

Sudan: Country Focus

Sudan: Country Focus Report

Country of Origin Information Report

February 2025



Manuscript completed in January 2025

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Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2025

PDF ISBN 978-92-9410-552-3 doi: 10.2847/7038973 BZ-01-25-010-EN-N

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Please cite as: EUAA, COI Report - Sudan: Country Focus, February 2025, https://coi.euaa.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2025_02_EUAA_COI_Report_Sudan_Country_Focus.pdf

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Acknowledgements

The EUAA acknowledges as the drafter of this report:

- James Restrepo, independent expert on Country of Origin Information (COI)

The following national COI departments reviewed this report:

- France, Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA), Information, Documentation and Research Division
- Denmark, Danish Immigration Service – DIS, Country of Origin Information

All parts of this report have been reviewed by at least one reviewer.

The review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of the EUAA.





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Disclaimer

This report was written according to the [EUAA COI Report Methodology \(2023\)](#). The report is based on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.

The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost care within a limited timeframe. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist.

Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular application for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position.

'Refugee', 'risk' and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.

Neither EUAA nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained in this report.

On 19 January 2022, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) became the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA). All references to EASO, EASO products and bodies should be understood as references to the EUAA.

The drafting of this report was finalised on 21 January 2025. Any event taking place after this date is not included in this report. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in the methodology section of the Introduction.





Glossary and abbreviations

Each term of the glossary and each definition begin with a capital letter. Borders of the glossary are transparent.

Term	Definition
ACJPS	African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies
ACLED	The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
ADF	Africa Defense Forum
<i>Agid</i>	Tribal military leaders
<i>Amir</i>	Tribal leaders
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CBS	Sudan's Central Bureau of Statistics
CFJ	Committee for Justice
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNN	Cable News Network
COI	Country of Origin Information
CPJ	Committee to Protect Journalists
Darfur	Historically refers to the entire Darfur region, which was divided into three states in 1994 and then subsequently into five states in 2011. Sometimes it is also known as Greater Darfur.
ERRs	Emergency Response Rooms
EU+ countries	Member States of the European Union and associated countries





Term	Definition
EUAA	European Union Agency for Asylum
<i>Faza'a</i>	An ancient pre-Islamic Sudanese tradition that allows tribes to call on their members and allies for support against attacks by other tribes or to take revenge for killings.
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FFC	Forces for Freedom and Change
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIS	General Intelligence Service
GPG	Global Partners Governance
HIV/Aids	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification





Term	Definition
IRC	International Rescue Committee
ISHR	International Service for Human Rights
<i>Jana jaish</i>	Child soldiers
<i>Janjaweed</i>	Arab nomad militia group operating in the Sahel region
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
<i>Kizan</i>	Members of Sudan's political Islamic movement that ruled alongside al-Bashir and now support the SAF and target civil society organisations 'in revenge' for overthrowing them in 2019
MIS	Military Intelligence Service
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
<i>Mustanfareen</i>	The mobilised, referring to armed popular resistance
NPR	National Public Radio
Nuba	A group of 50 or more autonomous and ethnically diverse communities, numbering some 3.7 million people, Nuba inhabit the mountainous Kordofan region.
<i>Nuba</i>	Denoting darkness or Black, <i>derogatory</i>
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
<i>Omda</i>	Leader of a village; mid-level administrators
RCs	Resistance Committees
RSF	Reporters Sans Frontières, Reporters Without Borders
RSF	Rapid Support Forces





Term	Definition
RWCHR	Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SAS	Small Arms Survey
SDN	Sudan Doctors Network
Sharia	the religious law of Islam; Islamic canonical law
SHRH	Sudan Human Rights Hub
SJS	Sudanese Journalism Syndicate
SLM-AW	Sudan Liberation Movement – Abdel Wahid al-Nur
SLM-MM	Sudan Liberation Movement – Minni Minnawi
SLM-Tambour	Sudan Liberation Movement – Mustafa Tambour
SPLM-N	Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North
SPLM-N-Agar	Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North – Malik Agar
SPLM-N-al-Hilu	Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North – al-Hilu
SSC	Sudan SOGI Coalition
Taqaddum	Coordination Body of Civilian Democratic Forces, coalition established in October 2023
TCC	Transitional Constitutional Charter
TIMEP	Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy
TSC	Transitional Sovereignty Council
UAE	United Arab Emirates
Umbay	Slave, <i>derogatory</i>





Term	Definition
UN	United Nations
UN FFM	UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
US	United States
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USD	US Dollar
USDOS	US Department of State
WHO	World Health Organization
<i>Zurug or zurga</i>	Denoting darkness or Black, <i>derogatory</i>



Introduction

The purpose of this report is to provide relevant information for the assessment of applications for international protection, including refugee status and subsidiary protection, and in particular for use in the EUAA's country guidance development on Sudan.

The report covers the period of 1 February 2024 – 30 November 2024, and it provides an update of the [EUAA COI report: Sudan - Country Focus](#) published in April 2024. For topics not covered in the previous report the reference period is 15 April 2023 – 30 November 2024. Events taking place after the end of the reference period have not been included.

Methodology

This report was jointly drafted by EUAA and James Restrepo and reviewed by EUAA and national COI departments in EU+ countries¹, as mentioned in the [Acknowledgements](#) section.

This report is produced in line with the [EUAA COI Report Methodology \(2023\)](#)² and the [EUAA COI Writing and Referencing Style Guide \(2023\)](#).³

Defining the terms of reference

The terms of reference (ToR) of this report were defined by EUAA based on discussions held and input received from COI experts in the EUAA COI specialist network on Sudan and from policy experts in EU+ countries within the framework of a Country Guidance development on Sudan. The ToR also builds on previous EUAA COI reports on Sudan covering the same topics. The ToR can be found in [Annex 2](#) of this report.

Collecting information

The information gathered is a result of research using public, specialised paper-based and electronic sources, as well as interviews with experts until 30 November 2024. Some limited additional information was added during the finalisation of this report in response to feedback received during the quality control process, until 31 January 2025.

All sources used are referenced in the Annex 1: Bibliography. Wherever information could not be found within the timeframes for drafting this report after carefully consulting a range of sources, this is stated in the report.

¹ All EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland.

² EUAA, EUAA Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, February 2023, [url](#)

³ EUAA, Writing and Referencing Guide for EUAA Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, February 2023, [url](#)



Research challenges

The present report has encountered a number of research challenges, including: lack of or limited reporting on some of the issues covered by the ToR due to the communication outage affecting media coverage and communication opportunities in wide parts of the country, for extended periods of time during the reference period; targeting of media personnel normally reporting on the issues addressed by the report and that often resulted in self-censorship and relocation; limited or scarce international and national media and other organisations presence in most of Sudan, as a consequence of the on-going hostilities; the sensitivity of the issues at stake; and the documented reluctance of affected survivors to report about incidents or events on safety and security grounds. Additionally, information on key socioeconomic indicators for Port Sudan, within the time reference period of this report, was scarce among the sources consulted within time constraints.

Quality control

To ensure that the authors respected the EUAA COI Report Methodology and that the Terms of Reference were comprehensively addressed, a review was carried out by COI specialists from the countries and organisations listed as reviewers in the [Acknowledgements](#) section. All comments made by the reviewers were taken into consideration and most of them were implemented in the final draft of this report, which was finalised on 31 January 2025. EUAA also performed the final quality review and editing of the text.

Sources

In accordance with EUAA COI methodology, a range of different published documentary sources have been consulted on relevant topics for this report. These include: COI reports by governments; information from civil society, advocacy groups, humanitarian organisations, and NGOs; international and NGO human rights reports; reports produced by various bodies of the United Nations; Sudanese and regionally-based media and social media; academic publications and think tank reports and specialised sources covering Sudan. All information from these sources was consulted within time constraints and within the research constraints posed by Sudan's challenging information-gathering environment.

In addition to using publicly available sources, oral sources were contacted and interviewed for this report. Sources were assessed for their background, publication history and current knowledge of the situation on the ground. A source who was interviewed chose to remain anonymous for security reasons. Yousra Elbagir Ahmed Abdullah, Africa Correspondent for Sky News, was interviewed on 10 December 2024. Elbagir Ahmed Abdullah has reported extensively on Sudan, including on the ground.

Finally, administrative and food security maps were borrowed from UNOCHA and FEWS NET respectively.

For additional details see the [Annex 1: Bibliography](#).






Structure and use of the report

The report is divided into three parts. The first chapter presents an overview of Sudan's historical context and state structure. It provides information on the country's judicial system and human rights situation. The second chapter focuses on the treatment of specific groups of population and profiles. The third chapter outlines the socio-economic situation in Port Sudan.



Maps



Map 1. Sudan Administrative map ⁴

⁴ Map 1: UNOCHA, Sudan – Administrative Map, June 2021, [url](#)



1. Country overview

1.1. Historical background

Sudan has a complex history marked by colonialism, civil war and authoritarianism. The country was a joint protectorate of Egypt and the United Kingdom known as the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium until 1956.⁵ After gaining independence, the country was mostly ruled by military authorities and faced high instability⁶ due to seventeen coups and two major civil wars.⁷ Over time, the military's influence has extended beyond politics to the economy, with interests in significant sectors such as manufacturing, banking, and gold mining.⁸

The country's struggles for independence and democracy set the stage for the rise of Omar al-Bashir and his Islamist-dominated administration that shaped the country's politics and society between 1989 and 2019.⁹ In 1989, Omar al-Bashir, a commander in the Sudanese army, staged a coup against Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, dissolving the government and all political parties.¹⁰ A secret police, repression of opposition, persecution of minorities and widespread corruption were among the autocratic practices that Sudanese citizens had to face.¹¹ Sharia legislation and morality police were enforced with punishments that included amputations and stoning. Women's rights were also heavily restricted.¹² Members of the National Congress Party (NCP) as well as members of the Sudanese Islamic Movement and any former employees of government organisations were seen as members of the Bashir authoritarian regime.¹³

In the 2000s the country continued facing internal instability as a result of ongoing internal conflicts.¹⁴ Between 2003 and 2005, the Bashir regime fuelled the conflict in Darfur when increasing tensions in the region were met with racially targeted attacks by government-backed Arab militias, known as *Janjaweed*.¹⁵ These resulted in the destruction of thousands of villages, the deaths of thousands, and the displacement of over two million people.¹⁶ Following the regional conflicts, the International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted Bashir and some of his associates for genocide and crimes against humanity in Darfur.¹⁷

⁵ CFR, Civil war in Sudan, updated on 3 October 2024, [url](#)

⁶ The Conversation, Sudan's entire history has been dominated by soldiers and the violence and corruption they bring, 3 May 2023, [url](#)

⁷ The First Sudanese War between 1955 and 1972 and the Second Sudanese War between 1983 and 2005

⁸ The Conversation, Sudan's entire history has been dominated by soldiers and the violence and corruption they bring, 3 May 2023, [url](#)

⁹ AP, Sudanese take aim at Islamist 'deep state' left by al-Bashir, 4 May 2019, [url](#)

¹⁰ VOA, A Timeline of Key Events in Rule of Sudan's al-Bashir, 11 April 2019, [url](#)

¹¹ The Conversation, Sudan crisis explained: What's behind the latest fighting and how it fits nation's troubled past, 17 April 2023, [url](#); CFR, Civil war in Sudan, updated on 3 October 2024, [url](#)

¹² AP, Sudanese take aim at Islamist 'deep state' left by al-Bashir, 4 May 2019, [url](#)

¹³ SWP, Berlin Power Relations in Sudan after the Fall of Bashir May 2024, [url](#)

¹⁴ CFR, Civil war in Sudan, updated on 3 October 2024, [url](#)

¹⁵ HRW, Entrenching Impunity, Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur, December 2005, [url](#)

¹⁶ Justiceinfo, Sudan: The First Darfur Trial Ended At the ICC, 19 December 2024, [url](#)

¹⁷ The Conversation, Peace in Sudan depends on justice for the Darfur genocide, 24 May 2023, [url](#); ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, ICC-02/05, [url](#)





Furthermore, the civil war between North and South, ongoing since 1983, came to an end in 2005 with the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). According to the agreement, a referendum would be held on Sudan's unity or Southern Sudan's independence.¹⁸ In 2011, a referendum in the south of the country resulted in a partition and the split in the Republic of Sudan and the new Republic of South Sudan.¹⁹ The secession and the lack of addressing the growing differences between Khartoum and the border regions triggered a new wave of violence.²⁰

By the end of 30 years of an authoritarian regime and international sanctions, Sudan was on the verge of collapse.²¹ At the end of 2018, a wave of extensive public demonstrations²² lasting several months led, in April 2019, to the ousting of the President by his own security forces, the SAF and the RSF.²³ In the same year, protests and sit-ins calling for handover to civilian rule continued in Khartoum culminating in the June attacks, when security forces violently cracked down protesters in multiple instances, with hundreds of civilians killed, over nine hundred injured and dozens missing.²⁴ West Darfur experienced a new escalation of attacks and violence, which has remained at high levels since then.²⁵

In the aftermath of the 2019 coup, the military leaders - General al-Burhan and RSF leader Lt Gen Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as Hemedti - struggled to relinquish control of the country. They agreed to share governing responsibility with the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), which represented a coalition of opposition parties, trade unions, civil society groups, rebel movements and resistance committees.²⁶ The negotiated power-sharing agreement, leading to the establishment of a Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC), intended to facilitate the transition of power from military to civilian authority by November 2021. Despite this arrangement, persistent political discord regarding representation in the legislative body and growing military criticism of civilian officials undermined the coalition.²⁷

The appointed prime minister, economist and development expert Abdalla Hamdok, was arrested and removed from office in October 2021²⁸ and the 2019 Constitutional Charter Declaration was suspended.²⁹ He was later reinstated in November 2021 once he agreed to

¹⁸ HNN, Alex de Waal: The Wars of Sudan, 19 March 2007, [url](#)

¹⁹ Carnegie Endowment, Sudan: From Conflict to Conflict, 16 May 2012, [url](#)

²⁰ IMF Working Papers, Political Fragility: Coups d'État and Their Drivers, Volume 2024: Issue 034, 16 February 2024, p.62, [url](#); Berridge W., Western Sudanese marginalization, coups in Khartoum and the structural legacies of colonial military divide and rule, 1924-present, 26 October 2023, [url](#)

²¹ African Arguments, Sudan: The violence is a symptom of a profound collective failure, 24 May 2024, [url](#)

²² HRW, "They were shouting "Kill Them" Sudan's Violent Crackdown on Protesters in Khartoum, 17 November 2019, [url](#)

²³ IMF Working Papers, Political Fragility: Coups d'État and Their Drivers, Volume 2024: Issue 034, 16 February 2024, [url](#)

²⁴ HRW, "They were shouting "Kill Them" Sudan's Violent Crackdown on Protesters in Khartoum, 17 November 2019, [url](#)

²⁵ HRW, "The Massalit Will Not Come Home": Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes Against Humanity in El Geneina, West Darfur, Sudan, 9 May 2024, [url](#), p. 22

²⁶ Crisis Group, A critical window to bolster Sudan's next government, 23 January 2023, [url](#)

²⁷ IMF Working Papers, Political Fragility: Coups d'État and Their Drivers, Volume 2024: Issue 034, 16 February 2024, [url](#)

²⁸ CFR, Civil war in Sudan, updated on 3 October 2024, [url](#)

²⁹ IDEA, Sudan's 2019 Constitutional Declaration, 2022, [url](#)



concede additional governing powers to Burhan, Hemedti and the rest of the security sector.³⁰ However, pro-democracy protesters, with women activists playing a pivotal role,³¹ went back on the streets against the terms of Hamdok reinstatement in a number of cities, including Port Sudan and Khartoum.³² Demonstrators had to face a heavy security presence with many being arrested and beaten.³³ Hamdok ultimately resigned in January 2022 and Burhan operated as *de facto* head of state with Hemedti acting as his deputy.³⁴ Further negotiations followed throughout the year, culminating in a deal in December 2022 outlining a two-year transition to civilian leadership and national elections.³⁵ However, unrest broke out in the country as several thousand people took the streets of Khartoum protesting against the deal³⁶ and calling for the military to hand over power to civilians. Protests continued until the first months of 2023.³⁷ The military began negotiations to form a civilian government³⁸ and initiated a number of technical workshops. Following the failure of the security sector reform workshop, due to the disagreement around the military chain of command and the timeline for integrating the RSF into the SAF, tensions escalated,³⁹ ultimately triggering the conflict between the two main security forces in the country.⁴⁰ For more information on the political situation and crisis background see section 1.1.1 of the [EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

1.2. State structure and governance

Since independence, Sudan has lacked democratic constitution-making processes⁴¹ with a documented history of short-lived constitutions (1956, 1965, 1973, 1985, 1998, 2005 and 2019).⁴² The 2019 Constitutional Declaration, signed in August 2019,⁴³ prioritised the peace process in articles 7 and 8. This laid the foundation for drafting and signing the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) in 2020 which became integral part of the Constitutional Declaration.⁴⁴ The JPA was composed of a national agreement and six separate tracks that covered Darfur, Eastern Sudan, the Two Areas, the North, the Centre and the Tamazuj track (relating to groups from the border regions of Darfur and South Kordofan), with separate protocols for each.⁴⁵ The agreement addressed key issues around power sharing, security, land ownership, and transitional justice, and six bilateral peace agreements signed between the government and

³⁰ CFR, Civil war in Sudan, updated on 3 October 2024, [url](#)

³¹ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 118

³² CFR, Civil war in Sudan, updated on 3 October 2024, [url](#)

³³ BBC, Sudan coup: Security forces accused of violence against protesters, 26 December 2021, [url](#)

³⁴ CFR, Civil war in Sudan, updated on 3 October 2024, [url](#)

³⁵ ICG, A Critical Window to Bolster Sudan's Next Government, 23 January 2024, [url](#)

³⁶ Reuters, Sudan generals and parties sign outline deal, protesters cry foul, 5 December 2024, [url](#)

³⁷ CFR, Civil war in Sudan, updated on 3 October 2024, [url](#)

³⁸ SWP Berlin Power Relations in Sudan after the Fall of Bashir May 2024, [url](#)

³⁹ IDEA, War in Sudan 15 april 2023: background, analysis and scenarios, August 2023, [url](#)

⁴⁰ The Conversation, Sudan's entire history has been dominated by soldiers and the violence and corruption they bring, 3 May 2023, [url](#)

⁴¹ Sudan Democracy First Group, The Rule of Law and Human Rights in Sudan, Paper 2, September 2014, [url](#)

⁴² IDEA, Reflections on Sudan's constitutional trajectory, 1953–2023, p.6, 2023, [url](#)

⁴³ IDEA, Sudan's 2019 Constitutional Declaration, 2022, [url](#)

⁴⁴ IDEA, The Juba Peace Agreement and the Sudanese Transition: Power sharing or democracy building? Technical Paper 2, November 2022, [url](#), p.5

⁴⁵ RVI, The remains of the JPA, the unlearnt lessons of the Juba peace agreement, 2023, [url](#)



different factions and armed groups.⁴⁶ However, not all armed groups signed the JPA and non-signatories - SPLM-N-al-Hilu and SLM-AW - were not bound by the legal framework established in it.⁴⁷

The Parliament of Sudan was dissolved following the coup d'état in April 2019.⁴⁸ In March 2021, a constitutional decree established a regional federal system. Furthermore, a committee was tasked to organise the Conference on the System of Governance to determine, among other things, the number of regions, boundaries, structures, authorities, competencies and the governance and administration levels of these regions.⁴⁹

Following the 2021 coup, the government was unable to finalise the transitional government institutions, namely the Parliament, Constitutional Court and specialised independent commissions (such as the Constitution conference commission, Peace commission, Election commission and Boundaries commission).⁵⁰ After the coup, al-Burhan declared a state of emergency⁵¹ and in December 2022 another framework Agreement was signed⁵² by 40 civil society groups as well as armed groups.⁵³ It formally prohibited security institutions from taking part in politics and transferred the administration of all state-owned enterprises to the finance ministry.⁵⁴ The framework agreement outlined a two-year transitional period, a consultative process intended to engage with all Sudanese citizens⁵⁵ and five key priorities: ensuring accountability and transitional justice; undertaking security and military sector reforms; implementing the JPA with signatory armed groups, as well as aligning with the political declaration involving non-signatory groups; establish an institutional framework grounded in the principles of the rule of law and fundamental rights; and addressing the ongoing crisis in eastern Sudan.⁵⁶ Elections were scheduled to be held in 2022. However, the October 2020 signing of the JPA and the 2022 amendment to the constitutional framework postponed them to early 2024.⁵⁷

In May 2023, after the outbreak of the conflict, SAF commander-in-chief and President of the TSC Lt Gen Al Burhan dismissed Hemedti from his position as deputy president of the TSC. Malik Agar, leader of the SPLM-N Agar, was appointed in his place.⁵⁸ All change and service committees in the regions and states were dissolved by ministerial decree, effectively banning all civil society groups, including the Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs) and the Forces for

⁴⁶ ConstitutionNet, The System of Governance Reform in Sudan: Challenges and Opportunities, 30 April 2021, [url](#)

⁴⁷ IDEA, Reflections on Sudan's constitutional trajectory, 1953–2023, p.6, 2023, [url](#); OHCHR, General allegation 128th session, (19 to 28 September 2022), [url](#)

⁴⁸ IPU, Sudan, 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁹ ConstitutionNet, The System of Governance Reform in Sudan: Challenges and Opportunities, 30 April 2021, [url](#)

⁵⁰ IDEA, Reflections on Sudan's constitutional trajectory, 1953–2023, p.6, 2023, [url](#); OHCHR, General allegation 128th session, (19 to 28 September 2022), [url](#)

⁵¹ REDRESS, "Taken from Khartoum's Streets", Legal Analysis, p.6, March 2022, [url](#)

⁵² IDEA, Reflections on Sudan's constitutional trajectory, 1953–2023, p.6, 2023, [url](#)

⁵³ Sudan Tribune, Who made it into Sudan's framework agreement, 30 December 2022, [url](#)

⁵⁴ Crisis Group, A critical window to bolster Sudan's next government, 23 January 2023, [url](#)

⁵⁵ ACLED, Sudan: Political Process to Form a Transitional Civilian Government and Shifting Disorder Trends, 14 April 2023, [url](#); UN News, Sudan holds massive political 'workshops', embarks on new transition phase, Security Council hears, 20 March 2023, [url](#)

⁵⁶ ACLED, Sudan: Political Process to Form a Transitional Civilian Government and Shifting Disorder Trends, 14 April 2023, [url](#)

⁵⁷ USDOS, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan, 22 April 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁸ Radio Dabanga, El Burhan sacks Hemedti as Sudan TSC V-P, appoints Malik Agar, 21 May 2023, [url](#)



Freedom and Change (FFC). The previous decrees issued in 2021 dissolving trade unions as well as professional organisations and their steering committees, remained in force.⁵⁹ In November 2024, al-Burhan reshuffled the cabinet replacing three ministers including the foreign minister.⁶⁰ According to the UN's Independent International Fact-Finding Mission (UN IFFM) for the Sudan 'state administrations [...] are increasingly militarized and have been integrated into the efforts to [...] suppress any opposition to SAF military rule. A number of State Governors are former SAF officers and regularly appear in military uniform.'⁶¹

Since the beginning of the conflict the RSF made efforts to build civilian governance structures to stabilise and reinforce its control over newly seized areas.⁶² While Sudan's government was still temporarily based in Port Sudan,⁶³ at the end of November 2024, the RSF has announced the formation of a civilian parallel government. Abdul Latif Abdullah al-Amin al-Hassan was appointed as prime minister heading a 90-member legislative civilian council based in Khartoum.⁶⁴

1.3. Rule of law and administration of justice

(a) Rule of Law

For background information about the rule of law see section 1.1.3 (f) of the [EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

In October, the UN IFFM for the Sudan expressed serious concerns over the collapse of the rule of law in the country, including the destruction of legal infrastructure, the disruption of police, prosecution and judiciary functions as well as the targeting of lawyers.⁶⁵ By November 2024, UN Special Rapporteurs, members of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, urged both warring parties to restore law and order.⁶⁶

Following the outbreak of the conflict, authorities imposed or extended a state of emergency across several states, including Khartoum and regions of Darfur, effectively granting security forces expanded powers and immunity for actions performed while on duty.⁶⁷ For additional

⁵⁹ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 309

⁶⁰ Sudan Tribune, Sudan conflict spiral into civil war, Tagadum urges safe zones, 2 November 2024, [url](#)

⁶¹ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 118

⁶² OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 99

⁶³ Sudan Tribune, Burhan, EU envoy discuss regional role ending Sudan conflict, 1 December 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁴ Asharq Al-Awsat, RSF Forms Parallel Civilian Govt in Khartoum, 30 November 2024, [url](#); Darfur24, RSF Announces Civil Administration in Khartoum State, 30 November 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁵ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 315

⁶⁶ OHCHR, Sudan: UN experts condemn campaign of violence against civilians amid rising displacement, Press Release, 5 November 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁷ REDRESS, "Taken from Khartoum's Streets", Legal Analysis, p.6, March 2022, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Khartoum State declares state of emergency to regulate foreign presence, 1 May 2024, [url](#); OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 51



information on the proclaimed state of emergency and security forces see [1.2 State structure and governance](#) and [1.3 \(e\) Policing the rule of law and the new state of emergency](#).

