Abierta, Paz Total: ¿un paso adelante y dos atrás?, 21 April 2025, [url](#); BBC News, Colombia reanudará bombardeos tras ataque atribuido a las FARC, 15 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>181</sup> Indepaz, El acuerdo entre el Gobierno y el Ejército Gaitainista de Colombia: ¿Un paso hacia la paz o un riesgo de impunidad?, 19 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>182</sup> Verdad Abierta, Paz Total: ¿un paso adelante y dos atrás?, 21 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>183</sup> McDermott, J., content added during peer review, 19 November 2025

<sup>184</sup> Verdad Abierta, Paz Total: ¿un paso adelante y dos atrás?, 21 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>185</sup> Verdad Abierta, Paz Total: ¿un paso adelante y dos atrás?, 21 April 2025, [url](#); Infobae, Estos serían los lazos corruptos que tenía el Clan del Golfo en la Policía y el Ejército Nacional: les pagaban hasta 50 millones de pesos, 1 December 2024, [url](#)

<sup>186</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 44; InSight Crime, National Liberation Army (ELN), 18 June 2024, [url](#)

<sup>187</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 43

<sup>188</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 43

<sup>189</sup> McDermott, J., content added during peer review, 19 November 2025

<sup>190</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 43

<sup>191</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 43. See also: France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 36

<sup>192</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 36; Al Jazeera, Colombia's ELN rebels face US drug threats amid push for peace talks, 02 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>193</sup> BBC News, "El ELN es hoy un ejército binacional y un instrumento clarísimo de Venezuela para influir en Colombia", 22 January 2025, [url](#); La Silla Vacía, Detrás de la nueva suspensión con el ELN está su relación con Maduro, 17 January 2025, [url](#)





ELN's fronts operate according to the place where they are located, with the front in Catatumbo managing the routes for the transit of drugs and contraband; the front that operates in the border between Antioquia and Bolívar, focusing on the corridor that connects Antioquia and Catatumbo; and along the Pacific coast, ELN seeks to control illegal mining activities,<sup>194</sup> as well as drug trafficking.<sup>195</sup>

Several peace negotiation initiatives have been explored between the government and the ELN in previous years.<sup>196</sup> The recent negotiation formally started in November 2022 and by April 2024, six rounds of negotiations had been completed with a seventh underway.<sup>197</sup> In April 2024, the ELN suspended the negotiations accusing the government of parallel negotiations with Frente Comuneros del Sur (FCS), a splinter group of the ELN.<sup>198</sup> In September 2024, the government suspended peace negotiations after the ELN carried out an attack in Arauca that left two soldiers dead and over 20 injured.<sup>199</sup> As of October 2025, peace negotiations remain suspended even more since fighting involving the ELN in early 2025 in the Catatumbo.<sup>200</sup>

After the demobilisation of the FARC-EP in 2016, the ELN and other illegal armed groups are disputing the territories left by the former guerrilla group.<sup>201</sup> Since 2016, the number of municipalities where the ELN has control and influence has increased progressively, from 99 municipalities in 2017, 167 in 2020, 215 in 2023, to 231 in 2024.<sup>202</sup> Pares indicated, however, that in 2025, ELN's influence was reduced to 149 municipalities, losing ground in Nariño, Vichada, Cauca, and the border between Antioquia and Chocó, but consolidating its strength in Norte de Santander, Arauca, and Cauca.<sup>203</sup>

The ELN is accused of crimes such as the illegal imposition of curfews; threats against social leaders; extortion; forced recruitment, including of minors; and participation in illegal economies such as illegal mining and drug trafficking.<sup>204</sup>

The ceasefire with the ELN expired on 3 August 2024, and confrontations with the security forces augmented significantly as a result, with fatalities increasing from 4 during the year-long ceasefire to at least 66 in the five-month period between its expiry and late December 2024.<sup>205</sup> Conflict with ELN and security forces mainly occurred in Antioquia, Arauca, Bolívar, and Norte de Santander, especially Catatumbo. In January 2025, the government declared a state of emergency for the Catatumbo area (Norte de Santander) after the ELN launched a combat operation against FARC dissidents, leaving over 80 dead and displacing at least 30 000 people in January 2025 and over 56 000 to 57 000 people in two months, one of the

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<sup>194</sup> Pares, *La paz ¿Cómo vamos?*, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 43; France, OFPRA, *Rapport de mission en République de Colombie*, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 36

<sup>195</sup> McDermott, J., content added during peer review, 19 November 2025

<sup>196</sup> Pares, *La paz ¿Cómo vamos?*, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 37; Netherlands (The), *Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia*, June 2024, [url](#), p. 12

<sup>197</sup> Pares, *La paz ¿Cómo vamos?*, 18 June 2025, [url](#), pp. 37, 40

<sup>198</sup> Pares, *La paz ¿Cómo vamos?*, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 40; Netherlands (The), *Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia*, June 2024, [url](#), p. 12

<sup>199</sup> Pares, *La paz ¿Cómo vamos?*, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 37

<sup>200</sup> UNVMC, *Report of the Secretary-General*, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 10

<sup>201</sup> Pares, *La paz ¿Cómo vamos?*, 18 June 2025, [url](#), pp. 44-45

<sup>202</sup> Pares, *La paz ¿Cómo vamos?*, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 45. See also: HRW, *World Report 2025 – Colombia*, 16 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>203</sup> Pares, *La paz ¿Cómo vamos?*, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 45

<sup>204</sup> Pares, *La paz ¿Cómo vamos?*, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 47; InSight Crime, *National Liberation Army (ELN)*, 18 June 2024, [url](#)

<sup>205</sup> UNVMC, *Report of the Secretary-General*, 26 December 2024, [url](#), para. 73





largest mass displacements in Colombia in decades.<sup>206</sup> The government also suspended peace talks with the ELN.<sup>207</sup> Sources characterised the violence by ELN and FARC dissidents that erupted in 2025 in Catatumbo as the worst crisis that the Petro government's 'Total Peace' policy has encountered.<sup>208</sup>

Actions carried out by the ELN during the reference period, as reported by sources, included:

- on 15 January 2025, armed individuals killed a couple and their 10-month-old baby on a road that leads to the municipality of Tibú, Norte de Santander. Authorities pointed to the ELN, but that armed group blamed FARC dissidents for the killings;<sup>209</sup>
- in January 2025, armed confrontations between the ELN and FARC dissidents in Catatumbo left over 80 people killed, dozens kidnapped, and thousands more displaced.<sup>210</sup>

### 3.1.3. Frente Comuneros del Sur (FCS)

FCS emerged in 1992 as Comuneros del Sur and became the first front of the ELN in Nariño.<sup>211</sup> In March 2024, FCS split from the ELN alleging differences in financial and commanding control with ELN's top commanders.<sup>212</sup> FCS operates in 11 municipalities of central Nariño, a critical area that connects the Cauca department with the Pacific coast.<sup>213</sup> Cauca is a separate department and has its own Pacific coastline.<sup>214</sup> According to Pares, since FCS has limited territorial presence, it has established alliances with other illegal armed groups such as the CNEB and Autodefensas Unidas de Nariño.<sup>215</sup> FCS is made up of over 200 combatants<sup>216</sup> or 520, according to Infobae.<sup>217</sup>

FCS reportedly engage in extortion, kidnapping,<sup>218</sup> drug trafficking, recruitment of minors, and illegal mining.<sup>219</sup> Additionally, the FCS has established parallel 'justice' mechanisms and social behaviour norms in areas where they operate, which include the imposition of curfews and the

<sup>206</sup> HRW, Colombia: Armed Groups Batter Border Region, 26 March, 2025, [url](#); UNHCR, The crisis continues in Catatumbo – Humanitarian Emergency, 05 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>207</sup> France24, Crisis en el Catatumbo: ¿fracasa la "paz total" de Petro en Colombia?, 23 January 2025, [url](#); swissinfo.ch, Escalada de violencia en Colombia pone en duda la «paz total» de Petro, 22 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>208</sup> France24, Crisis en el Catatumbo: ¿fracasa la "paz total" de Petro en Colombia?, 23 January 2025, [url](#); swissinfo.ch, Escalada de violencia en Colombia pone en duda la «paz total» de Petro, 22 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>209</sup> Infobae, ELN 'se lavó las manos' y negó su responsabilidad en la masacre de tres miembros de una misma familia en Tibú, 17 January 2025, [url](#); El Espectador, Investigación de inteligencia militar apunta al ELN por masacre de familia en Tibú, 17 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>210</sup> BBC News, Al menos 80 muertos en el noreste de Colombia en violentos enfrentamientos entre el ELN y disidencias de las FARC, 19 January 2025, [url](#); DW, Más de 80 personas han muerto por conflicto en el Catatumbo, 19 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>211</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 59

<sup>212</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 55; InSight Crime, La entrega de armas de los Comuneros del Sur, ¿el único éxito de la Paz Total de Colombia?, 9 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>213</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 47; Infobae, Este es el frente Comuneros del Sur, al que el ELN califica de "traidor" y por el cual congeló los diálogos con el Gobierno, 12 April 2024, [url](#)

<sup>214</sup> McDermott, J., content added during peer review, 19 November 2025

<sup>215</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 60

<sup>216</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 59

<sup>217</sup> Infobae, Este es el frente Comuneros del Sur, al que el ELN califica de "traidor" y por el cual congeló los diálogos con el Gobierno, 12 April 2024, [url](#)

<sup>218</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 59; Infobae, Fiscalía General suspendió órdenes de captura a miembros del frente Comuneros del Sur, del ELN, por petición del Gobierno Petro, 7 November 2024, [url](#)

<sup>219</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 59





issuing of communiqués on social norms<sup>220</sup> more or less reproducing tactics of social control previously used by the ELN in these territories.<sup>221</sup> Between January 2023 (officially as a structure of the ELN until March 2024) and May 2025, FCS has been involved in 127 violent incidents, including the use of antipersonnel mines and the imposition to restrictions on the freedom of movement.<sup>222</sup> According to Pares, and without providing further details, since the FCS initiated peace dialogs with the government, the number of incidents of forced displacement, child recruitment, and confinement of the population, have decreased.<sup>223</sup>

In May 2024, the government recognised the FCS as a separate armed group and established a table to initiate negotiations.<sup>224</sup> FCS indicated that it would demobilise within three months<sup>225</sup> and it finally demobilised in April 2025.<sup>226</sup> In February 2025, FCS announced a protocol for the 'progressive disarmament' of the group and the establishment of a technical commission to guarantee the destruction of weaponry.<sup>227</sup> Also, in April 2025, FCS handed over 585 explosive devices, including grenades, antipersonnel mines, and mortars, to a commission composed of observers from the Organization of American States (OAS) and the General Attorney Office.<sup>228</sup>

In April 2025, the Supreme Court of Colombia approved an extradition request made by the United States of the FCS leader, Gabriel Yepes Mejía, casting doubts about the continuation of the peace process.<sup>229</sup> In May 2025, however, President Petro signed an administrative decree suspending the extradition process, so Yepes Mejía continued in the peace process.<sup>230</sup>

Current challenges for the peace process with FCS include the repetitive postponement of a cease-fire due to logistical challenges, lack of coordination among FCS combatants, and pressures from other armed groups in areas where FCS operate.<sup>231</sup>

### 3.1.4. Estado Mayor de Bloques y Frentes (EMBF)

The EMBF is a dissident group of the FARC-EP<sup>232</sup> which has presence in 111 municipalities in eight departments and has about 2 700 combatants.<sup>233</sup> EMBF started out as part of EMC.<sup>234</sup> According to Pares, EMBF has two main structures as follows:

<sup>220</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 59

<sup>221</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 52

<sup>222</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 62

<sup>223</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 63

<sup>224</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 55; Infobae, Esta es la ruta de reintegración de los Comuneros del Sur, la "disidencia" del ELN que dialoga con el Gobierno Petro: tendrían participación política, 31 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>225</sup> Verdad Abierta, Paz Total: ¿un paso adelante y dos atrás?, 21 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>226</sup> McDermott, J., content added during peer review, 19 November 2025

<sup>227</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 56

<sup>228</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 56; InSight Crime, La entrega de armas de los Comuneros del Sur, ¿el único éxito de la Paz Total de Colombia?, 9 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>229</sup> Verdad Abierta, Paz Total: ¿un paso adelante y dos atrás?, 21 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>230</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 57; El País, Gustavo Petro frena la extradición a Estados Unidos de Gabriel Yepes Mejía, el comandante de Comuneros del Sur, 23 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>231</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 57; El País, Gustavo Petro frena la extradición a Estados Unidos de Gabriel Yepes Mejía, el comandante de Comuneros del Sur, 23 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>232</sup> InSight Crime, General Staff of Blocks and Front (EMBF), 31 July 2025, [url](#); Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 73

<sup>233</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 73

<sup>234</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 65





- Bloc Magdalena Medio 'Commandant Gentil Duarte', with presence in the departments of Antioquia, Cesar, Bolívar, Córdoba, and the Catatumbo region, and consists of Front 4, Front 18, Front 24, Front 36, Front 37 Martín Caballero, Front 33 Mariscal Antonio José de Sucre, and Mobil Column Bernardo Jaramillo; and
- Bloc 'José Suárez Briceño', with presence in the departments of Meta Huila, Caquetá, and Putumayo, and consists of Front Gaitán Gutiérrez, Front Marco Aurelio Buendía, Front Ever Castro, Front Arturo Ruíz, Front Iván Díaz, Front Rodrigo Cadete, Front Darío Gutiérrez, Front Jhon Linares, Front Raúl Reyes.<sup>235</sup>

EMBF reportedly creates social organisations in the areas where they operate and coopts other local organisations to exercise territorial control.<sup>236</sup> EMBF also engages in recruitment of children, particularly indigenous and children with behavioural problems or with drug addictions.<sup>237</sup> Extortion is a main source of income,<sup>238</sup> termed 'vaccines' (*vacunas*), that are charged mostly to those offering products and services, landowners, harvesters, as well as cattle ranchers.<sup>239</sup> EMBF also extorts members of Community Action Boards (Juntas de Acción Comunal, JACs).<sup>240</sup>

The peace process with EMBF initiated in March 2023<sup>241</sup> when it was still part of<sup>242</sup> the EMC, under the leadership of Iván Mordisco.<sup>243</sup> In March 2024, the government suspended the cease-fire with the EMC in Nariño, Cauca, and Valle del Cauca departments after the group carried out several attacks, including against indigenous Nasa in Cauca department.<sup>244</sup> In April 2024, the Iván Mordisco faction withdrew from the negotiation table and the process continued with the remaining blocs (Jorge Suárez Briceño, Magdalena Medio Comandante Gentil Duarte, and Raúl Reyes) under the name EMBF.<sup>245</sup>

Pares reported that, between January 2023 and May 2025, EMBF carried out 783 violent actions, including 234 cases of violations to the 'right to life', 190 cases of restrictions to the freedom of movement, 148 cases of the use of explosives, and 106 cases involving human rights defenders.<sup>246</sup> EMBF reportedly uses drones in armed attacks.<sup>247</sup> In May 2025, the EMBF killed nine soldiers in Guaviare department during an armed clash with the army.<sup>248</sup> El País reported that there are several versions around the circumstances of the clash, with the EMBF indicating that their combatants thought the army troops were members of a rival group, while the government indicated that the attack was premeditated.<sup>249</sup> The EMBF eventually indicated that the attack 'did not reflect the general policy of the group', casting doubts around its

<sup>235</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 73. See also: InSight Crime, General Staff of Blocks and Front (EMBF), 31 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>236</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 74

<sup>237</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 74

<sup>238</sup> McDermott, J., content added during peer review, 19 November 2025

<sup>239</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 74

<sup>240</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 77

<sup>241</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 65

<sup>242</sup> McDermott, J., content added during peer review, 19 November 2025

<sup>243</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 65

<sup>244</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 66; Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), p. 12

<sup>245</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 66

<sup>246</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 75

<sup>247</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 77; AFP, Drones: new terror tool for Colombian guerrillas, 21 June 2024, [url](#)

<sup>248</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 70; swissinfo.ch, Varios militares colombianos mueren en un ataque de disidencias de las FARC en el Guaviare, 28 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>249</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 70



capacity to exercise control within the ranks.<sup>250</sup> On 16 June 2024, the EMC carried out an attack against family members of the Vice-President Francia Márquez<sup>251</sup> in an effort to seek dialogue with President Gustavo Petro.<sup>252</sup>

Pares indicated that current challenges to the process with the EMBF include the territorial dispute among illegal armed groups, particularly the ELN, AGC and EMC dissidences, which undermines the EMBF's capacity to consolidate its presence in the territories they control and fulfil their commitments, and internal disputes.<sup>253</sup>

### 3.1.5. Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB)

CNEB is a FARC dissident group that separated from Segunda Marquetalia in November 2024 to continue negotiations with the government.<sup>254</sup> CNEB includes Comandos de la Frontera (CF) and Guerrilla Coordination Front for the Pacific (Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacífico, CGP).<sup>255</sup>

CNEB has presence in the departments of Caquetá, Nariño, Putumayo, and Amazonas, and has about 2 000 members,<sup>256</sup> or 3 000 according to Walter Mendoza, chief of the CNEB, cited by *Semana*.<sup>257</sup> CNEB is made up of smaller groups that operate with autonomy according to the characteristics of the regions where they operate.<sup>258</sup> It has local commanders in each municipality, and they establish alliances with other criminal groups to carry out their activities.<sup>259</sup> In Putumayo, for example, local CNEB cells established alliances with other illegal armed groups and drug trafficking networks from Brazil and Peru.<sup>260</sup>

CNEB activities evolve around the drug trafficking business, seeking to expand their presence along corridors for the transit of drugs, particularly in Putumayo, Amazonas, and Guaviare.<sup>261</sup> Activities include the control of illicit crops, administration of drug trafficking routes, extortion,<sup>262</sup> illegal mining, and forced displacement.<sup>263</sup> According to Pares, CNEB has penetrated into protected areas such as national parks where they carry out deforestation for the cultivation of illicit crops, and indigenous communities, where they impose social norms and coopt local organisations.<sup>264</sup>

<sup>250</sup> Pares, *La paz ¿Cómo vamos?*, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 70

<sup>251</sup> Netherlands (The), *Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia*, June 2024, [url](#), p. 12; *El Colombiano*, *Evacúan de Jamundí a la familia de la vicepresidenta Francia Márquez, tras atentado*, 16 June 2024, [url](#)

<sup>252</sup> Netherlands (The), *Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia*, June 2024, [url](#), p. 12

<sup>253</sup> Pares, *La paz ¿Cómo vamos?*, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 70

<sup>254</sup> Pares, *La paz ¿Cómo vamos?*, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 83; *Colombia Reports*, *Colombia to create three guerrilla demobilization zones*, 26 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>255</sup> Pares, *La paz ¿Cómo vamos?*, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 86; *InSight Crime*, *Border Command*, 31 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>256</sup> Pares, *La paz ¿Cómo vamos?*, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 86; *InSight Crime*, *Border Command*, 31 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>257</sup> *Semana*, *Walter Mendoza, leader of five blocs of the FARC dissidents, assures that he will not sign peace with Petro: "The chief negotiator knows it."* Exclusive, 11 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>258</sup> Pares, *La paz ¿Cómo vamos?*, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 86

<sup>259</sup> Pares, *La paz ¿Cómo vamos?*, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 87

<sup>260</sup> Pares, *La paz ¿Cómo vamos?*, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 87; *InSight Crime*, *Border Command*, 31 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>261</sup> Pares, *La paz ¿Cómo vamos?*, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 87; *InSight Crime*, *Border Command*, 31 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>262</sup> Pares, *La paz ¿Cómo vamos?*, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 87; *InSight Crime*, *Border Command*, 31 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>263</sup> Pares, *La paz ¿Cómo vamos?*, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 87

<sup>264</sup> Pares, *La paz ¿Cómo vamos?*, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 87



According to Pares, CNEB carried out 88 violent acts, including threats, harassment and illegal checkpoints, against social leaders, human rights defenders, and environmentalists.<sup>265</sup> Within the peace negotiations framework, an agreement was reached to handover for destruction 13.5 tons of war material in Nariño and Putumayo departments,<sup>266</sup> but this is still pending.<sup>267</sup> The first handover took place in the strategic municipality of Puerto Asís, Putumayo, on 15 October 2025.<sup>268</sup>

### 3.1.6. Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada (ACSN)

The ACSN, also known as Los Pachenca,<sup>269</sup> emerged in 2005-2006 after the demobilisation of the AUC and settled in Magdalena and La Guajira departments, operating mostly around the mountainous areas of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta.<sup>270</sup> It is estimated to have between 500<sup>271</sup> to 1100 combatants and they are currently present in between 14 and 19 municipalities in the departments of Cesar, Atlántico, Magdalena and La Guajira.<sup>272</sup> ACSN is composed of seven structures as follows:

- La Guajira: Front Renacer;
- Magdalena: Front Metro, Caribe Resistance Bloc, Front Cóndor de la Sierra, Urban Front Cacique, Front Bananero, and Los Rojos.<sup>273</sup>

The ACSN reportedly engages in armed confrontations with the EGC to dispute drug trafficking corridors; often civilians are caught in the crossfire leading to displacement and killings.<sup>274</sup> The ACSN also engages in extortion, killings-by-hire, threats, and the recruitment of children to collect extortions and sell drugs locally.<sup>275</sup>

According to Pares, between January 2023 and May 2025, the ACSN was involved in 415 armed actions, including indiscriminate killings, restrictions to the freedom of movement, forced recruitment, and gender-based violence.<sup>276</sup> In areas where they operate, the ACSN has reportedly restricted the celebration of cultural activities in indigenous and Afro-descendant communities, and they have infiltrated universities and unions, turning them into territories to be disputed and forcing changes to curriculums and institutional objectives to benefit criminal interests.<sup>277</sup>

<sup>265</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 92

<sup>266</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 10; El Espectador, Terminó la destrucción de 14 toneladas de material de guerra de disidencia de Mendoza: ¿qué sigue?, 10 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>267</sup> McDermott, J., content added during peer review, 19 November 2025

<sup>268</sup> Reuters, FARC dissidents hand over munitions to Colombia in peace gesture, 16 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>269</sup> La Silla Vacía, 'Paz Total: Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra anuncian cese al fuego', 13 August 2024, [url](#)

<sup>270</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 119; InSight Crime, Conquering Self Defense Forces of the Sierra Nevada (ACSN), 11 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>271</sup> EL PAIS, The expansion of the Conquering Self-Defense Forces of the Sierra Nevada sets off alarms, 13 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>272</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 119; InSight Crime, Conquering Self Defense Forces of the Sierra Nevada (ACSN), 11 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>273</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 120

<sup>274</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 120; InSight Crime, Conquering Self Defense Forces of the Sierra Nevada (ACSN), 11 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>275</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), pp. 121-123. See also: InSight Crime, Conquering Self Defense Forces of the Sierra Nevada (ACSN), 11 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>276</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 122

<sup>277</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 122



Negotiations between the government and the ACSN initiated in 2023 and are ongoing, but without significant advances.<sup>278</sup> Although the first steps of negotiations were supportive, with the ACSN announcing a ceasefire of military operations in August 2024, months later, in April 2025, the ACSN suspended negotiations after a regional operation of the Colombian army.<sup>279</sup>

### 3.1.7. Organised crime gangs

La Oficina de Envigado, or La Oficina, is the most influential criminal organisation in the Medellín metropolitan area and operate as a network federation of independent local organisations, but under a hierarchical, pyramidal, and unified command.<sup>280</sup> La Oficina exercises influence over Medellín's gangs, also known as *combos*, which consists of between 8 and 30 members each.<sup>281</sup> These combos administer the different illegal economies, including killings-by-hire, shark loans, known as '*gota-a-gota*', extortion, robberies, and social control over local communities.<sup>282</sup> La Oficina has a sophisticated capacity to articulate different criminal activities, including large-scale and street-level drug trafficking, extortion, sexual exploitation, and the 'regulation' of territories, local markets, and social leaders.<sup>283</sup> Pares identified two wings within La Oficina: an 'operative' faction that carries out the criminal activities, and a 'managerial' faction, made up of business people, former drug lords, and high-profile public figures known as 'The Invisibles'.<sup>284</sup> Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by EUAA within the time constraints of this report. According to Pares, the 350 combos that operate in Medellín under La Oficina have over 12 000 members in total.<sup>285</sup> Even though La Oficina controls large parts of criminal networks in Antioquia, AGC cells have been allegedly trying to establish presence in Medellín although no direct confrontations have been reported.<sup>286</sup> In the case of the AGC, they are not enemies but function more as criminal economic allies, especially in drug trafficking, which could explain the lack of direct confrontations between them.<sup>287</sup>

Shottas and Espartanos are two Buenaventura-based gangs<sup>288</sup> with between 600 and 1 000 members each.<sup>289</sup> Shottas dominate the continental part of Buenaventura and have localised leaders that provide logistical, financial, and military support to the gang.<sup>290</sup> Espartanos dominate the insular area of Buenaventura as well as part of the continental area, have a 'hermetic' structure, and their leaders operate from jails.<sup>291</sup> Both gangs dispute the control of

<sup>278</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 115

<sup>279</sup> La Silla Vacía, 'Paz Total : Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra anuncian cese al fuego', 13/08/2024, [url](#); El País, 'Las Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada suspenden los diálogos de paz con el Gobierno', 05/04/2025, [url](#)

<sup>280</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 157; France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 39

<sup>281</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 158; InSight Crime, Oficina de Envigado, 6 July 2024, [url](#)

<sup>282</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 158; InSight Crime, Oficina de Envigado, 6 July 2024, [url](#)

<sup>283</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 157; InSight Crime, Oficina de Envigado, 6 July 2024, [url](#). See also: France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 39

<sup>284</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 158

<sup>285</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 158

<sup>286</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 159

<sup>287</sup> InSight Crime, Oficina de Envigado, 6 July 2024, [url](#); France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 43

<sup>288</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 130; InSight Crime, The Fragile Peace Behind and Beyond Prison Bars in Colombia's Buenaventura, 17 February 2025, [url](#)

<sup>289</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 130

<sup>290</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 130; InSight Crime, The Shottas, 18 February 2025, [url](#)

<sup>291</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 130; InSight Crime, The Spartans, 19 February 2025, [url](#)



illicit economies, particularly street-level drug trafficking and extortion, as well as profits associated with large-scale drug trafficking from Buenaventura's port.<sup>292</sup> These organisations have established 'invisible frontiers' within Buenaventura that restricts the freedom of movement of locals.<sup>293</sup> Both organisations are accused of engaging in forced recruitment of children, using explosives, and threatening, intimidating and killing of social leaders.<sup>294</sup> Extortion is one of the main illegal economies in Buenaventura as it allows not only for increased profits but also social control over territories.<sup>295</sup> Reported cases of extortion have decreased from 257 in 2022, to 158 in 2023, to 135 in 2024, which was attributed to the establishment of a negotiation table by the government with these organisations.<sup>296</sup> Homicide numbers in Buenaventura have fluctuated throughout the years, with 194 in 2021, 109 in 2022, 136 in 2023, and 77 in 2024.<sup>297</sup> Most of the victims are adult males.<sup>298</sup> The ceasefire was broken in February 2025, leading to an increase in violence in Buenaventura to dispute territories, leaving over 50 dead.<sup>299</sup>

### 3.2. Conflict dynamics and main areas of dispute

This report does not purport to capture all the dynamics and ever-changing complexities of each conflict situation on the ground, and the following chapter presents a sampling of what are the main dynamics reported according to sources. It is important to note that they capture only a picture of the situation at a specific moment in time.

