Afghanistan Security Situation
Afghanistan – Security Situation

Country of Origin Information Report

August 2022
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Disclaimer

This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019). The report is based on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.

The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist.

Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular application for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position.

‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.

Neither the EUAA, nor any person acting on its behalf, may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained in this report.

On 19 January 2022 the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) became the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA). All references to EASO, EASO products and bodies should be understood as references to the EUAA.

The drafting of this report was finalised on 8 July 2022. Only a few incidents taking place after this date were included in this report, such as the killing of Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in a US-drone attack on 31 July 2022. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in the methodology section of the Introduction.
### Glossary and abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAN</td>
<td>Afghanistan Analysts Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQIS</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Freedom Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDSF/ANSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Defense and Security Forces/ Afghan National Security Forces, an umbrella term which included:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ABF (Afghan Border Force), ALP (Afghan Local Police), ANA (Afghan National Army), AAF (Afghan Air Force), ANP (Afghan National Police), ANCOF (Afghan National Civil Order Force), ASF (Afghan Special Forces), ANA TF (Afghan National Army Territorial Force), NDS (National Directorate of Security)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>Explosive remnants of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETIM</td>
<td>East Turkestan Islamic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA</td>
<td>Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISKP</td>
<td>Islamic State Khorasan Province</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loya Jirga</td>
<td>'Great assembly’, a regular council of elders, leaders, and prominent figures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loya Paktia</td>
<td>'Greater Paktya’, an area encompassing the provinces of Paktya, Paktika and Khost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPVPV</td>
<td>Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mullah</td>
<td>Religious leader/scholar, teacher at a religious school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLFA</td>
<td>National Liberation Front of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRF</td>
<td>National Resistance Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSIA</td>
<td>Afghanistan National Statistics and Information Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded ordnance</td>
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Introduction

The purpose of this report is to provide security-related information relevant for international protection status determination. The report contains information on the general security situation in Afghanistan, as well as information on security-related events on regional and provincial level.

The reference period is 15 August 2021–30 June 2022. The report is to be read in conjunction with two other COI reports published by EUAA in August 2022: Afghanistan – Targeting of Individuals and Afghanistan – Key Socio-economic Indicators in Afghanistan and in Kabul City.

Methodology

This report is an update of the EASO COI report Afghanistan Security Situation first published in January 2015 and updated annually. This report is produced in line with the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019) and the EASO COI Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2019).

Defining the terms of reference

The terms of reference were defined by EUAA and were based on inputs on information needs from country of origin information (COI) and policy experts in EU+ countries within the framework of a Country Guidance development on Afghanistan. The terms of reference are available in Annex 2: Terms of Reference.

Collecting information

In accordance with the EASO COI Report Methodology, the content of this report relies on a range of different open-source material, as well as interviews and email contacts with oral sources. Information was mainly gathered from public COI reports of national migration administrations, media reports, research articles, reports by international organisations, and international non-governmental organisations.

Quality control

The report was peer reviewed by COI specialists from EU+ countries mentioned in the Acknowledgements section, and internally by EUAA. All comments made by reviewers were taken into consideration and most of them were implemented in the final draft. Some information was added after the peer review during the finalisation of the report. The two main reports added are: report by United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) ‘Human Rights in Afghanistan, 15 August 2021 – 15 June 2022’, which is the first report released by UNAMA since the Taliban takeover of power in Afghanistan, and the report the

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3 EUAA COI reports are available via EUAA COI Portal, url
4 EASO, EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, June 2019, url
5 EASO, Writing and Referencing Guide for EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, June 2019, url

Sources

In accordance with the EASO COI Report Methodology the content of this report relies on a range of different open-source material. In accordance with the EASO COI Report Methodology oral sources were interviewed and contacted via email to fill in gaps in available written information. Material from interviews with oral sources for the EASO COI report: Afghanistan – Country Focus (January 2022) was also used for this report. Some sources were anonymised upon their own request. All sources are outlined in the Bibliography.

For information on security incidents and casualties/fatalities, data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED)\(^6\) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)\(^7\) have been used.

ACLED is a project collecting, analysing and mapping information on ‘dates, actors, locations, fatalities, and types of all reported political violence and protest events around the world’.\(^8\) For Afghanistan, ACLED covers political violence and protests spanning from January 2017 to the present.\(^9\) Each week, ACLED reviews around 110 sources in English, Dari/Farsi, Pashto, and Arabic on political violence in Afghanistan and collects the information into a database.\(^10\) The reference period for the ACLED data in this report is from 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022. EUAA downloaded the ACLED curated data files on Central Asia and the Caucasus, including Afghanistan, on 2 August 2022.

ACLED methodology applied for coding and monitoring of the data is explained in detail in its Codebook and in a specific methodology for Afghanistan.\(^11\) As ACLED points out, the reader should, however, be aware of some limitations in the data. These limitations, as described by ACLED, are:

‘the first is that most of the data is gathered based on publicly available, secondary reports. This means that the data is in part a reflection of the coverage and reporting priorities of media and international organisations. One of the effects of this is that it may under-estimate the volume of events of non-strategic importance (for example, low-level communal conflict, or events in very isolated areas). We work to address this possibility by triangulating data sources to include humanitarian and international organisation reports, rather than media alone; and by conducting ground-truthing exercises in which

\(^6\) ACLED, The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project - Bringing clarity to crisis, n.d., url
\(^7\) UCDP, Department of Peace and Conflict Research – Uppsala University, Sweden, n.d., url
\(^8\) ACLED, About ACLED, n.d., url
\(^9\) ACLED, ACLED Methodology and Coding Decisions around Political Violence and Demonstrations in Afghanistan (Version 5), February 2022, url, p. 3
\(^10\) ACLED, ACLED Methodology and Coding Decisions around Political Violence and Demonstrations in Afghanistan (Version 5), February 2022, url, p. 8
we present data to local organisations and partners to assess its validity among people working directly in conflict-affected contexts.\textsuperscript{12}

Therefore, ACLED’s figures in this report are to be considered as an estimate and indication of trends in violence over a given period of time.\textsuperscript{13} ACLED provides also an estimated number of casualties for each security incident, noting although that ‘fatalities data are typically the most biased, and least accurate, component of any conflict data’ and ‘should be treated as “reported fatalities”’.\textsuperscript{14}

For the purpose of this report, only the following types of events recorded by ACLED were included as security incidents for the analysis of the security situation in Afghanistan:

- ‘Battles’: ‘ACLED defines a battle as “a violent interaction between two politically organized armed groups at a particular time and location.” Battles can occur between armed and organised state, non-state, and external groups, and in any combination therein. There is no fatality minimum necessary for inclusion.’\textsuperscript{15} “The following sub-event types are associated with the “Battles” event type and are designated according to the outcome of the battle event: “Armed clash”, “Government regains territory”, and “Non-state actor overtakes territory”.\textsuperscript{16}

- ‘Violence against civilians’: ‘ACLED defines “Violence against civilians” as violent events where an organised armed group deliberately inflicts violence upon unarmed non-combatants. [...] “Violence against civilians” includes attempts at inflicting harm (e.g. beating, shooting, torture, rape, mutilation, etc.) or forcibly disappearing (e.g. kidnapping and disappearances) civilian actors. The following sub-event types are associated with the “Violence against civilians” event type: “Sexual violence”, “Attack”, and “Abduction/forced disappearance”.\textsuperscript{17}

- ‘Explosions/remote violence’: ‘ACLED defines “Explosions/Remote violence” as “one-sided violent events in which the tool for engaging in conflict creates asymmetry by taking away the ability of the target to respond”. [...] The following sub-event types are associated with the “Explosions/Remote violence” event type: “Chemical weapon”, “Air/drone strike”, “Suicide bomb”, “Shelling/artillery/missile attack”, “Remote explosive/landmine/IED”, and “Grenade”.\textsuperscript{18}

ACLED identified in its 2021 Codebook three codes for the geo-precision of events:

‘If the report notes a particular town, and coordinates are available for that town, the highest precision level “1” is recorded. If the source material notes that activity took place in a small part of a region, and notes a general area, a town with georeferenced coordinates to represent that area is chosen and the geo-precision code will note “2” for “part of region”. If activity occurs near a town or a city, this same precision code is

\textsuperscript{12} ACLED, Guide for Media Users, January 2015, url; pp. 9-10
\textsuperscript{13} ACLED, ACLED Methodology and Coding Decisions around Political Violence and Demonstrations in Afghanistan (Version 5), February 2022, url, p. 3
\textsuperscript{14} ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook, January 2021, url, p. 32
\textsuperscript{15} ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook, January 2021, url, p. 8
\textsuperscript{16} ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook, January 2021, url, p. 9
\textsuperscript{17} ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook, January 2021, url, p. 12
\textsuperscript{18} ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook, January 2021, url, p. 10
employed. If a larger region is mentioned, the closest natural location noted in reporting (like “border area”, “forest” or “sea”, among others) is chosen to represent the region – or a provincial capital is used if no other information at all is available – and is noted with precision level “3”. No ACLED event is associated with the “country” as the smallest location unit available.¹⁹

For the purposes of this report only the security incidents with the geo-precision at level 1 and 2 were taken into account.