The disregard for the rule of law in the country was underscored by the 2024 World Justice Rule of Law Index, which indicated a notable decline in Sudan's overall score. The country ranked 134th out of 142 globally, largely due to the lack of effective mechanism to limit governmental authority.⁶⁸ Violations - including extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary detentions and enforced disappearances – perpetrated by both warring parties persisted in the country, perpetuated by a culture of violence and impunity.⁶⁹

The latest USDOS report noted that the law permitted arrests without warrants, allowing magistrates to extend detention without charges for up to two weeks and up to six months for formal charges, despite legal requirements to inform individuals upon arrest. Bail was available for most offences, except for those accused of crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment. Suspects in common criminal cases were reportedly compelled into confessing under duress, subjected to physical abuse and police intimidation of family members. While legal assistance was available by law and could be requested through the legal aid department at the Ministry of Justice or the Sudanese Bar Association, the government often failed to provide support and legal aid organisations and lawyers partially filled the gap. Detainees arrested for protesting against the military takeover were routinely denied family contact and legal representation.⁷⁰

Despite the efforts made by the government to bring the national legislation in line with the Convention against Torture (UNCAT), Sudan's legal system continued to lack the necessary monitoring mechanisms and legal access to justice for victims of human rights violations.⁷¹ Sudanese domestic law did not explicitly criminalise enforced disappearances as offences.⁷²

According to Freedom House, despite the guarantees of equal treatment in the interim constitution and legal reforms introduced in 2020, women remained disadvantaged in many areas of the law. Perpetrators of widespread crimes against women, including during armed conflicts, have generally enjoyed impunity, and women were denied equal rights to property and inheritance under both laws and customary practices.⁷³

(b) Legal system

Sudan has a mixed legal system of Islamic law and English common law,⁷⁴ with Sharia introduced in 1983 and officially adopted under President Al-Bashir in 1989.⁷⁵ While Sharia law is not explicitly listed as part of Sudan's sources of law in the Transitional Constitutional

⁶⁸ World Justice Project, 2024 WJP Rule of Law Index, Sudan, [url](#)

⁶⁹ REDRESS, One Year On: Urgent Strategy Shift Required to Halt Atrocities in Sudan, 15 April 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁰ USDOS, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan, 22 April 2024, [url](#)

⁷¹ REDRESS, "Taken from Khartoum's Streets", Legal Analysis, p.19, March 2022, [url](#)

⁷² OHCHR, General allegation 128th session, (19 to 28 September 2022), [url](#)

⁷³ Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2024, Sudan, February 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁴ CIA, The world factbook, Sudan, accessed on 17 November 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁵ GAN Integrity, Sudan risk report, 5 November 2020, [url](#)



Charter (TCC), many Sudanese laws incorporate elements of Sharia. Furthermore, in matters that are not governed by any legislative text, the courts apply the Sharia.⁷⁶

The Miscellaneous Act of 2020, amending the Criminal Act of 1991, defines an adult as anyone over the age of 18, but criminal responsibility may be imposed on any child who has attained puberty, with care and reform measures allowed to be imposed on any child over the age of 12.⁷⁷ With 2020 Criminal Law amendments, women were no longer in need of a permit from male family members to travel with their children and female genital mutilation (FGM) was banned. Lashing and public flogging were ended and the consumption of alcohol by non-Muslims permitted.⁷⁸ For more information on FGM see section [2.6\(e\) Female genital mutilation \(FGM\)](#).

The 2020 amendment to the Cyber Crime Law of 2018 increased penalties for a range of cyber offences, including spreading false news to damage the reputation of the state.⁷⁹

The maximum penalty for torture is three months' imprisonment.⁸⁰ Amendments to the legal framework, such as the 2009 amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act and the 2022 amendment to the Armed Forces Act of 2007, addressed the prosecution for crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes, including offences against protected persons and prisoners of war, attacks on civilians, and displacement of the population.

However, significant gaps remain, such as the lack of provisions for holding commanders and superiors accountable and restrictions on the investigation and prosecution to direct perpetrators.⁸¹

Additionally, laws such as Article 3, restrict criminal proceedings against Sudanese nationals accused of international humanitarian law violations, including core international crimes, to domestic institutions. Furthermore, they prohibit any assistance or support to the extradition of any Sudanese national for prosecution abroad.⁸²

Sudanese law criminalises same-sex relationships and permits forced marriages.⁸³ For more information on same-sex relationship see section [2.8 LGBTIQ persons](#). The UN FFM for the Sudan has also shared concerns over the legal procedures required to prove rape, in particular the mandatory use of a medical report form which has become unavailable in many

⁷⁶ GlobalLex, Researching the Legal System of the Republic of Sudan, January/February 2023, [url](#)

⁷⁷ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), p.71

⁷⁸ Al Jazeera, Changes in criminal law as Sudan annuls apostasy death sentence, 12 July 2020, [url](#)

⁷⁹ Article 19, Sudan: Cybercrime Law can restrict vital information during the pandemic, 2022/01, [url](#)

⁸⁰ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 303

⁸¹ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), 306

⁸² OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), 307

⁸³ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 302



health facilities or police stations.⁸⁴ For more information on sexual violence and conflict-related sexual violence see section [2.6\(b\) Sexual violence and conflict-related sexual violence](#).

A number of legislative changes have been made since the beginning of the war, including the dissolution of the RSF by constitutional decree,⁸⁵ and the classification of the organisation as a terrorist organisation.⁸⁶

(c) The judicial system

The 2019 Constitutional Declaration established three judicial bodies: the Supreme Judicial Court, the Judicial Authority and the Constitutional Court. However, as of October 2022, only the Supreme Court of the Judicial Authority had been established. The Constitutional Court, with jurisdiction over the protection of rights and freedoms and the adjudication of constitutional disputes, remained unformed⁸⁷ after its dissolution in 2017.⁸⁸ The Sudanese Civil Procedure Act, adopted in 1983 and amended several times, stipulated five different types of courts: the National Supreme Court, the National Court of Appeal, the General Civil Court, the Magistrate's Court and the city and country courts.⁸⁹ Additionally, military courts can be convened for prosecuting military personnel for violation of military laws.⁹⁰

Despite its institutional independence, the judiciary is largely controlled by the executive.⁹¹ Lawyers were detained and threatened by both SAF and the RSF. They faced significant obstacles in exercising their functions due to harassment, surveillance, and potential arrest for allegedly supporting the RSF while providing legal defence to civilians in complex criminal cases related to human rights violations and war crimes under investigation by the authorities.⁹²

According to the October 2024 UN FFM for the Sudan, the RSF attempted to establish a justice system and field courts in areas under its control, but these institutions have been infrequently used. Additionally, the report indicated the establishment of martial courts as well as an investigative body to investigate reported mass killings committed in Ardamata.⁹³

⁸⁴ OHCHR, Note verbale dated 15 June 2024 from the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Office of the President of the Human Rights Council, 26 September 2024, A/HRC/56/G/4 [url](#), p.8; OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 302

⁸⁵ OHCHR, Note verbale dated 15 June 2024 from the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Office of the President of the Human Rights Council, 26 September 2024, A/HRC/56/G/4 [url](#), para 3

⁸⁶ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 50

⁸⁷ IDEA, Sudan's 2019 Constitutional Declaration: Its impact on the transition, 14 October 2022, [url](#), p.15, 16

⁸⁸ DPRU, DPRU Q&As: Elshareef Ali Mohammed, Sudanese Human Rights Initiative (SHRI), Sudan: Part Two, 11 July 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁹ GlobaLex, Researching the legal system of the Republic of Sudan, Mai Aman, January/February 2023, [url](#); Civil Procedure Act 2003 Part A and B, 2003 Edition, [url](#) (part A), [url](#) (part B)

⁹⁰ GlobaLex, Researching the legal system of the Republic of Sudan, Mai Aman, January/February 2023, [url](#)

⁹¹ GAN Integrity, Sudan risk report, 5 November 2020, [url](#)

⁹² OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 311, 314

⁹³ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 309, 323, 327, 328



The ongoing conflict has significantly affected the judicial infrastructure. Reports indicated systematic attacks on institutional buildings, including the headquarters and offices of the Attorney General in Khartoum State and courts by the RSF.⁹⁴ Attacks particularly affected Khartoum and the Darfur states. Burning of official records, in particular judicial records and land registries, were reported in El Geneina, Nyala and Zalingei. The lack of any digital back-up of court records posed a challenge. The Public Prosecution had made efforts to retrieve data from conflict-affected areas.⁹⁵

(d) Prosecution

The latest UN universal periodic review noted that the 2019 Constitutional Document introduced a legislative reform programme including the separation of Public Prosecutor from the executive branch.⁹⁶ In 2023, by Presidential Decree, the Sudanese authorities established a National Committee of Investigation on human rights violations, war crimes, and violations by the RSF. The committee, formed by GIS and military intelligence representatives, police and the ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs, was mandated to collect evidence and list all violations committed by the RSF since the beginning of the conflict.⁹⁷ As of September 2024, 18 741 cases had been registered.⁹⁸

Victims of rape and sexual violence face obstacles in reporting crimes due to fears of stigma and prosecution for adultery. Moreover, the laws lack effective provisions for prosecuting sexual and gender-based violence.⁹⁹ Human rights organisations cited substantial barriers to reporting gender-based violence, including police reluctance to investigate.¹⁰⁰ Testimonies collected by the UN FFM for the Sudan, including from survivors of rape and other forms of sexual violence, revealed a lack of trust in the ability and willingness of the domestic system to deliver justice.¹⁰¹ Authorities have often failed to investigate torture allegations or provided effective remedies and reparations to victims.¹⁰²

In response to allegations of repeated widespread sexual violence, the RSF announced that it was taking action to prevent and address violations of human rights. However, the RSF's announcements about accountability measures were not backed up by evidence. UN sources and events in El Fasher pointed to repeated RSF violations and abuses. Further, no information was shared with the ICC substantiating the RSF's claim of initiating investigations

⁹⁴ OHCHR, Note verbale dated 15 June 2024 from the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Office of the President of the Human Rights Council, 26 September 2024, [url](#), p.29

⁹⁵ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 310, 315

⁹⁶ OHCHR, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Sudan, 20 April 2022, [url](#)

⁹⁷ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 316

⁹⁸ Sudan Tribune, Sudan's Attorney General urges end of the UN mission, cites RSF death toll, 10 September 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁹ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 299, 302, 303 306, 307, 308

¹⁰⁰ USDOS, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan, 22 April 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰¹ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 329

¹⁰² OMCT, Briefing on Torture in Sudan, p.4, July 2020, [url](#)



of abuses;¹⁰³ its internal mechanisms, specifically the RSF Committee for Addressing Violations and field courts, are not active in enforcing accountability.¹⁰⁴

(e) Policing the rule of law and the new state of emergency

The 2019 Constitutional declaration stipulated that the police forces were national, uniformed law enforcement forces, and were competent to preserve the security and safety of society. They were subject to the policies and decisions of the executive authority by law [Article 35(1)].¹⁰⁵ The Sudan Police Force was responsible for traditional police functions, such as fighting crimes and maintaining public safety, as well as for a wider set of functions including civil defence, customs, wildlife protection and civil registration.¹⁰⁶ It fell under the direct command of the Minister of Interior¹⁰⁷ and had a well-established structure and a clear chain of command led by the Police Director-General.¹⁰⁸ In 2022, the Ministry of Interior established the Community Police, initiative that triggered a national debate for the similarities with the Public Order Police, a force repealed in 2019 and enforcing a strict moral code under al-Bashir era.¹⁰⁹

The Central Reserve Police (CRP), typically wearing light brown camouflage uniforms with a bird insignia,¹¹⁰ is a militarised police unit.¹¹¹ As stated by a MEE analyst ‘the Reserve Police is not at the front lines, but it supports the army and takes control of areas after the army clears them of RSF fighters.’¹¹² The date of creation of this police unit is unknown, though some experts place it around 1970s.¹¹³ The current number of members is unknown, but estimates from 2017 reported 20 000 members in Darfur, 40 000 in Khartoum and 20 000 outside Khartoum. The unit has been involved in incidents related to violence against protesters after the 2021 coup and violation of human rights.¹¹⁴

After the beginning of the war, RSF forces assaulted and occupied police offices in Khartoum states. Buildings, devices and equipment were damaged, including the identification documents factory (passports).¹¹⁵

¹⁰³ ICC, The office of the Prosecutor, Thirty-eighth report of the prosecutor of the international criminal court to the united nations security council pursuant to resolution 1593 (2005), [url](#), para 42

¹⁰⁴ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 323, 325, 327

¹⁰⁵ Policing Law, Sudan profile, 2021, [url](#)

¹⁰⁶ Vezzadini, Elena, Seri-Hersch, Iris, Revilla, Lucie, Poussier, Anael and Jalil, Mahassin Abdul. Ordinary Sudan, 1504–2019: From Social History to Politics from Below Volume 1 | Volume 2. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2023, [url](#), p.265

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, Vol 63, Police professional doctrine in Sudan: Establishment and development, December 2020, [url](#)

¹⁰⁹ Radio Dabanga, Outrage in Sudan as new force reminiscent of Public Order Police is installed, 19 August 2022, [url](#)

¹¹⁰ REDRESS, “Taken from Khartoum’s Streets”, Legal Analysis, p.6, March 2022, [url](#)

¹¹¹ REDRESS, Sudan Central Reserve Police, Briefing, March 2022, [url](#)

¹¹² MEE, Sudan’s Central Reserve Police: The notorious force taking on the RSF, 3 May 2023, [url](#)

¹¹³ REDRESS, Sudan Central Reserve Police, Briefing, March 2022, [url](#)

¹¹⁴ Reuters, U.S. places sanctions on Sudan’s Central Reserve Police over protest crackdown, 21 March 2022, [url](#)

¹¹⁵ OHCHR, Note verbale dated 15 June 2024 from the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Office of the President of the Human Rights Council, 26 September 2024, A/HRC/56/G/4, [url](#), p. 27



The April 2024 UNHCR protection brief on Sudan noted that ‘the broader breakdown in law and order in conflict affected states and absence of law enforcement bodies, is leading to the inability to provide protection from armed groups and criminal activities’.¹¹⁶ In its latest report, USDOS indicated that most IDP camps had no functioning police force.¹¹⁷ Moreover, in October 2024, the UN FFM for the Sudan voiced concerns regarding the collapse of the rule of law in the country, including the disruption of police functions.¹¹⁸

State security committees existed across the country before the conflict. They were chaired by governors and included senior military, intelligence, police and senior state officials, and coordinated and implemented key security policies at the state level.¹¹⁹ Constitutional Decree No. 6 of 2024, concerning the Security and Defence Council, set up security committees led by a High Technical Committee formed by various state agencies dealing with intelligence, police, defence, foreign affairs, justice and public prosecution. They were meant to maintain peace and security and carry out any task as ordered.¹²⁰

According to the 2022 report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Sudan acknowledged the lack of funding to train officials working in law enforcement agencies.¹²¹ The 2024 USDOS report indicated that government institutions and law enforcement were facing significant operational constraints due to the ongoing conflict, which has further reduced the already limited anti-trafficking efforts.¹²²

The UN FFM has received information that, from 2023, the RSF has undertaken some attempts to create a rudimentary military police and justice system through an RSF Committee to Address Violations (sometimes also referred to as the Committee to Address Negative Phenomena) and an RSF field court. These institutions seem to have been rarely used in the field. Additionally, the RSF established its own intelligence service with centralised specialised units, a counterintelligence unit and a unit to monitor civilians and civil society.¹²³

State of emergency

After the coup, al-Burhan declared a state of emergency by issuing a number of decrees, including Emergency Order No.3 that expanded the legal powers of regular forces and provided immunities for any activities undertaken during the course of their official duties.¹²⁴ This mandate was reinforced in May 2024 when the authorities declared a state of emergency in Khartoum¹²⁵ and in other states and regions - namely Darfur, Kordofan, Gezira, Gedaref, Sennar, Blue Nile, Northern and Eastern Sudan - allowing joint security forces, military

¹¹⁶ UNHCR, Protection brief: Sudan April 2024, 5 September 2024, p.20 [url](#)

¹¹⁷ USDOS, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan, 22 April 2024, [url](#)

¹¹⁸ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 315

¹¹⁹ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 82

¹²⁰ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 50

¹²¹ OHCHR, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Sudan, 20 April 2022, [url](#)

¹²² USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan, Sudan, 2024, [url](#)

¹²³ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 98, 327

¹²⁴ REDRESS, “Taken from Khartoum’s Streets”, Legal Analysis, p.6, March 2022, [url](#)

¹²⁵ Sudan Tribune, Khartoum State declares state of emergency to regulate foreign presence, 1 May 2024, [url](#)



intelligence and police to conduct law enforcement activities.¹²⁶ For additional information see section [2.1 Perceived political opponents](#).

In the same period, the General Intelligence Service (GIS) Law (2024 Amendment) further reinstated legal powers to intelligence personnel, including interrogation, search, detention and asset seizure, while also granting them immunity from criminal or civil prosecution.¹²⁷ Furthermore, the law authorised the GIS director to establish a special court for cases involving capital punishment.¹²⁸ The GIS, created in 2019¹²⁹, replaced the former National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS),¹³⁰ an agency controlling the RSF in the past and responsible for human rights violations during al-Bashir time.¹³¹

1.4. Human rights

The 2019 Constitutional declaration stipulated that all rights and freedoms contained in international human rights agreements, pacts, and charters ratified by the Republic of Sudan were an integral part of the new constitution (Article 41(2)).¹³² Sudan is a party to seven of the nine core international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).¹³³ At the regional level, it is a party to, among others, the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR) and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC).¹³⁴ Sudan has not ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of discriminations against women (CEDAW) and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

¹²⁶ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 14, 17

¹²⁷ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 80

¹²⁸ Sudan War Monitor, Sudan reinstates sweeping powers for intelligence service, 15 May 2024, [url](#);

¹²⁹ REDRESS, "Taken from Khartoum's Streets", Legal Analysis, p.10, March 2022, [url](#)

¹³⁰ OMCT, Briefing on Torture in Sudan, p.4, July 2020, [url](#); "The NISS was known for conducting violent counter-insurgency operations in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, including during peaceful protests, which culminated in the 3 June Massacre in 2019." From GSF, Sudan study on the status of and opportunities for reparations for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence, p.23, [url](#)

¹³¹ AI, Sudan: Agents of Fear: The National Security Service in Sudan, 19 July 2010, [url](#)

¹³² Policing Law, Sudan profile, 2021, [url](#)

¹³³ OHCHR, Ratification of 18 International Human Rights Treaties, Status of ratification, n.d., [url](#)

¹³⁴ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 35





The UN and HRW have documented evidence of human rights abuses, including torture and sexual violence, allegedly committed by both the SAF and the RSF.¹³⁵

Migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced persons (IDPs) remained especially vulnerable to sexual and labour exploitation, including by criminal networks engaged in human trafficking.¹³⁶

(a) Extrajudicial killings

According to the UN, international human rights organisations and media, the SAF, the RSF and affiliated armed militias were responsible for widespread extrajudicial killings of civilians, including children and women.¹³⁷ Both parties have engaged in extrajudicial killings and executions of SAF and RSF prisoners of war from opposing forces.¹³⁸ In October 2024, mass killings of civilians attributed to the RSF were reported in Al Jazeera,¹³⁹ where eastern villages witnessed a surge of sexual violence and extrajudicial killings.¹⁴⁰ Similar incidents were observed by residents of Khartoum.¹⁴¹ The Emergency Lawyers Group identified cases of arbitrary detentions and extrajudicial killings in the same area and in Port Sudan.¹⁴² Visual evidence obtained and verified by international outlets confirmed the involvement of RSF forces in the extrajudicial killings of unarmed civilians in North Darfur in June 2023.¹⁴³ For additional information see [EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

(b) Arbitrary arrests and detention

Sudan ratified the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforcement Disappearance (CED) in 2021 as well as the Convention against Torture (UNCAT).¹⁴⁴

According to Freedom House, although the interim constitution enshrined the right to due process, security forces have continued to engage in arrests and detentions¹⁴⁵ without provision of any warrant, legal documentation or justification for the arrest. Documented arrests and detentions of civilians on suspicion of supporting the other party in the conflict took place in various locations of Khartoum, West and Central Darfur as well as River Nile state since the beginning of the conflict.¹⁴⁶ Both the RSF and the SAF have engaged in detaining

¹³⁵ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#); HRW, Sudan: Fighters Rape Women and Girls, Hold Sex Slaves, 15 December 2024, [url](#)

¹³⁶ Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2024, February 2024, [url](#)

¹³⁷ USDOS, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan, 22 April 2024, [url](#); GCHRAGD, Human Rights Council 57th session, 10 September 2024, [url](#); OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the Sudan, A/HRC/55/29, 4 March 2024, [url](#), para 36

¹³⁸ USDOS, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan, 22 April 2024, [url](#)

¹³⁹ BBC, New wave of mass killings in Sudan alarms UN, 27 October 2024, [url](#)

¹⁴⁰ ISHR, Sudan: Protect civilians, end war crimes against them, 11 November 2024, [url](#)

¹⁴¹ Radio Dabanga, Malnutrition and extrajudicial killing reported by Khartoum residents, 22 October 2024, [url](#)

¹⁴² Radio Dabanga, Sudanese condemn 'extrajudicial killings of young men' in Khartoum Bahri, 2 October 2024, [url](#); Emergency Lawyers Facebook Page, 4 October 2024, [url](#)

¹⁴³ Lighthouse reports, the Kutum massacre, 9 September 2024, [url](#)

¹⁴⁴ OHCHR, Ratification of 18 International Human Rights Treaties, Status of ratification, n.d., [url](#)

¹⁴⁵ Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2024, Sudan, February 2024, [url](#)

¹⁴⁶ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 240, 246, 255





individuals based on perceived affiliations, political opinions, or ethnic origins.¹⁴⁷ The SAF has reinforced repression through the “Law on Unfamiliar Faces,” a harsh policy that arbitrarily targets individuals based on perceived social affiliations, labeling them as RSF sympathizers without evidence.¹⁴⁸ In May and June 2024, multiple media outlets highlighted arrests and detentions without judicial orders targeting civilians and political activists across Nile River state, Northern State, North Kordofan, Sennar, White Nile, West Kordofan, Kassala and Gedaref.¹⁴⁹ These detentions targeted activists and volunteers who stayed in their homes during the RSF's occupation.¹⁵⁰ In October 2024, as reported by the human rights organisation Justice for Africa, Nuba members of the Sudan Christian Church in Shendi, River Nile state, were arrested and subjected to mistreatment by SAF on suspicion of collaborating with the RSF.¹⁵¹ For additional information see section [2. Treatment of selected profiles and groups of the population](#). Arbitrary arrests and detention by both parties frequently involved individuals on their way to the border. Arrests were conducted at different locations often involving the use of physical violence.¹⁵²