In 2024, the ICRC identified eight non-international armed conflicts taking place in Colombia, including between the State and the ELN, the AGC and FARC dissident groups; and FARC dissident groups against the AGC, the ELN and other FARC dissident groups.<sup>300</sup> The July 2025 military intelligence report identified 13 main areas of dispute by illegal armed groups, as well as the areas where alliances have been identified and areas where confrontations are taking place, as follows:<sup>301</sup>

Area	Alliances	Confrontations
Norte de Santander	-	ELN – EMBF AGC – EMBF and ELN
Southern Bolívar	ELN – EMBF	AGC – ELN and EMBF

<sup>292</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), pp. 129-130; InSight Crime, The Shottas, 18 February 2025, [url](#)

<sup>293</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 130; InSight Crime, The Shottas, 18 February 2025, [url](#)

<sup>294</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 130; InSight Crime, The Shottas, 18 February 2025, [url](#)

<sup>295</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 137; InSight Crime, The Shottas, 18 February 2025, [url](#)

<sup>296</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 137

<sup>297</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 136

<sup>298</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 135

<sup>299</sup> Verdad Abierta, Paz Total: ¿un paso adelante y dos atrás?, 21 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>300</sup> ICRC, The human cost of armed conflicts in Colombia, 3 April 2024, [url](#)

<sup>301</sup> Infobae, Estas son las zonas en las que hay alianzas entre grupos armados de Colombia: Fuerzas Militares revelaron objetivos del accionar, 30 October 2025, [url](#); Caracol, Estas son las zonas más críticas en cuestión de alianzas de grupos armados ilegales en Colombia, 30 October 2025, [url](#)



Area	Alliances	Confrontations
Lower Cauca River, Antioquia	ELN – EMBF	AGC – ELN and EMBF
Arauca	-	ELN – EMC SM – ELN
Vichada/Guainía	-	ELN – SM
Chocó, Pacific coast	ELN – Shottas	ELN – AGC
Cauca	SM – EMC	SM and EMC – ELN
Nariño	FCS (Autodefensas Unidas de Nariño, AUN) – SM	EMC – FCS (AUN) and SM
Putumayo/Caquetá	-	EMC – FCS EMBF – EMC
La Guajira/Magdalena	-	AGC – ACSN
Valle del Cauca	Front 57 FARC dissidents – SM	ELN – AGC Front 57 FARC dissidents – EMC
Guaviare	-	EMBF – EMC
Meta	-	EMBF – EMC

In its September 2025 report on the mutations of armed groups, FIP provides a map showing the areas of influence and overlaps where armed and criminal groups have presence in



Colombia:




Figure 3: Geographic influence of armed and criminal groups in 2025<sup>302</sup>

<sup>302</sup> FIP and El Diálogo, Colombia, Mutaciones del crimen organizado, September 2025, [url](#), p. 9






Figure 4: Epicentres of violence in Colombia based on ACLED violent incident data (2018-2025)<sup>303</sup>

According to information provided to EUAA by Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), between 1 January and 24 October 2025, nearly 60 % of the violence in this period concentrates in 5 departments: Cauca, Antioquia, Norte de Santander, Nariño, Arauca.<sup>304</sup> The epicentres of that violence, according to ACLED, are visualised in the map at Figure 4.<sup>305</sup> Some of these epicentres are described below in additional detail.

<sup>303</sup> ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA.

<sup>304</sup> ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA.

<sup>305</sup> ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA.



## Municipalities with recorded presence of armed groups




Figure 5: Municipalities with recorded presence of armed groups, 2018-2024<sup>306</sup>

ACLED also reported that the number of municipalities with a recorded presence of armed groups has increased from 355 in 2018, to 456 in 2024, marking an expansion dating before President Gustavo Petro and continuing under his administration.<sup>307</sup> ACLED further noted there have been over 900 armed clashes between armed groups, marking a 61 % increase in that period.<sup>308</sup> The conflict is marked by fragmentation due to volatile alliances and divisions within armed and criminal groups themselves.<sup>309</sup>

### 3.2.1. Catatumbo, Norte de Santander

Catatumbo is a region rich in oil and one of the country's main centres for coca production<sup>310</sup> and according to the UN, it 'is the country's largest coca-growing enclave.'<sup>311</sup> It is one of the most strategic areas in the country due to the presence of a diverse number of illicit economies and its bordering location of Venezuela.<sup>312</sup> Confrontations between the ELN and

<sup>306</sup> ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA.

<sup>307</sup> ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA.

<sup>308</sup> ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA.

<sup>309</sup> ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA.

<sup>310</sup> AI, Colombia: Protect Civilians in Catatumbo, 22 January 2025, [url](#); UN, News, Colombia: Fleeing the thunder of violence in Catatumbo, 21 February 2025, [url](#)

<sup>311</sup> UN, News, Colombia: Fleeing the thunder of violence in Catatumbo, 21 February 2025, [url](#)

<sup>312</sup> UNOCHA, Necesidades humanitarias por desplazamiento masivo y restricciones a la movilidad en Catatumbo (Norte de Santander), 7 March 2025, [url](#), p. 2; Pares, Cuerpos para la guerra: Violencia Basada en Género y Reclutamiento en la frontera Colombo – Venezolana, 18 October 2024, [url](#), p. 28



the EMBF for the control of illicit revenues,<sup>313</sup> and attacks against infrastructure and state security forces have led to mass displacements, confinements, and the killing of civilians.<sup>314</sup>

UNOCHA reported that, in February 2025, 35 armed confrontations among illegal armed groups took place in, or around, the municipalities of Tibú, Convención, Teorama, and El Tarra.<sup>315</sup> According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), clashes between ELN and FARC dissidents between January and March 2025 led to the mass displacement of over 57 000 people, individual displacement of over 6 300 people, 17 800 confined, and over 10 000 facing severe restrictions to the freedom of movement, leaving them without access to essential goods and services.<sup>316</sup> The Office of the Ombudsperson indicated that, between January and September 2025, over 73 000 people have been forcefully displaced in the Norte de Santander department mostly in Catatumbo.<sup>317</sup> The same source indicated that in the same period, about 11 490 people were victims of confinement by illegal armed groups.<sup>318</sup>

Authorities reported that, between January and October 2025, 163 people have been killed during armed confrontations among illegal armed groups in the region, including 144 civilians, 6 former signatories of the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement, 3 social leaders, and 10 minors; most actions took place in the municipalities of Tibú, Teorama, Convención, El Tarra, and Hacarí.<sup>319</sup> However, without providing further detail, local NGOs indicated that there is underreporting in the region and that at least 400 killings have taken place among combatants, civilians, and state security forces.<sup>320</sup> According to the Constitutional Court, in 2025, seven former combatants of the FARC-EP have been killed and six disappeared.<sup>321</sup> News source Caracol quoted a representative of a local NGO as indicating that, according to their reporting, between January and November 2025, 300 minors have been forcefully recruited by illegal armed groups in Catatumbo, and that 12 minors and 62 persons under 28 years of age have been killed in the region.<sup>322</sup> UNOCHA reported that, due to the security situation, the access of humanitarian assistance is restricted in municipalities such as San Calixto, Teorama, Tibú, El Tarra, Convención, Hacarí, Sardinata, El Carmen, and Ábrego.<sup>323</sup>

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<sup>313</sup> Caracol, Estas son las zonas más críticas en cuestión de alianzas de grupos armados ilegales en Colombia, 30 October 2025, [url](#); AI, Colombia: Protect Civilians in Catatumbo, 22 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>314</sup> AI, Colombia: Protect Civilians in Catatumbo, 22 January 2025, [url](#); InSight Crime, Renewed War for Colombia Cocaine Center, 10 January 2025, [url](#); UNOCHA, Necesidades humanitarias por desplazamiento masivo y restricciones a la movilidad en Catatumbo (Norte de Santander), 7 March 2025, [url](#), p. 2

<sup>315</sup> UNOCHA, Necesidades humanitarias por desplazamiento masivo y restricciones a la movilidad en Catatumbo (Norte de Santander), 7 March 2025, [url](#), p. 2

<sup>316</sup> UNHCR, The crisis continues in Catatumbo – Humanitarian Emergency, 5 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>317</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Más de 192.000 personas afectadas por desplazamiento forzado masivo y confinamiento en los primeros nueve meses de 2025, 7 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>318</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Más de 192.000 personas afectadas por desplazamiento forzado masivo y confinamiento en los primeros nueve meses de 2025, 7 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>319</sup> La FM, Reportan varias personas muertas en medio de combates entre grupos armados en el Catatumbo, 22 October 2025, [url](#); RCN, Intensos enfrentamientos entre el ELN y disidencias de las FARC en Filogringo agravan la crisis en el Catatumbo, 22 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>320</sup> La FM, Reportan varias personas muertas en medio de combates entre grupos armados en el Catatumbo, 22 October 2025, [url](#); RCN, Intensos enfrentamientos entre el ELN y disidencias de las FARC en Filogringo agravan la crisis en el Catatumbo, 22 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>321</sup> El Colombiano, Un año de guerra en el Catatumbo: la Corte citó al Gobierno a responder en audiencia pública por la peor crisis humanitaria, 29 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>322</sup> Caracol, Aumenta el reclutamiento y asesinato de menores de edad en el Catatumbo, 5 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>323</sup> UNOCHA, Necesidades humanitarias por desplazamiento masivo y restricciones a la movilidad en Catatumbo (Norte de Santander), 7 March 2025, [url](#), p. 2



### 3.2.2. Southern Bolívar

Southern Bolívar is a strategic zone that connects Antioquia, Santander, Middle Magdalena River region, and Catatumbo, a strategic corridor for illegal armed groups for the exploitation and administration of illicit economies, particularly illegal mining<sup>324</sup> and coca production.<sup>325</sup> Main actors engaging in confrontations in Southern Bolívar include the AGC, ELN, and FARC dissidents; these actors seek to control the strategic corridor, as well as drug trafficking, illegal mining, and revenues from other illicit activities.<sup>326</sup> According to a report by the International Institute on Caribbean Studies, between 27 June and 7 August 2025, 22 armed confrontations were registered in southern Bolívar, leading to mass displacements and confinements.<sup>327</sup>

The Office of the Ombudsperson indicated that, between January and September 2025, 1 909 people were displaced, including 50 people (7 families) in Tiquiso, and 1 065 were confined across Bolívar department.<sup>328</sup> However, according to the Secretary of Public Safety of Bolívar, as of August 2025 there were over 7 000 families confined across the department, and teachers have been abandoning their posts in isolated areas due to the security situation and the lack of food staples.<sup>329</sup> In August 2025, Argentinian news source Infobae reported that, according to the Archbishop of Magangué, about 1500 families were in a situation of confinement in southern Bolívar due to constant bombardments and armed clashes among illegal armed groups and between these groups and the army, and the social control exerted by illegal armed actors.<sup>330</sup> The Archbishop also indicated that humanitarian assistance can only access the area if they obtain “permits” from illegal armed groups.<sup>331</sup>

On 4 November 2025, the ELN attacked a gold mine in the municipality of San Pablo, killing five people and causing the displacement of mining workers, as well as destroying the machinery, aggravating the economic crisis in the area.<sup>332</sup> On 3 September 2025, the ELN forced the population in San Agustín and Santo Domingo, municipality of Arenal, to abandon the area.<sup>333</sup> Additionally, the ELN is accused of planting anti-personnel mines in the area, further restricting freedom of movement and the ability of locals to harvest the land.<sup>334</sup>

<sup>324</sup> Pares, Continúa el recrudecimiento de violencia en el Sur de Bolívar: Alerta por crisis humanitaria, 15 September 2025, [url](#); El Tiempo, Las movidas criminales detrás de la disparada de los grupos armados en Colombia, 8 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>325</sup> Infobae, Guerra en el sur de Bolívar: obispo de Magangué habla de “un secuestro de gente” por los combates: “Los enfrentamientos son cerca a sus casas”, 6 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>326</sup> Pares, Sur de Bolívar: termómetro de la violencia y los retos de la implementación del Acuerdo de paz, 10 October 2025, [url](#); Infobae, Estas son las zonas en las que hay alianzas entre grupos armados de Colombia: Fuerzas Militares revelaron objetivos del accionar, 30 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>327</sup> In Pares, Continúa el recrudecimiento de violencia en el Sur de Bolívar: Alerta por crisis humanitaria, 15 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>328</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Más de 192.000 personas afectadas por desplazamiento forzado masivo y confinamiento en los primeros nueve meses de 2025, 7 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>329</sup> Infobae, Guerra en el sur de Bolívar: obispo de Magangué habla de “un secuestro de gente” por los combates: “Los enfrentamientos son cerca a sus casas”, 6 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>330</sup> Infobae, Guerra en el sur de Bolívar: obispo de Magangué habla de “un secuestro de gente” por los combates: “Los enfrentamientos son cerca a sus casas”, 6 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>331</sup> Infobae, Guerra en el sur de Bolívar: obispo de Magangué habla de “un secuestro de gente” por los combates: “Los enfrentamientos son cerca a sus casas”, 6 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>332</sup> El Colombiano, Masacre en Bolívar: cinco mineros fueron asesinados al parecer por el ELN, 6 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>333</sup> Pares, Continúa el recrudecimiento de violencia en el Sur de Bolívar: Alerta por crisis humanitaria, 15 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>334</sup> Pares, Continúa el recrudecimiento de violencia en el Sur de Bolívar: Alerta por crisis humanitaria, 15 September 2025, [url](#)



### 3.2.3. Lower Cauca River region in Antioquia

The lower Cauca River (Bajo Cauca) region in Antioquia is a strategic corridor for illegal armed groups in the production of cocaine and the illegal exploitation of minerals.<sup>335</sup> The region is known for its mining activity, of which 85 % is illegal.<sup>336</sup> The illegal mining of gold reportedly produces over 5 billion USD per year.<sup>337</sup> Illegal armed groups disputing the lower Cauca River in Antioquia include the AGC, the ELN, and EMBF.<sup>338</sup> The AGC reportedly controls the gold production chain, including the provision of materials for the extraction, like explosives and mercury, extorts gold producers, and acts as an 'arbiter' in gold production disputes.<sup>339</sup>

The conflict in this region deteriorated with the recent advance of the AGC into the San Lucas Mountains which straddle eastern Antioquia and southern Bolívar, which is a bastion of the ELN for the exploitation of gold and the production of cocaine.<sup>340</sup> In an effort to defend their territories, the ELN established an alliance with Fronts 18 and 36 of the EMBF, which has succeeded in delaying the advance of the AGC.<sup>341</sup>

Illegal armed groups use violence and intimidation to impose their norms and demonstrate their power and authority in their areas of influence.<sup>342</sup> The AGC, for example, disseminate 'social behaviour' manuals and punish those who do not follow their norms; it also impose curfews and confine communities during armed confrontations with other illegal armed groups.<sup>343</sup> Both the AGC and the ELN use antipersonnel mines to prevent the advancement of their rivals, planting them in areas used by the local communities such as roads and harvesting fields.<sup>344</sup> The number of homicides in the region has increased, particularly in Cáceres (34 in 2024, 18 in 2023) and Tarazá (29 in 2024, 12 in 2023).<sup>345</sup> In 2024, the Office of the Ombudsperson indicated that, between January and September 2025, 2 425 people were displaced, with the municipalities most affected including Anorí (51 people in 26 families), El Bagre (500 people in 220 families), and Tarazá (129 people in 53 families).<sup>346</sup> The same source indicated that over 8 300 people were victims of confinement by illegal armed groups in the Antioquia department.<sup>347</sup> The civilian population is caught in the middle of armed confrontations and often find themselves in contradicting situations as one armed actor order them to leave the area whereas another actor orders them to do the opposite.<sup>348</sup>

<sup>335</sup> InSight Crime, La interminable disputa por el Bajo Cauca: la joya criminal de Colombia, 28 March 2025, [url](#); FIP, La batalla que estamos perdiendo en el Bajo Cauca, 3 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>336</sup> FIP, La batalla que estamos perdiendo en el Bajo Cauca, 3 October 2025, [url](#); El Colombiano, Investigan a funcionarios del Bajo Cauca antioqueño por triquiñuela para 'maquillar' oro ilegal, 7 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>337</sup> FIP, La batalla que estamos perdiendo en el Bajo Cauca, 3 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>338</sup> FIP, La batalla que estamos perdiendo en el Bajo Cauca, 3 October 2025, [url](#); InSight Crime, La interminable disputa por el Bajo Cauca: la joya criminal de Colombia, 28 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>339</sup> FIP, La batalla que estamos perdiendo en el Bajo Cauca, 3 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>340</sup> InSight Crime, La interminable disputa por el Bajo Cauca: la joya criminal de Colombia, 28 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>341</sup> InSight Crime, La interminable disputa por el Bajo Cauca: la joya criminal de Colombia, 28 March 2025, [url](#);

Infobae, Estas son las zonas en las que hay alianzas entre grupos armados de Colombia: Fuerzas Militares revelaron objetivos del accionar, 30 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>342</sup> InSight Crime, La interminable disputa por el Bajo Cauca: la joya criminal de Colombia, 28 March 2025, [url](#); UNOCHA, Colombia: Briefing Departamental - Antioquia, enero a diciembre de 2024, 19 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>343</sup> InSight Crime, La interminable disputa por el Bajo Cauca: la joya criminal de Colombia, 28 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>344</sup> InSight Crime, La interminable disputa por el Bajo Cauca: la joya criminal de Colombia, 28 March 2025, [url](#); UNOCHA, Colombia: Briefing Departamental - Antioquia, enero a diciembre de 2024, 19 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>345</sup> InSight Crime, La interminable disputa por el Bajo Cauca: la joya criminal de Colombia, 28 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>346</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Más de 192.000 personas afectadas por desplazamiento forzado masivo y confinamiento en los primeros nueve meses de 2025, 7 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>347</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Más de 192.000 personas afectadas por desplazamiento forzado masivo y confinamiento en los primeros nueve meses de 2025, 7 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>348</sup> InSight Crime, La interminable disputa por el Bajo Cauca: la joya criminal de Colombia, 28 March 2025, [url](#)



### 3.2.4. Arauca

A bordering department with Venezuela, Arauca is a strategic corridor for the movement of illegal armed groups, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, trafficking in persons and contraband.<sup>349</sup> It is also a major department for the exploration and extraction of oil.<sup>350</sup> Arauca is disputed by the ELN and FARC dissidents (EMC and SM) seeking to consolidate their presence and hegemony through selective killings and executions.<sup>351</sup> The presence of Tren de Aragua is also reported,<sup>352</sup> although they have faced resistance from FARC dissidents.<sup>353</sup>

The Office of the Ombudsperson indicated that in 2024, 178 killings were reported in Arauca, being the highest rate of homicides per department (57.2) in the country.<sup>354</sup> Between January and September 2025, 84 people have been killed, including 4 social leaders and 2 signatories of the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement.<sup>355</sup> The municipalities with the highest number of homicides in this period of 2025 were Tame (24 homicides), Arauquita (21), Saravena (16), and Arauca City (12).<sup>356</sup> The Office of the Ombudsperson indicated that in 2024, 170 people were kidnapped and/or forcefully disappeared; out of the 170, 71 were being eventually freed, 12 were found killed, and the whereabouts of 82 were unknown.<sup>357</sup> Between January and September 2025, the number of kidnapped and/or forcefully disappeared was 180, including 76 who were eventually freed, 14 who were killed, and 90 whose whereabouts were unknown.<sup>358</sup> Forced recruitment, including of minors and indigenous minors, is also reported,<sup>359</sup> which coincides with the high rate of school desertions and the dynamics of forced displacement which have left a number of schools empty.<sup>360</sup>

On 22 September 2025, the Office of the Ombudsperson issued an Early Warning (*Alerta Temprana*) communication on the situation in Arauca due to armed confrontations between the ELN and FARC dissident groups.<sup>361</sup> The municipalities most affected by illegal armed actors' action include Arauca City, Arauquita, Saravena, Fortul, Tame, Puerto Rondón, and Cravo Norte.<sup>362</sup> Confrontations among armed actors involve the use of improvised explosive devices, antipersonnel mines, and unexploded ordnance.<sup>363</sup> Illegal armed actors also use gas

<sup>349</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana 014-2025, 22 September 2025, [url](#), p. 25; Pares, Cuerpos para la guerra: Violencia Basada en Género y Reclutamiento en la frontera Colombo – Venezolana, 18 October 2024, [url](#), p. 6

<sup>350</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana 014-2025, 22 September 2025, [url](#), p. 25; Pares, Cuerpos para la guerra: Violencia Basada en Género y Reclutamiento en la frontera Colombo – Venezolana, 18 October 2024, [url](#), p. 6

<sup>351</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana 014-2025, 22 September 2025, [url](#), p. 25; Pares, Cuerpos para la guerra: Violencia Basada en Género y Reclutamiento en la frontera Colombo – Venezolana, 18 October 2024, [url](#), p. 6

<sup>352</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana 014-2025, 22 September 2025, [url](#), p. 25; InSight Crime, Tren de Aragua Clashes with Colombia's Underworld, 17 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>353</sup> InSight Crime, Tren de Aragua Clashes with Colombia's Underworld, 17 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>354</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana 014-2025, 22 September 2025, [url](#), p. 26

<sup>355</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana 014-2025, 22 September 2025, [url](#), p. 26

<sup>356</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana 014-2025, 22 September 2025, [url](#), p. 26

<sup>357</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana 014-2025, 22 September 2025, [url](#), p. 30

<sup>358</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana 014-2025, 22 September 2025, [url](#), p. 30

<sup>359</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana 014-2025, 22 September 2025, [url](#), p. 34; Pares, Cuerpos para la guerra: Violencia Basada en Género y Reclutamiento en la frontera Colombo – Venezolana, 18 October 2024, [url](#), p. 6

<sup>360</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana 014-2025, 22 September 2025, [url](#), p. 34. See also: Pares, Cuerpos para la guerra: Violencia Basada en Género y Reclutamiento en la frontera Colombo – Venezolana, 18 October 2024, [url](#), p. 6

<sup>361</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana 014-2025, 22 September 2025, [url](#), p. 25

<sup>362</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana 014-2025, 22 September 2025, [url](#), p. 25

<sup>363</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana 014-2025, 22 September 2025, [url](#), p. 36



cylinders as rockets and carry out sabotage activities against oil pipelines, causing environmental contamination on harvesting and cattle fields.<sup>364</sup>

### 3.2.5. Pacific coastal areas of Nariño, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Chocó

Chocó, that borders Panama,<sup>365</sup> is a strategic area for the trafficking of drugs and arms<sup>366</sup> and for the illegal mining exploitation, especially gold.<sup>367</sup> Several illegal armed groups have presence in the area, including the ELN and AGC/Gulf Clan.<sup>368</sup> Illegal armed actors have been increasing in Chocó, as well as armed confrontations among them in their dispute for control over territories.<sup>369</sup> The Office of the Ombudsperson indicated that, between January and September 2025, over 18 900 people in Chocó were affected by confinement by illegal armed groups.<sup>370</sup> The same source indicated that 2 927 people were displaced, with the municipalities most affected including Quibdó (74 people, 17 families), Nóvita (80 people, 20 families), Medio Atrato (197 people, 45 families), and Alto Baudó (81 people, 20 families).<sup>371</sup> The same source indicated that over 18 900 people were victims of confinement by illegal armed groups, particularly in the municipalities of Nuquí (1 293 people, 387 families), Sipí (1 223 people, 387 families), Alto Baudó (843 people, 248 families), and Almaguer (3 746 people, 1 860 families).<sup>372</sup>

Nariño is part of a strategic corridor that connects Colombia with Ecuador.<sup>373</sup> It also has plenty of rivers and waterways that facilitate the transport of illicit goods and mobility of illegal armed groups.<sup>374</sup> FARC dissident groups and the recently founded Self-Defence Forces of Nariño (Autodefensas Unidas de Nariño, AUN) are known to dispute strategic areas of Nariño,<sup>375</sup> particularly Cumbitara, Los Andes, Tumaco, El Rosario, Samaniego, Ricaurte, Abades, Guambuyaco, and Piedemonte Costero.<sup>376</sup> Pares reported that armed confrontations among illegal armed groups have led to displacements, forced disappearances, selective killings, and threats.<sup>377</sup> The Office of the Ombudsperson indicated that, between January and September 2025, 5 090 people were displaced, and the municipalities most affected included Cumbitara

<sup>364</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana 014-2025, 22 September 2025, [url](#), p. 36

<sup>365</sup> McDermott, J., content added during peer review, 19 November 2025

<sup>366</sup> La FM, ¿Qué pasa con la crisis de orden público en el Chocó?: Ministerio y cúpula analizan la situación, 7 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>367</sup> InSight Crime, 'The Dragons of Chocó: Illegal Gold Mining in Colombia's Rivers', 23 May 2024, [url](#); AP News, 'Afro-Colombians fight the effects of gold mining through biodiversity projects in a violent region', 18 October 2024, [url](#); RFI, 'In Colombia, a river's 'rights' swept away by mining and conflict', 14 November 2024, [url](#)

<sup>368</sup> La FM, ¿Qué pasa con la crisis de orden público en el Chocó?: Ministerio y cúpula analizan la situación, 7 November 2025, [url](#); Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), pp. 103-104

<sup>369</sup> OAS, Comunicado de la MAPP/OEA sobre la situación de seguridad en Quibdó, 29 May 2025, [url](#); CODHES, Chocó vive una crisis humanitaria sin precedentes: 62 mil personas afectadas por confinamientos y 150 mil por causas climáticas, 15 November 2024, [url](#)

<sup>370</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Más de 192.000 personas afectadas por desplazamiento forzado masivo y confinamiento en los primeros nueve meses de 2025, 7 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>371</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Más de 192.000 personas afectadas por desplazamiento forzado masivo y confinamiento en los primeros nueve meses de 2025, 7 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>372</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Más de 192.000 personas afectadas por desplazamiento forzado masivo y confinamiento en los primeros nueve meses de 2025, 7 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>373</sup> Pares, Nariño: entre la esperanza de la paz y las contradicciones de la guerra, 28 August 2025, [url](#); Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana de Inminencia No. 002-24, 5 February 2024, [url](#), p. 5

<sup>374</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana de Inminencia No. 002-24, 5 February 2024, [url](#), p. 5

<sup>375</sup> Pares, Nariño: entre la esperanza de la paz y las contradicciones de la guerra, 28 August 2025, [url](#); Infobae, Golpe a las Autodefensas Unidas de Nariño: cayó uno de sus integrantes e incautaron armamento pesado, 5 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>376</sup> Pares, Nariño: entre la esperanza de la paz y las contradicciones de la guerra, 28 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>377</sup> Pares, Nariño: entre la esperanza de la paz y las contradicciones de la guerra, 28 August 2025, [url](#)



(167 people, 84 families) and El Charco (1 937 people, 808 families).<sup>378</sup> The Danish Refugee Council (DRC) reported that, between June and August 2025, 67 violent events were recorded in Nariño, including 35 attacks against civilians (661 people affected), 15 armed confrontations (9 affected), 9 instances of restrictions to the access of humanitarian assistance in affected areas (5 634 affected), and 6 forced displacement events (1 749 affected).<sup>379</sup>