EUAA provided analytical graphs on security incidents based on publicly available ACLED data. However, due to the decrease in the number of security incidents after the Taliban takeover on 15 August 2021, the graphs were included only for the provinces where more than 50 security incidents were recorded.

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) is a ‘data collection project for civil war’.²⁰ UCDP provided EUAA with a Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) covering the period from 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022.

UCDP’s methodology is explained on its website as well as its Georeferenced Event Dataset Codebook.²¹ The unit of analysis of UCDP is the ‘event’.²² UCDP defines an event as ‘[a]ny incident where armed force was used by an organised actor against another organized actor, or against civilians, resulting in at least 1 direct death at a specific location and a specific date’.²³ This leads, among other things, to ‘seemingly low estimates’ because ‘a number of factors can preclude a potential conflict event from inclusion in the UCDP GED’, for example, unclear actors or uncertainty about whether fatalities occurred.²⁴

UCDP provides three estimates for fatalities for each event – a low estimate, a best estimate, and a high estimate. In addition, UCDP provides an estimate of the number of civilian casualties.²⁵ According to UCDP, ‘it is quite likely that there are more fatalities than given in the best estimate, but it is very unlikely that there are fewer’.²⁶

Because of their definition of event, several types of violent incidents recorded by ACLED do not meet the criteria of UCDP, such as the option to assign violent events to “Unidentified Armed Groups”. As a result, the number of incidents recorded by ACLED can be significantly higher than the number of incidents recorded by UDCP. For the purposes of this report, ACLED and UCDP data was used to provide figures for the number of security incidents and overall recorded fatalities countrywide and for each province.

¹⁹ ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook, January 2021, url, p. 29
²⁰ UCDP, About UCDP, n.d., url
²¹ UCDP, UCDP Methodology, n.d., url; UCDP, UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset Codebook (Version 21.1), 2021, url, p. 4
²² UCDP, UCDP Methodology, n.d., url
²³ UCDP, UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset Codebook (Version 21.1), 2021, url, p. 4
²⁴ UCDP, UCDP Methodology, n.d., url
²⁵ UCDP, UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset Codebook (Version 21.1), 2021, url, p. 5
²⁶ UCDP, UCDP Methodology, n.d., url
Due to the lack of regional and/or local news outlets covering Afghanistan extensively, articles published by Pajhwok Afghan News\(^{27}\) and Hasht-e Subh\(^{28}\) were largely used to provide examples of security incidents that had caused civilian casualties. A shift in the reporting tone of Hash-e Subh, particularly when referring to resistance groups in Panjsher Province, was noted during the drafting exercise. Due to difficulties assessing the reliability of this source, case-by-case assessments have been made on the inclusion of reports from Hasht-e Subh. Reporting from Hasht-e Subh was often uncorroborated. Efforts to corroborate the information have been made but this was not always possible.

On internal displacement, the main sources used in the report are the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and the UN International Organization for Migration (IOM). UNOCHA provides information on conflict induced displacement, indicating, however, that numbers related to newly displaced populations due to conflict were still subject to assessment and ‘expected to change as new assessment figures become available’.\(^{29}\) The Displacement Tracking Matrix by IOM ‘tracks and monitors displacement and population mobility’ caused by conflict and natural disaster. The assessments track four target population categories: arrival IDPs, returned IDPs, persons who moved abroad, and returnees from abroad.\(^{30}\) For the period from August to December 2021, an Emergency Event Tracking (EET) assessment was conducted by IOM to track ‘displacement and population movements due to the rapid political transformations in 2021 and its consequences’\(^{31}\).

**Structure and use of the report**

The first part of the report gives an overview of the security situation in Afghanistan in the period between 15 August 2019 and 30 June 2022, focusing on such issues as the structure of the Taliban government, actors, and recent security trends, including regional differences and the impact on civilians. The second part of the report gives a regional description of the security situation (Kabul City and Afghanistan’s 34 provinces).

**Terminology**

In this report the Afghan authorities operating under the Taliban (since August 2021) are described as the *de facto* authorities, as the announced state or interim government have not been internationally recognised. For readability, specific ministries or ministers operating under the Taliban are referred to as, for example, the ‘Taliban Ministry of Interior’ or the ‘Taliban Minister of Foreign Affairs’. Persons working within lower-level authorities, who have been appointed by the Taliban or have returned to work since the takeover are not routinely

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\(^{27}\) Pajhwok Afghan News, Website, n.d., url

\(^{28}\) Hasht-e Subh, Website, n.d., url

\(^{29}\) UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022, url. UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022, url.

\(^{30}\) IOM, Afghanistan - Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November – December 2021), url, p. 1

\(^{31}\) IOM, Afghanistan - Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November – December 2021), url, p. 3
referred to de facto state employees or Taliban officials, but efforts had been made to give clear context in which capacity these persons are working.

The administration of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, that collapsed amid the Taliban takeover on 15 August 2021, is either referred to by its official name or as ‘the previous government’. In cases where the reports refer to the previous government of the Taliban of the 1990’s, this is indicated in the text.

Footnoted citations for documents published by Afghan authorities (typically previously cited as ‘Afghanistan’) are aligned with this terminology. This is to ensure a clear distinction between publications made by the previous elected Afghan government and publications published under the current de facto authorities.

Provinces and districts

The provincial chapters in this report are organised alphabetically and have the following structure: a general description of the province contains information on the geography and population. A section on recent trends in the security situation describes the nature of the violence, targets, locations, and casualties within the timeframe from 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022. Finally, the impact on the civilian population (where the information is available), including conflict-induced displacement, is described in a separate section.

There are a number of provinces and districts for which the administrative boundaries are unclear. For example, it is unclear whether the district of Gizab belongs to Uruzgan or Daykundi province. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) noted in April 2021 that as per presidential decree Gizab District was considered under Uruzgan Province.32 Hasht-e Subh in a September 2021 article mentioned Gizab region of Daykundi Province and explained that ‘Gizab used to be one of the administrative units of Uruzgan province. The Taliban have recently annexed it to Pato district of Daykundi province.’33 It is also unclear whether the district of Ghormach belongs to Badghis or Faryab province. According to UNODC, Ghormach district came in 2017 under the administration of Faryab Province,34 but there are still sources which assign the district to Badghis Province.35

Research limitations

Due to the Taliban takeover in August 2021, research limitations during the drafting of this report were observed. These challenges included: reduced and restricted media coverage, closing of local media outlets and fleeing of journalists, censorship, political interference from the Taliban in the work of journalists, threats and violence toward media workers and outlets, and difficulties verifying source/information reliability and corroborating information, especially

32 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2020, April 2021, url, p. 9
33 Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Affiliates Force Hazaras to Migrate From Daykundi, Central Afghanistan, 14 September 2021, url
34 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2021, March 2022, url, p. 16
35 See, for, example: Xinhua, Floods kill 8, wound over dozen in Afghanistan's Baghlan, Badghis provinces, 5 May 2022, url; Hasht-e Subh, Shortages of Medicine and Medical Staff in Badghis Amid a Human Catastrophe, 10 November 2021, url
from social media sources. Efforts have been made to locate reliable and corroborated information where possible given the limits.

Regarding population figures, there is a 'lack of reliable current disaggregated population data at provincial and district level'. The last national census was conducted in 1979. The numbers published by the de facto Taliban authorities in 2022 are based on the household listing of the years 2003-2005.