(c) Enforced disappearances

For additional information about enforced disappearances, see section 2.5.3 of the [EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

In February 2024, the Sudanese Group of Victims of Enforced Disappearance (SGVED) confirmed the disappearances of 993 persons (897 men and 96 women) in various cities including Wad Madani, Al-Hasaheisa and in the states of Al Jazirah, North Kordofan and Khartoum.¹⁵³ A report by the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) released in April 2024 indicated that in the first year of war 1 140 individuals were victims of enforced disappearance.¹⁵⁴ The 2024 report by the UN Working Group on enforced or involuntary disappearances noted 177 outstanding cases for Sudan.¹⁵⁵

In an article by Radio Tamazuj, a member of the Sudanese civil society organisation Missing People Initiative (Mafgoud) noted that enforced disappearances have increased since the beginning of the conflict.¹⁵⁶ In RSF-controlled areas people have been forced into disappearance, with their families coerced into paying ransoms for their release.¹⁵⁷ In March

¹⁴⁷ OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the Sudan, A/HRC/55/29, 4 March 2024, [url](#), para 57, 58

¹⁴⁸ The Sudan Times, Al-Burhan's SAF attacks civilians in Sennar State, RSF reports, 27 November 2024, [url](#)

¹⁴⁹ Radio Dabanga, National Umma Party condemns arbitrary detentions by Sudan Military Intelligence, 12 June 2024, [url](#); Radio Dabanga, Unlawful detentions and extrajudicial killings of activists continue in war-torn Sudan, 12 May 2024, [url](#);

¹⁵⁰ Radio Dabanga, Justice Africa Sudan: Fleeing Nuba Christians detained by Military Intelligence, 14 October 2024, [url](#)

¹⁵¹ Justice Africa Sudan, Urgent alerts, 13 October 2024, [url](#); Justice Africa Sudan, Press release, 16 October 2024, [url](#)

¹⁵² OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 242

¹⁵³ Sudan Tribune, Sudan sees surge in enforced disappearances as clashes expand, 16 February 2024, [url](#)

¹⁵⁴ ACJPS, A Report on Enforced Disappearances. One Year into Sudan War, 27 April 2024, [url](#)

¹⁵⁵ OHCHR, Enforced or involuntary disappearance, A/HRC/57/54, 26 July 2024, [url](#)

¹⁵⁶ Radio Tamazuj, Alarm over rise in enforced disappearances in Sudan war, 8 July 2024, [url](#)

¹⁵⁷ Radio Tamazuj, Alarm over rise in enforced disappearances in Sudan war, 8 July 2024, [url](#)





2024, the RSF arrested activists running soup kitchens in Khartoum while they were distributing food to civilians.¹⁵⁸

In another report, SGVED highlighted a reduction in the monitoring, documentation and reporting of enforced disappearances due to the worsening of the conflict. On some occasions reporting was limited by families' concerns about safety and potential reprisals. In cases where women were involved, cultural and societal pressures prevented the reporting.¹⁵⁹

As of mid-October 2024, the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa reported that 165 women and girls were missing. Additionally, the SGVED also reported a total of 149 missing women and girls.¹⁶⁰

(d) Treatment in detention and prison conditions

For more information about detention conditions, see section 2.3.1. of the [EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

According to the 2023 US country report on human rights practices, since April 2023, the RSF had reportedly established 44 centres for holding kidnapped persons in Khartoum and surrounding areas, while the SAF continued to operate eight detention centres. Prisoners were living in severe conditions due to overcrowding, food shortages, inadequate health care, heating, ventilation, lighting and physical abuse. Persons in these centres were reportedly subjected to starvation, sexual assault, beatings, and cruel treatment, with credible reports of deaths in custody.¹⁶¹ No access to detention facilities was allowed to international monitors since the beginning of the conflict in April 2023.¹⁶²

By June 2024, governors of River Nile and Gedaref states endorsed policies of 'regional profiling,' resulting in the detention and mistreatment of individuals from western Sudanese states.¹⁶³ In July 2024, the Sudanese Human Rights Initiative (SHRI) indicated Kober prison as one of the largest in Sudan and Al-Hadi as a newly established hosting a significant number of death row inmates. Additionally, it was indicated that a relevant number of death row inmates were hosted in another large prison in Port Sudan.¹⁶⁴

According to the UN FFM for the Sudan, RSF intelligence officers were present in RSF detention and interrogation centres. These were established in various locations, including police stations and prisons in RSF-captured areas, former SAF installations and re-purposed

¹⁵⁸ Al Jazeera, Are Sudan's civil society activists being targeted by both warring sides?, 1 April 2024, [url](#)

¹⁵⁹ OHCHR, inputs to the Report of the Secretary-General on Missing Persons, Joint submission by Mafgoud (Missing) Initiative and Wadaitohom Wain (Where are they!) Campaign. The status of enforced disappearance in Sudan, 8 October 2024, [url](#); Radio Dabanga, ACJPS: Enforced disappearances in Sudan 'systematic and escalating', 30 October 2024, [url](#)

¹⁶⁰ SIHA Network, Where is Roqia? The story of Siham Ishaq Hassan: A Mother's search for her Missing Daughter amidst the Sudanese conflict, 28 November 2024, [url](#)

¹⁶¹ USDOS, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan, 22 April 2024, [url](#)

¹⁶² USDOS, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan, 22 April 2024, [url](#); REDRESS, Serious human rights violations perpetrated in the context of mass civilian detention in Sudan, 30 September 2024, [url](#)

¹⁶³ Ayin Network, Sudan Conflict Monitor # 14, 30 June 2024, [url](#)

¹⁶⁴ DPRU, DPRU Q&As: Elshareef Ali Mohammed, Sudanese Human Rights Initiative (SHRI), Sudan: Part Two, 11 July 2024, [url](#)





civilian buildings.¹⁶⁵ Unofficial locations and informal detention centres were used by both parties, mostly university, such as the University of Africa in Khartoum, schools, private premises, gas stations, police stations and areas or buildings close to checkpoints.¹⁶⁶ Individuals, including children, were detained in inhuman conditions and denied access to legal assistance or judicial oversight. In some instances, these conditions led to deaths.¹⁶⁷

Additionally, the RSF attacked national and state prisons across multiple states, seizing and looting prison property.¹⁶⁸ These attacks led to the release of numerous prisoners, some of whom joined military operations, while others engaged in criminal activities.¹⁶⁹ As of September 2024, 19 481 inmates have escaped from Sudanese prisons.¹⁷⁰

Since the outbreak of hostilities, hundreds of fighters have been captured by the two parties, and most remain unaccounted for.¹⁷¹

(e) Torture and physical abuse

Evidence of torture and ill-treatment of civilians by both parties¹⁷² included the use of both physical and psychological violence. Torture was often used to extract information and intimidate individuals.¹⁷³ As indicated by Ayin network, multiple video sources reported instances of humiliating and degrading behaviours.¹⁷⁴ Whipping, beating and forcing detainees to walk on their knees on gravel roads were documented by videos uploaded on social media platforms.¹⁷⁵ Analysis by HRW suggested that these incidents occurred in Khartoum, Al Jazirah and North and West Kordofan.¹⁷⁶ Abuses included electric shocks and burns.¹⁷⁷ Testimonies collected by the UN FFM for the Sudan informed about sexual violence, including forced nudity, beatings on genitals and rape threats, against men and boys in detention, during or

¹⁶⁵ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 98

¹⁶⁶ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 98, 241

¹⁶⁷ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 255; ACJPS, Sudan War: Arbitrary Arrest, Torture, and Ill-treatment Behind Closed Doors, 14 March 2024, [url](#)

¹⁶⁸ OHCHR, Note verbale dated 15 June 2024 from the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Office of the President of the Human Rights Council, 26 September 2024, A/HRC/56/G/4, [url](#), p. 29

¹⁶⁹ OHCHR, Note verbale dated 15 June 2024 from the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Office of the President of the Human Rights Council, 26 September 2024, A/HRC/56/G/4, [url](#), p. 29

¹⁷⁰ OHCHR, Note verbale dated 15 June 2024 from the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Office of the President of the Human Rights Council, 26 September 2024, A/HRC/56/G/4, [url](#), p. 29

¹⁷¹ OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the Sudan, A/HRC/55/29, 4 March 2024, [url](#), para 53

¹⁷² ACJPS, Sudan War: Arbitrary Arrest, Torture, and Ill-treatment Behind Closed Doors, 14 March 2024, [url](#)

¹⁷³ REDRESS, Serious human rights violations perpetrated in the context of mass civilian detention in Sudan, September 2024, [url](#), p.6

¹⁷⁴ Ayin Network, Torture and murder – the horrors endured by military prisoners in Sudan’s war, 1 August 2024, [url](#)

¹⁷⁵ HRW, Sudan: Warring Parties Execute Detainees, Mutilate Bodies, 28 August 2024, [url](#)

¹⁷⁶ HRW, Sudan: Warring Parties Execute Detainees, Mutilate Bodies, 28 August 2024, [url](#)

¹⁷⁷ Irregular warfare, Unlawful Detention and Torture in Sudanese Conflict: Urgent Need for International Action, 18 April 2024, [url](#)



prior to their interrogation.¹⁷⁸ For more information see section [2. Treatment of selected profiles and groups of the population.](#)

Sudan's Constitutional Charter for the 2019 Transitional Period prohibited torture and ill treatments with Article 50 stating that 'No one may be subjected to torture or harsh, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment, or debasement of human dignity.'¹⁷⁹ Despite this, the Charter retained laws from the 2005 Transitional Constitution such as the 2010 National Security Act (NSA) and 1994 Evidence Act, which exposed detainees to torture and ill-treatments. Additionally, the 2007 Armed Forces Act, 2008 Police Act, and 2010 National Security Act granted immunities to state actors, limiting accountability for such practices.¹⁸⁰ Legal barriers such as official immunities, statutes of limitation, and inadequate victim protection further obstructed accountability for torture.¹⁸¹

(f) Death penalty

Sudan retains the death penalty for ordinary crimes.¹⁸² Capital punishment in the country is legal under Article 27 of the Sudanese Criminal Act 1991¹⁸³ and includes offences against the state and international crimes.¹⁸⁴ In 2020, amendments to the Criminal Law repealed the death penalty for apostasy, previously punished by stoning to death.¹⁸⁵ According to the 2022 Working Group report on Universal Periodic Review on Sudan, the country abolished the use of death penalties for discretionary (*ta'zir*¹⁸⁶) offences and retained it for extremely serious offences only (*hudud*¹⁸⁷ and *qisas*¹⁸⁸) under Article 53. The death penalty cannot be imposed for offences committed by persons under the age of 18 years or persons aged 70 or above, except in the case of *hudud* and retribution (*qisas*).¹⁸⁹ The 2024 UN FFM for the Sudan emphasised that the death penalty may apply for crimes committed by children under the command of the armed forces and/or groups.¹⁹⁰

Since the beginning of the conflict, people rejecting the war and refusing to side with the army, faced charges of spying for the RSF or being 'sleeper cells'. As explained by Radio Dabanga, these charges are punishable by death.¹⁹¹ In Khartoum 'the execution of so-called death sentences (by field trials) continued and has brought civilians and the military together

¹⁷⁸ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 171

¹⁷⁹ OMCT, Briefing on Torture in Sudan, p.4, July 2020, [url](#)

¹⁸⁰ OMCT, Briefing on Torture in Sudan, p.4, July 2020, [url](#)

¹⁸¹ OMCT, Briefing on Torture in Sudan, p.4, July 2020, [url](#)

¹⁸² AI, Death sentences and executions 2023, p. 42, May 2024, [url](#)

¹⁸³ REDRESS, The Criminal Act 1991, English, [url](#)

¹⁸⁴ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para 299

¹⁸⁵ Al Jazeera, Changes in criminal law as Sudan annuls apostasy death sentence, 12 July 2020, [url](#)

¹⁸⁶ In Muslim law, *Ta'zir* are discretionary punishments that can range from a harsh warning from the judge to corporal punishment such as flogging, imprisonment and exile.

¹⁸⁷ In Muslim law, *hudud* are the penalties explicitly established by the Koran and the Sunnah.

¹⁸⁸ In Muslim law, *qisas* are proportionate retaliation for intentional bodily harm or murder.

¹⁸⁹ OHCHR, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Sudan, 20 April 2022, [url](#), para.67

¹⁹⁰ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), p.71

¹⁹¹ Radio Dabanga, Unlawful detentions and extrajudicial killings of activists continue in war-torn Sudan, 12 May 2024, [url](#)



and is greatly supported by calls for incitement despite the catastrophic circumstances the city is witnessing.¹⁹²

While courts in Sudan were not known to have sentenced people to death in 2023,¹⁹³ between May and July 2024 six sentences were issued by courts in SAF-controlled areas,¹⁹⁴ followed by hundreds in December 2024 in various locations under army's control. These sentences were issued under article 50 and 51 of the Criminal Law ('undermining the constitutional system' and 'waging war against the state') against civilians accused of supporting the RSF militia or opposing the war.¹⁹⁵ According to the UN FFM report, as of October 2024 ten RSF members had been sentenced to death by hanging.¹⁹⁶ Additionally, another source reported that 17 RSF fighters were sentenced to death in September.¹⁹⁷

In RSF-controlled areas, houses holding execution rooms were found in Khartoum.¹⁹⁸ For additional information on extrajudicial killings see [1.4.\(a\) Extrajudicial killings](#)

¹⁹² Radio Dabanga, Sudanese condemn 'extrajudicial killings of young men' in Khartoum Bahri, 2 October 2024, [url](#)

¹⁹³ Al, Death sentences and executions 2023, p. 11, May 2024, [url](#)

¹⁹⁴ ISHR, Sudan: Protect lives, stop death sentences and execution of civilians, 4 July 2024, [url](#)

¹⁹⁵ Sudan Tribune, Mass death sentences and life terms issued for alleged RSF support, 31 December 2024 [url](#)

¹⁹⁶ OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para. 317

¹⁹⁷ Sudan Tribune, Death sentence in Port Sudan highlights crackdown on RSF sympathizers, 4 October 2024, [url](#)

¹⁹⁸ ISHR, Sudan: Protect lives, stop death sentences and execution of civilians, 4 July 2024, [url](#)



2. Treatment of selected profiles and groups of the population

This report covers the period from February to November 2024, with additional information covering up to December 2024. For background information, see section 2 of the [EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

2.1. Perceived political opponents

Sources indicated that political opponents continued to be targeted by both the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).¹⁹⁹ In an interview with EUAA, a human rights analyst with in-depth expertise on the country indicated that in areas controlled by the RSF, political activists are considered collaborators of the SAF, whereas in areas controlled by the SAF, they are arrested if they come from RSF-controlled areas.²⁰⁰ Freedom House indicated that '[p]olitical detainees, activists, and journalists have been held incommunicado without access to legal representation and have likely been subject to torture and inhumane treatment'.²⁰¹ The UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights indicated, in September 2024, that states of emergency are relied upon throughout the country to curtail activities by civil society organisations, journalists, and the political opposition.²⁰² For additional information see section [1.3\(e\) Policing the rule of law and the new state of emergency](#).

A human rights analyst interviewed by EUAA pointed out to cases of individuals going to court and sentenced to the death penalty after being accused of collaborating with the RSF, in what the source described as a 'worrying trend' with no due process.²⁰³ Sudan Tribune reported that, according to a local lawyer, 250 people were sentenced to death or life in prison in various locations, including Al Damazin and Blue Nile state, for supporting the RSF.²⁰⁴ For additional information on the rule of law and the administration of justice, see [1.3 Rule of law and administration of justice](#).

An October 2023 report by the UN FFM for the Sudan²⁰⁵ (UN FFM) indicated that sexual violence has been reportedly used by the SAF and security forces to repress activists,

¹⁹⁹ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Sudan, February 2024, [url](#); UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 165

²⁰⁰ Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

²⁰¹ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Sudan, February 2024, [url](#)

²⁰² OHCHR, Sudan: This tragedy needs to end, now, urges Deputy High Commissioner, 10 September 2024, [url](#).

See also: Sudan War Monitor, Sudan reinstates sweeping powers for intelligence service, 15 May 2024, [url](#)

²⁰³ Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

²⁰⁴ Sudan Tribune, Mass death sentences and life terms issued for alleged RSF support, 31 December 2024, [url](#)

²⁰⁵ The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan was established by the UN Human Rights Council in October 2023 and composed of three independent experts, Mohamed Chande Othman (Tanzania)

(Chairperson), Mona Rishmawi (Jordan/ Switzerland), and Joy Ngozi Ezeilo (Nigeria). The UN FFM produced the report based on information collected between January and July 2024 through, inter alia, field missions to Chad, Kenya, Switzerland and Uganda; submissions by stakeholders; reports of international, regional and non-



members of the political opposition, and pro-democracy protesters.²⁰⁶ Sexual violence also took place due to the perceived or real affiliation of their relatives with opposition parties or for documenting human rights violations.²⁰⁷ The UN FFM for the Sudan documented cases of women and girls who were raped in Khartoum by the RSF for allegedly supporting the previous regime or the SAF, and in Darfur for being human rights defenders and activists.²⁰⁸

Both the SAF and the RSF are accused of conducting arbitrary and illegal detentions of individuals accused of supporting the other party to the conflict.²⁰⁹ The RSF, for example, reportedly use unofficial and clandestine detention centres in Khartoum and Darfur in locations such as universities, schools, private houses, buildings, gas stations, police stations, and areas near checkpoints, whereas the SAF reportedly have illegal detention centres in Khartoum.²¹⁰ Sudan War Monitor reported in May 2024 that the RSF conducted a 'campaign of mass arrests' of perceived political opponents, detaining over 80 during the period of two weeks.²¹¹ Al Jazeera reported that, according to the UN and local sources, the SAF has been accused of arbitrarily detaining and summarily executing persons it perceives as political opponents when it retook Khartoum.²¹²

The UN FFM report from October 2024 noted, based on one witness's testimony, the systematic targeting of civil society, particularly individuals who remained neutral or opposed the war.²¹³ According to the same source, this has forced numerous professionals to flee the country.²¹⁴

A May 2024 COI report on Sudan produced by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, covering the period between August 2022 and 26 May 2024, indicated that, based on confidential sources, 'there have been few, if any, demonstrations'.²¹⁵ Oral sources consulted similarly indicated that, according to their knowledge, there have not been protests recorded in Sudan in 2024.²¹⁶ The Dutch COI report indicated that, based on confidential sources, it is 'quite risky for individuals to speak out publicly against the war. The warring parties interpreted protests against the war as expressions of criticism directed towards themselves. Both the RSF and SAF-affiliated intelligence agencies rounded up peace demonstrators'.²¹⁷

governmental organizations; and interviews and consultations with experts, regional non-governmental organizations, Sudanese civil society organizations, and victims. UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), paras. 1, 2, 11, 17-23.

²⁰⁶ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 165

²⁰⁷ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 172

²⁰⁸ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 172

²⁰⁹ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), paras. 241, 246; Sudan War Monitor, Rapid Support arrest more than 80 people in South Darfur, 15 May 2024, [url](#); Radio Dabanga, RSF detain three Umma party leaders in West Kordofan, 10 September 2024, [url](#)

²¹⁰ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), paras. 240-241

²¹¹ Sudan War Monitor, Rapid Support arrest more than 80 people in South Darfur, 15 May 2024, [url](#)

²¹² Al Jazeera, Is Sudan's army regaining ground lost in the civil war?, 19 October 2024, [url](#)

²¹³ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 312

²¹⁴ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 312

²¹⁵ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 52

²¹⁶ Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

²¹⁷ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 52



(a) Community leaders, lawyers, and human rights activists

For background information, see Section 2.3.2. of the [EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

The UN FFM for the Sudan indicated that community leaders, lawyers, and human rights activists continued to be targeted by warring parties.²¹⁸ It documented 'multiple incidents of threats, intimidation, harassment, attacks and reprisals against human rights defenders, lawyers and activists documenting human rights violations, and members of civil society, by both the SAF and RSF'.²¹⁹ The same source provided the examples of a human rights activist who was arrested and tortured in El Geneina for documenting human rights violations allegedly perpetrated by the RSF and its allies, and another who was abducted and tortured by the RSF in Omdurman in early 2024 accused of being a SAF spy due to his activism.²²⁰

The UN FFM for the Sudan indicated that female human rights defenders and activists have been targeted with sexual violence, arbitrary detention, and torture, and although they did not know the perpetrators, the perpetrators reportedly knew the activities of their victims and they were looking for them specifically.²²¹

Regarding the situation of lawyers, the UN FFM for the Sudan provided the following:

'lawyers are facing difficulties in exercising their functions, due to continued harassment, monitoring, targeting, and scrutiny by security actors. They also face challenges in providing adequate legal defense to the complex criminal cases brought forward by the authorities as part of the National Committee of Investigation on Human Rights Violations, War Crimes, and Violations by the Rebel Rapid Support Forces and Other Crimes, in SAF controlled areas since the start of the conflict. Lawyers providing legal assistance to civilians in such cases may reportedly face arrest over alleged affiliation or support to the RSF'.²²²

(b) Resistance Committees (RCs) and Emergency Response Rooms (EERs)

For background information, see Section 2.3.3. of the [EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

Sources reported that members of Resistance Committees (RCs) and Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs)²²³ continued to be detained and/or attacked on suspicion of collaborating with

²¹⁸ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 275

²¹⁹ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 275

²²⁰ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 275

²²¹ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), paras. 184, 196, 266

²²² UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 314

²²³ Resistance committees created Emergency Response Rooms (EERs) at the onset of the conflict in April 2023 to administer first aid in conflict areas. Over time, ERRS became distinct from resistance committees and solicited aid from abroad to feed their communities. Al Jazeera, Are Sudan's civil society activists being targeted by both warring sides?, 1 April 2024, [url](#)



rival parties.²²⁴ Reuters reported that both the SAF and the RSF suspect members of RCs and EERs for having led the pro-democracy protests that toppled the al-Bashir regime in 2019.²²⁵ The UN FFM for the Sudan indicated that SAF's military intelligence routinely targets these individuals and subjects them to arbitrary detention due to their perceived association with the Forces for Freedom and Change and for allegedly being RSF collaborators.²²⁶ A human rights analyst interviewed by EUAA indicated that, despite the barriers to operate, RCs have 'managed to function' but that they also become the target of rival groups.²²⁷ When they operate in RSF areas, for example, they become the target of the SAF.²²⁸

The UN FFM for the Sudan indicated that ERR volunteers have been subjected to sexual violence while performing their duties, as well as torture and arbitrary detention.²²⁹ Al Jazeera similarly reported that, in areas controlled by the RSF, ERR volunteers are exposed to arbitrary detention and physical and sexual violence due to lawlessness, and in areas controlled by the SAF, volunteers have been targeted by military intelligence and the 'Kizan', members of Sudan's political Islamic movement that ruled alongside al-Bashir and now support the SAF and target civil society organisations 'in revenge' for overthrowing them in 2019.²³⁰ Al Jazeera reported that, according to an ERR spokesperson, after the SAF recaptured neighbourhoods in Omdurman from the RSF in March 2024, several ERR volunteers had to flee as the SAF and SAF-affiliated militias reportedly started to search for people who were part of pro-democracy protests in the past.²³¹

Instances of targeting of RCs and EER volunteers, as reported by sources, include:

- In November 2024, The New Humanitarian reported that, according to the coordinator of a women's ERR in Khartoum, '21 women from a cooperative were recently detained, beaten, sexually harassed, and had their money stolen by members of the RSF'.²³²
- On 13 May 2024, Sudan War Monitor reported that, according to a local political activist, since April 2024, security forces arrested more than 50 people in En-Nahud, North Kordofan, with some of them being released while others still in detention; most of the detainees are political activists from the RCs who were calling to stop the war.²³³
- On 7 April 2024, Sudan Tribune reported that SAF's military intelligence was conducting an arrest campaign across Sennar state for several weeks, targeting members of political parties, RCs, and humanitarian workers, and that on that day, the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) and the General Intelligence Service (GIS) arrested a 'prominent' member of the Communist Party and a member of the RC. Both detainees

²²⁴ Reuters, Sudan's warring sides target local aid volunteers fighting famine, 8 October 2024, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Are Sudan's civil society activists being targeted by both warring sides?, 1 April 2024, [url](#); Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 54

²²⁵ Reuters, Sudan's warring sides target local aid volunteers fighting famine, 8 October 2024, [url](#)

²²⁶ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 243

²²⁷ Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

²²⁸ Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

²²⁹ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), paras. 215, 266

²³⁰ Al Jazeera, Are Sudan's civil society activists being targeted by both warring sides?, 1 April 2024, [url](#). See also: Reuters, Sudan's warring sides target local aid volunteers fighting famine, 8 October 2024, [url](#)

²³¹ Al Jazeera, Are Sudan's civil society activists being targeted by both warring sides?, 1 April 2024, [url](#)

²³² The New Humanitarian, Warring parties target local aid volunteers as fighting escalates in Sudan, 13 November 2024, [url](#)

²³³ Sudan War Monitor, Sudanese military intelligence murder lawyer affiliated with anti-war party, 13 May 2024, [url](#)



had been arrested and released the month prior after spending three months in detention.²³⁴

Additional information on these and other events could not be found among the sources consulted by EUAA within the time constraints of this report.