In Cauca, armed groups disputing territory include FARC dissident groups and the ELN.<sup>380</sup> Areas of dispute concentrate in northern and southern Cauca, in municipalities such as Balboa, Argelia, Santa Rosa, Macizo, Oriente, the Pacific coast, and Guapi Timbiquí.<sup>381</sup> Illegal armed groups reportedly employ exemplary violence such as torture, to prevent community opposition.<sup>382</sup> The Office of the Ombudsperson, however, noted that humanitarian emergencies also occur in other municipalities, including Cajibío, Caldon, Caloto, Santander de Quilichao, and others.<sup>383</sup> In September 2025, the Office of the Ombudsperson indicated that armed actors engage in armed confrontations with other armed actors, using explosives and gas cylinders, often indiscriminately, and that they also impose social norms in the territories they control. This same source indicated further in a report released at the end of October 2025 that, even if the State and governmental forces have increased their presence in Cauca to mitigate the violence in 2025, the situation remains very difficult, with one in four cases of minor forced recruitment nationally occurring in Cauca between January and October 2025. As mentioned further in this report, Cauca is also the department where the most social leaders were assassinated so far in 2025.<sup>384</sup>

In Valle del Cauca, areas of dispute concentrate in Calima and Buenaventura.<sup>385</sup> The Office of the Ombudsperson, however, noted that humanitarian emergencies also occur in other municipalities, including Ansermanuevo, Jamundí, San Pedro, Tuluá, and others.<sup>386</sup> Illegal armed actors in Valle del Cauca include main armed groups like the ELN, FARC dissident groups, the AGC, and powerful regional organised crime gangs such as the Shottas and the Espartanos in Buenaventura or La Inmaculada in Tuluá.<sup>387</sup> The Office of the Ombudsperson indicated that armed actors are disputing the control over the Garrapatas Canyon, engaging in armed confrontations with rival groups in rural areas and the outskirts of small towns.<sup>388</sup>

<sup>378</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Más de 192.000 personas afectadas por desplazamiento forzado masivo y confinamiento en los primeros nueve meses de 2025, 7 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>379</sup> DRC, Reporte situacional: Impacto de los eventos de conflicto armado en la zona del Catatumbo y en Nariño, 17 September 2025, [url](#), p. 2

<sup>380</sup> Infobae, Estas son las zonas en las que hay alianzas entre grupos armados de Colombia: Fuerzas Militares revelaron objetivos del accionar, 30 October 2025, [url](#); Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana 013-2025, 22 September 2025, [url](#), p. 80

<sup>381</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana 013-2025, 22 September 2025, [url](#), p. 82

<sup>382</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana 013-2025, 22 September 2025, [url](#), p. 82

<sup>383</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana 013-2025, 22 September 2025, [url](#), p. 148

<sup>384</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana 018-2025, 22 September 2025, [url](#), pp. 28, 37, 97; El Espectador, 'Masacres y control de grupos armados: así fue el último año en Cauca, según la Defensoría', 29/10/2025, [url](#)

<sup>385</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana 013-2025, 22 September 2025, [url](#), p. 82

<sup>386</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana 013-2025, 22 September 2025, [url](#), p. 148

<sup>387</sup> Infobae, Estas son las zonas en las que hay alianzas entre grupos armados de Colombia: Fuerzas Militares revelaron objetivos del accionar, 30 October 2025, [url](#); Caracol, Estas son las zonas más críticas en cuestión de alianzas de grupos armados ilegales en Colombia, 30 October 2025, [url](#); Defensoría del Pueblo, "Alerta Temprana N° 012-2025", 26/08/2025, [url](#)

<sup>388</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana de Inminencia No. 002-24, 5 February 2024, [url](#), p. 7



### 3.3. Peace initiatives

#### 3.3.1. 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement

In September 2025, the JEP issued its first ruling, sentencing seven former members of the FARC-EP and 12 former members of state security forces for their responsibility in the commission of war crimes during the conflict between the state and the FARC-EP.<sup>389</sup> The JEP continued working on the 11 overarching cases covering crimes committed during the conflict between the state and the FARC-EP.<sup>390</sup>

The 2016 Peace Accords ended a 50-year conflict between the government and the FARC-EP; however, violence by illegal armed groups has since continued and transformed into new dynamics.<sup>391</sup> New conflict dynamics post-2016 are described as fragmented and localised.<sup>392</sup> As of late 2024, the main armed groups in the country continued to operate and 'expand their presence' across the country.<sup>393</sup> The Petro government re-affirmed their commitment to the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Accords through 2024, while acknowledging their concerns regarding implementation, particularly rural land reform, as unequal land distribution is one of the main underlying causes of conflict.<sup>394</sup> Implementation of the 2016 Peace Accords has been described as 'slow and lackluster'.<sup>395</sup>

Land adjudication and formalisation advanced, with the latter reaching 50 % of the goal established in the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement.<sup>396</sup> Land delivery to peasants and ethnic populations also continued.<sup>397</sup> As of October 2025, around 9 % out of the three million-hectare of land set for adjudication in the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement has been completed; about 64 % of adjudicated land has benefited farmers.<sup>398</sup> Also, as of October 2025, about 3.5 million hectares of land have been formalised, about half of the seven million set in the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement; 75 % of formalised land has benefitted indigenous peoples.<sup>399</sup> In July 2025, the Ministry of Agriculture issued a decree establishing a program to grant land to victims of forced displacement.<sup>400</sup> Additional information could not be found among the sources consulted by EUAA within the time constraints of this report.

'Security guarantees' concerns, budgetary constraints, uneven regional investment, and insufficient coordination between state institutions are cited as the main challenges for the implementation of the agreement.<sup>401</sup>

<sup>389</sup> BBC News, Por qué la sentencia a la cúpula de las FARC y a 12 exmilitares es un hito en Colombia (y la controversia que generan las sanciones impuestas), 16 September 2025, [url](#); UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 3;

<sup>390</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 49

<sup>391</sup> HRW, World Report 2025 – Colombia, 16 January 2025, [url](#); Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2024 Country Report – Colombia, 2024, [url](#), p. 6

<sup>392</sup> Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2024 Country Report – Colombia, 2024, [url](#), p. 6; Pares, ¿Plomo es lo que viene?: Balance y retos de la política de paz total 2022-2024, 2024, [url](#), p. 47

<sup>393</sup> HRW, World Report 2025 – Colombia, 16 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>394</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 December 2024, [url](#), paras. 3, 18

<sup>395</sup> Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2024 Country Report – Colombia, 2024, [url](#), p. 3; Pares, ¿Cómo va la implementación de los acuerdos de paz en los dos años de Petro?, 1 August 2024, [url](#)

<sup>396</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 6

<sup>397</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 6

<sup>398</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), paras. 14-15

<sup>399</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), paras. 14-15

<sup>400</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 16

<sup>401</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 6



Despite efforts by state entities to provide protection to former combatants, violence against them persisted.<sup>402</sup> The reintegration of former combatants has had some progress in terms of access to land, housing and the establishment of collective productive projects.<sup>403</sup> Security risks and limited inter-institutional coordination remained.<sup>404</sup> Around 11 000 former combatants remained active in the reintegration process.<sup>405</sup> Since the signing of the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement, over 17 000 hectares have been delivered to former FARC-EP combatants.<sup>406</sup>

### 3.3.2. 'Total Peace' Plan

In November 2022, President Petro approved Law 2272 which defined the policy of 'Total Peace' to establish negotiation tables with illegal armed groups, including ELN, FARC dissident groups, and other criminal bands.<sup>407</sup> About 22 illegal armed groups sought to enter into the 'Total Peace' framework.<sup>408</sup> Peace negotiations with illegal armed groups under the 'Total Peace' plan have faced mounting obstacles.<sup>409</sup> Ceasefire agreements were established with different illegal armed groups, but most of these agreements were suspended after the commission of criminal activities.<sup>410</sup> The ELN has indicated that it did not agree to be part of any ceasefire with the government.<sup>411</sup> At the same time, a bilateral ceasefire began in August 2023 and expired in August 2024, as negotiations stalled.<sup>412</sup>

The 'Total Peace' policy 'faced difficulties'<sup>413</sup> and had limited impacts in ending abuses against civilians two years after implementation due to insufficient monitoring and failure of groups to comply with ceasefire conditions.<sup>414</sup> As of late 2024, truces with some criminal structures and the government remained in force, while other groups, not party to such talks, expanded violence.<sup>415</sup> Disputes and clashes between public security forces and armed groups continued in 2024, after suspension and non-renewal of ceasefires.<sup>416</sup> As of 19 November 2025, there were no national ceasefires in place as part of Paz Total.<sup>417</sup>

Despite limited advances in the security situation due to temporary ceasefires, negotiations with illegal armed groups under 'Total Peace' plan have stalled due internal fragmentation in some groups, lack of coordination and strategy from the government, and continuing armed confrontation among these groups.<sup>418</sup> Illegal armed groups also continued with criminal activities.<sup>419</sup>

<sup>402</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 8

<sup>403</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 6

<sup>404</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 6

<sup>405</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 22

<sup>406</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 26

<sup>407</sup> Colombia, Ministerio del Interior, Presidente Gustavo Petro, sancionó la Ley de la Paz Total, 4 November 2022, [url](#)

<sup>408</sup> Pares, 22 grupos armados buscan sumarse a la Paz Total, 16 September 2022, [url](#)

<sup>409</sup> Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), p. 11

<sup>410</sup> Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), p. 11

<sup>411</sup> Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), p. 11

<sup>412</sup> McDermott, J., content added during peer review, 19 November 2025

<sup>413</sup> Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2024 Country Report — Colombia, 2024, [url](#), p. 35

<sup>414</sup> HRW, World Report 2025 – Colombia, 16 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>415</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 December 2024, [url](#), para. 83

<sup>416</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 December 2024, [url](#), para. 10

<sup>417</sup> McDermott, J., content added during peer review, 19 November 2025

<sup>418</sup> El País, La paz total, la ambiciosa apuesta de Gustavo Petro que se ha atomizado en tres años de Gobierno, 7 August 2025, [url](#); Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), pp. 11-12

<sup>419</sup> Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), p. 12





Sources noted that the 'Total Peace' plan has had little effect on improving Colombia's security.<sup>420</sup> Even though confrontations between state security forces and illegal armed groups have decreased, illegal armed groups continue fighting among themselves causing serious violations of human rights for local populations.<sup>421</sup>

The following is the status of peace initiatives under 'Total Peace' plan for each participating armed group:

- FCS: International support from the OAS and the Dutch embassy. A technical commission was established for disarmament but lacks international oversight and monitoring.
- EMBF: International support from the UN and OAS, with Norway, Switzerland, EU, Venezuela, and Ireland as guarantors. It has an international oversight mechanism for ceasefire and disarmament.
- ELN: International support from the UN and OAS, with Brazil, Cuba, Chile, Mexico, Norway, and Venezuela as guarantors. It has an international oversight mechanism for ceasefire and disarmament.
- CNEB: International support from the UN and OAS, with Cuba, Norway, and Venezuela as guarantors. It has an international oversight mechanism for ceasefire and disarmament.
- AGC: International support from OAS, but no verification mechanism,<sup>422</sup> until a new agreement in September 2025 established a pilot verification mechanism in five municipalities in Antioquia and Chocó, with international support from the UN and the OAS.<sup>423</sup>
- ACSN: International support from OAS, but no verification mechanism.<sup>424</sup>

According to FIP, during 'Total Peace' negotiations, illegal armed groups have modified criminal strategies to hide the effects of violence.<sup>425</sup> This dynamic is also mentioned in reference to homicides, kidnappings, and extortion in [Section 4.1](#).

### 3.4. State response

Between January and November 2025, the army has conducted 146 military operations in Chocó, leading to the detention of over 150 members of illegal armed groups.<sup>426</sup> Without providing further detail, the Minister of Defence indicated, in November 2025, that the military and the police have increased operations against criminal groups by 20 % in 2025.<sup>427</sup> In October 2025, the army launched its first battalion of armed drones to combat illegal armed

<sup>420</sup> Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), p. 13; Infobae, La 'Paz Total' no mejora los indicadores de violencia en Colombia: es el país menos pacífico de Sudamérica, 29 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>421</sup> Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), p. 13

<sup>422</sup> Indepaz, "El acuerdo entre el Gobierno y el Ejército Gaitainista de Colombia: ¿Un paso hacia la paz o un riesgo de impunidad?", 19 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>423</sup> Indepaz, "El acuerdo entre el Gobierno y el Ejército Gaitainista de Colombia: ¿Un paso hacia la paz o un riesgo de impunidad?", 19 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>424</sup> Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, [url](#), p. 169

<sup>425</sup> FIP, Menos muertos, más afectados: evolución de la violencia contra civiles en Colombia, 3 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>426</sup> La FM, ¿Qué pasa con la crisis de orden público en el Chocó?: Ministerio y cúpula analizan la situación, 7 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>427</sup> Caracol, MinDefensa atribuye expansión de los grupos armados a economías como minería ilegal y narcotráfico, 4 November 2025, [url](#)





groups.<sup>428</sup> The battalion consists of 400 pilots and a similar number of drones, which are reportedly equipped with artificial intelligence and the capacity to conduct facial recognition, follow vehicles, and fly for about 45 minutes.<sup>429</sup>

Sources pointed to a lack of state presence in many areas of the country, particularly the Pacific coast.<sup>430</sup> A fact-finding mission report on Colombia published by the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides, OFPRA) quoted a local government source as indicating that in some areas of Tumaco, for example Nariño, authorities are unable to collect the bodies of deceased persons due to the lack of access routes and the security situation.<sup>431</sup> The state's monopoly on the use of force is described as 'limited' due to the presence of a broad range of non-state armed groups that contest territory and dominate in some areas,<sup>432</sup> particularly remote rural areas.<sup>433</sup>

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<sup>428</sup> DW, Ejército de Colombia presenta su primer batallón de drones, 11 October 2025, [url](#); swissinfo.ch, Colombia presenta su primer batallón de drones para combatir grupos armados, 11 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>429</sup> DW, Ejército de Colombia presenta su primer batallón de drones, 11 October 2025, [url](#); swissinfo.ch, Colombia presenta su primer batallón de drones para combatir grupos armados, 11 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>430</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 48

<sup>431</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 48

<sup>432</sup> Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2024 Country Report — Colombia, 2024, [url](#), p. 6; France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 48

<sup>433</sup> Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024 – Colombia, 2024, [url](#); France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 48



## 4. Impact of the violence on civilians and human rights

### 4.1. Conflict-related violence

#### 4.1.1. Overview

Violence in conflict-affected regions remained a 'grave concern', and conflict dynamics vary considerably across the regions of Colombia, affecting populations in, amongst others, areas historically affected by violence.<sup>434</sup> According to ACLED, the most common forms of violence in Colombia (January 2018-October 2025) were the targeting of civilians by armed groups (57 %), clashes between armed groups and state forces (23 %), clashes between armed groups (9 %), and 'other' unspecified reasons (11 %).<sup>435</sup> ACLED reported that during Petro's term, Colombian civilian population has had increased exposure to violence, noting a 3 % increase in civilian fatalities from armed group violence.<sup>436</sup> ACLED indicated in October 2025, that targeted civilians are 'increasingly political', noting that most of the violence that they recorded is against social leaders (678 events; 15 %) and JACs (211 events), farmers (especially in Cauca), and cattle ranchers (especially in Arauca and Cesar) (565 events), indigenous groups (470 events), labour groups (411 events), political figures (331 events), former FARC-EP combatants (166 events), Afro-Colombian ethnic groups (118 events).<sup>437</sup> Armed groups are accused of committing serious abuses against civilians across the country,<sup>438</sup> including targeted killings, child recruitment, forced confinement of populations, mass displacement, the use of antipersonnel mines, and extortion, among others.<sup>439</sup> Armed and criminal groups employ a wide range of social control strategies, including both direct violent actions—such as targeted killings, gender-based violence, recruitment of children and adolescents, and extortion systems—and indirect methods that influence community life, such as restricting movement and imposing behavioural norms. Together, these practices create a comprehensive system of domination that undermines state authority and uses the civilian population to consolidate territorial control.<sup>440</sup> Civilians are frequently caught in the cross-fire between groups fighting for control over strategic areas, such as in January 2025, when 80 people were killed and thousands forced to flee in northeast Colombia due to failed peace negotiations and confrontations between ELN and FARC dissidents over coca-growing border regions.<sup>441</sup> It was the ELN offensive that led to a suspension of peace talks, not the other way around.<sup>442</sup>

<sup>434</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary General, 27 June 2025, [url](#), paras. 7, 34

<sup>435</sup> ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA.

<sup>436</sup> ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA.

<sup>437</sup> ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA.

<sup>438</sup> HRW, World Report 2025 – Colombia, 16 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>439</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Diagnóstico de derechos humanos en Colombia, 10 December 2024, [url](#), pp. 11-13; UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 December 2024, [url](#), paras. 13, 40, 42, 76

<sup>440</sup> DeJusticia, Correspondence with EUAA, 3 November 2025

<sup>441</sup> AP, At least 80 people killed in northeast Colombia as peace talks fail, official says, 20 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>442</sup> McDermott, J., content added during peer review, 19 November 2025



According to ACLED, during 2023-2024, the most acute violence targeting civilians occurred within the territories where there is high competition between armed groups, notably Arauca, Putumayo, Chocó, and Antioquia. There were significant increases in civilian victims of explosive events, forced displacement, confinement, and recruitment.<sup>443</sup> They describe the evolution of violence targeting civilians in the past several years as 'less deadly, but more pervasive'.<sup>444</sup> ACLED reported that there have been 18 200 'violent events' in Colombia between 1 January 2018 and 24 October 2025, with roughly 14 600 reported fatalities from these events. They additionally report 11 200 'violent events targeting civilians', with 10 300 reported fatalities from these events.<sup>445</sup> ACLED provides a graphic on the most common types of violence as well as a map indicating the locations where its data recorded the highest civilian targeting incidents in 2023 and 2024.<sup>446</sup>

### Most common forms of violence in Colombia

1 January 2018 - 24 October 2025




Figure 6: ACLED data on most common forms of violence in Colombia 1 January 2018 - 24 October 2025<sup>447</sup>

<sup>443</sup> ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA.

<sup>444</sup> ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA.

<sup>445</sup> ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA.

<sup>446</sup> ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA.

<sup>447</sup> ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA.



### Violence targeting civilians by armed groups

2023 - 2024



Change rate (in %)\*  
 -69 0 34




Figure 7: ACLED data on violence targeting civilians (2023-2024)<sup>448</sup>

#### 4.1.2. Homicides and massacres

The homicide rate in Colombia has remained relatively stable during the past ten years, and remains less than half of what it was in the 1990s.<sup>449</sup> The national homicide rate in 2024 was 25.4 per 100 000 people, which is approximately the same as it was in 2015, though it remains among the highest in the region.<sup>450</sup> There was a slight decline in the murder rate in 2024 to 13 393 murders; which coincided with the government's attempts to negotiate ceasefires through the 'Total Peace' policy.<sup>451</sup> However, some regions experienced an increase in murders by organised criminal groups, and there was renewed violence especially in the Catatumbo region along the Venezuelan border in 2025, a hotspot for cocaine production.<sup>452</sup> Here, for example, the monthly average homicide rate increased from 10 in 2024, to 39 in the

<sup>448</sup> ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA.

<sup>449</sup> US, CRS, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, 30 May 2025, [url](#), p. 7

<sup>450</sup> US, CRS, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, 30 May 2025, [url](#), p. 7; Insight Crime, Homicide Round up 2024, 26 February 2025, [url](#)

<sup>451</sup> Insight Crime, Homicide Round up 2024, 26 February 2025, [url](#)

<sup>452</sup> Insight Crime, Homicide Round up 2024, 26 February 2025, [url](#)



first two months of 2025, according to HRW.<sup>453</sup> Below are the homicide rates and figures illustrated by various sources:




Figure 8: Homicide rates in major Colombian cities 2010-2024 based on SIEDCO/national police statistics<sup>454</sup>




Figure 9: National trends for intentional homicide 2014-September 2025 (Observatorio de Derechos Humanos y Defensa Nacional)<sup>455</sup>

<sup>453</sup> HRW, Colombia: Armed Groups Batter Border Region, 26 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>454</sup> FIP and El Diálogo, Tasa en Homicidios de Principales Ciudades Capitales, 2010-2024, in: FIP, Colombia, Mutaciones del crimen organizado, September 2025, [url](#), p. 17

<sup>455</sup> Colombia, Seguimiento a indicadores y resultados operacionales (16 October 2025), September 2025, [url](#)




Figure 10: Number of recorded homicides, 2022-2025, based on INMLCF statistics<sup>456</sup>

FIP emphasised that the reduction in 'lethal or mass violence' is not necessarily an indication that the situation for civilians has improved as other types of violations then occur that are unnoticed or difficult to measure. For example, threats, confinement, forced displacement are difficult to detect and quantify, and these actions are also used to control territory and enforce governance. While organised crime groups do not perceive the state as an existential threat, they do consider that their sources of income can be disrupted by the state, and therefore try to avoid the 'most visible forms of violence' (such as homicides) in order to avoid becoming a target of the state's action.<sup>457</sup> Colombian think tank DeJusticia similarly reported that although the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement reduced overall homicide rates, violence has increasingly targeted populations seen as obstacles to the expansion or control of illegal armed groups—such as social leaders, rural communities, and public officials. These violent groups navigate a tension between displaying violence to assert dominance and maintaining a low profile to preserve local social control and pursue parallel negotiations with the government's demobilisation efforts.<sup>458</sup> ACLED similarly observed that fewer events recorded can suggest that there is an increase in control over territory.<sup>459</sup>

Massacres refer to the simultaneous extra-judicial killing of three or more civilians in one incident and have continued to be reported in recent years. Tabulation of massacres varied between UN, NGO, and state sources. According to OHCHR, there were 123 alleged massacres (98 verified) in 2023, which was a 6 % increase from 2022,<sup>460</sup> and 29 alleged massacres (25 verified) between September and December 2024 as reported by UNVMC.<sup>461</sup> In the first several months of 2025, between 1 January and 30 April, the Ombudsman's Office recorded 22 massacres, totalling 67 victims, mainly occurring in Norte de Santander, Valle del Cauca, Antioquia, Santander, and Cauca.<sup>462</sup> As of June 2025, OHCHR received 13 allegations of massacres, and verified cases involved a total of 6 victims during the first half of 2025.<sup>463</sup> In contrast, the Institute for Development and Peace Studies (Instituto de Estudios para el

<sup>456</sup> EUAA, Table of Homicides based on INMCLF statistics 2022-2025

<sup>457</sup> FIP and El Diálogo, Colombia, Mutaciones del crimen organizado, September 2025, [url](#), p. 16

<sup>458</sup> DeJusticia, Correspondence with EUAA, 3 November 2025

<sup>459</sup> ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA.

<sup>460</sup> OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia (A/HRC/55/23), 12 July 2024, [url](#), para. 11

<sup>461</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 December 2024, [url](#), para. 39

<sup>462</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Preocupante panorama de violencia en Colombia en los primeros cuatro meses de 2025, 20 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>463</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2025/419), 27 June 2025, [url](#), para. 38



Desarrollo y la Paz, Indepaz), a Colombian NGO that researches on the Colombian conflict, recorded 679 massacres between 2016-2025, including 94 in 2023, 76 in 2024, and 63 massacres in 2025 as of October.<sup>464</sup> The Human Rights Observatory of the Ministry of Defense reported a slight reduction in the number of massacres and victims between 2022 (93 cases, 340 victims, and 2025 (71 massacres, and 250 victims).<sup>465</sup>

### 4.1.3. Enforced disappearances

Disappearances continued to be reported in the reference period, with some sources indicating also an increase in kidnappings. Between December 2016 and July 2024, ICRC reported 1 730 new enforced disappearances, noting that despite strong institutional presence on this issue, searches were difficult.<sup>466</sup> Between January and May 2024, ICRC documented 78 cases of disappearances related to the armed conflict across 9 departments, 65 % of which were in Arauca and Cauca.<sup>467</sup> For the entire year of 2024, the ICRC documented 252 cases of disappearances: 206 civilians, 44 members of armed groups, and 2 security force members.<sup>468</sup> ICRC reported that in the first half of 2025, 136 people went missing, most of whom were civilians.<sup>469</sup> The government's Unit for Missing Persons, which was created in 2017, had found 23 people alive, and recovered 1 626 bodies of missing persons, since its creation.<sup>470</sup> In May 2024, the government launched a new National Search System to coordinate the government's efforts in searching for missing persons.<sup>471</sup>

### 4.1.4. Kidnapping

The Human Rights Observatory of the Ministry of Defense reported that there has been an increasing trend in the total number of kidnappings (including for extortion) between 2021-2025, with cases rising from 160 in 2021, to 338 in 2023, and rising sharply to 406 between January and September 2025.<sup>472</sup> Kidnapping for ransom is usually linked to extortion; they are a source of revenue and a means of territorial control for armed groups; and although the rates for this fell between 2015 and 2021, during 2022-2024, they rose again to levels not seen since 2013; however, rates still remain much lower than in previous periods during the conflict.<sup>473</sup> The National Police's Unified Action Groups for Personal Freedom (Grupos de Acción Unificada por la Libertad Personal, GAULA) also reported a 50 % increase in kidnappings during 2023, listing FARC dissidents led by Iván Mordisco, and the ELN conducting most of the kidnappings.<sup>474</sup> Similarly, the Human Rights Observatory of the Ministry of Defence reported an increase from 80 cases of extortive kidnapping in 2020, to 221 cases in 2023, and 285 cases in the first half of 2025 (January to September).<sup>475</sup> Extortion and score-setting are often the main motives for kidnapping.<sup>476</sup> Extortion kidnapping are also used as a method to enforce governance by armed and illegal groups, with ACLED reporting a 126 %

<sup>464</sup> Indepaz, Masacres en Colombia (2016-2025) [consulted 13 October 2025], [url](#)

<sup>465</sup> Colombia, Seguimiento a indicadores y resultados operacionales (16 October 2025), September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>466</sup> ICRC, La situación humanitaria en Colombia ha seguido deteriorándose en 2024, 3 July 2024, [url](#); AI, Colombia 2024, [url](#)

<sup>467</sup> ICRC, La situación humanitaria en Colombia ha seguido deteriorándose en 2024, 3 July 2024, [url](#)

<sup>468</sup> ICRC, Humanitarian Challenges 2025 – Colombia, April 2025, [url](#), p. 8

<sup>469</sup> ICRC, Colombia : 2025 set to be the decade's worst year in humanitarian terms, 30 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>470</sup> AI, Colombia 2024, [url](#)

<sup>471</sup> AI, Colombia 2024, [url](#)

<sup>472</sup> Colombia, Seguimiento a indicadores y resultados operacionales (16 October 2025), September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>473</sup> US, CRS, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, 30 May 2025, [url](#), p. 7

<sup>474</sup> Infobae, Secuestros en Colombia aumentaron en un 50%, según el Gaulta de la Policía, 13 December 2023, [url](#)

<sup>475</sup> Colombia, Seguimiento a indicadores y resultados operacionales (16 October 2025), September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>476</sup> Infobae, Secuestros en Colombia aumentaron en un 50%, según el Gaulta de la Policía, 13 December 2023, [url](#); Pares, Radiografía de la extorsión: el principal desafío de la seguridad ciudadana, March 2024, [url](#), p. 7



increase in kidnappings during the first 38 months of Petro's presidency, one in five of which involves the ELN.<sup>477</sup> Below ACLED provides a graphic showing the increase in kidnappings since Petro took office:




Figure 11: Kidnappings by armed groups (May 2019–October 2025)<sup>478</sup>

#### 4.1.5. Extortion<sup>479</sup>

Extortion has risen significantly in recent years.<sup>480</sup> There were 11 078 cases of extortion reported to police in 2023,<sup>481</sup> 13 869 reported cases of extortion in 2024,<sup>482</sup> and 8 844 cases as of 30 September 2025.<sup>483</sup> The Ministry of Defence similarly reported a rise in cases since 2020, noting that there have been 8 805 cases reported between January and September 2025.<sup>484</sup>

<sup>477</sup> ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA.