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36 RSF, RSF seeks UN Security Council meeting on plight of journalists in Afghanistan, 18 August 2021, url; CNN, The media spotlight in Afghanistan is about to dim as journalists evacuate, 20 August 2021, url; Denmark, DIS, Afghanistan, Taliban’s impact on the population, June 2022, url, p. 8; HRW, Afghanistan: Taliban Threatening Provincial Media, 7 March 2022, url

37 IPC, Afghanistan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis (September 2021 – March 2022), October 2021, url, p. 13

38 Taliban de facto authorities of Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated Population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, p. III
Maps

Map 1. Afghanistan\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{39} UN, Afghanistan Overview Map, 20 May 2020, url
1. General description of the security situation in Afghanistan

1.1. Overview of the security situation

After United States (US) President Joe Biden announced in April 2021 that the US would withdraw all its remaining troops from Afghanistan by September 2021,40 the Taliban started a sweeping advance across large swaths of rural Afghanistan.41 Encountering minimal resistance from the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF), the Taliban forces swiftly regained control over most of the country.42 Following the capture of almost all provincial capitals,43 they entered Kabul on 15 August 2021,44 prompting the collapse of the elected government of the former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.45 On 6 September 2021, the Taliban claimed the capture of the Panjsher Valley, the ‘last remaining enclave of resistance against their rule’,46 and declared the end of its military offensive against the government forces.47 For the first time since 1978, Afghanistan was ‘largely at peace,’48 with the United Nations (UN) reporting a marked decline in security incidents as well as civilian casualties between 19 August and 31 December 2021.49

While the downward trend in security incidents continued during the period from 1 January to 21 May 2022, the UN Secretary-General assessed that the security situation in the country was becoming more and more fragile due to an intensification in attacks by Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), crime-related incidents arising from the country’s deteriorating economic and humanitarian situation,50 and attacks claimed by the National Resistance Front (NRF).51

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40 EPRS, Afghanistan once more under Taliban rule, 2 September 2021, url, p. 1; Feroz, E., Der längste Krieg: 20 Jahre War on Terror [The Longest War: 20 Years of War on Terror], Westend Verlag Gmbh, Frankfurt am Main, 2021, p. 9
42 EPRS, Afghanistan once more under Taliban rule, 2 September 2021, url, p. 1
44 EPRS, Afghanistan once more under Taliban rule, 2 September 2021, url, p. 1
45 Reuters, Ashraf Ghani: departing Afghan president who failed to make peace with Taliban, 16 August 2021, url
46 Al Jazeera, Panjshir, the last pocket of resistance, falls to Taliban, 7 September 2021, url
47 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, url, para. 15
48 AAN, Afghanistan’s conflict in 2021 (2): Republic collapse and Taleban victory in the long-view of history, 30 December 2021, url
49 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, url, para. 15
51 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, url, para. 15; UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, url, para. 38
Besides NRF, a number of other armed resistance groups emerged since the Taliban seized power, although limited information was available about these groups' numerical strength and operational capabilities. Furthermore, there were also reports of tensions between various Taliban factions and tensions and security incidents along several of the country's borders.

As of March 2022, the Taliban were reported to be in control of all the country's 34 provinces. However, no reports from 2022 or the last quarter of 2021 could be found within the time constraints of this report regarding the Taliban's territorial control at district level. A map published by the Long War Journal (LWJ), a website affiliated with the US non-profit think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), indicated that, as of 21 July 2022, the Taliban were controlling all of the country's 407 districts.

It was reported in January 2022 that 'numerous terrorist groups' had a presence in the country and that ISKP had expanded its attacks beyond Kabul and eastern Afghanistan. Two sources, the executive chairman of the former Afghan think tank Institute of War and Peace Studies and LWJ, noted in autumn 2021 that ISKP did not hold any territory. However, an early February 2022 report of the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team to the UN Security Council indicated that the group was in control of 'limited territory in eastern Afghanistan.' In late May 2022, the Monitoring Team noted in its report to the UN Security Council that ISKP might be weaker than previously assessed and 'unable to regain territory.'

NRF-affiliated groups have been operating mainly in Panjsher Province and Andarab District of Baghlan Province but ‘have not made significant territorial inroads’ according to the January

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52 ACLED and APW, Tracking Disorder During Taliban Rule in Afghanistan, A Joint ACLED and APW Report, April 2022, url, p. 9; UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/862-S/2022/485, 15 June 2022, url, para. 3
53 ACLED and APW, Tracking Disorder During Taliban Rule in Afghanistan, A Joint ACLED and APW Report, April 2022, url, p. 9
54 UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, url, para. 17-19; UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, url, para. 15
56 Norway, Landinfo, Afghanistan: Talibans regime – situasjonen etter maktovertakelsen [Afghanistan: the Taliban regime – situation after the takeover of power], 9 March 2022, url, pp. 14, 16
57 LWJ, Map of Afghanistan’s districts, updated daily, last updated 21 July 2022, url
58 UNAMA, SRSG Briefing to the Security Council, 26 January 2022, url, p. 3
60 RFE/RL, AfPak File Podcast: How Serious Is The Islamic State Threat In Afghanistan?, 22 October 2021, url
61 LWJ, In fight against Islamic State, the Taliban holds major advantage, 23 November 2021, url
62 UN Security Council, Twenty-ninth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, S/2022/83, 3 February 2022, url, para. 60
63 UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, url, para. 66
2022 report of the UN Secretary-General. An anonymous international organisation consulted by the Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre (Landinfo) similarly stated that the group did not control any territory as of February/March 2022. Peter Mills, Afghanistan researcher at the US-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW), noted at the end of April 2022 that NRF had shown that they were able to hold some rural areas, remote valleys and mountainous terrain ‘in places like Baghlan, parts of Takhar, Panjsher, parts of Badakhshan.’

1.2. The Taliban government

1.2.1. Political landscape

Following the Taliban takeover of Kabul on 15 August 2022 and the overthrow of the former elected government of Afghanistan, the Taliban on 7 September 2021 announced the restoration of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) and the creation of a ‘caretaker cabinet’ under the leadership of Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada (Mullah Akhundzada), the Taliban’s Amir al-Mu'minin (‘commander of the faithful’, the supreme leader).

As of June 2022, the members of the caretaker cabinet, appointed by the supreme leader through ‘decrees’ that did not require approval from a legislative body, were all from within the Taliban movement. All appointees were men and the vast majority were ethnic Pashtuns, although, as of late September 2021, the cabinet, with a total of 53 members, included two Uzbeks, four Tajiks, one Turkmen, one Hazara, one Nuristani, and one Khwaja. Many of the de facto cabinet members had clerical backgrounds and limited experience in administrative affairs. The idea of including political opposition figures in the cabinet or appointing them to other senior positions of power was publicly dismissed in a November 2021 statement by the Taliban’s acting foreign minister. Many appointees had been members of the previous Taliban government and part of the Rahbari Shura (the Taliban’s leadership council) headed...
by Mullah Akhundzada, and dozens of members of the caretaker government, including the de facto prime minister, his de facto deputies and the de facto foreign minister, are on UN Security Council’s sanctions list.

The Taliban government is headed by Mullah Muhammad Hassan Akhund (Mullah Hassan), one of the founders of the movement and a close confidant of Mullah Omar (d. 2013), the emir of Afghanistan in 1996-2001. As a de facto prime minister, he reports to the supreme leader. The choice of Mullah Hassan, a Kandahari who is influential religiously but not in military terms, has been viewed as a compromise, following tensions between hardliners and more moderate Taliban figures. For more information regarding divisions between various Taliban factions, see section 2.1.3 Internal clashes between Taliban factions.

Two of supreme leader Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada’s deputies, Mullah Omar’s son Mullah Muhammad Yaqub (Mullah Yaqub) and Sirajuddin Haqqani, the leader of the Haqqani network, were respectively appointed to the influential posts of de facto ministers of defence and interior. According to analyst Antonio Giustozzi, Mullah Yaqub had supported the peace negotiations. His Haqqani network, an organisation on the UN Security Council’s sanctions list, is known for having carried out high-profile attacks and suicide missions in Kabul in the past and, as of May 2022, was viewed to maintain the closest ties to Al-Qaeda among the Taliban. Besides the post of de facto minister of interior, the Haqqani Network secured control of the de facto government’s intelligence, passports and migration.
portfolios, including through the appointment of Sirajuddin Haqqani’s uncle Khalil al-Rahman Haqqani as *de facto* minister for refugees and repatriations.\(^{94}\)

In late September 2021, the Taliban suspended the Afghan constitution of 2004. While in late September 2021 they declared to provisionally implement elements of Afghanistan’s Constitution of 1964 (from the era of King Mohammad Zahir Shah, r. 1933 - 1973) that are not in conflict with *Sharia* and the ‘principles of the Islamic Emirate’, a former Afghan cabinet minister who had met with Taliban leaders noted in February 2022 that the Taliban government was ‘not based on any particular constitution’.\(^{97}\)