(c) Political party members and other perceived opponents

For background information, see Section 2.3.4. of the [EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

In October 2023, the Coordination Body of Civilian Democratic Forces (*Taqaddum*) was established as a large coalition of Sudanese civil society organisations and political actors,²³⁵ including the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), with the objective of 'finding a peaceful solution to the conflict in Sudan'.²³⁶ In late 2023, *Taqaddum* reached out to both SAF and RSF; only the RSF accepted *Taqaddum*'s invitation and a 'declaration of principles' was signed between *Taqaddum* and RSF in December 2023.²³⁷ The SAF and its supporters rejected the declaration and started to consider members of *Taqaddum* as RSF 'allies' and its 'political wing'.²³⁸ According to Chatham House, 'Taqaddum has also been relentlessly demonized by Islamist propagandists and Bashir regime supporters who regard them as the main threat to their ambition to return to power. These accusations have gained traction among many Sudanese in the context of heinous atrocities committed by the RSF and growing social polarisation between supporters of SAF, RSF and the anti-war campaign'.²³⁹ The SAF also accuse the FFC of not condemning the human rights violations and war crimes committed by the RSF.²⁴⁰

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) indicated that political parties and personalities in Sudan are 'irrelevant'²⁴¹ because they do not have the power to mediate between the two main warring forces, the SAF and the RSF,²⁴² and do not have the popular appeal they once had.²⁴³ ACLED added that the only political party that stands somehow neutral is the Sudanese Communist Party, which, despite not having influence in Sudan, continues to be popular with unions, students and state employees.²⁴⁴

²³⁴ Sudan Tribune, Sudanese security forces launch new arrest campaign in Sinja, 7 April 2024, [url](#)

²³⁵ Chatham House, A strong civilian coalition is vital to avert Sudan's disintegration, 21 June 2024, [url](#); CMI, The Sudan war: The potential of civil and democratic forces, April 2024, [url](#)

²³⁶ CMI, The Sudan war: The potential of civil and democratic forces, April 2024, [url](#)

²³⁷ Chatham House, A strong civilian coalition is vital to avert Sudan's disintegration, 21 June 2024, [url](#); CMI, The Sudan war: The potential of civil and democratic forces, April 2024, [url](#)

²³⁸ Chatham House, A strong civilian coalition is vital to avert Sudan's disintegration, 21 June 2024, [url](#); CMI, The Sudan war: The potential of civil and democratic forces, April 2024, [url](#)

²³⁹ Chatham House, A strong civilian coalition is vital to avert Sudan's disintegration, 21 June 2024, [url](#)

²⁴⁰ Sudan Tribune, FFC condemns human rights violations by Sudanese belligerents, 3 March 2024, [url](#)

²⁴¹ ACLED, Q&A: Sudan's broken hopes, 22 May 2024, [url](#), p. 5. See also: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Sudan, February 2024, [url](#); Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024; Elbagir Ahmed Abdullah, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

²⁴² ACLED, Q&A: Sudan's broken hopes, 22 May 2024, [url](#), p. 5. See also: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Sudan, February 2024, [url](#)

²⁴³ Elbagir Ahmed Abdullah, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

²⁴⁴ ACLED, Q&A: Sudan's broken hopes, 22 May 2024, [url](#), p. 5



Freedom House indicated that since the onset of the conflict in April 2023, 'civilian political parties have effectively been unable to operate in Sudan'.²⁴⁵ The same source added that despite the call to establish anti-war coalitions, the 'significant' fragmentation of political parties, their lack of coordination, and military interference have prevented them from establishing such coalitions.²⁴⁶ Radio Tamazuj reported that, according to the Sudanese Congress Party, government authorities in Port Sudan have been confiscating identity cards of its members, which prevents holders from renewing their passports among others.²⁴⁷ Radio Dabanga also reported that the National Umma Party (NUP) indicated that three of its members were detained on 6 September 2024 by the RSF.²⁴⁸ Additional information on the three members of the NUP could not be found among the sources consulted by EUAA within the time constraints of this report.

According to a human rights analyst interviewed by EUAA, the role of Islamists is 'exaggerated' and rather 'limited'; they use the opportunity of global mobilisation and try to influence the army, but the army continues to be independent.²⁴⁹ Additional information on Islamists within the reference period could not be found among the sources consulted by EUAA within the time constraints of this report.

2.2. Conscripts, draft evaders, forced recruitment to armed groups

Military service is both voluntary²⁵⁰ or compulsory,²⁵¹ it is open for both men and women between the ages of 18 and 33, and lasts between 12 and 24 months.²⁵² The Dutch COI report indicated nevertheless that, based on confidential sources it consulted, '[i]n formal terms, the Sudan National Service Act 1992 still applies', but it is not actively applied or enforced either by the Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) or the SAF 'as the forced recruitment of conscripts would further damage the standing of the SAF'.²⁵³ The same source indicated that before the fall of President Bashir, 'men of fighting age had to be able to prove that they had completed the compulsory military service before they could have a college degree authenticated, get a job in the public or private sector or travel abroad, [but that] this condition lapsed during the transition period' of Prime Minister Hamdok.²⁵⁴ For additional information on

²⁴⁵ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Sudan, February 2024, [url](#)

²⁴⁶ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Sudan, February 2024, [url](#)

²⁴⁷ Radio Tamazuj, Sudanese Congress Party accuses authorities of nullifying its members' nationality cards, 26 July 2024, [url](#)

²⁴⁸ Radio Dabanga, RSF detain three Umma party leaders in West Kordofan, 10 September 2024, [url](#)

²⁴⁹ Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

²⁵⁰ The Arab Weekly, No end in sight to Sudan war as both sides seek 'decisive' win, 15 November 2024, [url](#); US, CIA, The World Factbook: Sudan, 26 November 2024, [url](#)

²⁵¹ US, CIA, The World Factbook: Sudan, 26 November 2024, [url](#)

²⁵² US, CIA, The World Factbook: Sudan, 26 November 2024, [url](#)

²⁵³ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 63

²⁵⁴ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 63



the transitional period, see section [1.1 Historical background](#) in this report, and section 1.1.1. of the [EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

Both the SAF and the RSF, however, are accused of engaging in forced recruitment of men and boys.²⁵⁵ For information on child recruitment, see section [2.7\(b\) Child soldiers](#). In SAF-controlled areas, recruitment is carried out through mobilisation campaigns as part of an 'armed popular resistance to halt the RSF advance'.²⁵⁶ These campaigns appeal to the notion of 'dignity'²⁵⁷ and are also backed with allusions to RSF abuses committed in places they had taken over, which prompt prospective recruits to want to join the SAF and defend themselves, their property, and communities.²⁵⁸

Recruits come from all walks of life²⁵⁹ and are referred to as *mustanfareen*, or 'the mobilised'.²⁶⁰ According to a report by Africa Defense Forum (ADF),²⁶¹ the SAF uses social media to recruit volunteer fighters by directing them to the nearest SAF command or military unit to sign up.²⁶² The Dutch COI report indicated that some government officials face pressure to enlist in these mobilisation campaigns under the threat of losing their jobs or social benefits.²⁶³ Ayin Network, a Sudanese media network, reported that, as a response to a mobilisation drive carried out by the RSF since October 2024, SAF-allied militias led parallel campaigns in the Chad-bordering areas of Ambaro, Karnoi, Abu Gamra, and Al-Tina, where they mobilised 'thousands' of fighters into their ranks motivated by the need to protect their villages from armed attacks launched by the RSF and its allied militias.²⁶⁴ Without providing an exact date, the Dutch COI report provided the example of more than 40 Darfurian mineworkers in Northern and River Nile states who had to join the SAF and prove their loyalty because they were being seen as collaborators of the RSF.²⁶⁵

²⁵⁵ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 63; SHRH and Ayin Network, Child soldiers in Sudan: The future at stake., 17 July 2024, [url](#)

²⁵⁶ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 63

²⁵⁷ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 63

²⁵⁸ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 63; ADF, In Sudan, RSF Invokes Tradition to Force Children Onto Battlefield, 8 October 2024, [url](#)

²⁵⁹ ADF, In Sudan, RSF Invokes Tradition to Force Children Onto Battlefield, 8 October 2024, [url](#); Middle East Eye, Sudan: RSF committing massacres on daily basis as peace talks falter, 9 September 2024, [url](#)

²⁶⁰ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 63

²⁶¹ ADF is a military magazine published by the US Africa Command 'to provide an international forum for African security professionals'. ADF, About us, n.d., [url](#)


²⁶² ADF, In Sudan, RSF Invokes Tradition to Force Children Onto Battlefield, 8 October 2024, [url](#)

²⁶³ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 63

²⁶⁴ Ayin Network, RSF, SAF conduct recruitment drives across Darfur as fighting intensifies in El Fasher, 3 December 2024, [url](#)

²⁶⁵ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 64

Armed group
 ■ RSF ■ SAF



Map 2. Cities with highest number of recruitment camps.²⁶⁶

In RSF-controlled areas, Sudan Tribune reported that the RSF relies 'heavily' on tribal affiliations for recruitment.²⁶⁷ Sources reported that on 9 October 2024, Hemedti called for a 'general mobilisation' in Darfur and Kordofan to enlist 'one million' fighters, mainly along tribal lines, to deploy them to 'hotspots', including Khartoum and El Fasher.²⁶⁸ Sudan Tribune indicated that the Misseriya (West Kordofan) and Ta'aysha (South Darfur) rallied alongside the RSF.²⁶⁹ The same source indicated that the RSF is forcibly recruiting male IDPs in North Darfur to bolster its ranks amid 'mounting loses'.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁶ Map 2: SHRH and Ayin Network, Child soldiers in Sudan: The future at stake., 17 July 2024, [url](#)

²⁶⁷ Sudan Tribune, Sudan's RSF 'stoke ethnic tensions with tribal recruitment', 11 November 2024, [url](#)

²⁶⁸ Sudan Tribune, Sudan's RSF 'stoke ethnic tensions with tribal recruitment', 11 November 2024, [url](#); Ayin Network, RSF, SAF conduct recruitment drives across Darfur as fighting intensifies in El Fasher, 3 December 2024, [url](#)

²⁶⁹ Sudan Tribune, Sudan's RSF 'stoke ethnic tensions with tribal recruitment', 11 November 2024, [url](#)

²⁷⁰ Sudan Tribune, RSF forcibly recruits from Darfur camp amid mounting loses, 15 November 2024, [url](#)



The RSF reportedly uses intimidation, torture, the public execution of those who refuse to join, or the withholding of food or medicines, as tactics to recruit men into their ranks.²⁷¹ In an interview with EUAA, a human rights analyst reported having knowledge of cases of RSF combatants going to villages in central Sudan and asking people to fight, or withholding food to force the recruitment of locals.²⁷² The same source also indicated that many people join the RSF mostly driven by profit, personal interests, food, or to settle old scores in their own communities.²⁷³ Sources indicated that, as part of recruiting campaigns, the RSF frames its fight as 'fighting for democracy'²⁷⁴ or as a 'sacred duty'.²⁷⁵ Sources also reported that, as part of recruitment efforts, the RSF invokes *Faza'a*, 'an ancient' pre-Islamic Sudanese tradition that allows tribes to call on their members and allies for support against attacks by other tribes or to take revenge for killings.²⁷⁶ CNN reported that between January and March 2024, about 700 men and 65 boys were forcibly recruited by the RSF in the state of Al Jazirah.²⁷⁷ In one event in January 2024, the RSF attacked a village in Al Jazirah, rounded up the males, and executed six who refused to enlist, and in another event, on 27 February 2024, RSF combatants took over another village and looted the houses, set ablaze its supermarkets and food warehouses, and stole 30 vehicles after 20 residents refused to enlist.²⁷⁸ The Dutch COI report indicated that, according to a local source, SAF veterans are required by the RSF to join their ranks to avoid being detained.²⁷⁹

Human Rights Watch reported that, following the defection to the SAF of Abu Agla Keikel, a commander of an RSF-aligned force in eastern Al Jazirah state, on 20 October 2024, the RSF launched attacks on at least 30 villages and towns, including Rufaa, Tamboul, Al-Sireha, and Azrag, resulting in the displacement of over 130 000 people.²⁸⁰ ACLED indicated that Al-Sireha was particularly targeted, where between 50 and 500 men were killed, around 200 people were injured, and over 150 civilians were kidnapped, with victims of sexual violence committing suicide after the attack.²⁸¹

A human rights analyst indicated that, even though information on desertion was not readily available, he became aware of cases of SAF and RSF combatants retreating into South Sudan during combats; once on the South Sudan side, authorities await guidance from Port Sudan on what to do with SAF soldiers, whereas for RSF combatants, 'it is unclear what happens to

²⁷¹ CNN, 'Enlist or die': Fear, looming famine and a deadly ultimatum swell the ranks of Sudan's paramilitary forces, 21 March 2024, [url](#); Middle East Eye, Sudan: RSF committing massacres on daily basis as peace talks falter, 9 September 2024, [url](#)

²⁷² Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

²⁷³ Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

²⁷⁴ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 64

²⁷⁵ Sudan Tribune, Sudan's RSF 'stoke ethnic tensions with tribal recruitment', 11 November 2024, [url](#)

²⁷⁶ ADF, In Sudan, RSF Invokes Tradition to Force Children Onto Battlefield, 8 October 2024, [url](#); The New Arab, Are the RSF recruiting children to fight in Sudan's war?, 28 February 2024, [url](#)

²⁷⁷ CNN, 'Enlist or die': Fear, looming famine and a deadly ultimatum swell the ranks of Sudan's paramilitary forces, 21 March 2024, [url](#)

²⁷⁸ CNN, 'Enlist or die': Fear, looming famine and a deadly ultimatum swell the ranks of Sudan's paramilitary forces, 21 March 2024, [url](#); ADF, In Sudan, RSF Invokes Tradition to Force Children Onto Battlefield, 8 October 2024, [url](#)

²⁷⁹ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 64

²⁸⁰ HRW, Sudan: Rapid Support Forces Target Civilians, 10 November 2024, [url](#). See also: ACLED, Defection and violence against civilians in Sudan's al-Jazirah state, 18 November 2024, [url](#)

²⁸¹ ACLED, Defection and violence against civilians in Sudan's al-Jazirah state, 18 November 2024, [url](#)





them'.²⁸² Additional information on the treatment of defectors, draft evaders, and forced recruitment within the reference period of this report could not be found among the sources consulted by EUAA within the time constraints of this report.

2.3. Journalists and other media personnel

For background information, see section 2.1. of the [EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#). For additional information on media and communications, see section 1.3.2 of the [Sudan: Security situation report](#).

Sources indicated that freedom of expression and opinion continue to be curtailed by the SAF and the RSF, with incidents against journalists including surveillance, monitoring, physical violence, threats, intimidation, warnings against publishing certain information or expressing certain views, armed takeovers of media buildings, and repeated network disruptions and shutdowns of the internet.²⁸³ The UN's Independent International Fact-Finding indicated that Sudan experiences a 'systematic censorship' and suppression of information by both the SAF and the RSF, and that journalists are restricted from speaking to international media.²⁸⁴ The same source also indicated that journalists engage in self-censorship, particularly when reporting about corruption and the security agencies, and that the 'systematic targeting' of media companies has forced many outlets to shut down operations and leaving journalists without a source of income.²⁸⁵ The Dutch COI report quoted a confidential source commenting on issues that were the most sensitive for warring parties, as saying that:

'[i]n SAF territory, it was very risky to write about the SAF's airstrikes on civilian targets, the links between the SAF and Islamists of former President Bashir's government and the supply of Iranian drones to the SAF. In RSF territory, it was very dangerous to write about RSF gold and diamond smuggling, alleged Emirati arms support to the RSF, the massacres against the Masalit population in West Darfur and the widespread sexual violence in RSF territory'.²⁸⁶

Intimidation of journalists takes place mostly to prevent them from reporting on the conflict or to pressure them to present a more favourable view of one side of the conflict.²⁸⁷ Targeting usually consists of raiding media stations and the homes of journalists, the damage or confiscation of equipment, mass detentions of journalists and station workers, and violent attacks against outlets.²⁸⁸ Female journalists face 'heightened risk',²⁸⁹ with some targeted with

²⁸² Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

²⁸³ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 266; Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), pp. 55-56. See also: Sudan Tribune, Sudanese female journalists face threats, harassment, 7 May 2024, [url](#)

²⁸⁴ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 270

²⁸⁵ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 271

²⁸⁶ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 56

²⁸⁷ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), paras. 272-273

²⁸⁸ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), paras. 272-273

²⁸⁹ Radio Dabanga, Sudan journalists: '90% of media infrastructure wiped out by war', 2 October 2024, [url](#); Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 55



sexual violence to punish them for their profession, for being perceived as reporting on human rights violations, or for supporting the enemy.²⁹⁰ The UN FFM for the Sudan indicated that when female journalists have been targeted, perpetrators reportedly tell their victims that they knew about their activities and that they were looking for them specifically.²⁹¹

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) indicated that, between 1 January and 4 December 2024, four journalists were killed, one detained, and one taken hostage.²⁹² SJS documented 393 cases of 'direct violence' against journalists between April 2023 and April 2024, and also indicated that between January and April 2024, cases of targeted killings of journalists increased.²⁹³ On 2 November 2024, SJS provided the following statistics related to the targeting of journalists between April 2023 and November 2024:

- 13 journalists, including two women, were killed;
- 11 other journalists, including three women, were subjected to physical attacks and injured, in addition to one case of sexual assault;
- 30 journalists, including 10 women, were exposed to gunfire and shelling, which killed 15 of the journalists' relatives and severely damaged their homes;
- 60 journalists, including nine women, were kidnapped or forcefully detained;
- 56 threats were recorded, including against 26 female journalists; and
- 27 cases of physical assault and looting of property were recorded, including three against female journalists.²⁹⁴

Among the incidents of targeting of journalists, as reported by sources, are:

- On 30 September 2024, a freelance journalist working for several online news outlets was killed during clashes among armed actors in El Fasher, North Darfur.²⁹⁵
- On 23 August 2024, RSF armed men kidnapped a freelance journalist from his home in East Nile, Khartoum, and demanded a ransom of one million Sudanese pounds (400 USD). Upon payment, kidnappers demanded another million Sudanese pounds and threatened to kill him.²⁹⁶
- On 4 July 2024, a photojournalist was interrogated by military intelligence after returning from a reporting assignment covering the situation of displaced people from Sennar and Singa; officers erased all her photos and recordings before releasing her. In the previous months, the RSF had raided her house six times during which she was subjected to verbal abuse and attempted physical assault, and her relatives were harmed.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁰ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), paras. 184, 196

²⁹¹ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), paras. 184, 196

²⁹² RSF, Barometer, n.d., [url](#)

²⁹³ Free Press Unlimited, Sudan, n.d., [url](#)

²⁹⁴ Xinhua, At least 13 journalists killed since war broke out in Sudan: journalists syndicate, 2 November 2024, [url](#)

²⁹⁵ CFJ, Sudan: CFJ condemns killing of journalist Mubarak Abu Sin in El-Fasher clashes in Darfur, calls for investigations and accountability, 17 October 2024, [url](#)

²⁹⁶ CPJ, Paramilitary group kidnaps, demands ransom for Sudanese journalist, 29 August 2024, [url](#)

²⁹⁷ DARAJ, "I Will Not Stay Silent at the Cost of Truth": Sudanese Female Journalists Face Threats of Persecution and Death, 25 October 2024, [url](#)



- On 18 May 2024, the editor-in-chief of independent newspaper Al-Ahram al-Youm was detained by RSF soldiers in his home in Khartoum and taken to an undisclosed location.²⁹⁸
- On 1 March 2024, a local journalist and media director at the Sudanese Supreme Council for Media and Culture, and member of the Sudanese Journalists Syndicate, was killed in his home in El Fasher.²⁹⁹

2.4. Humanitarian and health personnel

For background information, see section 2.2. of the [EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

Humanitarian and aid workers face targeting by both the SAF and the RSF, and their allied militias,³⁰⁰ including violent attacks, sexual assault, and barriers to renew their registration.³⁰¹ They also face allegations of collusion with warring parties, derogatory remarks, and accusations of fuelling the conflict.³⁰² Healthcare workers are routinely intimidated and arbitrarily detained by both parties due to the nature of their work and female healthcare workers are targeted with sexual violence as a punishment for their activities.³⁰³

(a) Aid workers

For background information, see section 2.2.1. of the [EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

Sources indicated that humanitarian and aid workers continued to be targeted by both the SAF and the RSF, and their allied militias.³⁰⁴ Freedom House indicated that humanitarian organisations face obstacles in Sudan, including violent attacks, sexual assault, and barriers to renew their registration.³⁰⁵ Similarly, Insecurity Insight³⁰⁶ indicated that both local and international humanitarian organisations face 'significant dangers' both on the ground and online, including allegations of collusion with warring parties, derogatory remarks, and accusations of fuelling the conflict.³⁰⁷ According to the same source, in areas controlled by the

²⁹⁸ CPJ, CPJ calls for immediate release of Sudanese journalist Tariq Abdallah, 3 June 2024, [url](#)

²⁹⁹ UNESCO, UNESCO Director-General condemns killing of journalist Khaled Balel in Sudan, 19 March 2024, [url](#)

³⁰⁰ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Sudan, February 2024, [url](#); Insecurity Insight, Unsafe on the ground, Unsafe online: Humanitarian Workers in Sudan's civil war, July 2024, [url](#), pp. 1, 3

³⁰¹ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Sudan, February 2024, [url](#)

³⁰² Insecurity Insight, Unsafe on the ground, Unsafe online: Humanitarian Workers in Sudan's civil war, July 2024, [url](#), p. 1

³⁰³ HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 6; UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), paras. 184, 196

³⁰⁴ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Sudan, February 2024, [url](#); Insecurity Insight, Unsafe on the ground, Unsafe online: Humanitarian Workers in Sudan's civil war, July 2024, [url](#), pp. 1, 3

³⁰⁵ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Sudan, February 2024, [url](#)

³⁰⁶ Insecurity Insight is an association that 'supports the work of aid agencies, providers of healthcare, education, and protection services, and other civil society organisations'. It receives funding from, among others, the EU, and the governments of UK, Switzerland, and US. Insecurity Insight, Our team, n.d., [url](#)

³⁰⁷ Insecurity Insight, Unsafe on the ground, Unsafe online: Humanitarian Workers in Sudan's civil war, July 2024, [url](#), p. 1





SAF, aid workers are derogatorily labelled as '*Janjaweed*', 'paid traitors', 'liars', 'evil', 'criminals', and 'spies and followers of the RSF', and accused of selectively evacuating wounded RSF combatants over those from the SAF.³⁰⁸ In areas controlled by the RSF, aid organisations are accused of 'feeding on Sudan's conflicts'.³⁰⁹

Humanitarian Outcomes, an international research group providing research and policy advice for humanitarian aid agencies and donor governments,³¹⁰ indicated that local humanitarian actors such as community-led kitchens, 'lack access to security risk management resources to prepare for and protect themselves in interactions with armed actors' and that 'security capacities for the coordinated humanitarian response are weak overall, due to the lack of operational presence in the most severely affected regions, like Darfur and Kordofan'.³¹¹ According to confidential sources cited by the Dutch COI report on Sudan, even though RSF was apparently more cooperative with humanitarian organisations, aid workers did not necessarily feel safe in these areas, with instances of extortion of aid workers at checkpoints being conducted 'regularly'.³¹²

International aid workers and humanitarian organisations face bureaucratic restrictions to obtain visas.³¹³ For example, the Dutch COI report on Sudan quoted a source stating that a foreign aid worker was denied a visa and entry into Sudan and labeled as a 'threat to the state' for having previously contacted an RSF commander.³¹⁴ The RSF introduced administrative 'impediments' to humanitarian organisations, including mandatory registration and mandatory approval of travel permits for humanitarian personnel and supplies.³¹⁵ The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) indicated that, in September 2024, international NGOs and UN agencies requested 202 and 136 visas, respectively, of which 13 and 81 visas were approved.³¹⁶

Additionally, the UN FFM for the Sudan indicated that, according to representatives of humanitarian organisations, 'the RSF recently introduced a mandatory list of vendors from whom humanitarian organizations must procure goods and services if they procure them locally – a move that would endanger the neutrality of humanitarian operations and organizations'.³¹⁷ As of 19 November 2024, 168 organisations were operating in the country, including national NGOs (54 %), international NGOs (36 %), UN agencies (8 %), and the Red

³⁰⁸ Insecurity Insight, *Unsafe on the ground, Unsafe online: Humanitarian Workers in Sudan's civil war*, July 2024, [url](#), p. 3

³⁰⁹ Insecurity Insight, *Unsafe on the ground, Unsafe online: Humanitarian Workers in Sudan's civil war*, July 2024, [url](#), p. 3

³¹⁰ Humanitarian Outcomes, *About*, n.d., [url](#)

³¹¹ Humanitarian Outcomes, *Aid Worker Security Database: Signal Alert*, 29 October 2024, [url](#)

³¹² Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan*, May 2024, [url](#), p. 71

³¹³ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan*, May 2024, [url](#), pp. 70-71

³¹⁴ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan*, May 2024, [url](#), p. 71

³¹⁵ UN, *Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan*, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 283

³¹⁶ UNOCHA, *Sudan: Humanitarian Access Snapshot*, September 2024, [url](#)

³¹⁷ UN, *Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan*, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 283





Cross (2 %).³¹⁸ For additional information, see section 1.3.1 of the [Sudan: Security situation report](#).