<sup>478</sup> ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA.

<sup>479</sup> According to Pares, ‘extortion in its various forms, involves the use of different kinds of violence to obtain illicit revenues (for example, for providing security services), and also serves as a mechanism for settling scores between organizations that compete for those revenues’, Pares, Radiografía de la extorsión: el principal desafío de la seguridad ciudadana 1 March 2024, [url](#), p. 7

<sup>480</sup> Conflict analyst, Interview with EUAA, 14 October 2025; US, CRS, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, 30 May 2025, [url](#), p. 7

<sup>481</sup> Colombia, PNC, Crime statistics: Extorsión (2023), n.d., [url](#)

<sup>482</sup> Colombia, PNC, Crime statistics: Extorsión (2024), n.d., [url](#)

<sup>483</sup> Colombia, PNC, Crime statistics: Extorsión (1 January–30 September 2025), n.d., [url](#)

<sup>484</sup> Colombia, Seguimiento a indicadores y resultados operacionales (16 October 2025), September 2025, [url](#)




Figure 12: Extortion cases 2015-2025<sup>485</sup>

Extortion has continued to increase in the past few years as armed and criminal groups use it as a means of income and control over the local population, often in competition with one another for dominance over territory.<sup>486</sup> Extortion is both a criminal tactic (to control areas rich in resources such as coca, minerals, etc.,<sup>487</sup> and secure commodities<sup>488</sup> and illicit economy transportation corridors), and a tool for social and territorial governance by armed groups, especially in rural areas; in cities, is often linked to organised crime.<sup>489</sup> It has increasingly become a key source of revenue for illegal armed groups.<sup>490</sup> It has proliferated due to outsourcing by larger criminal and armed groups to local gangs,<sup>491</sup> loss of income from cocaine revenue, and due to it being less risky than other illegal activities such as drug trafficking.<sup>492</sup> Extortion, together with kidnapping, and other tactics, can be used by armed and criminal groups to enforce governance over local populations.<sup>493</sup>

The most affected areas are those where there is little state presence, high poverty, and significant natural resources, especially in the Andean region: Antioquia, Chocó, Caldas, Quindío, Risaralda, Cundinamarca, Tolima, Valle del Cauca, Cauca, Nariño; in the Caribbean coast: Atlántico, Bolívar; at the Venezuelan border: Norte de Santander; and the urban centres: Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Buenaventura, Quibdó, Cartagena, Barranquilla, and Cúcuta.<sup>494</sup>

<sup>485</sup> Colombia, Seguimiento a indicadores y resultados operacionales (16 October 2025), September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>486</sup> Pares, Radiografía de la extorsión: el principal desafío de la seguridad ciudadana, March 2024, [url](#), p. 7; France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 61; US, CRS, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, 30 May 2025, [url](#), p. 7

<sup>487</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 63

<sup>488</sup> McDermott, J., content added during peer review, 19 November 2025

<sup>489</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 63

<sup>490</sup> Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), pp. 92-94; Conflict analyst, Interview with EUAA, 14 October 2025

<sup>491</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 61

<sup>492</sup> Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), pp. 92-94

<sup>493</sup> ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA.

<sup>494</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 62



#### 4.1.6. Forced displacement

Colombians continues to have among the world's largest displaced populations, with nearly 7 million people internally displaced in a protracted humanitarian crisis driven by armed violence,<sup>495</sup> and averaging 150 000<sup>496</sup> newly displaced persons per year, with more than 280 000 registered IDPs in 2022 according to UNHCR.<sup>497</sup> Conflict-related displacement is caused by the security situation, security threats, intimidation, and extortion.<sup>498</sup> Decades of internal displacement driven by the presence of multiple armed and criminal groups have affected millions of people, and despite the signing of the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement, individual displacement has become the dominant trend, surpassing mass displacement,<sup>499</sup> though individuals may experience both types of displacement.<sup>500</sup> Individual displacement,<sup>501</sup> differently from mass displacement, tends to be underreported, and locating reliable data is challenging.<sup>502</sup>

Annual figures on displacement vary widely among sources, including between different government sources, due to differences in definitions and mandate; a table of major sources is provided below.

Most sources indicate frequent displacement occurring typically in the same conflict-affected departments year after year,<sup>503</sup> being mainly in the Pacific region.<sup>504</sup> According to multiple sources, the departments most affected in the reference period have been: Antioquia, Arauca, Bolívar, Caquetá, Cauca, Chocó, Córdoba, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, Sucre, and Valle del Cauca.<sup>505</sup> Afro-descendant and indigenous communities in the Pacific coast departments were disproportionately affected.<sup>506</sup> Disaster-related displacement due to

<sup>495</sup> UNHCR, Colombia emergency, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>496</sup> UNHCR, IDPs in Colombia, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras and Mexico, December 2023, [url](#), p. 2

<sup>497</sup> UNHCR, IDPs in Colombia, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras and Mexico, December 2023, [url](#), p. 2

<sup>498</sup> IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement, 13 May 2025, [url](#), p. 78; OHCHR, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia (A/HR/58/24), 22 January 2025, [url](#), para. 15

<sup>499</sup> According to ACAPS, 'massive displacement as a simultaneous is defined as an event affecting ten or more households or fifty or more people as stated in Article 12 of Decree 2569 of 2000.' See: ACAPS, Thematic Report – Colombia – Individual displacement: Bogotá, Buenaventura, Florencia, and Ocaña, 2 December 2024, [url](#)

<sup>500</sup> ACAPS, Thematic Report – Colombia – Individual displacement: Bogotá, Buenaventura, Florencia, and Ocaña, 2 December 2024, [url](#)

<sup>501</sup> According to ACAPS, 'individual displacement in Colombia is defined as an incident involving fewer than ten households or 50 people.' See: ACAPS, Thematic Report – Colombia – Individual displacement: Bogotá, Buenaventura, Florencia, and Ocaña, 2 December 2024, [url](#)

<sup>502</sup> ACAPS, Thematic Report – Colombia – Individual displacement: Bogotá, Buenaventura, Florencia, and Ocaña, 2 December 2024, [url](#)

<sup>503</sup> EUAA COI conclusion based on collection of various sources of data on displacement and confinement.

<sup>504</sup> UNOCHA, Informe : Impacto y Tendencias Humanitarias En Colombia Enero-Octubre de 2022, 21 November 2022, [url](#); Colombia, UARIV, Informe de Desplazamiento Forzado – Segundo Semestre 2023, 2024, [url](#), p. 8; Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Boletín sobre Dinámicas de Movilidad Humana Forzada en Colombia, 24 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>505</sup> ICRC, Colombia Humanitarian Report 2024, April 2024, [url](#); ICRC, Retos Humanitarios Colombia 2025, March 2025, [url](#), p. 7; Infobae, Colombia alcanzó los 5 millones de desplazados internos en 2023, un 5,6 % más que en 2022, 14 May 2024, [url](#); UNHCR, Colombia - Monitoring of humanitarian emergencies January to December 2023, 20 May 2024, [url](#); OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in Colombia (A/HRC/55/23), 12 July 2024, [url](#), para. 12; Colombia, UARIV, Informe de Desplazamiento Forzado – Segundo Semestre 2023, 2024, [url](#), p. 8; Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Boletín sobre Dinámicas de Movilidad Humana Forzada en Colombia, 24 January 2025, [url](#); Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Informe anual sobre movilidad humana forzada en Colombia 2022, n.d., [url](#), pp. 19, 25; UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2025/419), 27 June 2025, [url](#), para. 36; Infobae, Colombia alcanzó los 5 millones de desplazados internos en 2023, un 5,6 % más que en 2022, 14 May 2024, [url](#); Colombia, UARIV, Informe Semestral de Desplazamiento Forzado 2022-1, 2023, [url](#)

<sup>506</sup> OHCHR, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia (A/HR/58/24), 22 January 2025, [url](#), para. 15; IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement, 13 May 2025, [url](#), p. 78



flooding and drought was lower in 2024 than it was in the previous two years, but with 91 000 movements, still represented the third-highest amount in more than a decade.<sup>507</sup>

Between 1 January and 19 June 2025, UNOCHA recorded a total of 168 300 people affected in at least 112 humanitarian emergencies,<sup>508</sup> of which 67 800 people were victims of mass forced displacement, due especially to the events in Catatumbo in January, representing a 107 % increase compared with the same period in 2024.<sup>509</sup> UNHCR reported similarly that, since January 2025, the escalation of confrontations between armed groups caused the 'worst humanitarian crisis in a decade' with a 74 % increase in displacements and 15 % increase in confinements during the first half of 2025. Specifically, in Catatumbo region, there were 57 259 people displaced and 27 868 people confined as a result of conflict outbreaks there; causing the 'most significant large displacement in Colombia's recent history'.<sup>510</sup> For its part, the Office of the Ombudsperson reported that, between 1 January and 30 May 2025, 77 719 people were displaced, of which 68 347 were from Catatumbo.<sup>511</sup> Below is a table of sources reporting on various displacement figures, both mass and individual displacement:

Year	IDMC	UNOCHA (Mass Displacement)	ICRC (Individual Displacement)	UARIV (Mass Displacement)	Ombudsperson (Mass Displacement)
<b>2022</b>	339 000 <sup>512</sup>	70 267 <sup>513</sup>	123 220 <sup>514</sup>		58 269 <sup>515</sup>
<b>2023</b>	293 000 <sup>516</sup>	62 967 <sup>517</sup>	145 049 <sup>518</sup>		54 665 <sup>519</sup>
<b>2024</b>	388 000 <sup>520</sup>	180 000 <sup>521</sup>	117 697 <sup>522</sup>	41 228 <sup>523</sup>	25 611 <sup>524</sup>

The Unit for the Attention and Integral Reparation to the Victims (Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas, UARIV), the national unit providing assistance to victims of

<sup>507</sup> IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement, 13 May 2025, [url](#), p. 78

<sup>508</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2025/419), 27 June 2025, [url](#), para. 36

<sup>509</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2025/419), 27 June 2025, [url](#), para. 36

<sup>510</sup> UNHCR, Colombia Factsheet 2025, August 2025, [url](#), p. 2

<sup>511</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Boletín mensual – Dinámicas de Movilidad Humana Forzada en Colombia, July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>512</sup> Infobae, Colombia alcanzó los 5 millones de desplazados internos en 2023, un 5,6 % más que en 2022, 14 May 2024, [url](#)

<sup>513</sup> UNOCHA, Informe : Impacto y Tendencias Humanitarias En Colombia Enero-Octubre de 2022, 21 November 2022, [url](#)

<sup>514</sup> ICRC, Retos Humanitarios 2023 – Colombia, March 2023, [url](#)

<sup>515</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Informe anual sobre movilidad humana forzada en Colombia 2022, n.d., [url](#), pp. 19, 25

<sup>516</sup> Infobae, Colombia alcanzó los 5 millones de desplazados internos en 2023, un 5,6 % más que en 2022, 14 May 2024, [url](#)

<sup>517</sup> OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in Colombia (A/HRC/55/23), 12 July 2024, [url](#), para. 12

<sup>518</sup> ICRC, Colombia Humanitarian Report 2024, April 2024, [url](#)

<sup>519</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Durante el 2023 en Colombia, cerca de 121.000 personas fueron víctimas de desplazamiento forzado masivo y confinamiento, [url](#). MD = Mass displacements, ID = Individual displacements

<sup>520</sup> Eje21, Colombia contabilizó 7,2 millones de desplazados internos en 2024, un 43 % más que en 2023, 13 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>521</sup> UNOCHA, Informe Tendencias e Impacto Humanitario en Colombia 2024 – Fecha de corte : Enero-Diciembre de 2024, 3 February 2025, [url](#)

<sup>522</sup> ICRC, Retos Humanitarios Colombia 2025, March 2025, [url](#), p. 7


<sup>523</sup> ICRC, Humanitarian Challenges 2025 – Colombia, April 2025, [url](#), p. 7

<sup>524</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Boletín sobre Dinámicas de Movilidad Humana Forzada en Colombia, 24 January 2025, [url](#)



armed conflict, records the number of displaced people, but these figures largely rely on IDPs actively declaring their status to the UARIV.<sup>525</sup> However, IDPs frequently avoid reporting their displacement status due to fear for their safety, perceived uselessness, or lack of procedural knowledge. While the legal framework in Colombia offers comprehensive provisions for victims of displacement, implementation fell short and insufficient services were provided to those affected.<sup>526</sup>

**FIGURA 4.** Comportamiento del desplazamiento forzado por año de posacuerdo (24/11/2016 - 23/11/2024)



Fuente: elaboración propia con base en RUV (2024).

Figure 13: Registered victims of individual forced displacement since the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement (2016-2024), created by FIP based on UARIV data<sup>527</sup>

In January 2004, The Constitutional Court issued Sentence T-025 which declared the lack of protection for displaced persons as unconstitutional; yet few advances in protection have occurred in the 20 years since that declaration.<sup>528</sup> There is often a lack of sufficient government assistance for displaced people.<sup>529</sup> IDPs report perceived institutional distrust, inadequate assistance, and delays due to bureaucracy as the main reasons they do not report their situation to the UARIV.<sup>530</sup>

#### 4.1.7. Confinement

Confinement events were caused by the spread of illegal armed groups and confrontation between them as they seek social and territorial control and benefits from illicit economies

<sup>525</sup> ACAPS, Thematic Report – Colombia – Individual displacement: Bogotá, Buenaventura, Florencia, and Ocaña, 2 December 2024, [url](#)

<sup>526</sup> ACAPS, Thematic Report – Colombia – Individual displacement: Bogotá, Buenaventura, Florencia, and Ocaña, 2 December 2024, [url](#)

<sup>527</sup> CODHES, Informa 118 – Tendencias del desplazamiento forzado en Colombia en ocho años de posacuerdo (2016-2024), February 2025, [url](#), p. 14

<sup>528</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Se cumplen 20 años de una sentencia a favor de los desplazados, pero se ha avanzado poco, 26 January 2024, [url](#)

<sup>529</sup> HRW, World Report 2025 – Colombia, 16 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>530</sup> ACAPS, Thematic Report – Colombia – Individual displacement: Bogotá, Buenaventura, Florencia, and Ocaña, 2 December 2024, [url](#)



and fights with the armed forces.<sup>531</sup> Confinement – as manifested in severe mobility restrictions on communities, curfews imposed by armed groups and the use of anti-personnel mines – remained a primary and increasing driver of humanitarian needs and risks.<sup>532</sup> As with displacement, figures tracking confinement varied among sources. However, ICRC reported that in 2024, community confinement became more widespread than any time since the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement.<sup>533</sup> UNOCHA also reported that, in 2024, 138 419 people were in confinement, marking a 58 % increase compared to 2023, with 66 % being from Afro-descendant and indigenous populations.<sup>534</sup> Indicating a similar trend toward increased confinement, ICRC commented that the confined population in 2024 grew by 89 % compared to the previous year.<sup>535</sup> They also noted that confinements in 2025 have spread to departments where previously there were none reported, such as Norte de Santander, Guaviare, and Amazonas.<sup>536</sup> Below are examples of sources reporting on confinement figures:

Year	UNOCHA	ICRC	Office of the Ombudsperson
<b>2022</b>	96 200 <sup>537</sup>	39 404 <sup>538</sup>	62 380 <sup>539</sup>
<b>2023</b>	87 646 mainly in Caquetá, Cauca, Chocó, Nariño <sup>540</sup>	47 013 mainly in Chocó, Nariño, and Cauca <sup>541</sup>	66 279 mainly in Chocó, Putumayo, Nariño, Arauca, Valle del Cauca, and Cauca <sup>542</sup>
<b>2024</b>	138 419 <sup>543</sup>	88 874 mainly in Chocó (36 288), Antioquia, Arauca, Bolívar, Caquetá, Putumayo, Cauca <sup>544</sup>	107 931 mainly in Cauca and Caquetá <sup>545</sup>
<b>2025</b>		85 760 (January to May 2025) <sup>546</sup>	11 490 <sup>547</sup> (January to May 2025)

<sup>531</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2025/419), 27 June 2025, [url](#), para. 36

<sup>532</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2025/419), 27 June 2025, [url](#), para. 36

<sup>533</sup> ICRC, Humanitarian Challenges 2025 – Colombia, April 2025, [url](#), p. 6

<sup>534</sup> OHCHR, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia (A/HR/58/24), 22 January 2025, [url](#), para. 16

<sup>535</sup> ICRC, Humanitarian Challenges 2025 – Colombia, April 2025, [url](#), p. 6

<sup>536</sup> ICRC, Colombia : 2025 set to be the decade's worst year in humanitarian terms, 30 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>537</sup> UNOCHA, Informe : Impacto y Tendencias Humanitarias En Colombia Enero-Octubre de 2022, 21 November 2022, [url](#)

<sup>538</sup> ICRC, Retos Humanitarios 2023 – Colombia, March 2023, [url](#)

<sup>539</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Informe anual sobre movilidad humana forzada en Colombia 2022, n.d., [url](#), p. 25

<sup>540</sup> OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in Colombia (A/HRC/55/23), 12 July 2024, [url](#), para. 12

<sup>541</sup> ICRC, Colombia Humanitarian Report 2024, April 2024, [url](#)

<sup>542</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Durante el 2023 en Colombia, cerca de 121.000 personas fueron víctimas de desplazamiento forzado masivo y confinamiento, [url](#)

<sup>543</sup> UNOCHA, Informe Tendencias e Impacto Humanitario en Colombia 2024 – Fecha de corte: Enero-Diciembre de 2024, 3 February 2025, [url](#); OHCHR, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia (A/HR/58/24), 22 January 2025, [url](#), para. 15

<sup>544</sup> ICRC, Retos Humanitarios Colombia 2025, March 2025, [url](#), p. 6; citing UARIV numbers

<sup>545</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Boletín sobre Dinámicas de Movilidad Humana Forzada en Colombia, 24 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>546</sup> ICRC, Colombia – 2025 set to be the decade's worst year in humanitarian terms, 30 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>547</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Boletín mensual – Dinámicas de Movilidad Humana Forzada en Colombia, July 2025, [url](#)



#### 4.1.8. Anti-personnel mines

There was an increase in the presence, use, and abandonment of explosive devices (including landmines, remnants of war, improvised explosive devices) in both rural and urban areas in the reference period, with most victims being civilians. According to ICRC, the number of municipalities with reported incidents also increased in 2024, including some who had not reported any incidents in 2023, marking a spread to new areas. Most incidents occurred in Cauca, Nariño, and Antioquia.<sup>548</sup> However, data on victims varied across sources, with ICRC reporting 719 victims in 2024,<sup>549</sup> while the government reported 109.<sup>550</sup> ICRC indicated that the number of people killed and injured due to anti-personnel mines in 2024 was the highest since 2016.<sup>551</sup> The government reported the following figures for victims of anti-personnel mines from 2022 to August 2025, where approximately one in five have died, and also showing an increase from 2024 to 2025:<sup>552</sup>

Year	Civilians	Security forces	Total
2023	65	39	104
2024	66	43	109
2025 (August)	34	64	98

Escalating hostilities between competing armed groups led to the injury or death of 534 people by explosive devices in the first five months of 2025, according to ICRC recordings.<sup>553</sup>

#### 4.1.9. Violent acts against healthcare and education provision

Different forms of direct and indirect violence against health care institutions and health workers continued to be reported in the reference period in 2023,<sup>554</sup> 2024,<sup>555</sup> and 2025.<sup>556</sup> In 2023, there were 511 attacks against healthcare recorded, reaching 'unprecedented numbers', according to the Pan American Health Organization.<sup>557</sup> During 2024, ICRC reported 201 infractions against health service providers related to the armed conflict, including threats, restricted access to health, forcing healthcare workers to operate in inadequate conditions, theft of medicine and equipment, and actions hindering the care of sick and wounded people.<sup>558</sup> The majority of the ICRC's reported incidents occurred in Cauca, Antioquia, Arauca, Bolívar, and Chocó.<sup>559</sup> In 2025, several incidents were reported, including attacks on medical

<sup>548</sup> ICRC, La situación humanitaria en Colombia ha seguido deteriorándose en 2024, 3 July 2024, [url](#)

<sup>549</sup> Foro ONG Humanitarias Colombia, Antipersonnel Mines and Other Explosive Devices in Colombia, 2021–2024: A National Overview, 30 September 2025, [url](#), p. 1; ICRC, Humanitarian Challenges 2025 – Colombia, April 2025, [url](#), p. 5

<sup>550</sup> Colombia, Estadísticas de Asistencia Integral a las Víctimas de MAP y MUSE, 30 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>551</sup> ICRC, Humanitarian Challenges 2025 – Colombia, April 2025, [url](#), p. 5

<sup>552</sup> Colombia, Estadísticas de Asistencia Integral a las Víctimas de MAP y MUSE, 30 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>553</sup> Foro ONG Humanitarias Colombia, Antipersonnel Mines and Other Explosive Devices in Colombia, 2021–2024: A National Overview, 30 September 2025, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>554</sup> ICRC, Colombia Humanitarian Report 2024, April 2024, [url](#); PAHO, Act for humanity: Let's protect those who save lives, 19 August 2024, [url](#)

<sup>555</sup> ICRC, La situación humanitaria en Colombia ha seguido deteriorándose en 2024, 3 July 2024, [url](#); ICRC, Health care : another casualty of the armed conflict-Colombia, 27 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>556</sup> 7días.com, ONU condena ataque con explosivos contra hospital en Cauca y alerta por creciente violencia en el suroeste de Colombia, 11 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>557</sup> PAHO, Act for humanity: Let's protect those who save lives, 19 August 2024, [url](#)

<sup>558</sup> ICRC, Health care : another casualty of the armed conflict-Colombia, 27 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>559</sup> ICRC, Health care : another casualty of the armed conflict-Colombia, 27 March 2025, [url](#)



missions<sup>560</sup> and a drone attack on a hospital in Cauca.<sup>561</sup> ICRC documented 101 violent acts against healthcare related to the armed conflict in the first half of 2025.<sup>562</sup>

In a 2024 UN Security Council report, Secretary General addressed the cycles of violence against children, with armed groups using schools for military purposes and attacking schools and hospitals, affecting children.<sup>563</sup> Sources indicated that there were increased incidents of attacks on educational facilities in 2024, including the use of unexploded ordnance, compared to 2023.<sup>564</sup> The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) recorded 52 attacks on schools or schools routes in the first half of 2025, in the departments of Antioquia, Chocó, Cauca, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, and Valle del Cauca, affecting nearly 9 500 students, teachers, and staff.<sup>565</sup>

#### 4.1.10. Capacity of armed and criminal groups to track and trace targets who relocate

For detailed information on this topic, please refer to [EUAA Country Focus: Colombia \(2022\)](#), Section 5.8.