The Taliban dissolved the country’s two election commissions and several ministries, including the State Ministry for Peace Affairs and the State Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, as well as the Ministry of Justice’s department of political parties (which was responsible for the registration of political parties). In May 2022, the Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of the Constitution, the secretariats of the upper and lower houses of the Afghan Parliament, and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) were also abolished.\(^{99}\)

At the subnational level, senior officials including provincial and district governors, chiefs of police, department heads, and mayors were appointed. As of June 2022, all 34 *de facto* provincial governors were male and affiliated with the Taliban. While subnational positions have been reshuffled multiple times, 27 of the *de facto* governors were Pashtuns, four Tajiks, and one Uzbek, Turkmen and Pashai (Pashayi). Most of the appointees, as noted by the UN Secretary-General, were clerics and religious scholars.\(^{104}\)

In September 2021, several of the country’s major political parties, including the Jamiat-e Islami Party, voiced criticism at the composition of the *de facto* government, decrying that it

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93 UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, [url](#), para. 24
94 AA, Who’s who in Taliban interim government?, 9 September 2021, [url](#); Hasht-e Subh, No One Has the Right to Divide Afghanistan, Says Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani, 1 December 2021, [url]; UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, [url], para. 24
95 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, [url], para. 6
96 VOA, Taliban Say They Will Use Parts of Monarchy Constitution to Run Afghanistan for Now, 28 September 2021, [url]
97 VOA, Taliban Seeking 110,000-Strong Army After 6 Months in Power, 15 February 2022, [url]
98 Afghan Telegraph, Taliban dissolve two ministries and electoral bodies, 24 December 2021, [url]
99 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/862-S/2022/485, 15 June 2022, [url], para. 4
100 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, [url], para. 4
101 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/862-S/2022/485, 15 June 2022, [url], para. 4
102 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, [url], para. 5
103 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/862-S/2022/485, 15 June 2022, [url], para. 4
104 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, [url], para. 5
lacked inclusiveness and that political parties were not represented in it. The same month, NRF, denouncing the de facto government as illegal, announced the intention to declare a parallel government after consulting with political figures. While a few prominent political figures, including former Afghan president Hamid Karzai, remained in Afghanistan and were sometimes consulted by the Taliban, most of the political opposition was located outside the country and reported to be fragmented. In May 2022, at a meeting in Ankara, a group of exiled former Afghan warlords and politicians agreed to form an entity called the Supreme Council of National Resistance for the Salvation of Afghanistan. While the council’s declared aim was ‘to try to solve the problems of Afghanistan through talks’, its founders also called armed resistance against the Taliban ‘legitimate’. As of June 2022, Hasht-e Subh newspaper, however, observed that there was still no meaningful political opposition to the Taliban. For information regarding armed resistance against Taliban rule, please refer to section 2.2. Anti-Taliban resistance groups.

In April 2022, the Taliban announced plans to convene a Loya Jirga (‘great assembly’, a regular council of elders, leaders, and prominent figures) ‘soon’ in order to discuss current issues in the country. The assembly was eventually held in Kabul from 30 June to 2 July 2022. The overwhelming majority of its reportedly 4,500 (exclusively male) attendees were Taliban officials and supporters, most of them Islamic clerics. The meeting concluded with an 11-point resolution, in which the participants pledged allegiance to the Taliban’s supreme leader, called for the recognition of Taliban rule and the unfreezing of Afghan assets by the international community, and declared that any cooperation with ISIS was prohibited and that armed opposition against the Taliban government was rebellion, amongst others. They also declared their support for the Taliban’s policy to not interfere with other countries and to expect the same behaviour from other countries.

1.2.2. State administration

The Taliban’s efforts to present themselves as a government have been limited by a shortage in resources and capacities while the movement has been facing difficulties managing internal divisions. For information regarding divisions between various Taliban factions, see section 2.1.3. Internal clashes between Taliban factions. In January 2022, the UN Secretary-General
stated that the de facto government’s technical and administrative capabilities had been drained by former civil servants fleeing the country or going into hiding, its restrictive policies regarding women’s employment and its lack of funds and uncertain capacity to pay their government employees.\textsuperscript{120} A December 2021 Washington Post article noted that the country was ‘in dire need of educated, experienced bureaucrats to provide people with basic services’\textsuperscript{121} and in November 2021, UNAMA stated that the Taliban had yet to convince large parts of the Afghan population of their ability to govern the country.\textsuperscript{122}

After taking power, the Taliban announced plans to build a regular army mimicking the structure of the former Afghan National Army (ANA), from the level of army corps down to the smallest units. They declared that they wanted ex-ANA personnel to join its ranks, presumably to fill specialist, technical and administrative positions, according to analysts Antonio Giustozzi and Rasha Al Aqeedi.\textsuperscript{123} In late 2021, the Taliban circulated claims that they were to establish a small regular army\textsuperscript{124} of possibly no more than 40,000 men\textsuperscript{125} to defend the country’s borders and counter internal security threats.\textsuperscript{126} However, in May 2022 it was reported that acting defence minister Mullah Yaqub was believed to be envisaging a force of 100,000 to 150,000 troops under his direct command and that the total projected strength for both the Taliban Ministry of Defence’s and the Taliban Ministry of Interior’s forces would be between 300,000 and 350,000. The UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team estimated that this goal would be difficult to achieve in the light of the economic situation.\textsuperscript{127}

In early 2022, media referred to Taliban sources stating that they had around 80,000 army personnel,\textsuperscript{128} assigned to eight corps deployed across the country.\textsuperscript{129} However, the number of fighters in the Taliban’s ranks could not be confirmed independently.\textsuperscript{130} Three special forces battalions (so-called ‘red units’) were reportedly created to combat ISKP: the Badri 313 Battalion (600–700 fighters), the Fateh Force (reportedly 900–1000 fighters), and the Umari Force (manpower strength unknown).\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{120} UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667– S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, url, para. 10
\textsuperscript{121} Washington Post (The), Taliban recruits flood into Afghanistan from neighboring Pakistan as the group works to consolidate control, 18 December 2021, url
\textsuperscript{122} UNAMA, SRSG Briefing to the Security Council, 17 November 2021, url, p. 3
\textsuperscript{123} Giustozzi, A. and Al Aqeedi, R., Security and Governance in the Taliban’s Emirate, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 24 November 2021, url
\textsuperscript{124} Rehman, Z., Taliban quietly forming regular army to make Afghanistan a state, Nikkei Asia, 12 December 2021, url
\textsuperscript{125} Giustozzi, A. and Al Aqeedi, R., Security and Governance in the Taliban’s Emirate, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 24 November 2021, url
\textsuperscript{126} Giustozzi, A. and Al Aqeedi, R., Security and Governance in the Taliban’s Emirate, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 24 November 2021, url
\textsuperscript{127} UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, url, para. 33
\textsuperscript{128} TOLONews, Government to Build 150,000-Member Force, 10 January 2022, url; VOA, Taliban Seeking 110,000-Strong Army After 6 Months in Power, 15 February 2022, url
\textsuperscript{129} TOLONews, Government to Build 150,000-Member Force, 10 January 2022, url
\textsuperscript{130} VOA, Taliban Seeking 110,000-Strong Army After 6 Months in Power, 15 February 2022, url
\textsuperscript{131} UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, url, para. 34
According to an article by analysts Giustozzi and Al Aqeedi, local sources reported in November 2021 that the Taliban were introducing conscription in certain provinces, including Kandahar and Kabul. This information could not be corroborated by other sources consulted for this report. For information on the integration of former ANDSF personnel into the Taliban forces, please refer to section 2.1.2, Transition of former government forces to Taliban command.

The Taliban de facto government has also been seeking to rebuild the country’s air force with aircraft captured from the previous government and former air force personnel still remaining in Afghanistan. It was reported in the first half of 2022 that the Taliban were facing difficulties with repairing and using aircraft without US-trained pilots, crew members and mechanics, as well as parts. According to a Taliban air force commander and former government air force employees cited by the New York Times, at least 4,300 former Afghan Air Force (AAF) members had joined the nascent Taliban air force by March 2022, while others remained in hiding for fear of reprisals. As of May 2022, the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team noted that the Taliban were seen to have eight helicopters and one transport aircraft in service.

The New York Times noted in January 2022 that despite seizing US-supplied arms and equipment, Taliban fighters were ‘still far from being well equipped’. Also, most rank-and-file Taliban fighters, including those who freshly joined the movement in 2021 (when its victory was imminent) and for whom receiving a salary has been a chief concern, were yet to be paid their salaries as of January 2022. The UN Secretary-General similarly stated that, as of June 2022, ‘the majority of troops, in particular in the lower ranks, have received stipend payments only and not salaries’.