Sources indicated that looting and attacks against UN agencies and other organisations delivering aid, continued.³¹⁹ The International Organization for Migration (IOM) indicated that '[h]umanitarian and protection conditions in Sudan are among the worst in the world'.³²⁰ UNOCHA reported that between April 2023 and August 2024, 22 Sudanese aid workers have been killed and 34 injured while on duty.³²¹ UNOCHA indicated that between January and September 2024, humanitarian organisations reported 73 incidents related to humanitarian operations, including operational interference (36 % of cases), violence against humanitarian personnel (27 %), and bureaucratic impediments (26 %).³²² Humanitarian Outcomes indicated that between January and October 2024, 24 aid workers were killed in Sudan.³²³

Instances of targeting of aid workers and humanitarian organisations, as reported by sources, include:

- On 3 December 2024, the Committee for Justice (CFJ) reported the killing of a humanitarian activist by the RSF in Wad Gudat, Al Jazirah.³²⁴
- In August 2024, three staff from an international organisation operating in South Kordofan were detained by 'armed actors', and one staff was injured in South Kordofan when unknown assailants killed one civilian and injured three others.³²⁵
- On 2 May 2024, gunmen attacked a humanitarian convoy of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in South Darfur, killing two drivers and injuring three staff. The team was returning from an assessment of the humanitarian situation in Layba.³²⁶

(b) Healthcare personnel

For background information, see section 2.2.2. of the [EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

Human Rights Watch reported that local responders, including doctors, nurses, emergency care responders, and volunteers have been intimidated and arbitrarily detained by both parties because of their work, including providing medical assistance to victims of sexual violence.³²⁷ Female healthcare workers have been targeted with sexual violence as a

³¹⁸ UNOCHA, Sudan: Humanitarian Operational Presence, 19 November 2024, [url](#)

³¹⁹ OHCHR, Sudan: Trafficking for sexual exploitation and recruitment of children on the rise, warn UN experts, 22 March 2024, [url](#); Refugees International, The Nuba Mountains: A Window into the Sudan Crisis, August 2024, [url](#), p. 12

³²⁰ IOM, "Sudan at Breaking Point" Warns IOM as Famine, Floods add to Massive Displacement, 12 August 2024, [url](#)

³²¹ UNOCHA, Sudan: Situation Report, 3 November 2024, [url](#), p. 11

³²² UNOCHA, Sudan: Humanitarian Access Snapshot, September 2024, [url](#)

³²³ Humanitarian Outcomes, Aid Worker Security Database: Signal Alert, 29 October 2024, [url](#)

³²⁴ CFJ, Sudan: CFJ documents the killing of humanitarian activist Ezz Eldin Mustafa in "Al-Jazeera", calls for investigations, 3 December 2024, [url](#)

³²⁵ UNOCHA, Sudan: Humanitarian Access Snapshot, September 2024, [url](#)

³²⁶ Reuters, Attack on ICRC convoy in Sudan's South Darfur kills two drivers, injures three, 3 May 2024, [url](#)

³²⁷ HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 6





punishment for their activities.³²⁸ Perpetrators reportedly told female victims that they knew about their activities and that they were looking for them specifically.³²⁹ UNICEF Sudan's Chief of Health indicated that due to fear for their safety and the lack of protection, healthcare workers are unable to access healthcare facilities in 'many places', and that many have not been paid either.³³⁰ The World Health Organization (WHO) indicated that between April 2023 and 18 November 2024, 52 attacks against healthcare personnel were reported.³³¹

Among incidents of targeting of healthcare facilities and/or personnel, as reported by sources, include:

- On 30 December 2024, a clinic was burned down along with a market and a mosque in Wad Rawah, Al Jazirah state, and a number of pharmacies were looted during an attack by an unnamed actor.³³²
- On 29 October 2024, the Sudan Doctors Network (SDN) reported that the RSF conducted an attack on the Wad El Fadl area, Al Jazirah state, looting an unspecified number of health facilities, beating doctors, and expelling patients from the Wad El Fadl Hospital.³³³
- On 26 October 2024, the Sudan Tribune reported that the RSF carried out a retaliatory attack against eastern Al Jazirah state after one of its commanders defected to the military, including the rape of 37 women, 3 of whom were medical personnel at Rufaa Hospital.³³⁴
- On 25 October 2024, SDN reported that members of the RSF carried out an 'extensive looting' in Tamboul City, Al Jazirah state, including the Tamboul Hospital and pharmacies, assaulting medical staff and forcing them at gunpoint to treat injured members of the RSF.³³⁵
- On 17 October 2024, SDN reported that the RSF looted medicines and medical equipment from the Ramila Health Centre, in Dinder City, Sinnar state.³³⁶
- On 10 July 2024, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) indicated that it had to evacuate its team from the Turkish Hospital, Khartoum, due to a series of violent incidents against its staff, including a violent incident on 17 and 18 June 2024 when gunmen brought in wounded combatants and intimidated the staff with gunshots into their rooms.³³⁷
- In June 2024, two armed men arrested an MSF employee inside the Turkish Hospital and took him to an undisclosed location where he was 'severely beaten'.³³⁸

³²⁸ HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 6; UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), paras. 184, 196

³²⁹ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), paras. 184, 196

³³⁰ NPR, Attacks on Sudan's hospitals, clinics put millions at risk, 11 July 2024, [url](#)

³³¹ WHO, Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA): Sudan, n.d., [url](#)

³³² Insecurity Insight, Clinic burnt down in Al Jazirah state, 30 December 2024, [url](#)

³³³ SDN in Insecurity Insight, Attacks on Health Care in Sudan, 4 November 2024, [url](#), p. 2

³³⁴ Sudan Tribune, 37 rapes reported in Sudan's Rufaa amid RSF rampage, 26 October 2024, [url](#)

³³⁵ SDN, Rapid Support robs medical facilities in Tamboul city and assaults medical staff, 25 October 2024, [url](#)

³³⁶ SDN, Rapid Support Forces Loot Medicines and Medical Equipment from the Ramila Health Center East of Dinder, 17 October 2024, [url](#)

³³⁷ MSF, Sudan: Violence forces MSF to evacuate team from Turkish Hospital in Khartoum, 10 July 2024, [url](#)

³³⁸ MSF, Sudan: Violence forces MSF to evacuate team from Turkish Hospital in Khartoum, 10 July 2024, [url](#)






2.5. Ethnic groups

(a) General overview of the ethnic composition of the country

There are about 500 ethnic groups in Sudan,³³⁹ including the Fur, Beja, Nuba, Ingessana, Uduk, Fallata, Masalit [also spelled out as Massalit], Dajo, Gimir, Tunjur, and Berti.³⁴⁰ Sudan's society is mostly Muslim, with a small Christian minority.³⁴¹ Sudanese Arabs comprise about 70 % of the population.³⁴² According to Al Jazeera, 'Darfur's tribal society is classified broadly into 'non-Arab' (sedentary) and 'Arab' (nomadic) tribes, both groupings are Black and Muslim and have lived in Darfur for centuries. The non-Arab tribes speak several languages, as well as Arabic'.³⁴³ For additional and background information on ethnic groups in Darfur, see section 2.4. of the [EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).



³³⁹ ADF, Sudan Approaches 'Catastrophic Phase' of Ethnic Violence, 5 November 2024, [url](#); US, CIA, The World Factbook: Sudan, 19 November 2024, [url](#)

³⁴⁰ US, CIA, The World Factbook: Sudan, 19 November 2024, [url](#)

³⁴¹ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Sudan, February 2024, [url](#)

³⁴² US, CIA, The World Factbook: Sudan, 19 November 2024, [url](#)

³⁴³ Al Jazeera, Threat of RSF invasion looms over el-Fasher in Sudan's Darfur, 4 December 2024, [url](#)



Group name	Area in km ²
Other Arab Groups	354 102
Beja	253 320
Shaygiyya, Ja'aliyyin and Danagla (Arab)	111 119
Fur	93 532
Nuba	82 259
Other Northern Groups	13 155
Zaghawa	10 293
Rashaida	5813
Masalit	4773

Map 3. Map of ethnic groups in Sudan during 2012-2021.³⁴⁴

(b) Ethnic conflict related profiling and targeting

Sources indicated that the SAF's Military Intelligence target people, often based on their presumed or real ethnic identity, for allegedly supporting the RSF,³⁴⁵ including Arab tribes from Kordofan³⁴⁶ and tribes from West Darfur.³⁴⁷ OHCHR indicated that the RSF also carries out unlawful detentions of persons in Darfur based on ethnicity, particularly the Masalit³⁴⁸ and the Zaghawa.³⁴⁹ According to Ali Mahmoud Ali, Sudan researcher for ACLED, 'the RSF is fighting not just against the west of the country but the central and northern Arab tribes that traditionally control the government'.³⁵⁰ For background information on ethnic conflict related targeting, see section 2.3 and 2.4. of the [EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

Non-Arab/African in Darfur

Much of the violence in Darfur is attributed to the RSF and allied militias, and it is ethnically driven³⁵¹ as the RSF seeks to push non-Arabs out of certain areas.³⁵² Sources indicated that the Darfur region is 'on the brink' of a genocide.³⁵³ BBC quoted the UN Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide as saying that '[w]e do have circumstances in which a genocide could be occurring or has occurred' as 'many civilians were targeted based on their ethnicity'.³⁵⁴ In January 2025 the US administration formally declared that the

³⁴⁴ Map 3: Provided by Girardin, Luc et al., GROWup - Geographical Research On War, Unified Platform, ETH Zurich, Ethnicity in Sudan, n.d., [url](#), p. 1806

³⁴⁵ OHCHR, Sudan: This tragedy needs to end, now, urges Deputy High Commissioner, 10 September 2024, [url](#); ADF, SAF Accused of Targeting Civilians Based on Ethnicity, 6 February 2024, [url](#)

³⁴⁶ ADF, SAF Accused of Targeting Civilians Based on Ethnicity, 6 February 2024, [url](#)

³⁴⁷ Sudan Tribune, Sudanese military accused of ethnically targeted detentions, 24 July 2024, [url](#)

³⁴⁸ OHCHR, Sudan: This tragedy needs to end, now, urges Deputy High Commissioner, 10 September 2024, [url](#)

³⁴⁹ Al Jazeera, Threat of RSF invasion looms over el-Fasher in Sudan's Darfur, 4 December 2024, [url](#); Yale School of Public Health, Humanitarian Research Lab, Special Report: Fourteen Arson Attacks on Villages, North Darfur 2-12 October 2024, 16 October 2024, [url](#), p. 3

³⁵⁰ ACLED, Q&A: Sudan's broken hopes, 22 May 2024, [url](#), p. 5

³⁵¹ Refugees International, The Nuba Mountains: A Window into the Sudan Crisis, August 2024, [url](#), p. 11; UNSC, Resolution 2736 (2024), 13 June 2024, [url](#), p. 1

³⁵² Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Sudan, February 2024, [url](#)

³⁵³ BBC, World ignoring risk of Sudan genocide - UN expert, 24 May 2024, [url](#); CNN, Darfur may be on the brink of another genocide. Will the world act this time?, 14 June 2024, [url](#); US, CRS, The War and Humanitarian Crisis in Sudan, 19 November 2024, [url](#), p. 2

³⁵⁴ BBC, World ignoring risk of Sudan genocide - UN expert, 24 May 2024, [url](#)



RSF, its leader and allied militias have committed genocide and crimes against humanity in Sudan.³⁵⁵

The USDOS indicated that the RSF has 'perpetrated genocide in the Darfur region' during the war, and imposed sanctions on Hemedti.³⁵⁶ In December 2024, sources indicated that El Fasher, the last stronghold of the SAF, was about to fall to the RSF.³⁵⁷ Sources indicated that the Zaghawa, one of North Darfur's largest tribes whose areas stretch into Libya and Chad, are particularly vulnerable.³⁵⁸ Additionally, the Masalit are particularly targeted by the RSF, with some reports pointing to the 'erasing' of Masalit neighbourhoods 'from the map' after their displacement.³⁵⁹

According to the UN FFM for the Sudan, acts committed by the RSF against ethnic groups included 'killings, torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including rape and other forms of sexual violence, as well as looting, pillage and destruction of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population'.³⁶⁰ Pillage, looting, and the destruction of property in Darfur affected the livelihoods, public facilities, and access to water and healthcare for non-Arab communities, particularly the Masalit.³⁶¹ Sources indicated that RSF militias also target prominent members of the Masalit community, including academics, lawyers, imams, human rights activists, due to their professions.³⁶² The UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights indicated in September 2024 that its office has documented 'multiple testimonies' of summary executions, forced displacement, and sexual violence committed against the Masalit in West Darfur, and that ethnically-motivated violence and harassment has been documented in Darfur and Al Jazirah.³⁶³

Sexual assault of women and girls is commonplace in Darfur,³⁶⁴ with the UN FFM for the Sudan indicating that it is perpetrated on a 'large scale' during attacks of the RSF in cities and IDP camps in Darfur.³⁶⁵ Masalit women who are human rights defenders, journalists, and lawyers are specifically targeted by the RSF, including through gang-rape and other forms of sexual

³⁵⁵ The Guardian, US declares Sudan's paramilitary forces have committed genocide during civil war, 7 January 2025, [url](#)

³⁵⁶ USDOS, Treasury Sanctions Sudanese Paramilitary Leader, Weapons Supplier, and Related Companies, 7 January 2025, [url](#)

³⁵⁷ Al Jazeera, Threat of RSF invasion looms over el-Fasher in Sudan's Darfur, 4 December 2024, [url](#); Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Sudan, 1 December 2024, [url](#); The Economist, The war in Sudan, in maps and charts, 16 October 2024, [url](#)

³⁵⁸ Al Jazeera, Threat of RSF invasion looms over el-Fasher in Sudan's Darfur, 4 December 2024, [url](#); Yale School of Public Health, Humanitarian Research Lab, Special Report: Fourteen Arson Attacks on Villages, North Darfur 2-12 October 2024, 16 October 2024, [url](#), p. 3

³⁵⁹ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 148; Refugees International, The Nuba Mountains: A Window into the Sudan Crisis, August 2024, [url](#), p. 11. See also: HRW, "The Massalit Will Not Come Home": Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes Against Humanity in El Geneina, West Darfur, Sudan, 9 May 2024, [url](#), p. 2

³⁶⁰ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 164

³⁶¹ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 148; Refugees International, The Nuba Mountains: A Window into the Sudan Crisis, August 2024, [url](#), p. 11

³⁶² HRW, "The Massalit Will Not Come Home": Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes Against Humanity in El Geneina, West Darfur, Sudan, 9 May 2024, [url](#), p. 106; RWCHR, Breaches of the Genocide Convention in Darfur, Sudan: An Independent Inquiry, 2024, [url](#), p. 41

³⁶³ OHCHR, Sudan: This tragedy needs to end, now, urges Deputy High Commissioner, 10 September 2024, [url](#)

³⁶⁴ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Sudan, February 2024, [url](#); UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 177

³⁶⁵ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 177



violence.³⁶⁶ The UN FFM for the Sudan provided the example of two Masalit rape victims in West Darfur who indicated that *Janjaweed* perpetrators said during the rape that 'this year, all girls must be pregnant by the *Janjaweed*'.³⁶⁷ The Masalit are referred to by the RSF as 'slaves'³⁶⁸ and the use of racist slurs against non-Arabs is 'widespread'.³⁶⁹

Operation Broken Silence, a non-for-profit organisation that provides humanitarian aid to communities in need, similarly indicated that '[a] sizable portion of the RSF fighting force adheres to an extremely racist, Arab-supremacist ideology, which states that Darfur's historic African tribal groups must be cleansed from the region and all other Sudanese Arabs are inferior'.³⁷⁰

Incidents of ethnic-based targeting, as reported by sources during the reference period, included:

- On 1 December 2024, Sudan Tribune reported that the RSF bombarded the Zamzam camp in North Darfur, killing and injuring several and forcing 'thousands' to flee. The governor of Darfur region and the El Fasher RC attributed the attack as based on ethnic and racial grounds.³⁷¹
- Between 2 and 12 October 2024, the RSF attacked Zaghawa communities in Kutum in what is considered a 'pattern of systematic ethnic targeting', killing 50 people, displacing around 1 000 households from Bir Mezza, Disa, and surrounding villages, and 3 400 households from various villages around Kutum, and destroying about 14 communities.³⁷²
- IOM reported that on 1 September 2024, an armed Arab nomadic group launched an attack on local farmers in Beli village, Sharg Aj Jabal locality, South Darfur, displacing 27 households.³⁷³

Nuba in South Kordofan

The Nuba mountains is an area in South Kordofan, bordering South Sudan, and controlled by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N).³⁷⁴ This area enjoys relative security, but with a difficult humanitarian situation with between 700 000 and 900 000 IDPs arriving since April 2023.³⁷⁵ Once in the Nuba mountains, IDPs face problems with food and shelter.³⁷⁶ For more information, see section 2.3 of the [Sudan: Security situation report](#).

³⁶⁶ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 197

³⁶⁷ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 182

³⁶⁸ USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan, 24 June 2024, [url](#)

³⁶⁹ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 182

³⁷⁰ Operation Broken Silence, Specter of ethnic killing looms in Sudan's Nuba Mountains, 22 February 2024, [url](#)

³⁷¹ Sudan Tribune, RSF missile attack on Darfur's Zamzam IDP camp kills and injures civilians, 1 December 2024, [url](#)

³⁷² Yale School of Public Health, Humanitarian Research Lab, Special Report: Fourteen Arson Attacks on Villages, North Darfur 2-12 October 2024, 16 October 2024, [url](#), p. 3

³⁷³ IOM, DTM Sudan Flash Alert: Inter-communal conflict in Sharg Aj Jabal (Beli Village), South Darfur, 3 September 2024, [url](#)

³⁷⁴ Refugees International, The Nuba Mountains: A window into the Sudan crisis, August 2024, [url](#), p. 4; Operation Broken Silence, Specter of ethnic killing looms in Sudan's Nuba Mountains, 22 February 2024, [url](#)

³⁷⁵ Refugees International, The Nuba Mountains: A window into the Sudan crisis, August 2024, [url](#), p. 4; Operation Broken Silence, Specter of ethnic killing looms in Sudan's Nuba Mountains, 22 February 2024, [url](#)

³⁷⁶ Refugees International, The Nuba Mountains: A window into the Sudan crisis, August 2024, [url](#), p. 16



The SPLM-N has remained neutral in the current war between the SAF and the RSF.³⁷⁷ However, according to Small Arms Survey, the ethnicisation and tribalisation of the current conflict reopened divisions between groups due to the mobilisation along ethnic lines, which has been particularly exploited by the RSF in its recruitment of Hawazma, Kenana, and Misseriya in South Kordofan, by invoking 'Arab, pan-Sahelian tropes that appealed to members of the Al Attawa tribal umbrella'.³⁷⁸ The same source indicated that these tropes include a 'strong racial element and the capture of land in South Kordofan for Arab economic use is a core principle'.³⁷⁹

The Dutch COI report indicated that '[i]n Dilling and the surrounding areas, violence took on an ethnic dimension. This area was home to both Nuba and Arabs. The SPLM-N/Al Hilu and Dilling's SAF garrison consisted mainly of Nuba. In contrast, the RSF could rely on support mainly from the Hawazma, an Arab population group'.³⁸⁰ The same source quoted two confidential sources as indicating that 'cooperation between the SAF and SPLM-N/Al Hilu in Dilling and surroundings was not the result of an order from higher up but was an informal and spontaneous casual coalition of Nuba relatives serving in both forces'.³⁸¹

Incidents of armed actions in Nuba, as reported by sources during the reference period, included:

- On 9 June 2024, the SAF clashed with the RSF in Babanusa, West Kordofan, to regain control of some of the neighbourhoods.³⁸²
- On 8 April 2024, Radio Dabanga reported the attack on Qurdud Nyama, South Kordofan, by the RSF, leading to the death of over 100 people.³⁸³
- The International Service for Human Rights (ISHR), a Switzerland-based non-for-profit international organisation that promotes the protection of human rights, indicated that between 9 and 12 February 2024, the RSF launched an attack on the villages of Habila and surrounding areas near Dilling City, South Kordofan, in retaliation for their perceived support of the SAF.³⁸⁴ Over 76 people from the Nuba ethnic group were killed, at least 16 women and girls were kidnapped, 'dozens' of men and boys were missing, over 40 000 people were displaced, and at least five villages were destroyed and burned.³⁸⁵