Sources indicate that illegal armed groups expand their presence and influence through subcontracting to smaller groups and criminal outfits, as well as operating internationally due to participation in international criminal networks.<sup>566</sup> Jeremy McDermott commented that each targeting situation can be different, depending on the group, the location, the profile, including in relation to large cities such as Medellín, Cali, and Bogotá, where the dynamics of armed/criminal structures are each distinct. Regarding reaching a person who is considered by an armed group as high value or high profile, 'if a hit is out on that individual, there are local *oficinas* in most cities, so if there is enough interest or money to pay for it, the group can find someone almost anywhere; but they must want to kill them. In most cases, the group just want the problematic person out of their business. If the target is sitting on strategic or tactical intelligence about a group, they might be prepared to shell out a lot of money to have them murdered. They can often find people by tracking their social media and pressuring friends and family in the area in order to find someone they wish to target.'<sup>567</sup> According to a Conflict Analyst based in Colombia who specialises in tracking conflict and political developments in the country, 'in general, beyond just extortion, relocation in Colombia is increasingly less of a protective strategy' noting this was particularly the case for social leaders or politically sensitive cases. 'Furthermore, the analyst was of the view that in such cases the risk of being found by an armed group, unfortunately outstrips the capacity of the state to respond,

<sup>560</sup> Colombia, Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social, El Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social, rechaza con preocupación un nuevo acto que atenta contra labor de la Misión Médica en la Guajira, 15 August 2025, [url](#); Caracol, Suspenden servicios extramurales de salud por ataques a misión médica en el Catatumbo, [url](#)

<sup>561</sup> El Espectador, Atentados en Caloto (Cauca): atacan hospital Niña María y estación de Policía, 11 October 2025, [url](#); OHCHR, Mission in Colombia, X, [11 October 2025], [url](#); El Universal, ONU alerta por ataques a hospitales y civiles en el suroeste de Colombia, 12 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>562</sup> ICRC, Colombia : 2025 set to be the decade's worst year in humanitarian terms, 30 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>563</sup> UN Secretary-General on children and armed conflict, Children and Armed Conflict in Colombia – Report of the Secretary-General (S/2024/161), 13 February 2024, [url](#), paras. 19-20; UN Secretary-General on children in armed conflict, Report of the Secretary-General (A/79/878-S/2025/247), 17 June 2025, [url](#), para. 47

<sup>564</sup> Foro ONG Humanitarias Colombia, Antipersonnel Mines and Other Explosive Devices in Colombia, 2021–2024: A National Overview, 30 September 2025, [url](#), p. 9; NRC, Reporte semestral de escuelas seguras 2025, July 2025, [url](#), p. 2

<sup>565</sup> NRC, Reporte semestral de escuelas seguras 2025, July 2025, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>566</sup> EUAA, Country Focus – Colombia, December 2022, [url](#), p. 80, citing multiple oral sources

<sup>567</sup> McDermott, J., Correspondence with EUAA, 7 August 2025



whether that's through individual protection, or trying to create more specific conditions in cities. The threat is bigger than, and has overcome, the capacity of the state to respond.<sup>568</sup>

DeJusticia observed that the success of relocation also hinges on the state's capacity to limit and diminish the territorial influence of illegal armed groups. That influence, in turn, is determined primarily by the organisational structure of each group. For example, the largest post-FARC factions—those that rejected the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement—typically expand by establishing social and political control within defined territorial domains. Consequently, their attacks against community leaders and public officials tend to concentrate in rural areas, municipalities, and mid-sized towns within their operational range. In contrast, the Clan del Golfo, a combination of heirs of previous large illegal right-wing armies, local paramilitary groups that emerged after the 2016 peace agreements, and small urban criminal bands that attach to them from time to time, exhibits a far more pervasive and adaptable threat, capable of targeting individuals even beyond its traditional zones of influence. Another factor amplifying the reach of illegal armed groups is their access to the contract-killing economy. While authorities have apprehended the direct perpetrators of organised crimes, these individuals are often marginalised youths with no evident ties to organised structures, hired through opaque and fragmented chains of intermediaries. A notable example is the murder of a CTI investigator from La Guajira - although both the shooter and the attack's coordinator have been captured, they have yet to reveal the intellectual authors behind the crime. A similar pattern emerged in one of the most shocking recent events in Colombia—the assassination of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay in Bogotá on August 13, 2025—carried out by a 15-year-old during a public political rally.<sup>569</sup>

## 4.2. Other human rights issues

### 4.2.1. Trafficking in human beings

Trafficking in human beings is a prevalent issue in Colombia, with persons trafficked inside Colombia and internationally, specifically to Europe (e.g., Spain and France) and to other South American countries (e.g., Peru and Chile).<sup>570</sup> Sources indicated that the groups often identified as being mainly affected by trafficking risks included: Afro-Colombians,<sup>571</sup> Indigenous

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<sup>568</sup> Conflict analyst, Interview with EUAA, 14 October 2025

<sup>569</sup> DeJusticia, Correspondence with EUAA, 3 November 2025

<sup>570</sup> Colombia, FGN, Informe de Gestión 2020-2024: Consolidado, December 2023, [url](#), p. 29, para. 52

<sup>571</sup> USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Colombia, June 2024, [url](#); HRW, World Report 2025 – Colombia, 16 January 2025, [url](#)



people,<sup>572</sup> women,<sup>573</sup> children,<sup>574</sup> individuals with disabilities,<sup>575</sup> Venezuelan migrants,<sup>576</sup> migrants with intentions to cross the Darién Gap,<sup>577</sup> and LGBTIQ persons.<sup>578</sup>

In 2024, UN Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children (UNSR TIP), reported that migrants and refugees, in particular children and adolescents [in Colombia] who were trafficked were subjected to sexual exploitation and forced labour, such as gold mining.<sup>579</sup> According to the 2024 Trafficking in Persons report by USDOS, in 2023, Colombian government and NGOs identified 1 273 potential trafficking victims, including 602 sex trafficking victims, 40 forced labour victims, and 631 victims of unspecified forms of exploitation.<sup>580</sup> Traffickers used forced labour in their activities. Forced labour is prevalent in the extraction of coal, alluvial gold, and emeralds; coffee harvesting, palm production; begging in urban areas; and domestic service.<sup>581</sup>

Women and girls are subjected to sex trafficking<sup>582</sup> with sources reporting on trafficking of Colombian women and girls particularly in densely populated cities and areas with tourism and large industries.<sup>583</sup> Women and girls were also forcibly displaced by sexual violence. In border areas, women and girls are particularly affected by conflict-driven trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation, which is used by armed actors and organised criminal groups to fund their operations.<sup>584</sup> In 2024, UNSRTIP documented several cases of girls trafficked for sexual exploitation by non-State armed groups, with the aim of the girls being sexually exploited by armed groups members in Chocó and Nariño.<sup>585</sup> UNSRTIP noted that risks of sexual exploitation of men, boys and gender-diverse persons remain underreported, due to stigma, discrimination and violence, which also increases risks of trafficking and limits access to protection.<sup>586</sup>

There were also a million girls married before age 15 in Colombia, often due to decades of internal conflict, narco-culture, and poverty, with those in rural and indigenous communities

<sup>572</sup> USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Colombia, June 2024, [url](#); UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Visit to Colombia, Report of the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, Siobhán Mullally, 20 May 2024, [url](#), p. 3, para. 8

<sup>573</sup> UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Visit to Colombia, Report of the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, Siobhán Mullally, 20 May 2024, [url](#), p. 5, para. 22

<sup>574</sup> UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Visit to Colombia, Report of the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, Siobhán Mullally, 20 May 2024, [url](#), pp. 5, 10, paras. 22, 53

<sup>575</sup> USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Colombia, June 2024, [url](#); UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Visit to Colombia, Report of the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, Siobhán Mullally, 20 May 2024, [url](#), p. 5, para. 22

<sup>576</sup> USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Colombia, June 2024, [url](#); HRW, World Report 2025 – Colombia, 16 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>577</sup> USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Colombia, June 2024, [url](#); UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Visit to Colombia, Report of the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, Siobhán Mullally, 20 May 2024, [url](#), p. 5, para. 22

<sup>578</sup> USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Colombia, June 2024, [url](#); UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Visit to Colombia, Report of the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, Siobhán Mullally, 20 May 2024, [url](#), p. 5, para. 22

<sup>579</sup> UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Visit to Colombia, Report of the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, Siobhán Mullally, 20 May 2024, [url](#), pp. 5, 9, paras. 22, 47

<sup>580</sup> USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Colombia, June 2024, [url](#)

<sup>581</sup> USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Colombia, June 2024, [url](#)

<sup>582</sup> HRW, World Report 2025 – Colombia, 16 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>583</sup> USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Colombia, June 2024, [url](#)

<sup>584</sup> UNSC, Conflict-related sexual violence – Report of the Secretary General (S/2024/292), 4 April 2024, [url](#), para. 12

<sup>585</sup> UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Visit to Colombia, Report of the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, Siobhán Mullally, 20 May 2024, [url](#), p. 4

<sup>586</sup> UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Visit to Colombia, Report of the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, Siobhán Mullally, 20 May 2024, [url](#), p. 10, para 53



having higher rates. In 2024, Colombia outlawed child marriage after a 17-year long campaign.<sup>587</sup> Further information on implementation in practice could not be found among the sources consulted by the EUAA within the time constraints of this report.

Migrants in transit from Venezuela to Panama were subjected to disappearances, murders, and sexual violence.<sup>588</sup> Persons are trafficked by armed groups and criminal organisations in border areas including the Gulf of Urabá region (e.g., Apartado and Necoclí) and in the Darién Gap as reported by UNSRTIP in 2024.<sup>589</sup> Human Rights Watch indicated that Venezuelan migrants and refugees and Afro-Colombian communities living in departments such as Antioquia, Norte de Santander and Cundinamarca and the Capital District were particularly vulnerable to trafficking.<sup>590</sup> The authorities lacked 'effective and immediate investigations' into these cases.<sup>591</sup>

Armed and criminal groups forcibly recruit children and youth of Venezuelan, Indigenous, and Afro-Colombian descent, for combat, labour and sex exploitation. Colombian children are exploited by traffickers and forced to work in the informal sector and street vending.<sup>592</sup> UNSTRIP recorded cases of recruitment or use of children in Antioquia, Arauca, Bolívar, Cauca, Chocó, Nariño, and Putumayo Departments.<sup>593</sup>

In 2004, Colombia ratified the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children.<sup>594</sup> In 2005, national law number 985 was adopted, and it includes measures against trafficking in persons and standards for the care and protection of the victims.<sup>595</sup> Fear of and risks of reprisals by armed groups and criminal organisations and limited presence of civilian authorities were identified as some factors contributing to underreporting of trafficking in persons according to UNSRTIP.<sup>596</sup> Moreover, UNSRTIP reported on lack of services and effective protection for persons, especially children.<sup>597</sup> According to Human Rights Watch, access to legal aid, safe accommodations, long-term assistance and compensation was limited.<sup>598</sup> While the Colombian government increased prevention efforts, deficiencies in the identification of victims, especially among migrants were reported by USDOS in 2024.<sup>599</sup>

## 4.2.2. Torture

NGOs reported that, between January 2015 and June 2022, there were 495 cases of torture documented, half of which were allegedly committed by state agents and the other half by

<sup>587</sup> Guardian (The), Colombia outlaws child marriage after 17-year campaign, 14 November 2024, [url](#)

<sup>588</sup> UNCAT, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Colombia, 7 June 2023, [url](#), para. 34

<sup>589</sup> UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Visit to Colombia, Report of the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, Siobhán Mullally, 20 May 2024, [url](#), p. 5

<sup>590</sup> HRW, World Report 2025 – Colombia, 16 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>591</sup> UNCAT, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Colombia, 7 June 2023, [url](#), para. 34

<sup>592</sup> USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Colombia, June 2024, [url](#)

<sup>593</sup> UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Visit to Colombia, Report of the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, Siobhán Mullally, 20 May 2024, [url](#), p. 34, para. 817

<sup>594</sup> UN Treaty Collection, UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 2000, 2025, [url](#)

<sup>595</sup> UNHCR, Trafficking, Table 16, Colombia, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>596</sup> UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Visit to Colombia, Report of the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, Siobhán Mullally, 20 May 2024, [url](#), p. 6, para. 27

<sup>597</sup> UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Visit to Colombia, Report of the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, Siobhán Mullally, 20 May 2024, [url](#), p. 6, para. 27

<sup>598</sup> HRW, World Report 2025 – Colombia, 16 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>599</sup> USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Colombia, June 2024, [url](#)



non-state armed groups or unknown agents.<sup>600</sup> Torture was used by criminal and armed groups as a means of social control, intimidation of social leaders and human rights defenders, and as a form of discrimination.<sup>601</sup>

There were several documented cases of torture by armed groups in 2023, including the rape and sexual abuse of children by the ELN. There were two alleged acts of torture by security forces, and a further 68 cases of excessive use of force by police against demonstrators in the same year.<sup>602</sup> In its 2023 Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Colombia, the UN Committee Against Torture commented that there were serious allegations of torture, ill-treatment and sexual violence committed against detained persons in custody of the police.<sup>603</sup> Between 2018-2024, the UARIV received 777 applications from persons who had suffered acts of torture, with 314 persons having benefitted from compensation since 2010.<sup>604</sup>

The Netherlands' 2024 report on Colombia noted that there is high impunity for torture, and cases often remain unpunished. No official figures exist, making it difficult to estimate impunity levels also.<sup>605</sup> In addition, NGOs expressed concern about underreporting of torture.<sup>606</sup>

### 4.2.3. Prison conditions

Despite numerous laws and regulations to guarantee the respect for human rights in prisons, prison conditions remain poor due to lack of infrastructure, overcrowding, inhumane and degrading settings, and deficient physical and mental health services for prisoners.<sup>607</sup> ICRC noted in 2025 that overcrowding reached 28 % in national prison facilities and 122 % in temporary detention facilities such as those in police units.<sup>608</sup> The United Nations Convention against Torture commented on the misuse of pretrial detention causing lengthy wait times of up to two years in 'inhumane conditions' in temporary holding facilities. Large proportion of the prison population is held in 'deplorable conditions' with lack of access to drinking water, adequate sanitation and hygiene, and poor medical and psychological care.<sup>609</sup> There were reports of deaths of inmates due to the actions or omissions of the authorities, including improperly using firearms and electroshock weapons.<sup>610</sup> The monitoring of prisons was inadequate due to limited institutional capacity.<sup>611</sup>

<sup>600</sup> Colombian Coalition Against Torture, Alternative Report on the Sixth Periodic Report before the United Nations Committee against Torture, March 2023, [url](#), pp. 7, 12

<sup>601</sup> Colombian Coalition Against Torture, Alternative Report on the Sixth Periodic Report before the United Nations Committee against Torture, March 2023, [url](#), pp. 13-14

<sup>602</sup> USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2023 – Colombia, 22 April 2024, [url](#), pp. 5, 6, 18

<sup>603</sup> UNCAT, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Colombia, 7 June 2023, [url](#), para. 12

<sup>604</sup> Colombia, Information received from Colombia on follow-up to the concluding observations on its sixth periodic report (CAT/C/COL/FCO/6), 10 June 2024, [url](#), para. 51

<sup>605</sup> Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), p. 104

<sup>606</sup> Colombian Coalition Against Torture, Alternative Report on the Sixth Periodic Report before the United Nations Committee against Torture, March 2023, [url](#), p. 5

<sup>607</sup> Comisión de Seguimiento de la Sociedad Civil a la Sentencia T-388 de 2013, Décimo Primer Informe de Seguimiento al Estado de Cosas Inconstitucional del Sistema Penitenciario y Carcelario de Colombia, December 2023, [url](#), pp. 96-97

<sup>608</sup> ICRC, Colombia : 2025 set to be the decade's worst year in humanitarian terms, 30 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>609</sup> UNCAT, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Colombia, 7 June 2023, [url](#), para. 24

<sup>610</sup> UNCAT, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Colombia, 7 June 2023, [url](#), para. 28

<sup>611</sup> UNCAT, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Colombia, 7 June 2023, [url](#), para. 32



#### 4.2.4. Abuses and extra-judicial killings by state actors

Between 2002 and 2008, Colombia's military committed at least 6 402 extrajudicial killings<sup>612</sup> as commanders were under pressure to produce enemy casualties; these 'false positives' were often young men from poor neighbourhoods who were lured from their homes and were killed, dressed as enemy combatants, and presented as rebels killed in action. The Courts in Colombia had previously ordered the government to apologise for such killings, but under Presidents Santos and Duque, no apologies were forthcoming. In 2023, the Petro government issued a public apology for the extrajudicial killings of 19 individuals killed between 2004 and 2008, who were 'false positives'.<sup>613</sup> In 2025, the JEP indicted four Generals and 35 Non-commissioned officers for war crimes and crimes against humanity for 442 false positive cases that occurred in Antioquia between 2004 and 2007, including for the use of torture.<sup>614</sup>

Sources indicate that since Petro took office, the number of reported abuses by public security forces has declined; though abuses still occur,<sup>615</sup> impunity for past abuses was a problem and reforms to prevent repetition were limited.<sup>616</sup> OHCHR received 36 allegations of human rights violations by members of the security forces in 2023, and verified 18, which were referred to the Ministry of Defence for investigation. These violations included torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, gender-based violence, sexual violence, threats to personal integrity, arbitrary detention, and discrimination. There were also cases reported of corruption and collusion between members of the security forces and criminal and illegal armed groups.<sup>617</sup>

### 4.3. Treatment of specific profiles

The overview below is a non-exhaustive list of profiles that may face specific human rights concerns; there may be overlaps with the topics identified in [Section 4](#).

#### 4.3.1. Victims of extortion, including the *gota-a-gota* loan

Extortion was described by the Conflict Analyst as 'normalised,' very widespread, and that virtually everyone is extorted, with some being more extorted than others, varying by group and location.<sup>618</sup> Extortion can target anyone who conducts productive activity,<sup>619</sup> with some professions being especially susceptible to extortion and to be targets of violence<sup>620</sup> (for example, small vendors, kiosks, gas stations, hotels, large businesses, merchants, transport drivers, shopkeepers, and residents living on the peripheries of urban areas;<sup>621</sup> in rural areas, it can include cattle-ranchers and land owners, especially in territories controlled by armed

<sup>612</sup> Guardian (The), Colombia tribunal reveals at least 6,402 people were killed by army to boost body count, 19 February 2021, [url](#)

<sup>613</sup> AP, Colombia's government issues long awaited apology for extrajudicial killings during armed conflict, 4 October 2023, [url](#)

<sup>614</sup> Caracol, Por primera vez la JEP confirma actos de tortura en casos de falsos positivos, 19 February 2025, [url](#)

<sup>615</sup> Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), p. 102; HRW, World Report 2025 – Colombia, 16 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>616</sup> HRW, World Report 2025 – Colombia, 16 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>617</sup> OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in Colombia (A/HRC/55/23), 12 July 2024, [url](#), para. 22

<sup>618</sup> Conflict analyst, Interview with EUAA, 14 October 2025

<sup>619</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), pp. 63-64

<sup>620</sup> Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024 – Colombia, 2024, [url](#); Breda, T., ACLED, Civilians in Colombia face less deadly — but more pervasive — violence during Petro's presidency, 17 February 2025, [url](#)

<sup>621</sup> Pares, Radiografía de la extorsión: el principal desafío de la seguridad ciudadana, March 2024, [url](#), p. 7



groups).<sup>622</sup> The methods of extortion can be quite anonymous, due to the use of technologies like cell phones and social media, use of intermediaries, as well as direct threats or letters.<sup>623</sup>

Consequences of non-payment can include intimidation, threats and murder, including of loved ones, and appropriation of property.<sup>624</sup> Extortion is interrelated with other crimes such as threats, assault, and homicide, and remains underreported.<sup>625</sup> Victims often do not admit to being extorted, but rather state they are paying for protection or surveillance; there is a culture of silence and although victims often know who collects the money, shifting<sup>626</sup> local criminal dynamics often<sup>627</sup> cause confusion about who is in charge.<sup>628</sup>

In rural areas, extortion is carried out by armed groups and can have wider strategic goals, such as control over areas with coca crops, minerals, transport routes for drugs, and control over the movements of the population.<sup>629</sup> In urban areas, extortion is carried out by organised criminal groups and urban gangs that operate under delegation from major groups such as the AGC and ELN, which outsource criminal activities. These groups have no political ideology; extortion is both their method and their purpose. They also engage in drug selling, contract killing and micro-trafficking, and they frequently recruit young men and minors, sometimes through forced recruitment.<sup>630</sup> In urban areas such as Bogotá and Medellín, extortion is highly localised and complex, involving multiple criminal groups in specific neighbourhoods. In Medellín, for example, merchants must pay a daily quota to various criminal groups; there may be as many as 40 such groups operating just in the city centre,<sup>631</sup> and more than 100 criminal organisations across Medellín.<sup>632</sup> Due to lack of government protection and economic opportunity, local victims are often compelled to cooperate<sup>633</sup> with the criminals.<sup>634</sup>

*Gota a gota* is a loansharking system run by criminal networks that offers quick informal credit without checking a person's ability to repay. It charges very high interest rates.<sup>635</sup> Failure to pay exposes individuals to consequences such as threats, death threats, violence,<sup>636</sup> intimidation (verbal and written), warnings (throwing a grenade or explosive device at their business), kidnapping for ransom as a form of extortion or for non-payment, land or property seizure, homicide, or forced displacement.<sup>637</sup> Victims do at times report to police;<sup>638</sup> however fear of retribution prevent many victims from doing so.<sup>639</sup>

<sup>622</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), pp. 63-64

<sup>623</sup> Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), pp. 92-94

<sup>624</sup> Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), pp. 92-94

<sup>625</sup> Pares, Radiografía de la extorsión: el principal desafío de la seguridad ciudadana, March 2024, [url](#), p. 7; Conflict analyst, Interview with EUAA, 14 October 2025

<sup>626</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 66

<sup>627</sup> McDermott, J., content added during peer review, 19 November 2025

<sup>628</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 66

<sup>629</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 64

<sup>630</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 65

<sup>631</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 66

<sup>632</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Los Contrastes de la Realidad Humanitaria, 2024, [url](#), p. 59

<sup>633</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 62

<sup>634</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 62 McDermott, J., content added during peer review, 19 November 2025

<sup>635</sup> Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), p. 90; France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), pp. 69-70

<sup>636</sup> Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), p. 91

<sup>637</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), pp. 69-70

<sup>638</sup> Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), p. 92

<sup>639</sup> Conflict analyst, Interview with EUAA, 14 October 2025; Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), p. 92





The Conflict Analyst explained that ordinary victims of low-level extortion may avoid further targeting if they relocate, but the situation is very 'case-by-case' regarding whether someone can escape such targeting by relocation. Those targets with larger debts, perceived wealth, possible links to a rival group, or having a political stigma attached to them, would likely face higher risks of being tracked. Safety also depends on where they move—relocating within the same group's territory offers little protection. The analyst explained that 'if the group wants to find you, they will, and they can;' the analyst gave the view that all the groups have that capacity – either to find the victims themselves or to contract the elaborate networks that are present throughout Colombia, to find a group ready to sort of provide that service for payment.<sup>640</sup>

### **Recourse to authorities in cases of extortion**

It is theoretically possible to report an extortion case to the FGN, the police of the neighbourhood of residence, or the Immediate Reaction Commandos (Commandos de Atención Inmediata, CAI) units of the Colombian National Police. However, it is mainly the GAULA that intervene in such cases.<sup>641</sup> Through a free telephone line (165), victims can report extortion to the GAULA police unit. In a confirmed extortion case, police intervention requires waiting for the criminal to receive the extortion amount, hand it over in person, and begin to move away before being intercepted in *flagrante delicto* and arrested.<sup>642</sup>

GAULA is generally recognised for its reactivity and efficiency. The GAULA unit claims their operations have helped reduce extortion rates. In 2023, they made 2 775 arrests related to extortion (an increase of 11 % compared to 2022). For the GAULA, the goal is to capture the organisers (*dinamizadores*) of crimes such as kidnappings and extortions.<sup>643</sup> The police GAULA unit has carried out several major operations against extortion and criminal groups, notably the one at the end of 2023 that led to the arrest of José Manuel Vera Sulbarán (nicknamed 'Satanas'), one of the leaders of the Tren de Aragua.<sup>644</sup>

However, the effectiveness of GAULA's response depends on the willingness of the victim to provide information as doing so could expose them to risks from the perpetrators. It is common for the victim's relatives, fearing for the safety of the kidnapped person, to contact GAULA only at a late stage. Despite the measures taken against extortion and the operations against perpetrators, sources consulted by the OFPRA mission indicate that, in most cases, victims do not report the crimes, and they continue to pay their extortionists. Around 30 % of extortion victims turn to the authorities. Reporting is much lower in the most remote areas.<sup>645</sup> Lack of reporting is due to fear of reprisals,<sup>646</sup> lack of state control over the entire territory and limited state presence. In cities, for example, extortionists exploit insufficient police coverage by offering 'protection' to residents.<sup>647</sup> The Conflict Analyst explained that reporting is rare because people fear retribution and believe local police are infiltrated by criminal groups. Security institutions lack capacity to protect individuals, so only large businesses might get state support. For most, fear and mistrust make reporting futile.<sup>648</sup>

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<sup>640</sup> Conflict analyst, Interview with EUAA, 14 October 2025

<sup>641</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 70

<sup>642</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 70

<sup>643</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 71

<sup>644</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 71

<sup>645</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 71

<sup>646</sup> Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), pp. 92-94

<sup>647</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 71

<sup>648</sup> Conflict analyst, Interview with EUAA, 14 October 2025





According to the OFPRA fact-finding mission report on Colombia, it is 'difficult' to report extortion in isolated rural areas where the population is under surveillance by an armed group; doing so is 'impossible' in 'red zones' (for example, Tumaco in Nariño), where police do not go.<sup>649</sup> There is an enormous police and military presence in Tumaco urban centre, while some of the remoter rural zones are certainly no-go areas.<sup>650</sup> Moreover, in the context of the 'Total Peace' (Paz Total) process, GAULA (or the army) do not intervene when the perpetrator of an extortion or kidnapping belongs to the EMC or ELN, except in *flagrante delicto* (caught in the act). In the absence of *flagrante delicto*, they merely inform the negotiators. In contrast, when the crime has been committed by members of another armed group not engaged in a ceasefire with the government, they may intervene directly, even without *flagrante delicto*.<sup>651</sup> As of 19 November 2025, there were no nationwide ceasefires and only a handful of local restrictions on security force operations.<sup>652</sup> Sources noted that lack of trust in the authorities due to perceived corruption within the state authorities, as well as impunity are factors for lack of reporting.<sup>653</sup> Perpetrators often remain unpunished.<sup>654</sup>

### 4.3.2. Social leaders

Colombia has one of the highest rates of assassinations, threats, and stigmatisation of human rights defenders and social leaders in the world.<sup>655</sup> Between January 2016 and May 2025, a total of 1 569 social leaders have been killed in the country, according to the Office of the Ombudsperson.<sup>656</sup> Although the government has 'made concerted efforts' to address violence, the targeting of social leaders and human rights defenders continues. Killings, violent attacks, and threats to human rights defenders, social leaders, and former FARC-EP combatants remained 'important human rights concerns' in 2022,<sup>657</sup> 2023,<sup>658</sup> 2024,<sup>659</sup> and such targeting continued in 2025.<sup>660</sup> Sources indicated that 188 human rights defenders were killed in 2023<sup>661</sup> and 173 social leaders in 2024.<sup>662</sup> The Office of the Ombudsperson reported that 81 social leaders and human rights defenders were assassinated between 1 January and 31 May 2025.<sup>663</sup> In contrast, OHCHR received 34 allegations of homicide of social leaders

<sup>649</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 71

<sup>650</sup> McDermott, J., content added during peer review, 19 November 2025

<sup>651</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 71

<sup>652</sup> McDermott, J., content added during peer review, 19 November 2025

<sup>653</sup> Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), pp. 92-94; France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 71

<sup>654</sup> Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), pp. 92-94

<sup>655</sup> OAS, IACHR, Observaciones Preliminares: Visita in loco a Colombia 15-19 abril 2024, [url](#), p. 4; Frontline Defenders, Colombia cases, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>656</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Ascenden a 81 los asesinatos de personas defensoras de derechos humanos y liderazgos sociales en 2025, 20 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>657</sup> EU, EEAS, 2023 EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World, 29 May 2024, [url](#), p. 265

<sup>658</sup> Somos Defensores, Informe semestral enero-junio 2024, June 2024, [url](#)

<sup>659</sup> EU, EEAS, 2021 EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World, 19 April 2022, [url](#), p. 290; Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2024 Country Report — Colombia, 2024, [url](#), p. 32; Frontline Defenders, Colombia cases, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>660</sup> Breda, T., ACLED, Civilians in Colombia face less deadly — but more pervasive — violence during Petro's presidency, 17 February 2025, [url](#); UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2025/419), 27 June 2025, [url](#), para. 38

<sup>661</sup> EU, EEAS, 2023 EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World, 29 May 2024, [url](#), p. 265;

OAS, IACHR, Observaciones Preliminares: Visita in loco a Colombia 15-19 abril 2024, [url](#), p. 4

<sup>662</sup> Indepaz, Líderes sociales, defensores de DD.HH y firmantes de Acuerdo asesinados en 2024 y 2025, Consulted: 26 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>663</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Ascenden a 81 los asesinatos de personas defensoras de derechos humanos y liderazgos sociales en 2025, 20 June 2025, [url](#)



between January and June 2025.<sup>664</sup> Indepaz's monitoring observatory reported 117 killings in 2025, as of 2 October 2025.<sup>665</sup>

Attacks against human rights defenders, including Afro-Colombian leaders, peasants involved in implementing the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement, and environmental and land restitution leaders, were mainly concentrated in the departments of Antioquia, Arauca, Cauca,<sup>666</sup> Norte de Santander, Bolívar, Putumayo, Nariño, Santander, Valle del Cauca, and Cesar.<sup>667</sup> Social leaders, human rights defenders and other profiles such as communal and community leaders, leaders related to advocacy for indigenous, campesino and Afro-descendant rights, land/territorial and environmental rights,<sup>668</sup> conflict victims' rights, union/labour rights,<sup>669</sup> and those involved in illicit crop substitution, were also targeted,<sup>670</sup> as well as farmers in coca-growing areas, as well as political figures.<sup>671</sup>

Members of Community Action Boards (Juntas de Acción Comunal, JACs) are the profile most commonly targeted among social leaders.<sup>672</sup> ACLED indicated in October 2025 that targeted civilians are 'increasingly political', noting that most of the violence that they recorded is against social leaders (678 events; 15 %) and JACs (211 events).<sup>673</sup> Because JACs are spread across the country, often in areas controlled by armed groups, and because they are often used as the intermediaries between an armed group and the local population, this raises their profile in terms of frequency of targeting. JACs are deeply embedded in their communities and know their local populace well, which is useful for armed groups who do not tolerate dissent and kill JACs members who refuse compliance.<sup>674</sup> Social leaders who are environmental defenders are also victims of threats, family intimidation, attempts on their lives, displacement, and kidnapping, with the intent to force the environmentalists to abandon their cause; if they do not, homicides are often used to silence them. According to Global Witness, between 2018 and August 2024, there were 361 assassinations of social/environmental leaders, mainly in Cauca, Nariño, Antioquia, and Chocó.<sup>675</sup> The majority of the environmental