After taking over the Ministry of Interior, the Taliban indicated that they were planning to re-establish a police force and appointed police chiefs in the provinces. However, it was reported that since the August 2021 Taliban takeover of power placed the group in control of heavily populated new territories, its forces have been ‘stretched thin’.

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133 US, SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 April 2022, [url], p. 71
134 New York Times (The), Afghan Aviators Hide as Taliban Urge Them to Return to Duty, 13 March 2022, [url]
135 UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, [url], para. 36
136 New York Times (The), Afghan Aviators Hide as Taliban Urge Them to Return to Duty, 13 March 2022, [url]
137 UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, [url], para. 36
138 New York Times (The), On Patrol: 12 Days With a Taliban Police Unit in Kabul, 28 January 2022, [url]
139 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/862-S/2022/485, 15 June 2022, [url], para. 11
141 Washington Post (The), Taliban recruits flood into Afghanistan from neighboring Pakistan as the group works to consolidate control, 18 December 2021, [url]
campaign were released from duty.\textsuperscript{142} In January 2022, the New York Times commented that the Taliban’s post-takeover efforts at policing the country had been ‘ad hoc at best’: local Taliban units were compelled to take up new roles at checkpoints across Afghanistan. And members of this essentially rural former insurgency were now faced with the task of governing and securing large ‘unfamiliar urban centers’ like Kabul.\textsuperscript{143} These urban centres are home to the majority of the country’s population\textsuperscript{144} and were kept out of Taliban hands for many years.\textsuperscript{145}

\subsection*{1.2.3. Implementation of Sharia}

The Taliban \textit{de facto} government suspended the previous Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s constitution (for further details, please refer to section 1.2.1. \textit{Political landscape}) and announced a review of the compliance of existing Afghan laws with \textit{Sharia}.\textsuperscript{146} However, as of early 2022, the applicable legal framework remained unclear.\textsuperscript{147} For information regarding interpretations of \textit{Sharia} law in Afghanistan and the relationship between \textit{Sharia} and statutory law under the former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, see sections 1.1. to 1.4. of EASO’s December 2017 report \textit{Afghanistan Individuals targeted under societal and legal norms.}

After assuming power, the Taliban dismissed the previous judiciary.\textsuperscript{148} The Taliban supreme leader named an acting Minister of Justice, Chief Justice and head of the \textit{de facto} Supreme Court, and later appointed Supreme Court officials as well as an acting attorney general.\textsuperscript{149}

Regarding the administration of justice, the Taliban Minister of Justice declared that the services of judges educated under the previous government were no longer needed. Analysts Giustozzi and Al Aqeedi viewed this as an indication that the Taliban were seeking to export their judicial system of Taliban courts administering justice based on the group’s understanding of Islamic law from the countryside to the urban centres. In this system—described as having been fairly well-received among rural populations—sentences are largely based on oral evidence.\textsuperscript{150}

The Taliban abolished the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and reinstituted the Ministry for Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (MPVPV)\textsuperscript{151} \textit{(Dawat wa Ershad Amr bil-Maruf wa}

\textsuperscript{142} Giustozzi, A. and Al Aqeedi, R., Security and Governance in the Taliban’s Emirate, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 24 November 2021, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{143} New York Times (The), On Patrol: 12 Days With a Taliban Police Unit in Kabul, 28 January 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{144} Washington Post (The), Taliban recruits flood into Afghanistan from neighboring Pakistan as the group works to consolidate control, 18 December 2021, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{145} New York Times (The), On Patrol: 12 Days With a Taliban Police Unit in Kabul, 28 January 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{146} UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, \url{url}, para. 6
\textsuperscript{147} UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, \url{url}, para. 8
\textsuperscript{148} UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, \url{url}, para. 10
\textsuperscript{149} UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, \url{url}, para. 8
\textsuperscript{150} Giustozzi, A. and Al Aqeedi, R., Security and Governance in the Taliban’s Emirate, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 24 November 2021, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{151} HRW, From Taliban to Taliban: Cycle of Hope, Despair on Women’s Rights, 1 November 2021, \url{url}
Nahi al-Munkar\(^{152}\) which had enforced their interpretation of Sharia while they were previously in power.\(^{153}\) The de facto ministry is led by Sheikh Muhammad Khalid Hanafi,\(^{154}\) a religious scholar who worked in the Taliban’s judiciary during the insurgency years. While he has been viewed as a ‘less conservative’ representative of the Taliban, sources at the de facto ministry consulted by AAN noted that there were a variety of clerics within the ranks of the ministry, including figures who are ‘more conservative and hardline when it comes to enforcement’ of Sharia.\(^{155}\)

According to a description by its spokesperson, the de facto ministry ‘has a clear chain of command.’ It consists of three directorates, including ‘a separate department within Kabul.’ The first directorate is responsible for effecting hisbah (community morals) and has ten operatives (muhtasibeen) in each police district. The second directorate ‘reassures the Taliban’s former opponents of their security through the provision of cards that claim to certify their immunity from punishment.’ The third directorate manages complaints about alleged misconduct by Taliban personnel. The ministry is also divided into civilian and military sections, with the military section dealing with the cases of misconduct of personnel of Taliban military forces. London-based independent analyst Ahmed-Waleed Kakar noted that there were ‘widespread concerns among urban Afghans that the ministry might be ‘intent on targeting any social and cultural freedoms that do not align with the Taliban’s vision for an ideal Islamic society’—a vision that is not undisputedly supported by the inhabitants of cities like Kabul. Kakar also noted that there were fierce debates among Taliban members regarding the ‘rights and wrongs’ of social codes that they were supposed to enforce on the streets.\(^{156}\)

The Taliban have issued several decrees and general guidance notes regarding the implementation of Sharia law. In September 2021, the group issued a guidance note that instructed media organisations to avoid publishing content that contradicted Islam and Sharia.\(^{157}\) In March 2022, the Taliban ordered government employees to wear a beard and wear ‘long, loose top and trousers, and a hat or turban’, and it was reported that the Taliban MPVPV employees were ‘patrolling the entrances to government offices’ to monitor employees’ compliance with the new rules.\(^{158}\) In March 2022, the Taliban MPVPV ordered that men and women would visit Kabul’s amusement parks on separate dates.\(^{159}\)

While women were initially ‘still allowed to wear makeup and not required by law to wear a burqa or niqab’,\(^{160}\) in May 2022, the Taliban issued a decree obliging them to be fully covered from head to toe (including their faces) when appearing in public.\(^{161}\) It also stated that women

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\(^{152}\) AAN, Policing Public Morality: Debates on promoting virtue and preventing vice in the Taliban’s second Emirate, AAN, 15 June 2022, url

\(^{153}\) Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022 – Afghanistan, 28 February 2022, url

\(^{154}\) Kakar, A.-W., In Afghanistan, Vice and Virtue Are Front and Center, New Lines Magazine, 25 April 2022, url

\(^{155}\) AAN, Policing Public Morality: Debates on promoting virtue and preventing vice in the Taliban’s second Emirate, 15 June 2022, url

\(^{156}\) Kakar, A.-W., In Afghanistan, Vice and Virtue Are Front and Center, New Lines Magazine, 25 April 2022, url

\(^{157}\) UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, url, para. 6

\(^{158}\) Reuters, Taliban bars government employees without beards from work, 28 March 2022, url

\(^{159}\) RFE/RL/Gandhara, Taliban Gender-Segregates Kabul Fun Parks, Compounding Cutoffs For Girls And Women, 27 March 2022, url

\(^{160}\) Kakar, A.-W., In Afghanistan, Vice and Virtue Are Front and Center, New Lines Magazine, 25 April 2022, url

\(^{161}\) USIP, How the Taliban’s Hijab Decree Defies Islam, 12 May 2022, url
should go outside their homes only when necessary. The decree stipulated a list of punishments for violations, including warnings and summons to a government office to a male head of the household, and—in the case of repeated offences—short-term imprisonment and eventually a court case with further punishments for the male guardian.

At provincial level, provincial de facto departments for the 'promotion of virtue and prevention of vice' issued further policy instructions regarding dress codes, prayers, and gender segregation in public places.