³⁷⁷ Sudan War Monitor, Humanitarian talks between SAF and SPLM-North collapse, 22 May 2024, [url](#); Operation Broken Silence, Specter of ethnic killing looms in Sudan's Nuba Mountains, 22 February 2024, [url](#)

³⁷⁸ SAS, Nuba Hopes and Fears: Fuelling SPLA-North Mobilization in South Kordofan, March 2024, [url](#), p. 8

³⁷⁹ SAS, Nuba Hopes and Fears: Fuelling SPLA-North Mobilization in South Kordofan, March 2024, [url](#), p. 8

³⁸⁰ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 39

³⁸¹ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), pp. 39-40

³⁸² ACLED, Situation Update July 2024 – Sudan: The RSF marches on Sennar and West Kordofan, 12 July 2024, [url](#)

³⁸³ Radio Dabanga, Sudan: 'Over 100 dead' in South Kordofan attacks, 8 April 2024, [url](#)

³⁸⁴ ISHR, Civil society demands immediate intervention and thorough investigation in South Kordofan, Sudan, 1 March 2024, [url](#)

³⁸⁵ ISHR, Civil society demands immediate intervention and thorough investigation in South Kordofan, Sudan, 1 March 2024, [url](#)



2.6. Women and girls

(a) General overview of the situation of women and girls in Sudan

For background information, see section 2.5 of the [EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

Sources indicated that sexual violence against women and girls has a long history in Sudan and that it is being used as a weapon of war.³⁸⁶ Women and girls are sexually exploited when seeking refuge in areas controlled by armed actors.³⁸⁷ Victims of sexual violence are seen as unsuitable for marriage and a source of shame for the family.³⁸⁸ Healthcare centres reported an increasing number of unmarried women with unwanted pregnancies as a result of rape.³⁸⁹ While Sudanese law allows abortion within 90 days of pregnancy, pregnant women must obtain first a permission from the Office of the Public Prosecutor,³⁹⁰ which, due to the current breakdown of the country's institutions, forces many pregnant women to undergo unsafe abortions.³⁹¹

Child marriages are widespread due to the belief that by doing so, parents protect their girls from rape and preserve their perceived honour.³⁹² Forced marriages of girls and women to RSF members are increasing, with cases involving parents surrendering their daughters under threat or in exchange for financial compensation.³⁹³

Trafficking of women and girls for sexual exploitation, sexual slavery, child marriage, and the recruitment of minors by armed groups in Sudan, continued to be reported.³⁹⁴ There are reports of women and girls being sold at slave markets in areas controlled by the RSF, including in Darfur.³⁹⁵

Female genital mutilation (FGM) continues to be a widespread practice, with about 87 % of Sudanese women aged 15-49 and 31 % of girls younger than 15, having undergone the

³⁸⁶ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 165; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Sudan, February 2024, [url](#)

³⁸⁷ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 171; USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan, 24 June 2024, [url](#). See also: ACJPS, Forced prostitution: The effects of the Sudan war on women and girls, 30 September 2024, [url](#), p. 5

³⁸⁸ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 208

³⁸⁹ HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 50

³⁹⁰ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 207; HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 27

³⁹¹ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 207; HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), pp. 27-28

³⁹² HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 44

³⁹³ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 200; TIMEP, Forced Marriage in Sudan: A Silent Crime Perpetrated in War and Peace, 21 November 2024, [url](#)

³⁹⁴ OHCHR, Sudan: Trafficking for sexual exploitation and recruitment of children on the rise, warn UN experts, 22 March 2024, [url](#)

³⁹⁵ OHCHR, Sudan: Trafficking for sexual exploitation and recruitment of children on the rise, warn UN experts, 22 March 2024, [url](#)



procedure.³⁹⁶ FGM is performed, among others, on girls as young as 4 years old as well as women who are about to be married and pregnant women.³⁹⁷

Freedom House indicated that 'women continue to face disadvantages in many areas of the law, and perpetrators of widespread crimes against women—including during armed conflicts—have generally enjoyed impunity'.³⁹⁸ The same source indicated that women are denied equality of rights regarding property and inheritance laws, both under Sharia and customary practices.³⁹⁹

(b) Sexual violence and conflict-related sexual violence

For background information, see section 2.5.1. of the [EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

Sexual violence has a long history in Sudan and is used as a weapon to terrorise communities.⁴⁰⁰ Rape and gang rape are widespread and used on a 'large-scale' during the invasion of cities, attacks against IDP camps, prolonged occupation of residential areas, and against persons fleeing conflict-affected areas.⁴⁰¹ Sexual violence also takes place during raids of homes in search for weapons, ammunitions, or male relatives,⁴⁰² and on roads.⁴⁰³ According to the UN FFM for the Sudan, sexual violence, including rape, also takes place for 'opportunistic reasons' due to general impunity, the militarisation of urban areas, displacement, increasing poverty, food insecurity, and barriers to access public services.⁴⁰⁴ Large-scale sexual violence, including rape and gang-rape, was documented by the UN FFM for the Sudan in cities and IDP camps in West Darfur, South Darfur, Central Darfur, and Greater Khartoum.⁴⁰⁵ According to data verified by the UN FFM, incidents of sexual violence increased in the weeks leading up to RSF attacks.⁴⁰⁶ Most victims of sexual violence are women between 17 and 35 years old, although there have been documented cases of victims as young as 8 and old as 75 years old.⁴⁰⁷

Perpetrators include the SAF and its intelligence agencies, and the RSF and its allied militias.⁴⁰⁸ Most cases are attributed to RSF, accounting for 80% of the documented cases.⁴⁰⁹ Sources indicated that perpetrators threatened victims with weapons, including firearms,

³⁹⁶ Sudan and UNICEF, Sudan: Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2014, 2014, [url](#), p. xii

³⁹⁷ Sudan and UNICEF, Sudan: Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2014, 2014, [url](#), p. 220

³⁹⁸ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Sudan, February 2024, [url](#)

³⁹⁹ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Sudan, February 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁰⁰ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 165. See also: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Sudan, February 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁰¹ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 166

⁴⁰² UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 185; Refugees International, The Nuba Mountains: A Window into the Sudan Crisis, August 2024, [url](#), p. 11

⁴⁰³ SIHA Network, Gezira State and the Forgotten Atrocities A Report on Conflict related Sexual Violence, June 2024, [url](#), p. 6

⁴⁰⁴ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 173

⁴⁰⁵ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 177

⁴⁰⁶ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 179

⁴⁰⁷ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 171. See also: HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), pp. 2-3

⁴⁰⁸ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), paras. 167-168

⁴⁰⁹ OHCHR, Sudan: This tragedy needs to end, now, urges Deputy High Commissioner, 10 September 2024, [url](#)



knives, and whips, and subjected them to punching, beatings, lashings,⁴¹⁰ and the widespread use of racist slurs specific to non-Arabs with darker skin such as *zurga* or *nuba* ('black'), or pejorative attributes such as *umbay* ('slave').⁴¹¹ Sexual violence incidents often take place in the presence of relatives, including children, who are also subjected to lashings and beatings.⁴¹² According to a local source interviewed by Human Rights Watch, most cases of rape involved the participation of two or more RSF combatants as perpetrators.⁴¹³

According to the UN FFM for the Sudan, members of the SAF are accused of sexually exploiting women and girls seeking refuge in areas controlled by them, by offering food in exchange.⁴¹⁴ The same report indicated that there are cases of 'survival sex' whereby women and girls engage in sexual activities to access food or humanitarian assistance.⁴¹⁵ Human Rights Watch reported that, according to local accounts, the RSF regularly abduct women and girls, hold them in detention houses, often for weeks, and subject them to sexual violence and force them to provide domestic services, in what local sources define as a 'right of ownership' over them.⁴¹⁶ The same source indicated that victims are beaten, tortured, and denied access to food.⁴¹⁷

The UN FFM for the Sudan indicated that although there are no comprehensive statistics on conflict-related violence, including sexual violence, based on open and confidential sources it consulted, hospitals and service providers documented at least 400 victims of sexual violence between April 2023 and July 2024, most of them women and girls.⁴¹⁸ Further, based on information provided by sources, 63 cases of sexual violence were reported in Khartoum between May 2023 and July 2024, and, without providing further information, 40 % of cases recorded between December 2023 and April 2024 took place in Al Jazirah state, all attributed to the RSF.⁴¹⁹ The UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights indicated in September 2024 that its office had documented 97 incidents involving 172 victims, mostly women and girls, and that 81 % of these incidents were attributed to the RSF.⁴²⁰

Sexual violence is largely underreported in the country due to a culture of silence, stigma, social isolation, and, in some cases, killings, as well as a domestic legislation that puts an

⁴¹⁰ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), paras. 181-182. See also: HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 38

⁴¹¹ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), paras. 181-182

⁴¹² UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 187; HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 4. See also: SIHA Network, Gezira State and the Forgotten Atrocities A Report on Conflict related Sexual Violence, June 2024, [url](#), p. 8

⁴¹³ HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 38

⁴¹⁴ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 171; USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan, 24 June 2024, [url](#). See also: ACJPS, Forced prostitution: The effects of the Sudan war on women and girls, 30 September 2024, [url](#), p. 5

⁴¹⁵ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 200

⁴¹⁶ HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 39; USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan, 24 June 2024, [url](#)

⁴¹⁷ HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 39

⁴¹⁸ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 174

⁴¹⁹ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 179

⁴²⁰ OHCHR, Sudan: This tragedy needs to end, now, urges Deputy High Commissioner, 10 September 2024, [url](#)



'excessive burden' on the victims wishing to file a report.⁴²¹ Additionally, sexual violence cases are not reported due to insecurity, displacements, blackouts, and the collapse of healthcare services,⁴²² as well as the social stigma associated with receiving sexual and reproductive health services.⁴²³ Human Rights Watch indicated that, according to local healthcare providers it interviewed, the RSF tries to prevent their acts of sexual violence from being documented by threatening healthcare providers if they provide information to the Ministry of Health or international organisations, including the UN.⁴²⁴ According to the UN FFM report, in Sudanese society 'rape' only takes place when the penis penetrates the vagina and breaks the hymen, and other forms of rape, including anal rape, rape with body parts such as fingers, or other forms of penetration, are referred to by victims, and generally considered, 'sexual harassment'.⁴²⁵ Authorities failed to investigate sexual violence committed by state forces and impeded women rights organisations from investigating such crimes.⁴²⁶

Access to services for victims of sexual violence is difficult due to the breakdown of, attacks on, and occupation of, healthcare institutions, as well as the 'significant restrictions' in medical supplies.⁴²⁷ For example, medical supplies for post-rape care are in short-supply and often unavailable due to the destruction of medical facilities, like in Khartoum and Darfur.⁴²⁸ Critical medical supplies that are not readily available included medicines to prevent and/or treat HIV/Aids and Hepatitis B infections.⁴²⁹ Human Rights Watch indicated that, according to healthcare workers in the Khartoum area, some victims of rape arrived at the hospital with 'debilitating physical injuries' as a result of sexual violence and, in at least four cases, these injuries led to the death of the victim.⁴³⁰

Human Rights Watch indicated that, according to a UN source in Khartoum, healthcare centres are noticing a 'surging' number of unmarried women with unwanted pregnancies as a result of rape.⁴³¹ Sudanese law indicates that abortions following pregnancies are allowed within 90 days of pregnancy, and that pregnant women must obtain first a permission from the Office of the Public Prosecutor, presenting, as evidence, a police complaint and a report by a medical institution.⁴³² Sources indicated that due to the breakdown of the country's institutions, obtaining a legal permission for abortion is difficult, forcing many to undergo unsafe abortion

⁴²¹ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 176

⁴²² UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 176

⁴²³ HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 55

⁴²⁴ HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 6

⁴²⁵ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 180

⁴²⁶ HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 25

⁴²⁷ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 211

⁴²⁸ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 212

⁴²⁹ HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 51

⁴³⁰ HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 4

⁴³¹ HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 50

⁴³² UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 207; HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 27



outside medical facilities.⁴³³ Human Rights Watch provided the example of a woman in Khartoum who was raped and shot and whose husband expelled her from their house and took away their children after she could not have an abortion performed by the local medical centre.⁴³⁴

The UN FFM for the Sudan indicated that

'the 2009 amendment to the 1991 Criminal Act of 1991 criminalizes rape and other acts of a sexual nature as underlying crimes of crimes against humanity and war crimes; however, their definitions also fall short of the definitions under customary international law. For instance, the crime of forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity adds the element of 'affecting the ethnic composition'. Furthermore, victims/survivors of rape and other forms of sexual violence face hurdles in reporting such crimes at the national level, including due to fears of stigma, reprisals and/or being prosecuted for adultery. Concerns have in this regard been shared with the Fact-Finding Mission over the legal procedures necessary to prove rape, in particular the obligatory use of Form No. 8, a medical report which has become unavailable in many health facilities or police stations'.⁴³⁵

(c) Forced/early marriage and conflict-related forced/early marriage

The UN FFM report indicated that the (Muslim) Personal Status Act of 1991, 'which governs familial relations such as marriage, divorce, child custody and inheritance and is primarily based on Sharia law, permits forced marriages of Sudanese women and girls. It provides that the marriage of a Muslim woman or girl shall be concluded by her male guardian and authorizes the marriage of children as young as ten, with the authorization of a judge'.⁴³⁶

In March 2024, a group of UN experts, including the Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,⁴³⁷ issued a communication on trafficking and sexual exploitation in Sudan, pointing to an increase in early and forced marriages of children during the current conflict reportedly as a result of family separations and gender-based violence that results in rape and unwanted pregnancies.⁴³⁸ Sources similarly pointed to the increasing number of cases of forced marriages of girls and women to RSF members, with cases

⁴³³ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 207; HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), pp. 27-28

⁴³⁴ HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁴³⁵ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 302

⁴³⁶ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 302

⁴³⁷ The UN experts are Siobhán Mullally, Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children; Tomoya Obokata, Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences; Mama Fatima Singhateh, Special Rapporteur on the sale, sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children; Ms Ashwini K.P., Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance; Paula Gaviria Betancur, Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons. OHCHR, Sudan: Trafficking for sexual exploitation and recruitment of children on the rise, warn UN experts, 22 March 2024, [url](#)

⁴³⁸ OHCHR, Sudan: Trafficking for sexual exploitation and recruitment of children on the rise, warn UN experts, 22 March 2024, [url](#)



involving parents surrendering their daughters under threat or in exchange for financial compensation.⁴³⁹ In some cases, relatives agree to an early marriage in the belief that by doing so they would be protecting a woman or girl from rape outside of marriage.⁴⁴⁰

According to an Emergency Response Room volunteer interviewed by Human Rights Watch in February 2024 in Khartoum, early marriage of underage girls is 'quite a widespread practice' as '[p]eople are seeking ways to protect their girls from rape and preserve what they think is their honor, especially those without an option to leave'.⁴⁴¹ Another local source interviewed by Human Rights Watch indicated that '[m]ost of the marriages happened because of the combination of fear and huge amounts of money and gold offered to the family of the young bride'.⁴⁴² The same source further reported that women are also forced into marriages by RSF forces and that in Khartoum, for example, there are 'enormous numbers of marriages' as the 'RSF wanted wives', particularly commanders.⁴⁴³

The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP), a Washington DC-based non-for-profit organisation that provides analysis on Middle East and northern Africa issues, reported on the existence of 'matchmakers', people who work for the RSF 'facilitating' marriages for RSF fighters, and that according to a local lawyer who documents these cases, '[m]ost of these marriages are arranged expeditiously; families are notified to 'prepare' their daughters, typically within a day or two. This leaves little time for any escape attempts'.⁴⁴⁴ The same lawyer provided the example of a forced marriage in the Khalawda area, Al Jazirah state, as an example, where the girl's father

'unexpectedly invited the villagers to her wedding, only for villagers to realize that the 'groom' was one of the RSF fighters who had attacked the village earlier. Despite the girl's vehement opposition to the union, her father compelled her to marry the fighter. While disguised as a traditional wedding in terms of celebrations and customs, the lawyer argued that its primary purpose was to protect the girl and her family'.⁴⁴⁵

According to Girls Not Brides, the prevalence rate of marriages in Sudan of children 15 years old or younger is 12 %, and 18 years old or younger is 34 %.⁴⁴⁶

⁴³⁹ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 200; TIMEP, Forced Marriage in Sudan: A Silent Crime Perpetrated in War and Peace, 21 November 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁴⁰ HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 4; TIMEP, Forced Marriage in Sudan: A Silent Crime Perpetrated in War and Peace, 21 November 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁴¹ HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 44

⁴⁴² HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 44

⁴⁴³ HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 45

⁴⁴⁴ TIMEP, Forced Marriage in Sudan: A Silent Crime Perpetrated in War and Peace, 21 November 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁴⁵ TIMEP, Forced Marriage in Sudan: A Silent Crime Perpetrated in War and Peace, 21 November 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁴⁶ Girls Not Brides, Sudan, n.d., [url](#)



(d) Trafficking in human beings

The 2014 Anti-Human Trafficking Law criminalises sex and labour trafficking with a penalty between three- and ten-years' imprisonment for offenses involving adult male victims, and between five- and 20-years' imprisonment for offenses involving adult female and child victims.⁴⁴⁷

Sources indicated that Sudan has historically been a country of origin, transit, and destination for victims of modern slavery and human trafficking.⁴⁴⁸ Common forms of trafficking include early and forced marriage, forced or bonded labour, child labour, domestic servitude, and forced prostitution.⁴⁴⁹ According to a report by Global Partners Governance (GPG), an international development organisation with presence in over 40 countries providing political analysis and research, factors that contribute to the likelihood of being a victim of trafficking include the absence of protection and shelter, widespread displacement, limited access to education and health services, food insecurity, poor livelihood conditions, lack of awareness regarding available services, and insufficient service provision.⁴⁵⁰ Sources indicated that since the onset of the conflict in April 2023, risks have exacerbated.⁴⁵¹ The group of UN experts pointed to increasing reports of trafficking in persons, especially women and girls, for the purpose of sexual exploitation, sexual slavery, child marriage, and the recruitment of minors by armed groups in Sudan, and that access to support by victims has deteriorated since December 2023.⁴⁵² The same source also indicated that there are reports of women and girls being sold at slave markets in areas controlled by the RSF, including in Darfur.⁴⁵³

The USDOS report on human trafficking indicated that Sudanese women and girls living in IDP camps and rural areas are exploited by criminal groups into domestic work and sex trafficking. The same source indicated that '[s]ome government officials or border guards exploited women and girls fleeing the country in sex trafficking in exchange for visas or safe passage to neighboring countries'. Authorities did not report the results of prior investigations into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by officials.⁴⁵⁴

For additional information, see section [2.7\(d\) Trafficking in human beings](#).

(e) Female genital mutilation (FGM)

Female genital mutilation (FGM) refers to 'all procedures involving partial or total removal of the external female genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs for non-medical

⁴⁴⁷ USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan, 24 June 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁴⁸ GPG, The impact of conflict on modern slavery and human trafficking in Sudan and the region, 2024, [url](#), p. 1; ACJPS, Forced prostitution: The effects of the Sudan war on women and girls, 30 September 2024, [url](#), p. 4; USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan, 24 June 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁴⁹ GPG, The impact of conflict on modern slavery and human trafficking in Sudan and the region, 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁴⁵⁰ GPG, The impact of conflict on modern slavery and human trafficking in Sudan and the region, 2024, [url](#), p. 5

⁴⁵¹ GPG, The impact of conflict on modern slavery and human trafficking in Sudan and the region, 2024, [url](#), p. 1;

USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan, 24 June 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁵² OHCHR, Sudan: Trafficking for sexual exploitation and recruitment of children on the rise, warn UN experts, 22 March 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁵³ OHCHR, Sudan: Trafficking for sexual exploitation and recruitment of children on the rise, warn UN experts, 22 March 2024, [url](#); see also: Asharq Al-Awsat, A Travesty of The War in Sudan: The Trafficking of Women, 2 February 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁵⁴ USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan, 24 June 2024, [url](#)



reasons'.⁴⁵⁵ Although FGM was criminalised in Sudan in 2020,⁴⁵⁶ the practice is still 'widespread'.⁴⁵⁷ A 2024 essay on gender in Sudan in the context of the current war indicated that since the early 2000s, 'traditional midwives' and 'cutters' who used to profit from performing FGM in the past, started to work in national public health campaigns to convince families to end FGM.⁴⁵⁸ According to the authors of the essay, after April 2023 and with healthcare infrastructure affected by the conflict, FGM was likely resurging as salaries for midwives have not been paid and there is no enforcement for the implementation of the law that criminalises FGM.⁴⁵⁹

Sudan has one of the highest rates of FGM in the world.⁴⁶⁰ According to a 2014 report⁴⁶¹ by Sudan's Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and UNICEF, about 87 % of Sudanese women aged 15-49 and 31 % of girls younger than 15, have undergone FGM.⁴⁶² Regionally, rates vary from the low of 45.4 % in Central Darfur, to 97 % in North Kordofan, 97.3 % in East Darfur, and 97.6 % in North Darfur.⁴⁶³ The report by Sudan's CBS and UNICEF indicated that, in Sudan, 'FGM is generally carried out on girls between the ages of 4 and 14, [but] it is also done to infants, women who are about to be married and, sometimes, to women who are pregnant with their first child or who have just given birth'.⁴⁶⁴

FGM is very common among Sudanese IDPs living in refugee camps in Chad.⁴⁶⁵ The Guardian reported that rates of FGM in Chad (34.1 % of women, overall) are particularly higher in the south and east of the country, which is where the camps for Sudanese IDPs are located.⁴⁶⁶ In a visit carried out by The Guardian to the Adré refugee camp in Chad, the journalist met three girls aged between three and nine years old who were being 'prepared' by their family to be cut by putting henna tattoos on the girls' feet and fingers, which is a 'traditional way of "celebrating" the FGM procedure', and according to a social worker at the camp, FGM 'takes

⁴⁵⁵ WHO, Eliminating Female genital mutilation: An interagency statement, 2008, [url](#), p. 1

⁴⁵⁶ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Sudan, February 2024, [url](#); The Guardian, Women's rights groups fear FGM is rife among Sudanese refugees in Chad, 18 November 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁵⁷ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 205; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Sudan, February 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁵⁸ Bedri, Nafisa and Tamsin Bradley, The Gendering of Sudan's Brutal War, The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, Spring 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁵⁹ Bedri, Nafisa and Tamsin Bradley, The Gendering of Sudan's Brutal War, The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, Spring 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁶⁰ The Guardian, Women's rights groups fear FGM is rife among Sudanese refugees in Chad, 18 November 2024, [url](#); UNFPA and Women's Refugee Commission, Female genital mutilation in humanitarian settings in the Arab region: Gaps and priorities for prevention and response programming, 2021, [url](#), p. 5

⁴⁶¹ The 2014 survey is still considered by sources as a reliable frame of reference on FGM statistics for Sudan. UNFPA and Women's Refugee Commission, Female genital mutilation in humanitarian settings in the Arab region: Gaps and priorities for prevention and response programming, 2021, [url](#), p. 5; CMI, Improved Understanding of FGM/C Abandonment among Sudanese Families in Khartoum and Kassala States, September 2020, [url](#), p. 9

⁴⁶² Sudan and UNICEF, Sudan: Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2014, 2014, [url](#), p. xii

⁴⁶³ UNFPA and Women's Refugee Commission, Female genital mutilation in humanitarian settings in the Arab region: Gaps and priorities for prevention and response programming, 2021, [url](#), p. 5

⁴⁶⁴ Sudan and UNICEF, Sudan: Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2014, 2014, [url](#), p. 220

⁴⁶⁵ The Guardian, Women's rights groups fear FGM is rife among Sudanese refugees in Chad, 18 November 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁶⁶ The Guardian, Women's rights groups fear FGM is rife among Sudanese refugees in Chad, 18 November 2024, [url](#)



place in secret because it contravened Chadian laws', adding that children and married women alike undergo the procedure.⁴⁶⁷

2.7. Children

(a) General overview

Both the SAF and the RSF are accused of violating children's rights, including through killing, maiming,⁴⁶⁸ and sexual abuse.⁴⁶⁹ Children have been killed in airstrikes and shelling on residential areas, central markets and schools, including in Khartoum, East Nile, North Darfur and Nyala, as well as in crossfires and through execution.⁴⁷⁰ On 5 June 2024, for example, the RSF and allied militias attacked the village of Wad al-Noura, Al Jazirah state, with artillery shells, machine guns, and assault rifles, killing 100 people, including over 35 children.⁴⁷¹ On 1 July 2024, Sudan Tribune reported that eight people, including children, were killed and 18 injured after the RSF launched a drone strike against a mosque in El Fasher.⁴⁷² In September 2024, during clashes between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North-al-Hilu (SPLM-N-al-Hilu) and the SAF in Sennar City, artillery shells used by the SAF reportedly killed dozens of people, including children.⁴⁷³

Most victims of sexual violence are women and girls, however, there are cases of men and boys who are victims of sexual abuse, though many of these cases are not reported due to cultural norms or the lack of support services available to them.⁴⁷⁴ Human Rights Watch reported that most services for victims of sexual violence are only available for women and girls, and that male victims have 'fewer channels' to seek help.⁴⁷⁵ Most reported cases of sexual violence against men and boys took place in detention during or prior to their interrogation, and included forced nudity, beatings on genitals, rape threats, and reportedly, rape and gang-rape, in most cases by RSF members.⁴⁷⁶ The UN FFM report indicated that there are reports of boys under the age of 18 who, after being detained by both the SAF and the RSF, were imprisoned with male detainees in Khartoum and Darfur.⁴⁷⁷ For additional information on conflict related sexual violence, see section [2.6 Women and girls](#).