<sup>664</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2025/419), 27 June 2025, [url](#), para. 38

<sup>665</sup> Indepaz, Líderes sociales, defensores de DD.HH y firmantes de Acuerdo asesinados en 2024 y 2025, Consulted: 2 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>666</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 December 2024, [url](#), para. 45; See also: El País, Colombia, the deadliest country in the Americas for human rights defenders, 6 March 2024, [url](#)

<sup>667</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Ascenden a 81 los asesinatos de personas defensoras de derechos humanos y liderazgos sociales en 2025, 20 June 2025, [url](#); UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2025/419), 27 June 2025, [url](#), para. 38

<sup>668</sup> EUAA, Country Focus – Colombia, December 2022, [url](#), pp. 101-102; OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia (A/HRC/55/23), 12 July 2024, [url](#), para. 58, 59, 60; Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Ascenden a 81 los asesinatos de personas defensoras de derechos humanos y liderazgos sociales en 2025, 20 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>669</sup> BBC News, The world's most dangerous country for trade unionists, 19 May 2025, [url](#); ITUC, 2025 ITUC Global Rights Index, 2025, [url](#), p. 35

<sup>670</sup> Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024 – Colombia, 2024, [url](#); Breda, T., ACLED, Civilians in Colombia face less deadly — but more pervasive — violence during Petro's presidency, 17 February 2025, [url](#)

<sup>671</sup> Breda, T., ACLED, Civilians in Colombia face less deadly — but more pervasive — violence during Petro's presidency, 17 February 2025, [url](#); For an extensive description of profiles linked to civil society, see: France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), section 6.2.5

<sup>672</sup> Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), pp. 65-66; MOE, Violencia Contra Liderazgos Políticos, Sociales y Comunales - Corte general: 1 de enero al 8 de mayo de 2025, June 2025, [url](#), pp. 20-22

<sup>673</sup> ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA

<sup>674</sup> Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), pp. 65-66

<sup>675</sup> Pares, Informe - situación de violencia contra liderazgos ambientales en Colombia, 22 October 2024, [url](#), pp. 11-14

leaders killed were indigenous leaders, followed by campesino and Afro-descendant leaders.<sup>676</sup>

The perpetrators of these assassinations are frequently unidentified.<sup>677</sup> Sources indicate that most of the killings are carried out by armed and criminal groups; and impunity for the assassinations was a problem.<sup>678</sup> Threats can come in-person, via letters/pamphlet, telephone, text messages, via third party, attempted murder, or surveillance. Leaflet threats from armed groups are common and designate some individuals as 'military objectives'; sometimes criminals also appropriate the names of powerful groups to scare their targets, though this 'does not mean the risk is less real'.<sup>679</sup> Often when social leaders are threatened, this is coupled with forced displacement, and for those around them from the community.<sup>680</sup> High levels of impunity for such killings continues.<sup>681</sup>




Figure 14: Indepaz - Assassinations of social leaders and human rights defenders 2016-October 2025<sup>682</sup>

<sup>676</sup> Pares, Informe - situación de violencia contra liderazgos ambientales en Colombia, 22 October 2024, [url](#), p. 15

<sup>677</sup> Pares, Informe - situación de violencia contra liderazgos ambientales en Colombia, 22 October 2024, [url](#), p. 17

<sup>678</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 77 Pares, Informe - situación de violencia contra liderazgos ambientales en Colombia, 22 October 2024, [url](#), pp. 17-19

<sup>679</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 78

<sup>680</sup> EUAA, Country Focus – Colombia, December 2022, [url](#), pp. 121-122

<sup>681</sup> DeJusticia, Correspondence with EUAA, 3 November 2025

<sup>682</sup> Graphic created by EUAA based on: Indepaz, Visor de asesinato a personas líderes sociales y defensores de derechos humanos en Colombia 2016-2025, consulted October 2025, [url](#)




Figure 15: Social leaders assassinated in 2025 (October 2025)<sup>683</sup>

<sup>683</sup> Map created by EUAA based on: Indepaz, Visor de asesinato a personas líderes sociales y defensores de derechos humanos en Colombia 2016-2025, consulted October 2025, [url](#)



### 4.3.3. Former combatants of the FARC-EP

Many former FARC-EP combatants who signed on to the 2016 Final Agreement have been killed and 'thousands' displaced.<sup>684</sup> Since 2016, 481 killings of former combatants have been recorded by the UN (including 11 women, 63 Indigenous persons, and 58 Afro-Colombians), as well as 164 attempted homicides (including 17 women) and 57 disappearances (including one woman).<sup>685</sup> According to Indepaz, 50 former combatants were killed in 2023 and 31 in 2024.<sup>686</sup> The UN reported that there were 48 former combatants who were killed in 2023, 33 in 2024<sup>687</sup> and 29 as of June 2025.<sup>688</sup> The Office of the Ombudsperson reported that 21 signatories were murdered between 1 January and 31 May 2025,<sup>689</sup> and Indepaz reported 33 killings between January and October 2025.<sup>690</sup> The departments most affected were Arauca, Cauca, Guaviare, Meta, Antioquia, and Huila.<sup>691</sup> Threats by armed groups have driven instances of mass displacement.<sup>692</sup>

In 2025, the UNVMC described a 'worsening pattern of violence' against this profile, highlighting problems of stigmatisation, displacement, and lack of protection.<sup>693</sup> The killings, largely committed by illegal armed groups, are mainly centred in municipalities with illicit economies, and a limited state presence, which hinders the state's response.<sup>694</sup> Former combatants encountered 'heightened threats in areas where fluid conflict dynamics have led to multiple armed actors moving into and disputing areas where they have settled'.<sup>695</sup>

The IACHR indicated that the government launched a new security plan for this profile in 2024.<sup>696</sup> In September 2025, the UNVMC stated that, during the reporting period, 18 arrest warrants against alleged perpetrators of attacks on former combatants were issued (half of which have yet to be executed). These included two warrants against alleged instigators of the attacks.<sup>697</sup> Additionally, five convictions were obtained (not involving any of the instigators).<sup>698</sup> The UNVMC indicated that 'out of a total of 595 cases of attacks against former combatants under the purview of the Special Investigation Unit of the FGN, there had been 97 convictions, and 190 cases were reported as in trial phase. Impunity following attacks against former FARC-EP combatants remains high, underscoring a need for strengthened capacities of the Special Investigation Unit, as well as for improved coordination between the latter and other specialised units of that focus on illicit economies and organized crime'.<sup>699</sup>

<sup>684</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 December 2024, [url](#), para. 3

<sup>685</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 39

<sup>686</sup> Indepaz, Visor de asesinato a firmantes del acuerdo de paz en Colombia 2017-2024, [url](#)

<sup>687</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 December 2024, [url](#), para. 41; EEAS Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2023 indicates 50 were killed in 2022 and 44 killed in 2023.

<sup>688</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2025/419), 27 June 2025, [url](#), para. 34

<sup>689</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Ascenden a 81 los asesinatos de personas defensoras de derechos humanos y liderazgos sociales en 2025, 20 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>690</sup> Indepaz, Líderes sociales, defensores de DD.HH y firmantes de Acuerdo asesinados en 2024 y 2025, Updated 2 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>691</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2025/419), 27 June 2025, [url](#), para. 34

<sup>692</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 December 2024, [url](#), para. 41

<sup>693</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary General, 27 June 2025, [url](#), para. 35

<sup>694</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2025/419), 27 June 2025, [url](#), para. 34

<sup>695</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 40

<sup>696</sup> OAS, IACHR, Observaciones Preliminares: Visita in loco a Colombia 15-19 abril 2024, [url](#), p. 7

<sup>697</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 42

<sup>698</sup> OAS, IACHR, Observaciones Preliminares: Visita in loco a Colombia 15-19 abril 2024, [url](#), p. 7; UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 42

<sup>699</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 42






Figure 16: Assassinations of signatories to the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement /former FARC-EP combatants<sup>700</sup>

<sup>700</sup> Chart created by EUAA based on: Indepaz, Visor de asesinato a firmantes del acuerdo de paz en Colombia 2017-2024 (consulted October 2025), [url](#)



#### 4.3.4. Political activists and electoral candidates

Sources indicate an increase in the number of attacks against members of political parties, candidates, and former politicians during the reference period for this report.<sup>701</sup> ACLED indicated, in October 2025, that 331 events of civilian targeting of political figures took place between August 2022 and October 2025.<sup>702</sup>

Criminal and armed groups threatened, attacked, and killed government officials, politicians, and electoral candidates,<sup>703</sup> particularly at the local level and related to local elections.<sup>704</sup> Indepaz reported that, between 2016 and 2025, it recorded 74 killings of candidates for elected office (some of whom were also identified as social leaders), including those running for local and municipal councils or administrations, or for mayor, for example.<sup>705</sup> According to confidential sources interviewed by the Dutch authorities, it was not always clear whether the murdered politicians were killed for their political activism—for example, for fighting against the (illegal) economic interests of certain parties. In some cases, politicians were murdered precisely because of their ties to illegal armed groups. In another example, a politician nominated by an illegal armed group as their candidate in the mayoral elections was threatened by that group after losing the election. Politicians with ties to illegal armed groups also had to fear competing illegal armed groups in the area.<sup>706</sup>

High profile examples of targeting of political activists in the period, included:

- In May 2025, political activist for the Colombia Humana movement, Alberto Peña, was assassinated in Cauca after calling for a march in support of the government.<sup>707</sup>
- Miguel Uribe Turbay, a Colombian senator and presidential hopeful, was shot at a campaign rally in Bogotá on 7 June 2025, was hospitalised in critical condition, and died of complications from his injuries on 11 August 2025.<sup>708</sup> Segunda Marquetalia was reportedly responsible, but the group has denied responsibility.<sup>709</sup>

#### 4.3.5. People involved in the justice system

There has been a reduction in the number of attacks and murders of legal professionals since 2016; however, people involved in the justice system, including justice officials and crime

<sup>701</sup> Conflict analyst, Interview with EUAA, 14 October 2025; DeJusticia, Correspondence with EUAA, 3 November 2025

<sup>702</sup> ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA

<sup>703</sup> Conflict analyst, Interview with EUAA, 14 October 2025; Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), p. 66; MOE, Violencia Contra Liderazgos Políticos, Sociales y Comunales - Corte general: 1 de enero al 8 de mayo de 2025, June 2025, [url](#), pp. 14-17

<sup>704</sup> MOE, Violencia Contra Liderazgos Políticos, Sociales y Comunales - Corte general: 1 de enero al 8 de mayo de 2025, June 2025, [url](#), p. 3; MOE, Violencia Contra Liderazgos Políticos, Sociales y Comunales - Balance tras cuatro meses de avance del calendario electoral 8 de marzo de 2025 a 8 de julio de 2025, 9 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>705</sup> Indepaz, Listado de candidatos a cargos de elección popular, 2025, [url](#); MOE, Violencia Contra Liderazgos Políticos, Sociales y Comunales - Balance tras cuatro meses de avance del calendario electoral 8 de marzo de 2025 a 8 de julio de 2025, 9 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>706</sup> Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), p. 66

<sup>707</sup> Prensa Latina, Colombian president condemns assassination of political activist, 4 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>708</sup> HRW, Colombia: Presidential Candidate Attacked, Severely Injured, 10 June 2025, [url](#); International Crisis Group, Assassination Attempt on Top Politician Stirs Colombian Anxieties, 9 June 2025, [url](#); WOLA, Colombia Must Not Backtrack into Political Violence, 10 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>709</sup> Reuters, Dissident FARC faction denies role in attack on Colombian senator, 13 June 2025, [url](#)



witnesses are still targeted,<sup>710</sup> with high levels of impunity.<sup>711</sup> During the past three years, illegal armed groups have increasingly extended their use of violence beyond direct confrontation with state security forces, targeting judicial and bureaucratic institutions during specific moments such as electoral cycles or in the aftermath of major armed clashes. There has been a 'dramatic increase' in the number of requests for personal protection by judicial workers, according to DeJusticia.<sup>712</sup> In some cases, lawyers who worked with ethnic communities were surveilled, followed, harassed and threatened by armed groups; pressure has been placed on judges involved in murder cases, or they have been attacked or threatened.<sup>713</sup> In another example, after former President Uribe Vélez's 2025 conviction for fraud and witness tampering, the presiding judge faced online threats and defamation, prompting the National Protection Unit (Unidad Nacional de Protección, UNP) to consider heightened protection and to call for safeguarding judicial independence.<sup>714</sup> Examples of incidents in the reference period included:

- in September 2023, the facilities of the criminal courts in Tuluá (Valle del Cauca) were attacked with explosives;<sup>715</sup>
- in November 2024, a female official of the investigation corps of the FGN in La Guajira was murdered by a gunman on a motorcycle;<sup>716</sup>
- in January 2025, a lawyer was assassinated in a public street in a town south of Bogotá; the suspect was caught with the weapon in *flagrante delicto*, but later released, sparking criticism of the justice system;<sup>717</sup>
- in April 2024, AGC declared judges and prosecutors operating in the department of Cesar as 'military targets' through a pamphlet campaign, threatening not only police and military personnel but also judicial officials, naming two female members of the judiciary who had been handling cases against the group;<sup>718</sup>
- in July 2025, a lawyer was assassinated by a gunman in his own office;<sup>719</sup>
- in September 2025, in rural Boyacá, a trial attorney at the local circuit court was found dead in his own residence, showing signs of violence.<sup>720</sup>

#### 4.3.6. Indigenous and Afro-descendant communities in conflict-areas

Despite legal guarantees against it, there were reports of discrimination on the basis of gender, as well as against women, indigenous people, Afro-descendant Colombians, and

<sup>710</sup> EUAA, Country Focus – Colombia, December 2022, [url](#), pp. 121-122; Colombian Caravana, Report of the VIII Visit of the International Caravan of Jurists to Colombia – 2024, 2024, [url](#)

<sup>711</sup> Colombian Caravana, Report of the VIII Visit of the International Caravan of Jurists to Colombia – 2024, 2024, [url](#), p. 6

<sup>712</sup> DeJusticia, Correspondence with EUAA, 3 November 2025

<sup>713</sup> Colombian Caravana, Report of the VIII Visit of the International Caravan of Jurists to Colombia – 2024, 2024, [url](#), pp. 11, 13

<sup>714</sup> WOLA, Historic ruling in Colombia: A Win for the Country's Legal System, 30 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>715</sup> El Espectador, Atacan con explosivos juzgados penales de Tuluá (Valle del Cauca), 13 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>716</sup> El Universal, A la cárcel presunto coordinador del asesinato de funcionaria del CTI, 11 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>717</sup> Infobae, Testigo descarta robo en homicidio de abogado que quedó registrado en video: el asesino quedó libre, 16 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>718</sup> El Tiempo, 'Clan del Golfo' amenaza con plan pistola a jueces y fiscales en el Cesar: 'No estamos jugando, los acribillaremos', 30 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>719</sup> Vanguardia, Abogado fue asesinado en su propia oficina: sicario uso un arma con silenciador, 5 July 2025, [url](#); Periodismo Público, Luto en Chía: asesinan a otro abogado dentro de su oficina, 4 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>720</sup> Infobae, Judicializan a presunto responsable del homicidio de un servidor judicial en Boyacá, 14 September 2025, [url](#)



people with disabilities.<sup>721</sup> Colombia has a 'solid and advanced' legal and jurisprudential framework that recognises and protects the human rights of indigenous peoples and black, Afro-Colombian, Raizal and Palenquera communities. However, these ethnic peoples are disproportionately affected,<sup>722</sup> encounter 'differentiated impacts from the internal armed conflict, and face obstacles in accessing and enjoying their economic, social, cultural and environmental rights', as armed groups take advantage of the lack of state presence in rural areas.<sup>723</sup>

In October 2025, ACLED provided data to EUAA recording 411 events of civilian targeting by armed groups against 'indigenous groups' and 118 events targeted against 'Afro-Colombian ethnic groups' between August 2022 and October 2025.<sup>724</sup>

In regions where the state is absent or has little presence, Indigenous and Afro-descendant leaders in the community are at the forefront of encountering armed groups that arrive in their territory to contest the local order and, as a consequence, many social leaders who are murdered come from these communities.<sup>725</sup> Ongoing conflicts in areas with ethnic communities have led to restrictions on freedom of movement, imposed curfews, surveillance, and disrupted ways of life.<sup>726</sup> Areas where these groups experienced the most mass displacement and confinements were in Antioquia, Cauca, César, Chocó, La Guajira, Magdalena, Nariño, Putumayo, and Valle del Cauca.<sup>727</sup>

There are approximately 30 (out of 115) indigenous groups at risk of extinction that are protected under orders of the Constitutional Court.<sup>728</sup> Indigenous people have been targeted 'by all sides of the country's various conflicts.'<sup>729</sup>

#### 4.3.7. Journalists

Colombia's 1991 Constitution enshrines the right to freedom of expression and freedom of information.<sup>730</sup> No entity has regulatory powers over the press.<sup>731</sup> On 9 September 2024, President Petro signed Presidential Directive 7 to strengthen freedom of expression and press freedom.<sup>732</sup> While noting the existence of this framework, Colombia is described as one of the most dangerous countries on the continent for journalists.<sup>733</sup> The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión, RELE) noted that it ranked second in the region for murders of journalists in 2024.<sup>734</sup> Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF) stated that covering certain

<sup>721</sup> USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2023 – Colombia, 22 April 2024, [url](#), pp. 30, 32, 34, 38, 40

<sup>722</sup> AI, The State of the World's Human Rights – Colombia 2024, 29 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>723</sup> OAS, IACHR, Observaciones Preliminares: Visita in loco a Colombia 15-19 abril 2024, [url](#), pp. 8-9

<sup>724</sup> ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA.

<sup>725</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 78

<sup>726</sup> VMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 58

<sup>727</sup> OAS, IACHR, Observaciones Preliminares: Visita in loco a Colombia 15-19 abril 2024, [url](#), pp. 8-9

<sup>728</sup> Colombia, ODHAC, Context of the population of ethnic peoples in Colombia, September 2024, [url](#)

<sup>729</sup> Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024 – Colombia, 2024, [url](#)

<sup>730</sup> RSF, Colombia country page, n.d., [url](#); Colombia, Constitución Política de Colombia, [url](#), Arts. 20, 73

<sup>731</sup> Media Journalism Research Center, Colombia – Government, Politics and Regulations, 6 April 2023, [url](#), p. 21

<sup>732</sup> Colombia, Directiva Presidencial 07, 9 September 2024, [url](#); Colombia, Presidencia de la República de Colombia, Gobierno firma directiva presidencial para fortalecer libertad de expresión y libertad de prensa, 9 September 2024, [url](#)

<sup>733</sup> RSF, Colombia country page, n.d., [url](#); OAS, RELE, Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión, Informe Anual 2024, 3 March 2025, [url](#), para. 360

<sup>734</sup> OAS, RELE, Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión, Informe Anual 2024, 3 March 2025, [url](#), para. 362



topics such as the environment, armed conflict, armed groups and corruption can draw harassment, intimidation and violence.<sup>735</sup> Sources indicate that hostility towards the press has been exacerbated by stigmatising statements made by the authorities,<sup>736</sup> including by President Petro over the recent years,<sup>737</sup> government spokespersons and officials, and against women journalists in particular.<sup>738</sup> Sources reported on several cases of legal proceedings and investigations against media outlets during the reference period,<sup>739</sup> including orders to reveal information related to journalistic investigations.<sup>740</sup> RSF reported that the high-risk situation for journalists was exacerbated by the expansion of armed groups and other criminal actors operating across large regions of the country.<sup>741</sup> Sources noted that the reported attacks on journalists were mainly conducted by illegal actors, including criminal gangs and armed groups.<sup>742</sup> The Freedom of the Press Foundation (Fundación para la Libertad de Prensa, FLIP) reported that several types of attacks against journalists show a 'significant increase' between 2023 and 2025, from digital attacks and to threats, illegal surveillance by state agents, and aggression by armed and criminal groups as well as sexual violence.<sup>743</sup> In 2024, the FLIP recorded 530 attacks against 330 journalists, including 215 incidents of threats, 20 cases of forcibly displaced journalists, 4 cases of exiles, 2 kidnappings and 3 murders. RSF reported 5 media professionals killed between 2023 and 2025.<sup>744</sup> The RELE recorded the murder of at least 7 journalists and media workers in 2024.<sup>745</sup> Sources reported that another journalist survived an attempted murder in 2025.<sup>746</sup> According to the FLIP, the increase of violence against the media is connected to the escalation in armed conflict, with attacks increasing each year since the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement.<sup>747</sup> Incidents of violence against journalists by individuals participating in demonstrations are also reported in the context of media professionals covering social protests in several cities around the country, such as harassment, verbal attacks, destruction of journalistic material, death threats and physical assault.<sup>748</sup>

<sup>735</sup> RSF, Colombia country page, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>736</sup> FLIP, Presidente Petro persiste en su estrategia de deslegitimar el periodismo, 16 May 2024, [url](#); OAS, RELE, Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión, Informe Anual 2024, 3 March 2025, [url](#), para. 360

<sup>737</sup> RSF, RSF alarmed by escalation in Colombian president's attacks against media, 5 July 2024, [url](#)

<sup>738</sup> OAS, RELE, Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión, Informe Anual 2024, 3 March 2025, [url](#), para. 360; NDTV World, Colombian President calls female journalists "dolls of the mafia", 13 September 2024, [url](#)

<sup>739</sup> OAS, RELE, Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión, Informe Anual 2024, 3 March 2025, [url](#), para. 382; Inter American Press Association, Mid-Year Meeting Report, Colombia, 16 April 2024, [url](#); FLIP, Fiscalía General de la Nación continúa acosando a Cambio, 14 March 2024, [url](#)

<sup>740</sup> FLIP, De manera inconstitucional la Policía solicita a la W Radion revelar sus fuentes, 6 March 2024, [url](#)

<sup>741</sup> RSF, Colombia country page, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>742</sup> OAS, RELE, Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión, Informe Anual 2024, 3 March 2025, [url](#), para. 360; FLIP, Bajo todos los fuegos: periodismo y nuevas guerras en Colombia, 10 February 2025, [url](#), para. 4

<sup>743</sup> FLIP, Cómo se vive y se sobrevive al periodismo en Colombia, 2025, [url](#) p. 11

<sup>744</sup> RSF, Barometer, Exaction victims in Colombia between 2023 and 2025, n.d., [url](#); Colombia One, Colombian Journalist Jaime Vasquez Murdered, 16 April 2024, [url](#); El País, Jorge Méndez, el periodista comunitario que buscaba cambiar la imagen de La Gabarra y terminó asesinado, 28 June 2024 [url](#); Caracol, Investigan el asesinato del periodista Luis Gabriel Pereira en Ciénaga de Oro, Córdoba, 11 May 2025, [url](#); CPJ, Colombian journalist Mardonio Mejía Mendoza shot dead at home, 29 January 2024, [url](#); CPJ, Colombian journalist Óscar Gómez Aguedo shot dead at radio station, 30 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>745</sup> OAS, RELE, Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión, Informe Anual 2024, 3 March 2025, [url](#), para. 360; Caribe Afirmativo, Julio Alberto Zapata, reconocido locutor de San Rafael, fue hallado muerto en su casa, 23 April 2024, [url](#); El Espectador, Asesinaron a Hilton Eduardo Barrios, ex candidato a la alcaldía de Puerto López, 26 April 2024, [url](#)

<sup>746</sup> FLIP, Rechazamos atentado en contra del periodista Gustavo Chicangana, 7 July 2025, [url](#); CPJ, Colombian journalist, wife wounded in targeted shooting, 7 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>747</sup> FLIP, Bajo todos los fuegos: periodismo y nuevas guerras en Colombia, 10 February 2025, [url](#)

<sup>748</sup> OAS, RELE, Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión, Informe Anual 2024, 3 March 2025, [url](#), paras. 377-379



Journalists are among the individuals at risk who can theoretically seek the assistance of the UNP,<sup>749</sup> established in 2011<sup>750</sup> for the protection of media professionals amongst 16 categories of citizens.<sup>751</sup> However, the process can be lengthy as it can take between 4 and 7 months to address a threat, and measures are described by sources as 'completely impractical'<sup>752</sup> and 'insufficient'.<sup>753</sup> Sources gave the view that the UNP is facing a crisis due to lack of means and allegations of corruption.<sup>754</sup> At least two journalists have been reported to have been murdered between 2022-2024 while under protection measures from UNP,<sup>755</sup> while others continue to receive death threats from armed groups in 2024-2025.<sup>756</sup>

#### 4.3.8. Trade unionists

Most public accounts focus on social leaders rather than *sindicalistas* (trade unionists), so union-specific figures remain unclear and may be underreported.

The International Trade Union Conference produces a Global Rights Index on the situation of trade unionists, and remarked that, in 2023, Colombia was described as the 'world's deadliest country for trade unionists', reporting that Colombia was one of eight countries in the world where trade unionists are murdered, reporting 22 cases in 2021, and 13 cases in 2022.<sup>757</sup> Between 2023 and 2024, at least 11 were assassinated.<sup>758</sup> They faced death threats, attacks, and targeted assassinations.<sup>759</sup>

Often killings remain unresolved and un-investigated; however, the government launched a process of reparation to the trade union movement in September 2023, recognising it as a 'collective victim' of the conflict, and including assassinated trade union members in the Single Registry of Victims (Registro Único de Víctimas, RUV).<sup>760</sup> In October 2025, ACLED provided data to EUAA recording 411 events of civilian targeting by armed groups against 'labor groups' between August 2022 and October 2025.<sup>761</sup> Justice For Colombia reported the killing of at least 8 trade unionists affiliated to teachers unions between January 2024 and March 2025.<sup>762</sup>

Examples from media sources where trade unionists were killed in 2025 include: the leader of a workers' association killed in Norte del Cauca by armed men who entered his home;<sup>763</sup> the killing of a teacher's union member in Cauca who was assassinated in front of her child;<sup>764</sup> and the leader of a regional workers' committee who was killed by a *sicario* on a motorcycle.<sup>765</sup>

<sup>749</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 83

<sup>750</sup> Colombia, Decreto 4065 de 2011, 2011, [url](#)

<sup>751</sup> UNESCO, National safety mechanisms in Colombia, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>752</sup> FLIP, Bajo todos los fuegos: periodismo y nuevas guerras en Colombia, 10 February 2025, [url](#)

<sup>753</sup> FLIP, Bajo todos los fuegos: periodismo y nuevas guerras en Colombia, 10 February 2025, [url](#)

<sup>754</sup> FLIP, Bajo todos los fuegos: periodismo y nuevas guerras en Colombia, 10 February 2025, [url](#); France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 83

<sup>755</sup> FLIP, Bajo todos los fuegos: periodismo y nuevas guerras en Colombia, 10 February 2025, [url](#)

<sup>756</sup> RSF, Colombia: Threats against investigative journalists escalate despite government response efforts, 31 October 2024, [url](#)

<sup>757</sup> Justice for Colombia, Colombia again deadliest country for trade unionists in 2023: ITUC, 4 July 2023, [url](#)

<sup>758</sup> ITUC, Global Rights Index 2024, June 2024, [url](#), p. 57

<sup>759</sup> ITUC, Global Rights Index 2024, June 2024, [url](#), p. 57

<sup>760</sup> ITUC, Global Rights Index 2024, June 2024, [url](#), p. 57

<sup>761</sup> ACLED, Data on political violence and demonstrations in Colombia, October 2025. Unpublished information provided to EUAA.