There were instances of Taliban fighters subjecting people to violence or verbal confrontations. A January 2022 New York Times article recounted how a Taliban unit guarding a Shia shrine in the capital confronted, interrogated, and beat teenage boys who were walking in the streets with their girlfriends. These beatings followed a prior argument between the fighters as to whether the boys should be punished physically or only reprimanded verbally. In other cases, men were reportedly stopped and harassed by Taliban fighters for wearing Western style clothes or shaving beards, and women for leaving their homes without a male relative or not wearing a burqa. According a source consulted by Kakar, as of April 2022 taxi drivers were avoiding to carry female passengers out of concerns that patrols from the Taliban MPVPV might accuse them of facilitating prostitution. Drug addicts have reportedly been 'rounded up and taken off the streets' while drug dealers have been 'physically assaulted'. Taliban patrolling Kabul neighbourhoods were reported to sometimes inflict physical punishments on smokers, based on the group's general disapproval of smoking.

Taliban guards have also been involved in identifying smugglers of alcohol. In April 2022, in what was reported as the first court verdict of its kind since the Taliban took power, the Taliban-run Supreme Court informed that seven men were flogged in Kabul after being sentenced by the court to 35 lashes each for offences including sale and consumption of alcohol. For more information on the implementation of Sharia within the de facto state institutions and in everyday life, please refer to EUAA August 2022 report Afghanistan – Targeting of Individuals.

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162 UNAMA, UNAMA Statement on the Hijab Directive by Taliban authorities, 7 May 2022, [url]
163 USIP, How the Taliban’s Hijab Decree Defies Islam, 12 May 2022, [url]
164 Al Jazeera, Afghan women deplore Taliban’s new order to cover faces in public, 8 May 2022, [url]
165 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/862-S/2022/485, 15 June 2022, para. 9
166 Al Jazeera, 100 days of the Taliban, 23 November 2021, [url]
167 New York Times (The), On Patrol: 12 Days With a Taliban Police Unit in Kabul, 28 January 2022, [url]
168 CNN, The Taliban have Afghanistan's justice system in their hands. CNN shows what it's like, 11 October 2021, [url]
169 Telegraph (The), Taliban 'flog young Afghans for wearing jeans', 22 August 2021, [url]
170 HRW and SJSU, Afghanistan: Taliban Abuses Cause Widespread Fear, 23 September 2021, [url]
171 openDemocracy, I travelled around Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. This is what I saw, 24 November 2021, [url]
172 Kakar, A-W., In Afghanistan, Vice and Virtue Are Front and Center, New Lines Magazine, 25 April 2022, [url]
173 New York Times (The), On Patrol: 12 Days With a Taliban Police Unit in Kabul, 28 January 2022, [url]
174 New York Times (The), On Patrol: 12 Days With a Taliban Police Unit in Kabul, 28 January 2022, [url]
175 AFP, Seven Afghan men flogged on Taliban-run Supreme Court order, 20 April 2022
1.2.4. Ability to secure law and order

While there was a lack of comprehensive data on crime rates, it was reported that the immediate aftermath of the Taliban takeover of power saw a drop in the crime rate. Whereas under the previous government, robberies and kidnappings were reportedly a ‘near-daily occurrence’ in Kabul, the Taliban immediately made their presence known through street patrols. They halted street fights, arrested alleged kidnappers and summoned crime suspects to police stations while going after those who ignored their summons. For lesser crimes, they authorised local elders to hand out judgments based on their understanding of Islamic law.

By the second half of October 2021, sources began to report a rise in the number of crimes, with Kabul residents pointing to an increase in armed robberies, kidnappings and extortion described as occurring on a daily basis in the capital. During September and October 2021, some 40 businesspersons were abducted in the capital as well as in Balkh, Kunduz, Nangarhar, Kandahar, and Herat provinces. Several of these abductees were reportedly killed while fighting with the kidnappers. In early November 2021, an Afghan professor of law interviewed by the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) assessed that the overall level of crime had in fact not decreased since the Taliban assumed power. Several sources interviewed by DIS for its June 2022 report stated that the crime levels ‘have risen concurrently with the deepening of the humanitarian and economic crisis in the country,’ particularly affecting the capital and other big urban areas, which saw a rise of robberies, kidnappings, and thefts after 15 August 2021. At the same time, Amina Khan, the Director of Centre for Afghanistan, Middle East & Africa (CAMEA) at the Institute of Strategic Studies (ISSI), Islamabad, noted that while ‘people are engaging themselves in petty crimes to sustain themselves,’ ‘the scale of serious crimes such as kidnapping’ declined ‘because people are afraid of the punishments from the Taliban.’

It was reported that some abuses were occurring within the context of the Taliban’s law enforcement efforts, including executions of former ANDSF and intelligence personnel, robberies in houses perpetrated by armed men identifying themselves as Taliban and contract killings by rank-and-file Taliban members seeking ‘to earn cash as they are not being

176 Denmark, DIS, Afghanistan: Recent events, December 2021, url, pp. 56, 62
177 Washington Post (The), Taliban recruits flood into Afghanistan from neighboring Pakistan as the group works to consolidate control, 18 December 2021, url; Ariana News, Four suspected kidnappers captured in Kabul, hostages freed, 2 October 2021, url
178 Al Jazeera, Taliban: From Afghanistan’s rugged mountains to policing streets, 5 October 2021, url
179 Ariana News, Four suspected kidnappers captured in Kabul, hostages freed, 2 October 2021, url
180 Al Jazeera, Taliban: From Afghanistan’s rugged mountains to policing streets, 5 October 2021, url
181 FP, Afghan Crime Wave Adds to Taliban Dystopia, 29 October 2021, url; Washington Post (The), Taliban recruits flood into Afghanistan from neighboring Pakistan as the group works to consolidate control, 18 December 2021, url; UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, url, para. 15
182 FP, Afghan Crime Wave Adds to Taliban Dystopia, 29 October 2021, url
183 TOLOnews, Kidnapping Cases Surge in Afghanistan, 28 October 2021, url
184 Denmark, DIS, Afghanistan: Recent events, December 2021, url, p. 51
185 Denmark, DIS, Afghanistan: Taliban’s impact on the population, June 2022, url, p. 12
186 Denmark, DIS, Afghanistan, Taliban’s impact on the population, June 2022, url, p. 80
187 New Yorker (The), The Taliban Confront the Realities of Power, 21 February 2022, url
188 Hash-t-e Subh, Kabul Residents Tired of Increasing Armed Robberies, 21 October 2021, url
In February 2022, the Taliban began to conduct house-to-house searches on a large scale in Kabul and several neighbouring provinces with the declared aim of seeking out weapons and criminals who were allegedly behind a recent string of kidnappings and robberies. Some residents, however, reportedly indicated that the Taliban were also searching for individuals linked to the former Afghan government or the international forces, or even specifically targeting former security officials in the name of combating crime. Following these campaigns, the Taliban Ministry of Interior in May 2022 claimed that incidences of theft, kidnapping, and other crimes in the country had dropped to zero. However, Hasht-e Subh emphasised that this claim still did not reflect the situation in urban areas.

According to a representative of an international organisation interviewed by DIS for its June 2022 report, the crime level in Afghanistan was ‘underreported’ and, for instance, the cases of kidnappings were frequently resolved internally between the involved parties. The source also noted that the Taliban lacked ‘necessary education as police enforcement’ and had no experience with ‘regular policing.’ Therefore, the Taliban used ‘a deterrence strategy’ in some instance, e.g., in Herat, when the bodies of kidnappers were publicly displayed.

In November 2021, an anonymous London-based journalist told DIS that safety in rural areas had improved since the Taliban takeover. The drop in attacks involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs) ensured that roads were more secure, allowing people to travel to districts that had previously been considered too dangerous or inaccessible. According to an anonymous international NGO in Kabul consulted by the Swedish Migration Agency, as of March 2022 travelling along the main roads normally did not pose a problem during daytime. However, travel along smaller roads carried a greater risk of encountering explosive remnants from the past conflict. The same source was also quoted as saying that unknown risks may exist in some areas that previously could not be reached due to the conflict, and that some local conflicts remained, such as tribal conflicts, land disputes, and conflicts related to Kuchi (Pashtun nomads in southern and eastern Afghanistan) migration.

In February 2022, the Taliban had issued new rules mandating that alleged criminals should be tried three times and that death penalties must be signed by the Taliban supreme leader.