⁴⁶⁷ The Guardian, Women's rights groups fear FGM is rife among Sudanese refugees in Chad, 18 November 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁶⁸ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁴⁶⁹ HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 45

⁴⁷⁰ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 233

⁴⁷¹ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 135

⁴⁷² Sudan Tribune, RSF drone strikes on El Fasher mosque, kills eight, 1 July 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁷³ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 136

⁴⁷⁴ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 171; HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), pp. 44-45

⁴⁷⁵ HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 45

⁴⁷⁶ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), paras. 171, 199

⁴⁷⁷ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 247



IOM indicated that 6.2 million children in Sudan are in need of child protection services.⁴⁷⁸

(b) Child soldiers

For background information, see Section 2.6. of the [EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

Sudan acceded the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict in 2005, is party to the International Labour Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, and has domestic legislation prohibiting the recruitment of children under the age of 18.⁴⁷⁹ However, Sudanese criminal legislation does not provide sanctions for the use of children in hostilities by armed groups.⁴⁸⁰ The UN FFM report indicated that children have been recruited and used in hostilities, as well as killed, injured, abducted, forcibly displaced, detained alongside adults, tortured, subjected to sexual violence, and denied access to healthcare and education.⁴⁸¹

According to a joint investigation by the Sudan Human Rights Hub (SHRH), a civil society organisation that promotes the protection of human rights in the country, and Ayin Network, based on testimonies from victims, lawyers, activists, and witnesses, as well as their own monitoring, the scale of child recruitment in the current conflict is 'massive and widespread' and takes place throughout the country.⁴⁸²

Sources indicated that children are recruited by armed groups, including the SAF, the RSF, and their allied militias,⁴⁸³ the SPLM-N-al-Hilu, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North-Malik Agar (SPLM-N-Agar), the Sudan Alliance,⁴⁸⁴ and SAF supporters, including Islamist groups, the Muslim Brotherhood, the National Congress Party, the Sudan Liberation Movement – Mustafa Tambour (SLM-Tambour), the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and Sudan Liberation Movement – Minni Minnawi (SLM-MM).⁴⁸⁵ The SAF has reportedly been establishing alliances with armed militias in Northern Darfur, Khartoum, and Al Jazirah such as the SLM-MM and the JEM, which are accused of using child soldiers.⁴⁸⁶

Child soldiers in Sudan are known as *jana jaish* and there are no statistics about their numbers.⁴⁸⁷ According to Sudanese military intelligence officers, the number of child recruits in the RSF is estimated between 8 000 and 10 000.⁴⁸⁸ Sudan Tribune reported that, according to local organisation National Committee for War Crimes and Violations, the RSF has recruited

⁴⁷⁸ IOM, Sudan Regional Response Overview, Mid-year report — January to June 2024, 31 July 2024, [url](#), p. 4

⁴⁷⁹ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 219; SHRH and Ayin Network, Child soldiers in Sudan: The future at stake., 17 July 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁸⁰ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 219

⁴⁸¹ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 216

⁴⁸² SHRH and Ayin Network, Child soldiers in Sudan: The future at stake., 17 July 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁸³ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), paras. 219, 232; SHRH and Ayin Network, Child soldiers in Sudan: The future at stake., 17 July 2024, [url](#); USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan, 24 June 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁸⁴ USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan, 24 June 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁸⁵ SHRH and Ayin Network, Child soldiers in Sudan: The future at stake., 17 July 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁸⁶ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 224

⁴⁸⁷ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 64

⁴⁸⁸ The New Arab, Are the RSF recruiting children to fight in Sudan's war?, 28 February 2024, [url](#)





around 6 000 children.⁴⁸⁹ Sources indicated that the use of child soldiers is not hidden by armed groups, and on the contrary, they appear in social media networks with uniforms and weapons.⁴⁹⁰

The UN FFM report indicated that factors that contributed to the recruitment of children included their desire to seek revenge, as a protection move to defend their communities and livelihoods, and as a tribal custom.⁴⁹¹ Recruitment also takes place through coercion, threats, and kidnapping.⁴⁹² According to a local source interviewed by SHRH and Ayin Network in West Darfur, the recruitment of children is also done through friends who encourage and tempt them to join the RSF with promises of wealth, luxury, and safety.⁴⁹³ The SAF launched a 'mobilization campaign' in December 2023 to bolster its ranks with 'volunteers', who are also called *mustanfareen*, many of whom are minors.⁴⁹⁴ Sources reported that the RSF is invoking *Faza'a* to recruit men and boys.⁴⁹⁵ The UN FFM report indicated that 'the use of children by Arab militias is deeply entrenched in the Sudanese 'Faza'a' (الفرع) tradition which consists of the spontaneous mobilisation of armed men to defend the community against a perceived threat, particularly prevalent in Darfur and Kordofan'.⁴⁹⁶ The UN FFM report indicated that girls under 18 years of age and women are also recruited by the SAF and are sent to training camps in River Nile and Port Sudan.⁴⁹⁷ For additional information, see section [2.2 Conscripts, draft evaders, forced recruitment to armed groups](#).

Sources indicated that local leaders play a significant role in child recruitment to seek protection for their communities or in exchange for money for communal or personal use.⁴⁹⁸ The UN FFM report indicated that '[t]ribal military leaders or 'Agid' receive instructions from mid-level administrators or 'Omdas' who respond to tribal leaders 'Amirs' orders to provide them with a specific number of combatants from a specific tribe. 'Agid' would then request each family of the clan to assign a number of their sons, including the ones below 18'.⁴⁹⁹

In addition to being used in combat, recruited children are also used by armed groups in operating checkpoints, transporting ammunition, conduct of rudimentary reconnaissance and surveillance activities, and performing labour in military camps.⁵⁰⁰ The RSF reportedly use children as human shields,⁵⁰¹ bodyguards, informers, combatants, to conduct security patrols,

⁴⁸⁹ Sudan Tribune, Sudan war crimes panel registers 12,400 cases against RSF, 28 July 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁹⁰ SHRH and Ayin Network, Child soldiers in Sudan: The future at stake., 17 July 2024, [url](#); UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), paras. 224, 226

⁴⁹¹ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 220

⁴⁹² SHRH and Ayin Network, Child soldiers in Sudan: The future at stake., 17 July 2024, [url](#); Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), pp. 63-64

⁴⁹³ SHRH and Ayin Network, Child soldiers in Sudan: The future at stake., 17 July 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁹⁴ SHRH and Ayin Network, Child soldiers in Sudan: The future at stake., 17 July 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁹⁵ ADF, In Sudan, RSF Invokes Tradition to Force Children Onto Battlefield, 8 October 2024, [url](#); The New Arab, Are the RSF recruiting children to fight in Sudan's war?, 28 February 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁹⁶ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 231

⁴⁹⁷ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 224

⁴⁹⁸ SHRH and Ayin Network, Child soldiers in Sudan: The future at stake., 17 July 2024, [url](#); UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 231

⁴⁹⁹ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 231

⁵⁰⁰ USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan, 24 June 2024, [url](#); Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 64

⁵⁰¹ USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan, 24 June 2024, [url](#); Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 64





man checkpoints, carry out searches, monitor arrestees, pillage, commit arson, commit acts of torture in detention centres, and record scenes of crimes and post them on social media.⁵⁰²

According to SHRH and Ayin Network, child recruitment into the RSF dates before April 2023, whereas for the SAF it became more prevalent after the onset of the current conflict.⁵⁰³ Child recruitment takes place mostly in Darfur and the Eastern and Northern states of the country (Northern State, River Nile, Kassala, Gedaref, Sennar, and West Kordofan).⁵⁰⁴ The UN FFM report indicated that, according to local sources, minors have been identified in the ranks of the RSF and its allied militias in El Geneina, Ardamata (West Darfur) and other localities along the border with Chad, Zalingei, Nyala, Wad Madani, Khartoum, and El Fasher.⁵⁰⁵

According to a local source interviewed by SHRH in March 2024, SAF 'volunteers', many of whom are between 15 and 16 years of age, are paid around 1 000 USD and are given a gun.⁵⁰⁶ According to testimonies received by SHRH and Ayin Network, Mayors of the RSF are paid between 200 000 and 300 000 Sudanese pounds (between 317 and 475 EUR) per recruited child.⁵⁰⁷ Another local source indicated that they are also recruited as spies and paid about 10 USD for a recognisance mission.⁵⁰⁸

The USDOS report on human trafficking stated that the government 'did not report investigating or prosecuting any officials for the recruitment or use of child soldiers' and the government ceased efforts to verify that the SAF was not recruiting children.⁵⁰⁹

(c) Labour exploitation

The 2010 Children's Act indicates that the minimum working age is 14 years old, although 'persons under that age can work in pastoral and agricultural activities'.⁵¹⁰ The 2024 USDOS report on trafficking in persons for Sudan indicated that '[a]lthough information on the worst forms of child labor was difficult to obtain due to the conflict, observers report child labor remains prevalent in Sudan. Criminal groups exploit Sudanese women and girls – particularly IDPs or those from rural areas – in domestic work and in sex trafficking'.⁵¹¹ The USDOS report also indicated that, according to local observers, child labour is 'prevalent' in Sudan.⁵¹² Save the Children similarly indicated that the conflict has forced many children into child labour.⁵¹³

Additional information could not be found among the sources consulted by EUAA within the time constraints of this report.

⁵⁰² UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 228

⁵⁰³ SHRH and Ayin Network, Child soldiers in Sudan: The future at stake., 17 July 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁰⁴ SHRH and Ayin Network, Child soldiers in Sudan: The future at stake., 17 July 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁰⁵ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 227

⁵⁰⁶ SHRH and Ayin Network, Child soldiers in Sudan: The future at stake., 17 July 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁰⁷ SHRH and Ayin Network, Child soldiers in Sudan: The future at stake., 17 July 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁰⁸ SHRH and Ayin Network, Child soldiers in Sudan: The future at stake., 17 July 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁰⁹ USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan, 24 June 2024, [url](#)

⁵¹⁰ UN, Committee on the Rights of the Child, Combined fifth and sixth periodic reports submitted by the Sudan under article 44 of the Convention, due in 2015*, 20 June 2024, [url](#), Table 3

⁵¹¹ USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan, 24 June 2024, [url](#)

⁵¹² USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan, 24 June 2024, [url](#)

⁵¹³ Save the Children, Sudan: Hundreds of unaccompanied children among thousands fleeing latest surge of fighting, 22 August 2024, [url](#)



(d) Trafficking in human beings

The 2014 Anti-Human Trafficking Law criminalises sex and labour trafficking with a penalty between three- and ten-years' imprisonment for offenses involving adult male victims, and between five- and 20-years' imprisonment for offenses involving adult female and child victims.⁵¹⁴

The US Department of State indicated that anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts declined after the onset of hostilities on 15 April 2023, and that the government has not reported 'any trafficking investigations, prosecutions, or convictions' since then.⁵¹⁵ Law enforcement was 'inadequate or entirely absent' from some areas.⁵¹⁶ There is no law dedicated exclusively to human smuggling, which makes it difficult to separate from human trafficking and prosecute.⁵¹⁷ According to the USDOS report on human trafficking, 'corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns'.⁵¹⁸ For further information, see section [1.3 Rule of law and administration of justice](#).

The USDOS report provided the following profile of trafficked children:

'Traffickers exploit children experiencing homelessness in Khartoum – including Sudanese and unaccompanied migrant children from West and Central Africa – in forced labor for begging, market vending, and in sex trafficking. Business owners, informal mining operators, community members, and farmers exploit children working in brick-making factories, gold mining, collecting medical waste, street vending, and agriculture; victims endure threats, physical and sexual abuse, and hazardous working conditions with limited access to education or health services'.⁵¹⁹

For additional information, see section [2.6\(d\) Trafficking in human beings](#).

2.8. LGBTIQ persons

Sources indicated that same-sex relations are criminalised under Section 148 of the Penal Code of 1991,⁵²⁰ which indicates the following:

'148 Sodomy

(1) Any man who inserts his penis or its equivalent into a woman's or a man's anus or permitted another man to insert his penis or its equivalent in his anus is said to have committed Sodomy.

⁵¹⁴ USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan, 24 June 2024, [url](#)

⁵¹⁵ USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan, 24 June 2024, [url](#)

⁵¹⁶ USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan, 24 June 2024, [url](#)

⁵¹⁷ USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan, 24 June 2024, [url](#)

⁵¹⁸ USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan, 24 June 2024, [url](#)

⁵¹⁹ USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan, 24 June 2024, [url](#)

⁵²⁰ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 302; ILGA, ILGA Database: Sudan, n.d., [url](#)



(2) (a) Whoever commits Sodomy shall be punished with flogging one hundred lashes and he shall also be liable to five years imprisonment.

(b) If the offender is convicted for the second time he shall be punished with flogging one hundred lashes and imprisonment for a term which may not exceed five years.

(c) If the offender is convicted for the third time he shall be punished with death or life imprisonment'.⁵²¹

The UN FFM report indicated that the Penal Code criminalises same-sex relations with its provision on 'sodomy', which is only applicable to men, and 'indecent acts', applicable to both men and women.⁵²² The Dutch COI report indicated that, according to confidential sources it consulted, '[i]n a legal sense, 'sodomy' refers to anal sex, where it does not matter whether the anal sex is performed by two men or by a man and a woman. In colloquial language, however, 'sodomy' can be used as a synonym for homosexuality'.⁵²³

Sources indicated that with the enactment of Law No. 12 of 2020, the execution and flogging punishments for sodomy were removed from the Penal Code.⁵²⁴ ILGA indicated, however, that 'persons found guilty for a second time are still liable to imprisonment of up to 7 years and to life imprisonment upon a third conviction. Furthermore, Section 151 punishes acts of "gross indecency" and Section 152 punishes acts of sexual nature "that cause discomfort to public sentiment or public modesty" with imprisonment of up to six months and/or a fine'.⁵²⁵ According to a shadow report for the third Universal Periodic Review of Sudan by the Sudan SOGI Coalition (SSC), the Sudanese law and judicial system still allows judges to assign punishments arbitrarily, including the death penalty or corporal punishment such as 'flogging'.⁵²⁶ The same source also indicated that the new rules of evidence allow the use of digital evidence such as private chats or pictures on mobile phones as the basis for a conviction for homosexuality.⁵²⁷ According to a confidential source cited in the Dutch COI report, 'this change was intended to allow LGBTIQ+ people to be criminally prosecuted with less evidence'.⁵²⁸

Discrimination and violence against LGBTIQ people are common.⁵²⁹ Freedom House indicated that LGBTIQ people 'are politically marginalized and face serious deterrents to open

⁵²¹ Sudan, The Penal Code 1991, 1991, [url](#)

⁵²² UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 302

⁵²³ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 94

⁵²⁴ ILGA, ILGA Database: Sudan, n.d., [url](#); SSC, Shadow report for the third Universal Periodic Review of the Republic of Sudan Human rights violations based on SOGIESC in Sudan, March 2021, [url](#), p. 6; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Sudan, February 2024, [url](#)

⁵²⁵ ILGA, ILGA Database: Sudan, n.d., [url](#)

⁵²⁶ SSC, Shadow report for the third Universal Periodic Review of the Republic of Sudan Human rights violations based on SOGIESC in Sudan, March 2021, [url](#), p. 6

⁵²⁷ SSC, Shadow report for the third Universal Periodic Review of the Republic of Sudan Human rights violations based on SOGIESC in Sudan, March 2021, [url](#), p. 6

⁵²⁸ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 94

⁵²⁹ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Sudan, February 2024, [url](#)



participation, including a criminal ban on same-sex sexual relation'.⁵³⁰ Section 152 of the Penal Code of 1991 indicates the following:

'152 Obscene and Indecent Acts

(1) Whoever does in a public place an indecent act or an act contrary to public morals or wears an obscene outfit or contrary to public morals or causing an annoyance to public feelings shall be punished with flogging which may not exceed forty lashes or with fine or with both.

(2) The act shall be contrary to public morals if it is regarded as such according to the standard of the person's religion or the custom of the country where the act takes place'.⁵³¹

Sources indicated that Sudan lacks protection of LGBTIQ persons with regards to discrimination in employment, housing,⁵³² education, and access to health care.⁵³³ The Dutch COI report indicated that, according to confidential sources, LGBTIQ people face 'discrimination, stigmatisation, dismissal, social exclusion and mistreatment if their sexual orientation and/or gender identity were to become known', and that in Sudanese society, the LGBTIQ community 'was associated with mental illness and paedophilia', which is why people keep their identity hidden.⁵³⁴

Regarding transgender individuals, the Dutch report indicated that, according to a confidential source, 'it was almost impossible for transgender people to obtain identity documents stating their gender identity' and that they 'experience problems crossing national borders, as the gender listed in their passports did not match their gender identity and the manner in which they expressed and dressed themselves'.⁵³⁵

The Dutch report provided as example of targeting of LGBTIQ persons, that of a homosexual man whose father, upon noticing 'feminine traits', physically assaulted him for 'allegedly disgracing the family honour'.⁵³⁶ In an interview with EUAA, a human rights analyst with in-depth expertise on the country also provided the example of a gay person who was arrested by the RSF on suspicion of collaborating for SAF and when they checked his Tinder profile, upon discovering his sexual orientation, he was tortured with more cruelty.⁵³⁷ Additional information on these or other cases could not be found among the sources consulted by EUAA within the time constraints of this report.

⁵³⁰ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Sudan, February 2024, [url](#)

⁵³¹ Sudan, The Penal Code 1991, 1991, [url](#)

⁵³² ILGA, ILGA Database: Sudan, n.d., [url](#); Equaldex, LGBT Rights in Sudan, n.d., [url](#)

⁵³³ ILGA, ILGA Database: Sudan, n.d., [url](#); Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 94

⁵³⁴ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 94

⁵³⁵ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 95

⁵³⁶ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 95

⁵³⁷ Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024



3. Key socio-economic situation with focus on Port Sudan

3.1. Socio-economic overview

Specific information on the socio-economic situation in Port Sudan was scarce among the sources consulted by EUAA within the time constraints of this report. However, more detailed information was available about mobility and admittance to Port Sudan. Where detailed information was unavailable, country-level data was provided to offer a broader understanding of the key socio-economic situation.

This section should be read in conjunction with section 1.3.1 Humanitarian situation of the [Sudan: Security situation report](#).

For information on displacement and healthcare, see section 1.1.5. (a) and (c) of the [EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#). Additional information can be found in section 1.3.1 (a) and (c) of the [Sudan: Security situation report](#).

3.1.1. Economic situation

According to International Monetary Fund's (IMF) estimates for 2024, Sudan is projecting a negative 20.3 % for its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and an inflation rate of 242.2 %.⁵³⁸ According to the Finance Minister of Sudan, due to the armed conflict, state revenue fell over 80 %.⁵³⁹ The GDP per capita is 606 USD dollars⁵⁴⁰ and since the start of the conflict, the currency has depreciated over 300 %.⁵⁴¹

A report on the socioeconomic impact of the conflict on urban households produced by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),⁵⁴² indicated that the conflict has 'led to a significant deterioration of economic activity'.⁵⁴³ Armed actions in the context of the current conflict have damaged the infrastructure, including roads and supply chains, impacting Sudan's ability to conduct foreign

⁵³⁸ IMF, World Economic Outlook (October 2024): Sudan, n.d., [url](#)

⁵³⁹ Africanews, Sudan's economy contracts 40% as war rages, 13 August 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁴⁰ IMF, World Economic Outlook (October 2024): Sudan, n.d., [url](#)

⁵⁴¹ IFPRI and UNDP, The Socioeconomic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households: Evidence from a National Urban Household Survey, November 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁵⁴² The report is based on a survey of 3 000 households that took place between 24 May 2024 and July 2024. The survey was conducted by phone; however, the authors caution that '[i]n Sudan, where mobile phone penetration is not universal, phone surveys inherently exclude households without access to cell phones, which are often the poorest and most marginalized. This exclusion is likely exacerbated during the current crisis, as infrastructure damage and economic instability may further limit access to functioning mobile networks and charged devices. This potential sampling bias significantly affects the generalizability of findings, particularly for indicators that are closely tied to socioeconomic status'. IFPRI and UNDP, The Socioeconomic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households: Evidence from a National Urban Household Survey, November 2024, [url](#), p. 6

⁵⁴³ IFPRI and UNDP, The Socioeconomic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households: Evidence from a National Urban Household Survey, November 2024, [url](#), p. 2



trade and exports.⁵⁴⁴ Trade with neighbouring countries such as Chad and Libya has slumped 'dramatically'.⁵⁴⁵

The banking system is facing a liquidity crisis.⁵⁴⁶ Sources indicated that banking operations, most of them based in Khartoum, have been suspended for the most part due to insecurity, power outages, and looting.⁵⁴⁷ According to the International Rescue Committee (IRC), '[b]lockages in banking transactions, the lack of liquidity and transportation disruptions are contributing to a rise in basic food prices'.⁵⁴⁸ A human rights analyst indicated that:

'since there is no reliable banking system, people use mobile banking, but that also depends on the diaspora and the capacity to send money. In Port Sudan, for example, Western Union works, but that depends on the access to internet. In areas in central Sudan, for example, there is no internet, and using Starlink is very risky because the RSF controls communications in that area, and those who have family abroad are exposed to kidnapping from the RSF if their communications via Starlink get hacked by the RSF. Some cases of kidnappings have taken place after communicating through Starlink and the RSF gets knowledge of that information'.⁵⁴⁹

According to the IFPRI and UNDP survey, about 24 % of households reported receiving assistance, including from family members and other individuals (14.6 %), international humanitarian organisations (4.6 %), domestic humanitarian organisation (1.6 %), and national government agencies (1 %).⁵⁵⁰

IFPRI and UNDP report indicated that 69.9 % of urban households are headed by women, and that out of that number, the following statistics are provided:

- marital status: married (41.6 %), widowed (22.5 %), single (19.1 %), and separated (16.8 %);
- education: 'high' (61.8 %), 'medium' (27.2 %), and 'low' (11 %);
- employment status: no employment/no income (36.4 %), self-employed (28.9 %), full-time worker (19.1 %), and part-time worker (10.4 %).⁵⁵¹