<sup>762</sup> Justice for Colombia, March 2025 Update, March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>763</sup> El Tiempo, Asesinan a otro líder sindical en el norte del Cauca: esto es lo que se sabe, 11 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>764</sup> Justice for Colombia, March 2025 Update, March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>765</sup> Eje21, Un sicario asesina a tiros a un líder sindical en la ciudad colombiana de Valledupar, 30 April 2025, [url](#)



### 4.3.9. Victims of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)

Colombia ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1982<sup>766</sup> and acceded the Inter-American Convention of Belem do Para in 1996.<sup>767</sup> Colombia's principal national legal framework to combat violence against women and fulfil its international obligations is based on Law 1257 of 2008 and Law 294 of 1996.<sup>768</sup>

Gender-based violence is described as a 'critical problem' in Colombia by the OAS.<sup>769</sup> As reported by ABColombia, a human and environmental rights advocacy project of a consortium of British and Irish organisations working in Colombia,<sup>770</sup> violence against women in Colombia is perpetrated in public and private spheres, it can be political violence, conflict-related violence, physical, cultural and societal violence.<sup>771</sup> The Colombian National Institute of Health (Instituto Nacional de Salud, INS) reported 158 394 cases of gender-based violence (GBV) in 2023 (122 846 female victims), 164 141 GBV cases in 2024 (127 018 female victims) and 135 561 (102 585 female victims) cases by the end of October 2025.<sup>772</sup> The Global Protection Cluster (GPC) reported that out of the total number of GBV survivors reported in 2024, 76 % were women and 46 % children and adolescents.<sup>773</sup> The GPC noted that GBV remains underreported, in part due to fear of reporting and social stigma.<sup>774</sup> It is also reported by the UN that migrant women are at greater risk of experiencing gender-based violence.<sup>775</sup>

Sexual violence remains among the human rights violations of concern,<sup>776</sup> particularly against women, children, and youth, and especially in post-conflict reintegration areas.<sup>777</sup> Indigenous, Afro-descendant, and rural/peasant women, as well as female former combatants were particularly susceptible to sexual violence in rural areas and areas controlled by armed groups.<sup>778</sup> The UN Secretary General Special Representative on Conflict Related Sexual Violence reported that in 2024, the UARIV recorded 1 009 cases of conflict-related sexual violence against women, 73 against men and 15 against persons with diverse sexual orientation or gender identity, representing an increase of 68 % from the previous year.<sup>779</sup> The report noted that members of illegal armed groups as well as police and national armed forces were implicated in conflict-related sexual violence.<sup>780</sup> The OHCHR reported on conflict-related GBV used strategically by armed groups for social and territorial control, including by targeting women human rights defenders.<sup>781</sup> It also noted the high incidence of sexual violence against

<sup>766</sup> OHCHR, Ratification Status for the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>767</sup> OAS, Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women, Status of signatures and ratifications, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>768</sup> Greta Friedemann-Sánchez & Margaret Grieve, General Background on Colombian Laws on Violence against Women, Orders of Protection, and Shelters, University of Minnesota Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs, January 2017, [url](#); Colombia, Ley 1257 de 2008, 2008, [url](#); Colombia, Ley 294 de 1996, 1996, [url](#)

<sup>769</sup> OAS, IACHR, Observaciones Preliminares: Visita in loco a Colombia 15-19 abril 2024, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>770</sup> ABColombia, About Us, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>771</sup> ABColombia, Colombia: Violence against women, girls and the LGBTQI+ Community – Its causes and consequences, 26 November 2024, [url](#), p. 7

<sup>772</sup> Colombia, INS, Violencia de género e intrafamiliar y ataques con agentes químicos, [url](#)

<sup>773</sup> GPC, Protection Analysis Update for Colombia, October 2024, [url](#), p. 8

<sup>774</sup> GPC, Protection Analysis Update for Colombia, October 2024, [url](#), p. 8

<sup>775</sup> GPC, Protection Analysis Update for Colombia, October 2024, [url](#), p. 8

<sup>776</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 December 2024, [url](#), para. 44; OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia (A/HRC/55/23), 12 July 2024, [url](#), paras. 14, 15

<sup>777</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 December 2024, [url](#), para. 44

<sup>778</sup> OAS, IACHR, Observaciones Preliminares: Visita in loco a Colombia 15-19 abril 2024, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>779</sup> UN, Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (2024), 2025, [url](#), p. 17

<sup>780</sup> UN, Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (2024), 2025, [url](#), p. 17

<sup>781</sup> OHCHR, Annual report on the situation of human rights in Colombia, 22 January 2025, [url](#), p. 4, para. 20



indigenous persons and Afro-descendent persons, as well as against migrant and refugee women and girls.<sup>782</sup>

The ICRC reported that despite underreporting, incidence of sexual violence related to armed conflict was on the rise in 2024, and it was often used by armed groups to intimidate, punish and destroy the social fabric.<sup>783</sup> In a specific incident documented in September 2024 in the department of Chocó, sources reported that the AGC had issued a '*plan feminicidio*' through which the armed group disseminated a list of at least 27 women's names and photographs, all of whom were alleged to have some relation with other criminal groups operating in the region, in a context marked by a rise of feminicides in the region, and territorial dispute between the AGC and the ELN.<sup>784</sup> It also noted that femicides have been targeting women who are social and community leaders.<sup>785</sup>

The Colombian system to monitor gender-based violence (Sistema Integrado de Información de Violencias de Género - SIVIGE),<sup>786</sup> reported 42 167 cases of sexual violence in 2023, 43 309 in 2024, and 24 013 in the first six months of 2025. The SIVIGE also reported 92 201 cases of GBV for the first six months of 2025, of which 42 790 were physical violence and 24 013 of sexual violence. The SIVIGE noted that 75,6 % of the reported GBV cases were women and girls, and that they represented 82,4 % of the sexual violence cases.<sup>787</sup> 87,18 % of the victims of physical GBV recorded in the SIVIGE were related to their aggressor, and 59,16 % of the aggressors were either the partner (36,52 %) or ex-partner (22,64 %); 77,61 % of the incidents took place at the place of residence of the victim.<sup>788</sup>

The Colombian Observatory of Femicides (Observatorio Colombiano de Femicidios) recorded 707 femicides in 2023, 1 584 in 2024, and 971 between January and September 2025.<sup>789</sup> Out of the 3 262 victims of femicides recorded between 2023 and 2025, in 1 100 cases the incidents were reported having taken place at the victim's place of residence, and 1 285 reported knowing the perpetrator.<sup>790</sup>

In November 2024, Colombia launched its first national action plan on women, peace, and security aimed at access to justice and GBV prevention with specific assistance for displaced, indigenous, and Afro-Colombian women.<sup>791</sup>

#### 4.3.10. Children

Children continued to experience 'grave' human rights violations in the context of the conflict. The UN reported in 2024 instances of child recruitment (450 cases), killing and maiming (78 cases), sexual violence (33 cases), child abduction (16 cases), and attacks on schools and hospitals (42 incidents), use of schools for military purposes by armed groups (35 schools),

<sup>782</sup> OHCHR, Annual report on the situation of human rights in Colombia, 22 January 2025, [url](#), p. 4, para. 20

<sup>783</sup> ICRC, Humanitarian Challenges 2025 – Colombia, 27 March 2025, [url](#), p.9

<sup>784</sup> Insight Crime, Violence against women is being used as a weapon of war in Colombia. Again., 9 October 2024, [url](#); El País, Un '*plan feminicidio*' destapa la degradación del conflicto en la capital del Chocó, 23 September 2024, [url](#)

<sup>785</sup> Insight Crime, Violence against women is being used as a weapon of war in Colombia. Again., 9 October 2024, [url](#)

<sup>786</sup> Colombia, Ministerio de Justicia, Sistema Integrado de Información de Violencias de Género, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>787</sup> Colombia, Sistema de Vigilancia en Salud Pública, SIVIGE, 30 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>788</sup> Colombia, Sistema de Vigilancia en Salud Pública, SIVIGE, 30 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>789</sup> Observatorio Colombiano de Femicidios, Femicidios Colombia – Víctimas, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>790</sup> Observatorio Colombiano de Femicidios, Femicidios Colombia – Víctimas, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>791</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 December 2024, [url](#), para. 7



and denial of humanitarian access (24 incidents); Afro-descendant and indigenous children were the majority of victims.<sup>792</sup>

Child recruitment and trafficking of children into armed groups continued in the reference period.<sup>793</sup> Children come often from poor low-income urban areas, or remote rural territories where the state has a limited presence.<sup>794</sup> The Humanitarian NGO Forum documented the annual increase in the recruitment of children and adolescents between 2021-2024.<sup>795</sup> The UN reported 123 cases in 2021, 130 cases in 2022, 277 cases in 2023.<sup>796</sup> The Office of the Ombudsperson released a report in March, expressing concern over the recruitment of children, and noting that 463 cases were recorded in 2024, 279 boys and 184 girls.<sup>797</sup> marking a 64 % increase compared to the previous year.<sup>798</sup> Child recruitment has reached its highest point in ten years, though underreporting is an issue.<sup>799</sup> Child recruitment is especially a occurring in Cauca,<sup>800</sup> Nariño, Arauca, and Putumayo.<sup>801</sup> All criminal and armed groups recruit minors; however the ELN and FARC dissident groups are the most prevalent recruiters.<sup>802</sup>

Recruitment occurs through trickery, luring, abduction and selling of children.<sup>803</sup> Children are lured with promises of money, access to vehicles, cell phones, or status; and recruitment occurs often via social media, with depictions glamorising the benefits of becoming a member of the armed group.<sup>804</sup> Boys are sold for approximately 120 USD; while girls can be sold for as much as four times that amount, depending on the child's characteristics. Child recruitment is a source of income for armed groups, but also allows groups to control territory, amass troops and intimidate the local community who fear for the safety of their children. Children often perform many tasks, the most important of which is forming the perimeter of 'expendable troops that protect the core leadership and fighters' often with little training and being sent to remote areas. They also perform chores and 'many are sexually abused.'<sup>805</sup> In urban areas, children are a 'cheap labour force' used for transporting drugs, weapons, dealing, extortion collection, hitmen work, and murder.<sup>806</sup> Those who try to escape are 'almost certainly killed as punishment' which serves as a deterrent to others. Those who do return from recruitment

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<sup>792</sup> UN Secretary-General on children and armed conflict, Children and Armed Conflict in Colombia – Report of the Secretary-General (S/2024/161), 13 February 2024, [url](#), para. 19-20; UN Secretary-General on children in armed conflict, Report of the Secretary-General (A/79/878-S/2025/247), 17 June 2025, [url](#), paras. 43-49

<sup>793</sup> BBC News, A Colombian presidential hopeful was shot. A 15-year-old is the prime suspect, 13 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>794</sup> BBC News, A Colombian presidential hopeful was shot. A 15-year-old is the prime suspect, 13 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>795</sup> Humanitarian NGO Forum – Colombia, Situation of the Recruitment, Use and Utilization of Children and Adolescents in Colombia 2024, 30 September 2025, [url](#), p. 2

<sup>796</sup> Humanitarian NGO Forum – Colombia, Situation of the Recruitment, Use and Utilization of Children and Adolescents in Colombia 2024, 30 September 2025, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>797</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary General, 27 June 2025, [url](#), para. 37; Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, 51% de casos de reclutamiento conocidos por la Defensoría corresponde a niñas, niños y adolescentes de pueblos indígenas, 31 July 2024, [url](#)

<sup>798</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 December 2024, [url](#), para. 11; El País, Colombia, the deadliest country in the Americas for human rights defenders, 6 March 2024, [url](#); Humanitarian NGO Forum – Colombia, Situation of the Recruitment, Use and Utilization of Children and Adolescents in Colombia 2024, 30 September 2025, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>799</sup> Dickenson, E., Colombia's Stolen Children, in Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2025, [url](#); See also: BBC News, A Colombian presidential hopeful was shot. A 15-year-old is the prime suspect, 13 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>800</sup> Dickenson, E., Colombia's Stolen Children, in Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>801</sup> El País, Colombia, the deadliest country in the Americas for human rights defenders, 6 March 2024, [url](#)

<sup>802</sup> El País, Colombia, the deadliest country in the Americas for human rights defenders, 6 March 2024, [url](#); Dickenson, E., Colombia's Stolen Children, in Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>803</sup> Dickenson, E., Colombia's Stolen Children, in Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2025, [url](#); Dickenson, E., Colombia's Stolen Children, in Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>804</sup> Dickenson, E., Colombia's Stolen Children, in Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2025, [url](#); Dickenson, E., Colombia's Stolen Children, in Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2025, [url](#); El País, Colombia, the deadliest country in the Americas for human rights defenders, 6 March 2024, [url](#)

<sup>805</sup> Dickenson, E., Colombia's Stolen Children, in Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>806</sup> BBC News, A Colombian presidential hopeful was shot. A 15-year-old is the prime suspect, 13 June 2025, [url](#)



encounter ostracisation, stigma, risks of re-recruitment, or being killed in retaliation for deserting.<sup>807</sup> While prioritising the problem of child recruitment, the Petro government has failed to negotiate an end to the practice, indicating that insufficient pressure has been applied to armed groups to address the issue,<sup>808</sup> and the issue has not been discussed in dialogues between armed groups and the state.<sup>809</sup>

### 4.3.11. LGBTIQ persons

LGBTIQ persons' rights are legally protected, but they are often targeted for social discrimination and abuse, facing impunity for crimes committed against them.<sup>810</sup> Colombia's legal framework recognises consensual same-sex sexual acts as legal, same-sex marriage and civil unions, allows for adoption by same-sex couples and includes restrictions on non-essential medical interventions on intersex minors. It also permits Colombian citizens to change their name and gender markers in the civil registry. The penal code includes provisions criminalising acts of discrimination based on sexual orientation and defines that the motivation of a crime being based on the victim's sexual orientation constitutes an aggravating circumstance.<sup>811</sup> The Colombian constitutional court's jurisprudence over the past 20 years includes a number of cases that determined the judicial implementation of the legislative framework.<sup>812</sup> In 2023, the Law 2281<sup>813</sup> created the Ministry for Equality and Equity, under President Gustavo Petro, to address inequalities and promote the rights of minorities, including LGBTIQ persons.<sup>814</sup> In March 2025, a National Policy for the Guarantee of the Rights of the LGBTIQ Population<sup>815</sup> was approved,<sup>816</sup> setting a 10-year roadmap for the full inclusion and protection of LGBT persons.<sup>817</sup>

In 2023, the JEP reported that LGBTIQ individuals had been 'disproportionately' affected by the armed conflict, with Caribe Afirmativo recording more than 4 190 victims. As of the end of 2024,<sup>818</sup> the Unit for the Attention and Integral Reparation to the Victims (Unidad para las Víctimas) also reported that more than 6 500 LGBTIQ+ persons have been counted as victims of the conflict.<sup>819</sup>

The OHCHR reported that gender-based violence is underreported, and victim stigmatisation results in hampering access to justice and services.<sup>820</sup> Sources reported that, despite the legal framework, societal obstacles and discriminations persist and continue to hinder its effective

<sup>807</sup> Dickenson, E., Colombia's Stolen Children, in Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>808</sup> Dickenson, E., Colombia's Stolen Children, in Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>809</sup> El País, Colombia, the deadliest country in the Americas for human rights defenders, 6 March 2024, [url](#)

<sup>810</sup> Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024 – Colombia, 2024, [url](#)

<sup>811</sup> ILGA World, ILGA World Database – Colombia, [url](#)

<sup>812</sup> Colombia, Corte Constitucional, Sentencia T675/17, 14 March 2018, [url](#); Colombia, Corte Constitucional, Sentencia T033/22, 21 February 2022, [url](#); Colombia, Corte Constitucional, Sentencia T1025/02, 27 November 2002, [url](#)

<sup>813</sup> Colombia, Ley 2281 de 2023, 2023, [url](#)

<sup>814</sup> UN Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity (UN IE SOGI), Country visit to the Republic of Colombia (19 to 30 May 2025), End of mission statement, 30 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>815</sup> Colombia, CONPES, Documento 4147, Política Nacional para la Garantía de los Derechos de la Población LGBTIQ+, 26 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>816</sup> Colombia, Departamento Nacional de Planeación, Colombia Avanza a una nueva era de inclusión y justicia. Aprobado por unanimidad el CONPES LGBTIQ+, [url](#)

<sup>817</sup> UN IE SOGI, Country visit to the Republic of Colombia (19 to 30 May 2025), End of mission statement, 30 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>818</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 103

<sup>819</sup> Colombia, UARIV, 'Transitamos hacia la paz', un conversatorio para honrar y reconocer a las víctimas del conflicto LGBTIQ+, 27 June 2024, [url](#)

<sup>820</sup> OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia, 24 February-4 April 2025, [url](#), par. 20



implementation.<sup>821</sup> The OFPRA's fact-finding mission report on Colombia reported that LGBTIQ people encounter community violence in rural areas, and particularly from armed groups, while they encounter differentiated treatment by healthcare, police, and educational institutions in urban areas. Furthermore, the report noted that there is a 'significant divide' between urban Bogotá and the rest of Colombia, paradoxically, with Bogotá, Medellín and Cali having the highest homicide rates.<sup>822</sup> However, the IACHR reported that they are especially at risk of violence in areas controlled by armed groups and rural locations.<sup>823</sup>

Sources during the reference period report instances of discrimination and blocked access to services,<sup>824</sup> threats, police violence, and homicides of LGBTIQ+ individuals.<sup>825</sup> During 2023, the NGO Colombia Diversa recorded 203 cases of threats against LGBTIQ+ persons in Colombia in 2023, most of which came from unknown perpetrators and armed groups<sup>826</sup> as well as 78 incidents of police violence affecting 89 LGBTIQ+ people,<sup>827</sup> and 159 homicides, mostly of gay men, and trans women.<sup>828</sup> Also in 2023, the NGO Caribe Afirmativo reported 2 333 incidents of threats and 1 109 cases of discrimination and harassment, 155 cases of police violence and 157 cases of homicide.<sup>829</sup> The Regional Network on Information about LGBTI Violence (Red Sin Violencia LGBTI) data for 2024 reported that, out of 361 recorded cases of LGBTIQ+ persons victims of homicide in Latin America and the Caribbeans, 175 took place in Colombia, representing the highest number of recorded cases in the region.<sup>830</sup>

The FGN created a special group for investigating crimes against LGBTIQ populations in 2024.<sup>831</sup> According to sources interviewed by OFPRA in 2024, LGBTIQ+ people often do not trust public institutions, due to the perception of impunity; however, the FGN's specialised unit for investigating complaints of crimes against LGBTIQ individuals does reportedly process complaints in practice, according to Alianza LGBTI Antioquia. In emergencies, LGBTIQ people can dial the national hotline 123 to be connected to a prosecutor for this group. The Office of the Ombudsperson remained one of the few trusted institutions.<sup>832</sup>

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<sup>821</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 102

<sup>822</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 105

<sup>823</sup> OAS, IACHR, Observaciones Preliminares: Visita in loco a Colombia 15-19 abril 2024, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>824</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Defensoría alerta sobre aumento de violencias contra mujeres transgénero en Colombia, 20 November 2024, [url](#)

<sup>825</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), pp. 108-109

<sup>826</sup> Colombia Diversa, La realidad de la discriminación 04 – Amenazas contra personas LGBTIQ+ en Colombia en 2023, December 2024, [url](#), pp. 5, 24

<sup>827</sup> Colombia Diversa, La realidad de la discriminación 03 – Violencia policial y abuso de autoridad contra personas LGBTIQ+ en el contexto Colombiano, November 2024, [url](#), p. 12

<sup>828</sup> Colombia Diversa, La realidad de la discriminación 01 – Boletín de homicidios contra personas LGBTIQ+ en Colombia en 2023, July 2024, [url](#), p. 14

<sup>829</sup> Caribe Afirmativo, 1NCONT4BL3S: Sin registro no hay memoria, Informe sobre la situación de derechos humanos de personas LGBTIQ+ en Colombia en 2023, [url](#)

<sup>830</sup> Sin Violencia LGBTIQ+, Annual Report: Homicides of LGBTIQ+ People in Latin America and the Caribbean 2024 [url](#), p. 21

<sup>831</sup> El Tiempo, Fiscalía crea grupo para investigar delitos cometidos contra población LGBTIQ+, 28 February 2024, [url](#)

<sup>832</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), pp. 105-106



## 5. State institutions and access to justice

### 5.1. Attorney-General's Office (Fiscalía General de la Nación, FGN)

The FGN was established by the 1991 Constitution and is independent of the executive branch; it is tasked with criminal investigation, fighting criminality, and ensuring access to efficient justice.<sup>833</sup> With 5 000 to 6 000 prosecutors and 8 000 investigators, the FGN is deployed across the national territory, and present in approximately 1 100 municipalities.<sup>834</sup> There are about 8.9 prosecutors per 100 000 inhabitants.<sup>835</sup> In Colombia, the heads of bodies such as the Office of the Ombudsperson and the FGN serve staggered four-year terms, meaning each president works with both their own appointees and those of their predecessor. Recently, new leadership more aligned with President Petro has taken office, leading to stronger cooperation—especially from the FGN—on government priorities like peace negotiations and the suspension of arrest warrants for participants in those talks.<sup>836</sup> The FGN has the Judicial Police Corps for Investigations (Cuerpo Técnico de Investigación, CTI), which deals with crime and investigations, identifying perpetrators and bringing them to justice. Intermediaries can access the unit physically at police stations, by telephone, through the national hotline 122, by email or through internet platform for reporting crime.<sup>837</sup>

The FGN has a Special Investigation Unit (Unidad Especial de Investigación) and has implemented a new investigation model to identify linkages between attacks against former FARC combatants and human rights defenders.<sup>838</sup> Writing in July 2025, the UNVMC reported that there have been convictions of 116 individuals, including 5 considered 'most responsible' out of the 611 cases under investigation since 2017.<sup>839</sup> The FGN stated that resolution of murders of human rights defenders is between 65-70 %, however, this only means a suspect has been identified; in terms of prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment, the rate drops significantly with the FGN obtaining approximately 180 convictions since 2016.<sup>840</sup> Out of a total of 595 cases of attacks on former combatants under the purview of the FGN's Special Investigation Unit, there have been 97 convictions and 190 in trial phase.<sup>841</sup> Impunity remained high due to the Unit's weakness in prosecuting those materially and intellectually responsible for attacks.<sup>842</sup> High levels of impunity are driven by problems with the investigative and prosecutorial processes of the FGN; with most judicial bottlenecks occurring at the first stages of the justice system.<sup>843</sup> Corporación Excelencia en la Justicia indicated in 2024 that out of the

<sup>833</sup> Colombia, Office of the Attorney General of Colombia, 2010, [url](#)

<sup>834</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), pp. 17-18

<sup>835</sup> CEJ, El 93% de las denuncias penales en Colombia no avanzan más allá de la indagación, revela informe de la CEJ sobre el SPOA, 17 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>836</sup> Conflict analyst, Interview with EUAA, 14 October 2025

<sup>837</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 18

<sup>838</sup> OAS, IACHR, Observaciones Preliminares: Visita in loco a Colombia 15-19 abril 2024, [url](#), p. 6; France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 18

<sup>839</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary General, 27 June 2025, [url](#), para. 40

<sup>840</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 77

<sup>841</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 42

<sup>842</sup> OAS, IACHR, Observaciones Preliminares: Visita in loco a Colombia 15-19 abril 2024, [url](#), p. 6; UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 42

<sup>843</sup> DeJusticia, Correspondence with EUAA, 3 November 2025



almost 2 million criminal complaints filed, 93.2 % stagnate in the preliminary stages of investigation, without getting into a judicial hearing; that out of the 1.4 million solved cases, 81.9 % were archived (closed without full adjudication), and only 3.7 % reached a first-instance decision from a judge; and that the national conviction rate for oral trials was about 56.6 %.<sup>844</sup>

## 5.2. Anti-kidnapping and extortion units (Grupos de Acción Unificada por la Libertad Personal, GAULA)

GAULAs are specialised anti-extortion and anti-kidnapping policing and military units with about 1 659 agents that cover 90 % of the national territory, and are involved in prevention and investigation, intelligence gathering and cooperation with foreign authorities. Police's GAULAs are deployed to urban areas and report to the Colombian National Police, while the military units of GAULA operate in rural zones and are under the General Command of the Colombian Armed Forces. In addition, there are 'CiberGAULA' to fight against digital extortion, as well as a free national hotline (165) to allow victims to quickly connect with GAULA officers. Cases that are forwarded to the GAULA are sent to one of the 33 FGN delegates who are responsible for extortion cases. The GAULA also collaborates with the CTI and the PNC.<sup>845</sup>

According to an April 2023 article, between January and April 2023, the 33 military GAULA units made 218 arrests for extortion, 46 of which were from AGC/Pelusos/Caparros, and 54 other organised crime groups, while 118 were ordinary common crime.<sup>846</sup> During 2023, the National Police's GAULA Unit reported that 2 708 people were arrested for extortion, a rise of 12 % from 2022, with 82 % of them receiving a prison sentence. For kidnapping, 630 people were arrested (a 17 % increase over 2022), with 90 % of them placed in detention awaiting a judicial process.<sup>847</sup>

During 2024, military GAULAs conducted 600 operations, and arrested 900 people for extortion and 120 for kidnapping according to Infobae.<sup>848</sup>

## 5.3. Office of the Ombudsperson (Defensoría del Pueblo)

The Office of the Ombudsperson (Defensoría del Pueblo) was also established in the 1991 Constitution, and has a mandate to defend, promote, and protect human rights and liberties.<sup>849</sup> It has four national-level offices (protection and promotion of human rights; resources and judicial actions; complaints reception and procedures; and public defender office); and 18 delegations that touch a broad spectrum of human rights issues in Colombia ranging from advice to victims of the armed conflict, ethnic groups, transitional justice, and freedom of

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<sup>844</sup> CEJ, El 93% de las denuncias penales en Colombia no avanzan más allá de la indagación, revela informe de la CEJ sobre el SPOA, 17 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>845</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), pp. 20-21

<sup>846</sup> Colombia, GAULA Militares, 21 April 2023, [url](#)

<sup>847</sup> Infobae, Secuestros en Colombia aumentaron en un 50%, según el Gaula de la Policía, 13 December 2023, [url](#)

<sup>848</sup> Infobae, El Comando Gaula Militar potenciará las acciones contra la extorsión y el secuestro en Colombia, 28 September 2024, [url](#)

<sup>849</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Qué hacemos, n.d., [url](#)



expression, among others.<sup>850</sup> According to the Conflict Analyst, under the leadership of the current Ombudsperson, Iris Marín, the Office of the Ombudsperson has been significantly revitalised—morale has improved, credibility in rural communities has strengthened, and the institution's voice has been effectively used to highlight key issues.<sup>851</sup>