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189 FP, Afghan Crime Wave Adds to Taliban Dystopia, 29 October 2021, [url]
190 VOA, Taliban Defend Door-to-door Searches in Kabul, Ban Future Evacuations of Afghans, 27 February 2022, [url]
191 VOA, Taliban Defend Door-to-door Searches in Kabul, Ban Future Evacuations of Afghans, 27 February 2022, [url]
192 Al Jazeera, Taliban conducting house-to-house sweep across Afghan capital, 27 February 2022, [url]
193 DW, Taliban conduct sweeping house-to-house searches, 16 March 2022, [url]
194 VOA, Taliban Defend Door-to-door Searches in Kabul, Ban Future Evacuations of Afghans, 27 February 2022, [url]
195 Hasht-e Subh, Crime Rates in Afghanistan Remain High, 22 May 2022, [url]
196 Denmark, DIS, Afghanistan, Taliban’s impact on the population, June 2022, [url], pp. 12-13, 68
197 Denmark, DIS, Afghanistan: Recent events, December 2021, [url], p. 55
198 MRG, Kuchis, n.d., [url]
199 Sweden, Migrationsverket, Afghanistan: Säkerhetsläget efter talibanrörelsens maktövertagande [Afghanistan: Security situation after Taliban takeover of power] (version 1.0), 29 April 2022, [url], p. 20
200 New Yorker (The), The Taliban Confront the Realities of Power, 21 February 2022, [url]
In June 2022, the UN Secretary-General noted that ‘the justice system, including the courts, remained challenged by structural, resource and capacity constraints and by a lack of clarity regarding the applicable legal framework.’ As a consequence, court procedures ‘tended to be delayed, increasing the number of pretrial detainees.’

1.2.5. Protests and demonstrations

Following the Taliban takeover of power, protests by Afghan women against restrictions imposed by the Taliban de facto government took place in early September 2022 in Herat, Kabul, and Mazar-e-Sharif. The de facto authorities cracked down on these protests using tear gas and beating several protesters. On 8 September 2021, they issued an instruction banning unauthorised assemblies. On 11 September 2021, some 300 women (allegedly students) at a university in Kabul held a protest in support of the Taliban’s policies on gender segregation, criticising women who had protested in the streets a few days earlier.

Most protests for women’s rights reportedly largely abated during the last quarter of 2021, with women’s groups increasingly resorting to meeting in private settings and disseminating their messages through social media. Meanwhile, some protests continued, primarily involving ‘teachers and health and other workers protesting the non-payment of salaries.’

Protests by women’s rights activists reportedly increased in January 2022 when around 25 women held an anti-Taliban rally in Kabul. Several female participants of the protests and their relatives were reportedly ‘abducted from their homes, workplaces or off the streets’ and went missing for 25 days; the Taliban denied their involvement in these abductions. On 11 February 2022, 29 women activists and their children were arrested while seeking refuge in a women’s shelter in Kabul and detained for more than two weeks. In late March 2022, around two dozen mainly female protesters gathered near the Taliban Ministry of Education in Kabul, demanding the reopening of girls’ secondary schools. The Taliban refrained from intervening.

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201 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, para. 38
202 HRW, Afghan Women Protest Against Taliban Restrictions, 7 September 2021
204 New York Times (The), Taliban Fighters Crush a Women’s Protest Amid Flickers of Resistance, 4 September 2021
206 AFP, Veiled protest: Afghan women rally in support of the Taliban, 11 September 2021
207 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, para. 38
208 Women’s Agenda, Female anti-Taliban activists have finally been released, 14 February 2022
209 UN OHCHR, Press briefing notes on Afghanistan, 1 February 2022
210 AI, There is a window of opportunity to negotiate for the rights of Afghan women, but it is rapidly closing, 1 April 2022
211 AI, There is a window of opportunity to negotiate for the rights of Afghan women, but it is rapidly closing, 1 April 2022
212 BBC News, Afghanistan: Protesters urge Taliban to reopen girls’ schools, 26 March 2022
In early May 2022, several dozen women's rights activists protested against the Taliban decree mandating women to wear the burqa in public. It was reported that Taliban operatives sought to intimidate the protesters, threatening to use lethal violence against them.\(^\text{213}\) In late May 2022, some two dozen women held another protest in Kabul at the Ministry of Education against the restrictions on their rights. The *de facto* authorities ended the rally by deploying Taliban operatives in plain clothes who confiscated the mobile phones of some of the protesters and prevented photos and videos from being taken.\(^\text{214}\) For more information on treatment of protesters by the *de facto* authorities, please refer to [EUAA August 2022 report Afghanistan – Targeting of Individuals](#).

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\(^{213}\) RFE/RL/Gandhara, Afghan Women Protest New Burqa Decree Despite Taliban Threats, 10 May 2022, [url](#)

\(^{214}\) AFP, Afghan women demand education and work at Kabul protest, 29 May 2022
2. **Actors**

2.1. **Taliban**

2.1.1. **Geographic presence and structure**

(a) **Presence of Taliban forces**

As of spring/summer 2022, the Taliban were in control of all the country’s 34 provinces\(^{215}\) and sources indicate that no other actor constituted an existential threat to the Taliban’s authority.\(^{216}\) In June 2022, International Crisis Group stated that the Taliban exercised territorial control on a level not experienced by any single political actor since the 1970s.\(^{217}\)

The Taliban forces, whose size could not be independently confirmed since the takeover in August 2021,\(^{218}\) are reportedly ‘stretched thin’ across the country, as their victory meant they had to control densely populated urban areas.\(^{219}\) As of November 2021, Taliban troops were reportedly concentrated in the cities, particularly Kabul and in Panjsher Province, and in areas bordering Tajikistan.\(^{220}\) In Kabul City, Taliban patrols were reported to have become a common sight.\(^{221}\)

However, as reported by Giustozzi and Al Aqeedi, the Taliban were reported to be ‘only able to deploy 20-30 men’ per district, with activities limited to guarding facilities at the district centres and carrying out occasional patrols. In the villages, where Taliban were rarely seen, local representatives were appointed and tasked with reporting to the Taliban. While in some parts of Afghanistan the Taliban seemed ‘satisfied with this level of garrisoning’, in others they asked mullahs (religious scholars/leaders) and village elders to set up new small-scale Taliban militias to police the areas.\(^{222}\)

As of spring 2022, Kate Clark, co-director of the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), indicated that the Taliban’s control extended to the country’s border areas as there were no armed opposition groups holding any territory next to a border.\(^{223}\) In Badghis Province
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(bordering Turkmenistan),224 one source reported that the Taliban’s Herat-based 207th Corps (Al-Farooq Corps)225 deployed three battalions to Ab Kamari, Jawand, and Tagab Alam districts in February 2022,226 while another source indicated that four new battalions were created in the province as part of the 207th Corps.227 Another battalion of the 207th corps was sent to Parchaman District of Farah Province (bordering Iran) the same month.228

Moreover, Mohammad Natiq, a freelance journalist and activist, noted that the Taliban de facto government’s chief of staff claimed that over 10 000 Taliban troops had been placed in Badakhshan Province229 (bordering Tajikistan, Pakistan, and China) where a new unit—the Omar Salis Division—was created in February 2022,230 as well as in Baghlan, Takhar, and Kunduz, with the aim of suppressing NRF activity.231 This information could not be corroborated and no further details could be found regarding the source’s credentials. According to the ISW, new battalions were also created in Kapisa Province’s Kohistan District and in Nangarhar Province. In addition, the Taliban’s Paktya-based 203rd Corps deployed 1500 troops to Bamyan Province.232 A new anti-insurgency security unit was reportedly created in Badakhshan in April 2022.233

In February 2022 in Panjsher Province, described as ‘the only significant pocket’ of anti-Taliban resistance in the country,234 the Taliban reportedly deployed an ‘several thousand’ fighters including its Red Units (special forces) in response to continued attacks from NRF fighters.235 According to a March 2022 report, Taliban troops had been ‘stationed even in the most remote valleys of Panjsher’.236 Although in May 2022 NRF claimed that it had seized ‘the main road, outposts and villages’ in three unnamed districts of the province, this claim was rejected by the Taliban.237 As the New York Times noted, such ‘competing, one-sided narratives’238 have made it difficult to assess incidents claimed by NRF.239