⁵⁴⁴ Africanews, Sudan's economy contracts 40% as war rages, 13 August 2024, [url](#); IFPRI and UNDP, The Socioeconomic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households: Evidence from a National Urban Household Survey, November 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁵⁴⁵ Africanews, Sudan's economy contracts 40% as war rages, 13 August 2024, [url](#); IFPRI and UNDP, The Socioeconomic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households: Evidence from a National Urban Household Survey, November 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁵⁴⁶ Africanews, Sudan's economy contracts 40% as war rages, 13 August 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁴⁷ IFPRI and UNDP, The Socioeconomic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households: Evidence from a National Urban Household Survey, November 2024, [url](#), p. 59; IRC, Watchlist Crisis Alert: Sudan — A Catastrophe the World is Choosing to Ignore, 25 June 2024, [url](#), p. 15

⁵⁴⁸ IRC, Watchlist Crisis Alert: Sudan — A Catastrophe the World is Choosing to Ignore, 25 June 2024, [url](#), p. 15

⁵⁴⁹ Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

⁵⁵⁰ IFPRI and UNDP, The Socioeconomic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households: Evidence from a National Urban Household Survey, November 2024, [url](#), p. 63

⁵⁵¹ IFPRI and UNDP, The Socioeconomic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households: Evidence from a National Urban Household Survey, November 2024, [url](#), pp. 10-11



3.1.2. Employment

In 2022, the unemployment rate was 8.4 %, with Khartoum and Central Darfur experiencing 1.5 times higher rates than the national average.⁵⁵² For 2024, the IMF projected a rate of 58 %.⁵⁵³ South and Central Darfur and North Kordofan showed lower employment rates than the national average.⁵⁵⁴ The lack of employment and income, as well as the destruction of critical infrastructure, are among the main drivers for the increasing number of civilians joining armed groups.⁵⁵⁵

According to the IFPRI and UNDP survey, 39.3 % of heads of households are self-employed, 15.6 % are full-time wage workers, 8.2 % are part-time wage workers, and 18.1 % are unemployed.⁵⁵⁶ The survey also indicated that self-employment is most common among male household heads (40 %, compared to 28.9 % of female household heads), but female household heads are more likely than male household heads to report no income or employment (36.4 % compared to 16.9 %).⁵⁵⁷

3.1.3. Poverty

The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) indicated that before the conflict, two-thirds of Sudan's population were already living in extreme poverty.⁵⁵⁸ In 2022, Sudan ranked 170 out of 193 countries in the Human Development Index, which is considered 'low human development'.⁵⁵⁹

The UN FFM indicated that the RSF and its allied militias have 'engaged in a pattern of destruction of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population' as well as the 'economic, social and cultural rights of the civilian population, in particular their rights to physical and mental health and to food, water and housing'.⁵⁶⁰ For more information on food insecurity, access to housing and water, see sections [3.1.4 Food security](#), [3.1.5 Housing, water, and sanitation](#), and section 1.3.1 of the [Sudan: Security situation report](#). For background information, see section 1.1.5. of the [EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#). In February 2024, the RSF shut down telecommunication services provided by the three largest telecommunication companies in most part of the country, affecting the ability of many Sudanese to pay for food and other essentials since many rely on online payments.⁵⁶¹

⁵⁵² IFPRI and UNDP, The Socioeconomic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households: Evidence from a National Urban Household Survey, November 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁵⁵³ IMF, World Economic Outlook (October 2024): Sudan, n.d., [url](#)

⁵⁵⁴ IFPRI and UNDP, The Socioeconomic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households: Evidence from a National Urban Household Survey, November 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁵⁵⁵ ACAPS, Sudan: Scenarios, October 2024, [url](#), p. 11; IRC, Crisis in Sudan: What is happening and how to help, 24 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁵⁶ IFPRI and UNDP, The Socioeconomic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households: Evidence from a National Urban Household Survey, November 2024, [url](#), p. 11

⁵⁵⁷ IFPRI and UNDP, The Socioeconomic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households: Evidence from a National Urban Household Survey, November 2024, [url](#), p. 11

⁵⁵⁸ OHCHR, Sudan faces one of the worst famines in decades, warn UN experts, 17 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁵⁹ UNDP, Human Development Report 2023/2024, 2024, [url](#), p. 276

⁵⁶⁰ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 145


⁵⁶¹ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 268



3.1.4. Food security

For country-wide background information, see section 1.1.5. of the [EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#). Increasing hunger due to food deprivation has been reported throughout the country.⁵⁶² Additionally, agricultural companies, particularly near conflict zones, have faced severe disruptions.⁵⁶³ According to a human rights analyst with in-depth expertise on the country, who was interviewed by EUAA, in some areas the RSF cuts the electricity, so people pay a fee to have it re-installed. Farmers also pay protection fees, which in some places can go up to \$400 USD per month to allow farmers to farm.⁵⁶⁴

Barriers to access local markets have also been reported, mainly due to the security situation.⁵⁶⁵ For example, according to IFPRI and UNDP, about 25 % of households in Khartoum are unable to visit markets, followed by Al Jazirah (21.6 %), Red Sea (18.3 %), Kassala (17.1 %), and North Darfur (16.7 %).⁵⁶⁶ Barriers that led to markets not being successful included the lack of buyers and sellers, high prices, and logistical hurdles.⁵⁶⁷



Map 4. Sudan Acute Food Insecurity: June 2024 assessed outcomes.⁵⁶⁸

⁵⁶² UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 62

⁵⁶³ IFPRI and UNDP, The Socioeconomic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households: Evidence from a National Urban Household Survey, November 2024, [url](#), p. 22; US, CIA, The World Factbook: Sudan, 19 November 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁶⁴ Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

⁵⁶⁵ IFPRI and UNDP, The Socioeconomic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households: Evidence from a National Urban Household Survey, November 2024, [url](#), p. 58

⁵⁶⁶ IFPRI and UNDP, The Socioeconomic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households: Evidence from a National Urban Household Survey, November 2024, [url](#), p. 58

⁵⁶⁷ IFPRI and UNDP, The Socioeconomic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households: Evidence from a National Urban Household Survey, November 2024, [url](#), p. 59

⁵⁶⁸ Map 4: FEWS NET, Sudan Acute Food Insecurity: June 2024 assessed outcomes, June 2024, [url](#)



IOM indicated that 95 % of IDPs are unable to buy food due to the 'steep costs'.⁵⁶⁹ The same source indicated that reception communities have also experienced increase in the cost of food due to sudden population increases, in some cases upwards 50 %, stretching the availability of already-scarce resources.⁵⁷⁰

Both the SAF and the RSF have hampered the transport of humanitarian aid through the territories they control.⁵⁷¹ Human Rights Watch reported that since late 2023, the SAF, particularly its military intelligence branch, have placed 'significant restrictions' on access to aid.⁵⁷² In an interview with EUAA, a human rights analyst with in-depth expertise on the country similarly indicated that the SAF instructed military intelligence to not allow people to buy goods in SAF-controlled areas to bring into RSF-controlled areas.⁵⁷³ Between February and August 2024, the SAF prevented the transit of humanitarian aid through the Adré border crossing from Chad alleging that it would benefit the RSF, and the RSF prevented the transit of humanitarian aid through El Fasher alleging that it would benefit the SAF.⁵⁷⁴

Floods have also affected areas at risk of famine.⁵⁷⁵ The rainy season, which started in June 2024, affected about 596 000 people in 15 states, including Red Sea (about 169 400 people), North Darfur (123 860), Northern (68 200), South Darfur (63 130), and River Nile (59 000).⁵⁷⁶ Out of those affected, 124 000 lived in areas at risk of famine.⁵⁷⁷

Additional information within the time reference period could not be found among the sources consulted by EUAA within the time constraints of this report.

3.1.5. Housing, water, and sanitation

The IFPRI and UNDP report indicated that, based on the survey results, access to drinking water deteriorated after April 2023, and that in urban areas, reliance on piped water is decreasing and is replaced with tanker trucks, carts, and animals.⁵⁷⁸ The same source indicated that, after April 2023, there was a deterioration of sanitary conditions, with a shift from adequate facilities like flushed toilets, to less sanitary options such as latrines and open pits.⁵⁷⁹ According to the survey, access to flushed toilets decreased from 41.2 % of households to 26.4 %, and the use of latrines became the 'most common facility used by urban

⁵⁶⁹ IOM, Sudan Regional Response Overview, Mid-year report — January to June 2024, 31 July 2024, [url](#), p. 4

⁵⁷⁰ IOM, Sudan Regional Response Overview, Mid-year report — January to June 2024, 31 July 2024, [url](#), p. 4

⁵⁷¹ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 284; Refugees International, The Nuba Mountains: A Window into the Sudan Crisis, August 2024, [url](#), p. 12

⁵⁷² HRW, "Khartoum is not Safe for Women Anymore!": Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan's Capital, July 2024, [url](#), p. 55

⁵⁷³ Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

⁵⁷⁴ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 284; Refugees International, The Nuba Mountains: A Window into the Sudan Crisis, August 2024, [url](#), p. 23

⁵⁷⁵ UNOCHA, Sudan: Situation Report, 3 November 2024, [url](#), p. 6

⁵⁷⁶ UNOCHA, Sudan: Situation Report, 3 November 2024, [url](#), p. 6

⁵⁷⁷ UNOCHA, Sudan: Situation Report, 3 November 2024, [url](#), p. 6

⁵⁷⁸ IFPRI and UNDP, The Socioeconomic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households: Evidence from a National Urban Household Survey, November 2024, [url](#), p. 53

⁵⁷⁹ IFPRI and UNDP, The Socioeconomic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households: Evidence from a National Urban Household Survey, November 2024, [url](#), p. 53



households', from 35.4 % of households before the conflict to 43.8 % after the conflict.⁵⁸⁰ Additional information within the time reference period could not be found among the sources consulted by EUAA within the time constraints of this report.

3.1.6. Education

Schools continued to be targeted by armed groups.⁵⁸¹ Sources indicated that most schools remain closed for the second school year in a row and that more than 17 million of the 19 million school-aged children are out of school.⁵⁸² Over 110 schools and hospitals have been attacked since the beginning of the conflict,⁵⁸³ and as of May 2024, 2 500 schools, i.e. 13 % of all schools, are used as IDP shelters, affecting the education of over two million children in host communities.⁵⁸⁴ Some schools and universities have reopened in states considered as 'safe'; however, the Ministry of Education has opposed the move indicating that it would create 'educational disparities' across the country.⁵⁸⁵

UNICEF indicated that on 16 September 2024, 600 schools were reopened in Red Sea state, receiving children 'from the state, as well as children from elsewhere in Sudan displaced by the ongoing conflict'.⁵⁸⁶

Additional information on education in Port Sudan within the time reference period could not be found among the sources consulted by EUAA within the time constraints of this report.

3.1.7. Situation of specific groups

Specific information on the situation of specific groups in Port Sudan could not be found among the sources consulted by EUAA within the time constraints of this report.

⁵⁸⁰ IFPRI and UNDP, The Socioeconomic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households: Evidence from a National Urban Household Survey, November 2024, [url](#), p. 54

⁵⁸¹ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 137

⁵⁸² UNICEF, At least five children reportedly killed and 20 injured in shelling of school and market in El Obeid city, Sudan, 15 August 2024, [url](#); GPG, The impact of conflict on modern slavery and human trafficking in Sudan and the region, 2024, [url](#), p.5

⁵⁸³ UNICEF, At least five children reportedly killed and 20 injured in shelling of school and market in El Obeid city, Sudan, 15 August 2024, [url](#); GPG, The impact of conflict on modern slavery and human trafficking in Sudan and the region, 2024, [url](#), p.5

⁵⁸⁴ IFPRI and UNDP, The Socioeconomic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households: Evidence from a National Urban Household Survey, November 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁵⁸⁵ GPG, The impact of conflict on modern slavery and human trafficking in Sudan and the region, 2024, [url](#), p.5

⁵⁸⁶ UNICEF, A Glimmer of Hope Comes to Red Sea State, Sudan, 16 September 2024, [url](#)



3.2. Mobility and admittance

3.2.1. Freedom of movement

Port Sudan is under the control of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF).⁵⁸⁷ In an interview with EUAA, Elbagir Ahmed Abdullah indicated that there is a 11 p.m. curfew and the city is heavily guarded as it is the seat of the current government and where high-ranking officers live.⁵⁸⁸ The same source also indicated that 'everyone arriving in Port Sudan is thoroughly checked and need an ID to enter and move around the city. To leave the city, journalists, for example, need a permit from the Intelligence Services. A permit is also required to leave Omdurman'.⁵⁸⁹

A human rights analyst with deep knowledge of the country, who was interviewed by EUAA, provided the following information on Port Sudan:

'it is very difficult to travel to Port Sudan. The main reason is money because housing is unaffordable, and it is a very expensive city. Even if people have money, they get looted in the way to Port Sudan by either the RSF or the SAF or both, because people must pay at checkpoints. There are no jobs or sources of income or humanitarian presence, and the city is overrun. People from the middle class and with connections with the military can move around or settle in Port Sudan easier... There is lots of security in Port Sudan as well, and strangers are easily noticed; it is very tricky for people who fled from RSF areas'.⁵⁹⁰

The Dutch COI report quoted a confidential source as indicating that 'Sudanese returning by land through SAF territory could be subjected to ethnic profiling. In particular, Arabs from Darfur and Kordofan were at risk of being suspected by the authorities of supporting the RSF, and being treated as such. [...] Individuals seeking to pass through checkpoints in the interior were also subject to ethnic profiling'.⁵⁹¹ The same source indicated, without providing further information, that racial profiling 'played less of a role at Port Sudan airport'.⁵⁹²

The UN FFM for the Sudan indicated that individuals, particularly men, who try to flee the country or various locations within the country are subjected to arbitrary detention by armed groups.⁵⁹³ The RSF and Arab militias, for example, reportedly detain men trying to flee El Geneina and other areas in an effort to avoid being killed, and the SAF reportedly unlawfully

⁵⁸⁷ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 57

⁵⁸⁸ Elbagir Ahmed Abdullah, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

⁵⁸⁹ Elbagir Ahmed Abdullah, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

⁵⁹⁰ Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

⁵⁹¹ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 99

⁵⁹² Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 99

⁵⁹³ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 244



detain men trying to flee Kordofan to South Sudan.⁵⁹⁴ According to the above-mentioned human rights analyst, people are not allowed to leave RSF areas.⁵⁹⁵

The issuance of travel permits for aid workers experience significant delays, particularly for travel into areas not controlled by the government.⁵⁹⁶ Also, understaffing at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has impacted the issuance of visas for humanitarian personnel.⁵⁹⁷ According to a human rights analyst interviewed by EUAA, both the SAF and the RSF have permit systems, but since the SAF inherited the state apparatus, the permit system in areas under their control is more sophisticated.⁵⁹⁸

The USDOS report indicated that after the start of the conflict in April 2023, the migration route crossing through Sudan was disrupted, resulting in fewer migrants transiting the country.⁵⁹⁹ Additional information within the time reference period could not be found among the sources consulted by EUAA within the time constraints of this report.

3.2.2. Access to civil documentation in Port Sudan

The Dutch report indicated that the issuance of passports and the determination of an individual's nationality is the responsibility of the General Administration of Passports and Migration, which falls under the Ministry of Interior of Sudan.⁶⁰⁰ According to confidential sources for the Dutch COI report, '[d]ue to the intense violence, people in the capital Khartoum could no longer apply for documents. Government agencies in charge of issuing documents, including the aforementioned General Administration of Passports and Migration, had relocated to Port Sudan'.⁶⁰¹ Another source indicated that 'identity cards were not available anywhere, and birth certificates could be obtained only in states controlled by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)'.⁶⁰²

The Dutch report indicated that, according to confidential sources, there are 'several' states where it is still possible to apply for a passport, and that these states are usually under the control of the SAF, such as Sennar, Northern, River Nile, White Nile, Al Jazirah, Gedaref, Red Sea, Kassala, North Kordofan, and Blue Nile.⁶⁰³ The same source also indicated that it was possible to apply for a Sudanese passport at Sudanese embassies abroad, including in Cairo,

⁵⁹⁴ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), paras. 244-246

⁵⁹⁵ Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

⁵⁹⁶ UNOCHA, Sudan: Situation Report, 3 November 2024, [url](#), p. 7

⁵⁹⁷ UNOCHA, Sudan: Situation Report, 3 November 2024, [url](#), p. 7

⁵⁹⁸ Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

⁵⁹⁹ USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan, 24 June 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁰⁰ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 46

⁶⁰¹ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 46

⁶⁰² Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 46

⁶⁰³ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 46



Addis Ababa, Doha, Dubai, Juba, Jeddah, and Riyadh.⁶⁰⁴ Passport applications reportedly take over two months to be processed.⁶⁰⁵

3.2.3. Airport and flight connections (domestic and international)

Sources indicated that international flights from Arab countries to Port Sudan were available (e.g. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE).⁶⁰⁶ FlightConnections indicates that Port Sudan has airlines' connections with countries including Turkey, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, and UAE.⁶⁰⁷ FlightRadar indicated that, on 23 December 2024, commercial flights arrived from and departed Port Sudan to cities including Juba (Badr Airlines), Riyadh (Tarco Aviation and Starlink Aviation), Jeddah (Tarco Aviation and Starlink Aviation), Cairo (Egyptair and Badr Airlines), Djibouti (Taquan Air), Addis Ababa (Ethiopian Airlines and Badr Airlines), Doha (Tarco Aviation and Starlink Aviation), and Dubai (Tarco Aviation, Starlink Aviation, and Badr Airlines).⁶⁰⁸

Sources indicated that no commercial domestic flights were operating in the country.⁶⁰⁹ In an interview with EUAA, a human rights analyst with years of experience in the country indicated that in areas under SAF control, people can fly in military cargo flights, but they will have to know someone in the military to gain access and pay for the trip.⁶¹⁰ In an interview with EUAA, Yousra Elbagir Ahmed Abdullah, Africa Correspondent for Sky News, similarly indicated that some people move within Sudan via humanitarian flights, but it is very limited, and added that within Sudan, most people travel by bus, and since land travel is the only way to move within the country, travellers will go through a checkpoint at some point during their journey.⁶¹¹ Sources indicated that the international airport in Khartoum is no longer operational due to heavy fighting in the city.⁶¹² Additional information could not be found among the sources consulted by EUAA within the time constraints of this report.

3.2.4. Information on number and location of checkpoints, and procedures at checkpoints

Sources indicated that Sudan experiences internal travel restrictions due to the many checkpoints (also known as 'toll gates') set up by both the SAF and the RSF.⁶¹³ In an interview with EUAA, a human rights analyst with in-depth expertise on the country indicated that

⁶⁰⁴ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 46

⁶⁰⁵ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 46

⁶⁰⁶ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 57; FlightRadar, PZU/HSPN, Port Sudan New International Airport, Sudan, n.d., [url](#)

⁶⁰⁷ FlightConnections, Flights from Port Sudan (PZU), n.d., [url](#)

⁶⁰⁸ FlightRadar, PZU/HSPN, Port Sudan New International Airport, Sudan, n.d., [url](#)

⁶⁰⁹ Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024; Elbagir Ahmed Abdullah, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

⁶¹⁰ Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

⁶¹¹ Elbagir Ahmed Abdullah, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

⁶¹² Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 57; Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024; Elbagir Ahmed Abdullah, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

⁶¹³ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 57; Elbagir Ahmed Abdullah, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024





checkpoints are 'very common' and that they are used to control the population and also as a system for looting.⁶¹⁴ In an interview with EUAA, Elbagir Ahmed Abdullah indicated that a journey that used to take a few hours, now and due to checkpoints, can take most of the day.⁶¹⁵ Additional information related to Port Sudan could not be found among the sources consulted by EUAA within the time constraints of this report.

3.2.5. Restrictions on access and return to certain areas

IOM indicated that there are increasing reports of forced returns to Sudan from Egypt, with those forcibly returned facing 'extreme and dire conditions', and that there have been reports of deaths due to dehydration along irregular routes.⁶¹⁶ The same source indicated that about 4 000 people cross the border with Chad through Adré every week, most of them from Al Geneina, Ardamata, and West Darfur, and that around 92 % of people cross due to insecurity and lack of food.⁶¹⁷

A human rights analyst interviewed by EUAA indicated that he did not know of particular profiles of people being targeted upon return to Sudan. However, he has knowledge of Sudanese nationals being targeted abroad, particularly in Egypt, by Egyptian security services, mainly due to criticising the UAE, in what appears to be a 'trend of silencing anti-UAE voices abroad'.⁶¹⁸ Additional information could not be found among the sources consulted by EUAA within the time constraints of this report.

(a) Requirements for settling in Port Sudan for returnees from abroad

The Dutch COI report indicated that, upon arrival, 'Sudanese returnees suspected of cooperating with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) were at risk of interrogation and detention'.⁶¹⁹ A human rights analyst interviewed by EUAA indicated that, to his knowledge, information on the situation of returnees was not available, 'but since the situation is very fluid, it is very difficult to determine what happens to people entering Port Sudan from abroad'.⁶²⁰ Additional information could not be found among the sources consulted by EUAA within the time constraints of this report.

⁶¹⁴ Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

⁶¹⁵ Elbagir Ahmed Abdullah, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

⁶¹⁶ IOM, Sudan Regional Response Overview, Mid-year report — January to June 2024, 31 July 2024, [url](#), p. 4

⁶¹⁷ IOM, Sudan Regional Response Overview, Mid-year report — January to June 2024, 31 July 2024, [url](#), p. 5

⁶¹⁸ Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

⁶¹⁹ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 57

⁶²⁰ Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024





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Annex 2: Terms of Reference

The purpose of this report is to provide information relevant for international protection status determination, including refugee status and subsidiary protection, and for use in the development of the EUAA Country Guidance on Sudan.

The general reference period should be **1 February 2024 – 30 November 2024** for the topics already addressed in the aforementioned Country Focus report. For other topics the reference period will be **15 April 2023 – 30 November 2024**.

Research should cover the following:

Country overview

This section should provide a general overview of the crisis background and the current political situation as well as information on the State ability and willingness to provide protection, the rule of law and the administration of justice. Furthermore, it should address the situation of human rights at country level.

Treatment of selected profiles

The research should cover the following profiles:

Political opponents

- Political opposition: overview including who can be considered as a political opponent
- Community leaders, lawyers and human rights activists
- Resistance committees
- Political party members and other perceived opponents (FFC-CC and FFC-Democratic Block)
- Islamists/alleged Islamists
- Protestors
- Defectors from the government

Conscripts, draft evaders, forced recruitment to armed groups

Journalists and other media personnel

- **Humanitarian and health personnel**
- Aid workers
- Healthcare personnel

Ethnic groups

- General overview of the ethnic composition of the country
- Ethnic conflict related profiling:
 - Non-Arab/African in Darfur (update)
 - Nuba in South Kordofan



- **Women and girls**
- General overview of the situation of women and girls in Sudan
- Sexual violence and conflict-related sexual violence
- Forced/early marriage and conflict-related forced/early marriage
- Trafficking in human beings
- FGM

☐ **Children**

- General overview of the situation of children in Sudan
- Child soldiers
- Labour exploitation
- Trafficking in human beings

☐ **LGBTIQ persons (including the legal framework)**

Key socio-economic situation with focus on Port Sudan

The chapters dedicated to socio-economic situation in Port Sudan

☐ **Socio-economic overview**

- Economic situation
- Employment
- Poverty
- Food security
- Housing, water, and sanitation
- Health care
- Education
- Situation of specific groups, where relevant (e.g. women who are divorced/single/widowed, children, orphans, IDPs, returnees, etc.)
- Displacements and returns

☐ **Mobility and admittance**

- Freedom of movement, including impact of ethnic/religious background, gender, place of origin, age, (perceived) political affiliation
- Civil documentation needed for return and moving in Port Sudan
- Airport and flights connections (internal and international)
- Information on number and location of checkpoints, procedures at checkpoints (including possible problems for specific categories of people)
- Requirements for settling in the defined area for returnees from abroad
- Information on accessibility from Port Sudan airport to other locations
- Restrictions on access and return to certain areas (Port Sudan)
- Administrative requirements for settling in Port Sudan





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