In 2017, the Office of the Ombudsperson established the Early Warning System (*Sistema de Alertas Tempranas*, SAT) to warn the government on the potential or actual risk or actions of human rights violations committed against a segment of the population.<sup>852</sup> The UARIV reported in 2022 that, although alerts were being issued, there was a low level of compliance with the recommendations of the SAT by national and territorial entities.<sup>853</sup> Between 2020 and 2024, the Office of the Ombudsperson monitored and issued Early Warning 019 of 2023 (AT 019-23), which identified 706 municipalities at risk for the work of human rights defenders. It also issued Early Warning 007 of 2024 for the Amazon concerning risks posed to environmental leaders. Moreover, the Office of the Ombudsperson issued over 100 municipal-level early warnings, highlighting human rights defenders at particular risk.<sup>854</sup> According to the Office of the Ombudsperson, persistent violence in Colombia against social leaders and human rights defenders, in particular, is due to limited state response, lack of coordination between national and local levels, and insufficient resources, which 'seriously hindered the effective protection of civilians.'<sup>855</sup> The UNVMC reported in September 2025 that a new updated system was launched in September 2023 to support the prompt response to early warnings issued by the office, with the aim to improve operational response capacity.<sup>856</sup>

## 5.4. National Protection Unit (Unidad Nacional de Protección, UNP)

Since 2012, the National Protection Unit (UNP), under Colombia's Ministry of the Interior, has been responsible for implementing protective measures for individuals and communities whose lives are threatened due to their leadership or advocacy roles. Beneficiaries include political activists, journalists, human rights defenders, social leaders, former guerrilla members of the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement, and vulnerable communities. To request protection, individuals or groups must submit an application and supporting documents online or via one of the 31 regional protection groups. Each case is assessed through a risk assessment report and reviewed by the Risk Evaluation and Recommendation Committee (CERREM, Comité de Evaluación del Riesgo y Recomendación de Medidas), which includes subcommittees focused on women, individuals, and collectives such as Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities. Depending on the assessed level of threat—ordinary, extraordinary, or extreme—protection

<sup>850</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 19

<sup>851</sup> Conflict analyst, Interview with EUAA, 14 October 2025

<sup>852</sup> Colombia, Decreto 2124 de 2017, 2017, [url](#), Art. 4

<sup>853</sup> Colombia, Comisión de Seguimiento y Monitoreo a la Implementación de la Ley 1448 de 2011, "Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras", Noveno informe de seguimiento al Congreso de la República 2021-2022, 22 August 2022, [url](#), p. 104

<sup>854</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Los Contrastes de la Realidad Humanitaria, 2024, [url](#), p. 74

<sup>855</sup> Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Los Contrastes de la Realidad Humanitaria, 2024, [url](#), pp. 87-88

<sup>856</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 37



measures may range from basic tools like bulletproof vests to armed bodyguards and armoured vehicles, with measures lasting one year and being subject to review.<sup>857</sup>

The Unit is reported to be hampered by a lack of timely and transparent risk analysis, differentiation for ethnic and regional variations, and protections that take into account gender.<sup>858</sup> OFPRA interlocutors indicated that the UNP is in 'crisis' due to lack of resources and corruption; while even when measures are in place they sometimes encounter logistical and practical problems, such as broken vehicles or panic buttons that do not function.<sup>859</sup> Other examples include mobile phones delivered to rural areas without coverage, lack of planning, or UNP monitoring or controlling those they are meant to protect.<sup>860</sup> According to DeJusticia, the same persistent barriers remain during the reference period: insufficient funding for UNP operations, administrative delays in protection procedures, arbitrary and rigid risk assessments, inadequate security allocations, and poor coordination among state agencies.<sup>861</sup>

In 2023, UNP received approximately 64 000 requests for protection and of those, 6 000 were given protection measures.<sup>862</sup> The UN reported that 4 000 HRDs had protection measures in place and more than 320 groups received collective protection from the government.<sup>863</sup> Reporting in 2024, the UN indicated that emergency procedures were in place to evacuate and provide emergency protection measures to former combatants in high-risk areas; however, since the signing of the Final Agreement in 2016, 45 former combatants were killed while awaiting protection, and 14 were killed despite having protection measures in place.<sup>864</sup> In 2024, 11 people were killed despite having protection in place.<sup>865</sup>

DeJusticia indicated to EUAA for this report that relocation of threatened leaders to major cities remained an available protection measure, administered solely by the UNP. The agency provides financial assistance and determines eligibility based on risk assessments derived from applicants' self-reports. However, significant shortcomings persist. Limited public funding restricts the number of beneficiaries, and many relocated individuals are forced to return to their regions due to the high cost of living in urban areas.<sup>866</sup> DeJusticia commented that the effectiveness of relocation measures in large cities—intended to protect individuals from armed groups—depends critically on the availability of sustainable livelihoods and support networks in the host location. Many are forced to return to their regions once financial assistance ends or when they cannot find viable means to rebuild their lives in the city.<sup>867</sup>

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<sup>857</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), pp. 24, 82, 83

<sup>858</sup> OAS, IACHR, Observaciones Preliminares: Visita in loco a Colombia 15-19 abril 2024, [url](#), pp. 5-6; the UNVMC also mentions in its December 2024 reporting that the Unit still lacks internal protocols on GBV. UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 December 2024, [url](#), para. 44

<sup>859</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), pp. 83-84

<sup>860</sup> Colombian Caravana, Report of the VIII Visit of the International Caravan of Jurists to Colombia – 2024, 2024, [url](#), p. 11

<sup>861</sup> DeJusticia, Correspondence with EUAA, 3 November 2025

<sup>862</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 83

<sup>863</sup> US, CRS, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, 30 May 2025, [url](#), p. 11

<sup>864</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 December 2024, [url](#), para. 43

<sup>865</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 83

<sup>866</sup> DeJusticia, Correspondence with EUAA, 3 November 2025

<sup>867</sup> DeJusticia, Correspondence with EUAA, 3 November 2025



## 5.5. Constitutional Court

The Constitutional Court is an independent tribunal, committed to safeguarding and protecting human rights. It often intervenes to order the state to provide for the equal rights of marginalised groups.<sup>868</sup> For instance, in December 2023, the Court ordered the government to better protect human rights defenders and bring to justice those involved in the killings (SU-546 of 2023), declaring their situation to be unconstitutional due to the increasing rates of aggressions against human rights defenders in general, and due to the blocked capacity of the State to prevent and control such violence.<sup>869</sup> In 2022, a similar ruling was made regarding the human rights violations of former combatants and signatories to the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement (SU-020 of 2022).<sup>870</sup> The court has also issued a series of decisions against the operational problems of the UNP, and highlighting the barriers stopping the successful implementation of the Early Warning System of the Ombudsperson's office, and the need for greater national and regional coordination and funding for the protection of former combatants and human rights defenders.<sup>871</sup> DeJusticia remarked that the growing number of court decisions on the protection of human rights defenders reflects mounting frustration with the institutional framework's ineffectiveness. The judiciary has become the last resort for civil society when the government fails or refuses to uphold its own standards. Since 2022, however, this series of judicial decisions has strengthened the leverage and accountability capacity of human rights defenders and their allies, enabling them to exert greater pressure on the government for more effective action.<sup>872</sup>

## 5.6. Special Jurisdiction for Peace (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, JEP)

The JEP is an independent judicial body created as part of the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement. Its mission is to investigate, judge, and sanction the most serious crimes committed during the armed conflict<sup>873</sup> involving the FARC-EP,<sup>874</sup> which began in 1964 and officially ended in 2016. The JEP scope deals with former FARC members, state security forces, civil servants, and civilians involved in grave crimes.<sup>875</sup> As a temporary institution (2018–2035), the JEP does not address all crimes but focuses on emblematic and representative cases, primarily from the late 1990s to early 2000s. Victims were invited to submit detailed reports, not formal complaints, resulting in a database of over 20 million entries. From this, the JEP launched 11 major 'macro-cases', each potentially involving up to 300 000 victims. These cases cover issues such as kidnappings, territorial conflicts, extrajudicial killings ('false positives'), child recruitment, crimes against indigenous peoples, and gender-based violence.<sup>876</sup> The JEP prioritises those with the highest responsibility and

<sup>868</sup> Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2024 Country Report — Colombia, 2024, [url](#), pp. 7, 15

<sup>869</sup> Colombia, Corte Constitucional, Sentencia Su.546/23, December 2023, [url](#); HRW, World Report 2025 – Colombia, 16 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>870</sup> Colombia, Corte Constitucional, Sentencia SU020/22, 2022, [url](#)

<sup>871</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary General, 27 June 2025, [url](#), para. 35

<sup>872</sup> DeJusticia, Correspondence with EUAA, 3 November 2025

<sup>873</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 22

<sup>874</sup> McDermott, J., content added during peer review, 19 November 2025

<sup>875</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 22

<sup>876</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 22





operates through transitional justice principles. Offenders who admit guilt may engage in a dialogical process based on restorative justice, involving direct interaction with victims.<sup>877</sup>

In the JEP, individuals who are found guilty but accept responsibility do not serve prison sentences. Instead, they receive restorative sanctions aimed at repairing harm to victims. These sanctions last eight years and may include projects such as demining and mine-risk education, environmental restoration efforts, memorial initiatives for Indigenous communities, or building hospitals for survivors of sexual violence.<sup>878</sup>

FARC-EP guerrillas who signed the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement and comply fully with the JEP's conditions are also granted protection from extradition. This immunity applies not only to war crimes but also to drug trafficking and other illegal acts linked to the armed conflict.<sup>879</sup>

Those who deny responsibility are investigated by the JEP's Prosecutor's Office and face prosecution through the 'non-recognition section.' If found guilty in a standard criminal trial, they can receive prison sentences of up to 20 years. Appeals are possible within the JEP system, including its appellate and cassation chambers.<sup>880</sup>

While JEP's Case 8 involves paramilitary crimes, most paramilitaries are tried under the separate Justice and Peace Tribunals, created in 2005 following a peace deal with the AUC. This earlier transitional justice system has, over 17 years, prosecuted around 35 000 individuals, with investigations led by the Public Prosecutor and cases reviewed by the Supreme Court.<sup>881</sup>

The JEP continued to work 'despite significant challenges' to deliver justice for victims of the conflict. In the six years of its operation, JEP has charged 158 individuals with war crimes and crimes against humanity, mainly from the FARC-EP and security forces,<sup>882</sup> and continues to investigate cases of kidnapping, extrajudicial killings, and child recruitment.<sup>883</sup> The JEP has yet to convict or sentence any individuals (as of 2024),<sup>884</sup> or high level perpetrators,<sup>885</sup> raising concerns about impunity.<sup>886</sup>

Sources report that in September 2023, JEP launched a judicial 'macro-case' on gender-based, sexual and reproductive violence and other crimes committed on the basis of discrimination related to sexual orientation, gender expression and/or identity in the Colombia conflict.<sup>887</sup> The data presented by the JEP notes that 33 % of the cases were attributed to the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, 5.82 % were attributed to the FARC and 3.14 % were

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<sup>877</sup> New Humanitarian (The), In Colombia's Medellín, a group of ex-soldiers tried to make amends for their crimes, 8 September 2025, [url](#); France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 22

<sup>878</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 23

<sup>879</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 23

<sup>880</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 23

<sup>881</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 23

<sup>882</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 December 2024, [url](#), paras. 48-50

<sup>883</sup> HRW, World Report 2025 – Colombia, 16 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>884</sup> HRW, World Report 2025 – Colombia, 16 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>885</sup> Foundation Hirondelle, Seven Years of Colombia's JEP, 25 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>886</sup> New Humanitarian (The), In Colombia's Medellín, a group of ex-soldiers tried to make amends for their crimes, 8 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>887</sup> Colombia, JEP, La JEP abre macrocaso 11 que investiga la violencia basada en género incluyendo violencia sexual y reproductiva, y crímenes cometidos por prejuicio, 27 September 2023, [url](#); InSight Crime, Colombia Expands investigation of Gender Violence in its Armed Conflict, 29 September 2023, [url](#)





attributed to state agents, while in 30 % of the cases the actor was not identified.<sup>888</sup> Sources report in November 2024 that the JEP indicted 6 former FARC commanders for crimes against children,<sup>889</sup> including in relation to reproductive health and gender-based violence.<sup>890</sup>

In April 2025, the JEP ordered the government to strengthen the presence of public security forces in areas used for training and reintegration of former combatants, in recognition of a worsening pattern of violence against them; and urged the government to hold a plenary session of the National Commission for Security Guarantees, which has not met for over a year.<sup>891</sup> This has hindered the policy to dismantle armed groups and consequently, it 'has yet to yield significant results that would positively impact the security of communities in conflict-affected regions where the state remains limited'.<sup>892</sup>

In September 2025, the JEP issued its first restorative sentences, in a 'historic step' in the pursuit of justice for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the internal armed conflict. Seven members of the FARC-EP Secretariat and 12 members of the public security forces were given sentences of 8 years of restorative activities and restrictions on their rights and freedoms, the maximum sentence provided in the context of the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement.<sup>893</sup>

## 5.7. Victim's Unit (Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas, UARIV)

In 2011, then-President Juan Manuel Santos signed into law the Victims and Land Restitution Law (Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras) or Law 1448 of 2011, to provide protection and restitution for victims of the armed conflict and survivors of human rights violations, including state abuses, since 1985.<sup>894</sup> The Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas (UARIV), also known simply as the Victims' Unit, was established under Colombia's 2011 Victims and Land Restitution Law (Law 1448).<sup>895</sup> The UARIV is a public agency that evaluates claims from individuals and groups affected by internal armed conflicts.<sup>896</sup> The mandate of the National System of Comprehensive Victim Support and Reparation and the entities that comprise it, is to implement existing reparation measures for torture victims, which also cover human rights defenders, social leaders and journalists.<sup>897</sup> Initially created for a 10-year

<sup>888</sup> Colombia, JEP, Caso 11 Violencia basada en género, sexual y reproductiva, y otros crímenes por prejuicio basados en la orientación sexual, la expresión y/o identidad de género diversa, Número de víctimas de VBG, VSX, VR y VP registradas según presunto actor armado, n.d., [url](#); InSight Crime, Colombia Expands investigation of Gender Violence in its Armed Conflict, 29 September 2023, [url](#)

<sup>889</sup> HRW, Colombia Charges Former FARC Leaders with Child Recruitment, 20 November 2024, [url](#)

<sup>890</sup> Colombia Reports, Colombia's war crime tribunal indicts former FARC chiefs over child recruitment, 14 November 2024, [url](#)

<sup>891</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2025/419), 27 June 2025, [url](#), para. 35; UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 35

<sup>892</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 35

<sup>893</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 September 2025, [url](#), para. 43

<sup>894</sup> AI, Colombia: The Victims and Land Restitution Law, April 2012, [url](#)

<sup>895</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 25

<sup>896</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 24

<sup>897</sup> Colombia, Information received from Colombia on follow-up to the concluding observations on its sixth periodic report (CAT/C/COL/FCO/6), 10 June 2025, [url](#), para. 48





mandate starting in June 2012, its operation has been extended until June 2032.<sup>898</sup> The UARIV operates across Colombia with 20 regional offices and 256 service points.<sup>899</sup>

Victims (from 1 January 1985 and after) must be registered in the Central Registry of Victims (RUV, Registro Único de Víctimas) in order to access measures in Law 1448.<sup>900</sup> Potential victims must register through the regional offices of the PGN, Office of the Ombudsperson, or Municipal Ombudspersons, submitting a statement (*declaración*) about the abuses suffered.<sup>901</sup> The government of Colombia states that the Victims Unit 'evaluates each case individually and determines whether the victim meets the requirements for administrative compensation. If the victim is found to be entitled to compensation, an application process involving verification of the harm suffered is carried out'.<sup>902</sup> The Dutch authorities write that '[t]he unit checks the relevant facts to decide whether or not to include the person in the register'. A confidential source interviewed by the Dutch authorities stated that this is 'an administrative check and not an actual investigation carried out by the unit'; evidence of the victim's statement may be submitted with the form but it is not mandatory.<sup>903</sup> The OFPRA fact-finding mission report similarly stated that UARIV evaluates claims without requiring them to provide proof—the burden lies with the Colombian state.<sup>904</sup> According to a Conflict Analyst interviewed by EUAA, the letters issued by the Victim's Unit 'do not carry a lot of legal weight' as the unit 'documents what is said to them, but this is not necessarily the basis for taking further policy actions'. The analyst noted that, due to the way the law is formulated, there are certain types of violations, such as displacement, that mean a victim is automatically eligible for benefits, while other types of victimisation, like forced recruitment or sexual violence, have additional rules around compensation. As a result, often victims who approach UARIV only report one type of victimisation that allows them to obtain compensation, even if they have suffered a much larger set of issues.<sup>905</sup>

During the 60-day review period when claims are assessed, displaced applicants may receive housing and financial aid ranging from 250 000 to 1 400 000 Colombian pesos (COP), depending on family size.<sup>906</sup> If approved, victims are added to the national registry and may receive reparations including financial compensation, education support, medical care, or assistance in resettling or returning home.<sup>907</sup> The government of Colombia indicated that 'once approved, the amount of compensation is established according to the severity of the harm and the impact suffered by the victim. All persons included in the Central Register of Victims who are eligible for such compensation are entitled to apply for this measure. This includes human rights defenders, social leaders and journalists'.<sup>908</sup> They further note that 'the administrative compensation paid to victims of torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is equal to 10 times the current legal monthly minimum wage and is paid directly to the victim. If the torture suffered by the victim caused personal injuries, the provisions of decision No. 848 of 2014 are applied and the victim is entitled to receive the amount

<sup>898</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 25

<sup>899</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 25

<sup>900</sup> Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), p. 47

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<sup>902</sup> Colombia, Information received from Colombia on follow-up to the concluding observations on its sixth periodic report (CAT/C/COL/FCO/6), 10 June 2024, [url](#), para. 48

<sup>903</sup> Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, [url](#), p. 47

<sup>904</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 25

<sup>905</sup> Conflict analyst, Interview with EUAA, 14 October 2025

<sup>906</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 25

<sup>907</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 25

<sup>908</sup> Colombia, Information received from Colombia on follow-up to the concluding observations on its sixth periodic report (CAT/C/COL/FCO/6), 10 June 2024, [url](#), para. 48





corresponding to the physical or psychological harm suffered; however, the sum of these amounts may not exceed 40 times the current legal monthly minimum wage.<sup>909</sup>

In September 2025, UARIV indicated that there were 10.11 million victims of the armed conflict who had been registered with the Victims Unit, and that 7.82 million had completed the requirements to receive compensation.<sup>910</sup> The UARIV reported that out of the 7.7 million people recognised as victims in 2024, over 1.7 million had been compensated by the government.<sup>911</sup>

## 5.8. Effectiveness and access to justice/courts

Sources described access to justice as limited,<sup>912</sup> particularly for victims of GBV, former FARC-EP combatants, indigenous and Afro-descent groups,<sup>913</sup> and LGBTIQ people.<sup>914</sup> Also, citizen confidence in the judiciary is impacted by corruption, lack of efficiency, and 'limited territorial operability'.<sup>915</sup> Corruption continued to be reported, and especially affected the defence and security sectors, while administrative corruption in the judicial sector was a problem.<sup>916</sup> Lack of institutional coordination, limited state presence and discriminatory treatment of victims limited access to justice, as well as lack of implementation of existing laws and judgments meant to protect victims.<sup>917</sup> According to DeJusticia, there are four main challenges to the judiciary during the reference period for this report, which continue from previous EUAA reporting: congestion, corruption, gaps between legal services supply and demand, and institutional mis-adjustments to attend to particular crimes.<sup>918</sup> Over the past ten years, the 'judicial congestion rate' (the percentage of delayed cases not yet dealt with by the judiciary) have increased from 31.5 % in 2013 to 47.7-53.2 % between 2020-2024.<sup>919</sup> Often criminal complaints that are reported are either backlogged, dismissed, or encounter difficulties in the trial phase; consequently, of the 1.87 million criminal reports entered into the system from citizen complaints, formal complaints and through urgent investigations, 93 % of active cases remain stuck at the preliminary investigation stage, without progression to trial, indicating that justice is limited in practice and reporting crimes does not reliably lead to investigation, trial, and adjudication.<sup>920</sup>

<sup>909</sup> Colombia, Information received from Colombia on follow-up to the concluding observations on its sixth periodic report (CAT/C/COL/FCO/6), 10 June 2024, [url](#), para. 48

<sup>910</sup> Colombia, UARIV, Registro Único de Víctimas, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>911</sup> Colombia, UARIV, Informe de gestión 2024, January 2025, [url](#), p. 33

<sup>912</sup> HRW, World Report 2025 – Colombia, 16 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>913</sup> UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 December 2024, [url](#), paras. 6, 9, 12, 13, 44

<sup>914</sup> ASYLOS, Colombia: Situation of LGBTIQ+ people, June 2025, [url](#), pp. 21-22

<sup>915</sup> Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2024 Country Report – Colombia, 2024, [url](#), p. 13; See also: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024 – Colombia, 2024, [url](#)

<sup>916</sup> Transparency International, Transparencia por Colombia, Radiografía de los Hechos de Corrupción en Colombia 2021-2022, [url](#), p. 21

<sup>917</sup> Colombian Caravana, Report of the VIII Visit of the International Caravan of Jurists to Colombia – 2024, 2024, [url](#), pp. 21, 22

<sup>918</sup> DeJusticia, Correspondence with EUAA, 4 November 2025

<sup>919</sup> CEJ, Índice de Congestión de la Rama Judicial en Colombia (Sector Jurisdiccional), 3 October 2025, [url](#)

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ICRC also remarked that, due to frequent changes in territorial control by armed and criminal groups, their unpredictable behaviour limited the ability of victims to access state and humanitarian assistance.<sup>921</sup>

The Conflict Analyst explained that, during the past several years, the institutions of the state involved in protection and justice have remained 'quite stable' and have not experienced significant backsliding; however, the worsening issue is the lack of resources, as funding linked to the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement has shrunk, and is affecting the capacity of these institutions across the board.<sup>922</sup> The analyst noted that the Victims Unit is 'in crisis', being underfunded, under-resourced, and over-subscribed; leaving communities to perceive it as 'very unresponsive'.<sup>923</sup> According to interlocutors interviewed by OFPRA in 2024, while some institutions appear to avoid problems of corruption, such as the JEP or the Office of the Ombudsperson, it nonetheless remains a recurring problem within certain state structures. In this regard, the UNP appears to be particularly criticised, while the Office of the Ombudsperson remains the most trusted of the institutions.<sup>924</sup> The Conflict Analyst noted that changes in leadership at the Office of the Ombudsperson have 'reinvigorated the institution significantly' and is perceived as 'very credible' in the countryside by communities.<sup>925</sup> OFPRA notes that these dysfunctions should not obscure the concrete actions successfully carried out by the institutions, however, they have as a corollary, a lack of trust among the population, who often doubt their efficiency.<sup>926</sup> Thus, various interlocutors told OFPRA of a 'generalised mistrust' which concerns all social strata, maintained by 'a feeling of almost total impunity' in the country because 'complaints lead nowhere'.<sup>927</sup>

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<sup>921</sup> ICRC, Humanitarian Challenges 2025 – Colombia, April 2025, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>922</sup> Conflict analyst, Interview with EUAA, 14 October 2025

<sup>923</sup> Conflict analyst, Interview with EUAA, 14 October 2025

<sup>924</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 17

<sup>925</sup> Conflict analyst, Interview with EUAA, 14 October 2025

<sup>926</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 17

<sup>927</sup> France, OFPRA, Rapport de mission en République de Colombie, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 17





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McDermott, J., Mr. McDermott is the co-director and co-founder of Insight Crime. Mr. McDermott has over two decades of experience reporting from around Latin America. He is a retired military officer who then became a war correspondent working in the Balkans, the Middle East, and then Colombia. Mr. McDermott has worked for the UK's most prestigious media outlets including the BBC, the Daily Telegraph, and The Economist. He specialises in drug trafficking, organised crime and the Colombian civil conflict. His organisation, Insight Crime, is a think tank that seeks to deepen and inform the debate about organised crime and citizen security in the Americas through reporting, analysis, investigations, and policy suggestions on challenges in the region.

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## Annex 2: Terms of Reference

### Colombia (Country Focus – Update 2025)

**Reference period:** December 2022-December 2025 (3 years)

The reference period will provide an update to the previous Country Focus report, which covered up to November 2022, and focused on Petro's presidency. This update will cover a three year period and provide updates on developments during the Petro presidency.

#### Legal and political situation

*Information on the main structures of the state; political developments, and demographic and migration trends:*

- Demographics and migration profile
- System of government
  - Description of the state structure and form of government, including administrative structure, executive, legislative, judicial branches
  - Security forces
  - Integrity issues (corruption, abuses, etc)
- Political situation
  - Political developments within the reference period related to current government, implementation of the 2016 Peace Agreement, and Petro's Paz Total plan

#### Security situation and civilian impacts (20-25 pages)

*Information on armed confrontations occurring, types of violence, how widely; main armed actors involved in confrontations; main areas affected by armed violence; conflict developments:*

- Main criminal-conflict dynamics and drivers for the 2023-2025
- Illegal armed groups:
  - Main structures, activities, and geographic presence
    - Paramilitary successor groups, including AGC
    - ELN
    - FARC dissident groups
    - Other criminal groups/organised crime groups/gangs
  - Interaction dynamics between illegal armed groups
  - Interaction dynamics with security forces

#### Human rights situation and impact of violence on civilians

*Information on main international legal instruments which the country is a party, ratification, and implementation of such instruments. Analysis of the main, general human rights issues, including those arising from the impacts of violence. Information on factors influencing a person's capacity to relocate; ability to relocate within the territory in relation to tracking capacity of armed groups or other entities involved in targeting of profiles.*



*Information on torture, prison conditions, corruption and abuses by the State forces, as well as information on extradition treaties and the legality/use of the death penalty by the State should be included.*

- International legal instruments
- Impact of armed violence on civilian population, especially by illegal armed groups
  - Social control
  - Homicides
  - Massacres
  - Extortion
  - kidnapping
  - Enforced disappearances
  - Anti-personnel mines, remnants of war, UXO
  - Attacks on health infrastructure
  - Displacement, including within urban areas
  - Confinement
- Other: Discrimination, torture, corruption, extra-judicial killings and abuses by state actors, prison conditions, death penalty

### **Profiles**

- Impact on Indigenous and Afro-descendant communities
- Social leaders, human rights defenders, environmental leaders, and associated profiles
- Former members of the FARC-EP and people involved in the Peace Process
- Victims of extortion
- Journalists
- People involved in the justice system, including officials and witnesses
- Victims of sexual violence and GBV
- Children impacted by forced recruitment, confinement, displacement, and violence
- LGBTIQ people

### **State response to human rights violations**

*Provide information on the mechanisms, measures and actions of the State available to respond to victims of violations, and witnesses (and family members), including State presence, capacity and effectiveness:*

- Justice system (Reporting to police; use of judicial system; capacity and integrity)
- Early Warning System (SAT, Sistema de Alertas Tempranas)
- National Protection Unit (UNP, Unidad Nacional de Protección)
- Office of the Ombudsperson (Defensoría del Pueblo)
- Police and Attorney General's Office (FGN, Fiscalía General de la Nación)
- GAULA and anti-extortion/kidnapping units
- Access to justice/courts



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