225 Pajhwok Afghan News, Afghan army corps renamed by defence minister, 8 November 2021, url
226 ISW, Afghanistan in Review: Taliban and opposition groups prepare for a new spring fighting season in Afghanistan, 9 March 2022, url
228 ISW, Afghanistan in Review: Taliban and opposition groups prepare for a new spring fighting season in Afghanistan, 9 March 2022, url
229 Mohammad Natiq [Twitter], posted on: 14 February 2022, url
231 Mohammad Natiq [Twitter], posted on: 14 February 2022, url
232 ISW, Afghanistan in Review: Taliban and opposition groups prepare for a new spring fighting season in Afghanistan, 9 March 2022, url
233 Ariana News, Badakhshan establishes new anti-insurgency unit, 19 April 2022, url
234 Washington Post (The), Inside the Taliban’s secret war in the Panjshir Valley, 8 June 2022, url
235 ISW, Afghanistan in Review: Taliban and opposition groups prepare for a new spring fighting season in Afghanistan, 9 March 2022, url
236 Glinski, S., Afghanistan six months on from the Taliban takeover – photo essay, Guardian (The), 4 March 2022, url
237 AFP, Offensive launched against Taliban rule: armed group, 7 May 2022
238 Washington Post (The), Inside the Taliban’s secret war in the Panjshir Valley, 8 June 2022, url
239 New York Times (The), Taliban Search Operation Echoes Resented U.S. Tactics, 4 March 2022, url
(b) Structure of the Taliban forces

The Taliban’s supreme leader, Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, has been the movement’s ‘ultimate authority’ on all religious, political, and military matters. Prior to the Taliban takeover of power in August 2021, the military chain of command fell under the Taliban’s Military Affairs Commission. This entity was dominated by two of the supreme leader’s deputies, Mullah Yaqoob and head of Taliban military operations, and Sirajuddin Haqqani, leader of the Haqqani network. The Military Affairs Commission functioned in ways similar to a government ministry, with ‘representatives at the zonal, provincial and district levels’. Moving up the chain of command from the lowest level, each district-level Taliban commander answered to a provincial command. Three or more provincial commands reportedly formed one of seven regional ‘circles’. These ‘circles’ were overseen by two deputy heads of the Military Affairs Commission, one responsible for the Taliban’s ‘western zone’ of military command (comprising 21 provinces) and the other for the ‘eastern zone’ (13 provinces). The US Institute of Peace (USIP) assessed that this splitting of authority over military affairs between Yaqoob and Haqqani was apparently solidified by their respective appointments as the Taliban interior and defence minister in September 2021.

As the movement sought to ‘adapt from a decentralized, flexible insurgency to a state authority’ after its takeover of power, an anonymous Afghanistan-based security analyst consulted by Deutsche Welle (DW) indicated that there was a lack of clarity among Taliban fighters regarding the movement’s military structures. In many cases, there was no clearly discernible chain of command. This was reportedly most apparent in Kabul, where the anonymous security analyst was quoted as saying that there were cases where several Taliban commanders were claiming to be in charge of the same area or issue. While the previous Taliban Military Affairs Commission used to be in command of all Taliban fighters, after the group seized control of the country there was uncertainty among fighters on the ground as to whether they would be ‘under the Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of Interior Affairs’, a local commander in Nuristan Province told DW.

In October 2021, the Taliban announced commanders for their new military corps. The following month, the Taliban Ministry of Defence announced that the armed forces consisted of the following eight military corps: the 313th Central Corps in Kabul, the 209th Corps in Balkh (‘Al-Fatah Corps’), the 217th Corps in Kunduz (‘Omari Corps’), the 205th Corps in Kandahar (‘Al-
Badr Corps'), the 215th Corps in Helmand ('Azm Corps'), the 201st Corps in Laghman ('Khalid Bin Walid'), the 203rd Corps in Paktya ('Mansoori Corps') and the 207th Corps in Herat ('Al-Farooq Corps'). However, it was reported that the exact structure of these forces was unclear.

The Taliban also operated special forces units, including the reportedly 5,000-strong Badri 313 unit which was formed by the Haqqanis (the name ‘Badri 313’ is reportedly often used interchangeably with other terms used to refer to the Taliban’s special forces, such as the Red Unit). It was reported that the Badri 313 unit may have evolved into the Kabul-based 313th Central Corps mentioned above. Another special forces unit, the 200-strong Yarmouk 60 Special Forces Battalion of the Haqqani-led Ministry of Interior, was first mentioned in November 2021 and officially confirmed in January 2022. Indeed, the Haqqani Network (which has its power base among Pashtuns in south-eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal region) has been described as the Taliban’s ‘best militarily equipped faction’. According to an assessment by the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team in May 2022, the network ‘now largely controls security in Afghanistan, including the security of the capital, Kabul’, where Haqqani special forces operate military bases. In February 2022, the Ministry of Interior reportedly created a special unit comprising 500 men to monitor checkpoints and conduct night patrols tasked with ‘preventing armed robberies and monitoring the activities of the security forces’.

In December 2021, a 170-member unit within Special Forces was reportedly created to protect educational institutions.

For more information on the structure of the Taliban forces, see chapter 1.2.2. Security Institutions of EASO January 2022 report Afghanistan – Country Focus.

### 2.1.2. Transition of former government forces to Taliban command

On 17 August 2021, the Taliban declared a ‘general amnesty’ for all employees of the former government of Afghanistan, urging them to return to their workplaces. Members of the former ANDSF units were requested to register with the Taliban to obtain a letter guaranteeing their safety. Under this amnesty programme, those who registered were

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252 KP, Taliban retitles all military corps in Afghanistan, 8 November 2021, [url](url)
253 DW, Afghanistan: What will the Taliban do without an enemy to fight?, 11 October 2021, [url](url)
254 Giustozzi, A. and Al Aqeedi, R., Security and Governance in the Taliban’s Emirate, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 24 November 2021, [url](url)
255 LWJ, Taliban’s special forces outfit providing ‘security’ at Kabul airport, 22 August 2021, [url](url)
256 BBC Monitoring, Afghan Taliban release video of new special forces, 15 February 2022
257 Islamic Emirate Of Afghanistan [Twitter], posted on: 16 January 2022, [url](url)
258 RFE/RL/Gandhara, Taliban’s ‘Mullahcratic’ Government: Militants Fail To Form Inclusive Administration, 8 September 2021, [url](url)
259 UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, para. 24
260 New Yorker (The), The Taliban Confront the Realities of Power, 21 February 2022, [url](url)
261 TOLOnews, New Special Unit to Increase Kabul Security, Monitor Checkpoints, 22 February 2022, [url](url)
262 KP, Taliban creates police unit for protecting educational institutes, 25 December 2021, [url](url)
263 Al Jazeera, Taliban offers amnesty, promises women’s rights and media freedom, 17 August 2021, [url](url); Shafaq News, Taliban declare ‘general amnesty’ for government officials in Afghanistan, 17 August 2021, [url](url)
'screened for ties to particular military, police, militia, and special forces units, or to commanders or former provincial authorities,'\textsuperscript{264}

With the aim of enhancing expertise in the Taliban ranks, the \textit{de facto} government launched campaigns to recruit former Afghan National Army (ANA) personnel, former members of the security authorities,\textsuperscript{265} and military pilots.\textsuperscript{266} In February 2022, acting defence minister Mullah Yaqoob declared that ‘professional’ Afghans who were employed with the previous government and those whom the former government sent abroad for military training could now join the new army that was in the process of being formed.\textsuperscript{267}

While Al Jazeera emphasised that there was ‘little evidence’ of former officers and soldiers being integrated into the Taliban ranks,\textsuperscript{268} open-source-based reporting by the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), cited by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in January 2022, indicated that an unspecified number of ex-ANDSF members had ‘joined Taliban security forces at lower levels’, alongside civilians.\textsuperscript{269} It was noted that former Afghan security forces personnel were not allowed to take up leadership positions after joining the Taliban forces.\textsuperscript{270} Almost all women who had previously been working in the security forces were dismissed, ‘except those serving in detention facilities and assisting with body searches’.\textsuperscript{271} At the same time, there were some reported cases of former Afghan army medical specialists who were appointed to senior (medical) posts within the Taliban defence ministry.\textsuperscript{272}

As of March 2022, at least 4 300 former Afghan Air Force personnel, including 33 pilots, had reportedly joined the \textit{de facto} government’s nascent air force. Pilots who joined the Taliban ranks told the New York Times in March 2022 that they had not been harmed or threatened. However, they had not been paid their salaries either and lacked full-time work.\textsuperscript{273} Indeed, the UN Secretary-General stated that as of June 2022, the majority of troops have not received salaries but stipend payments only.\textsuperscript{274}

A May 2022, the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team assessed that overall, these recruitment efforts by the Taliban were not successful given that Taliban members were involved in revenge killings and abductions of former ANDSF personnel, providing these

\textsuperscript{264} HRW, “No forgiveness for people like you”, 30 November 2021, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{265} UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, \url{url}, para. 35
\textsuperscript{266} UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, \url{url}, para. 35; New York Times, Afghan Aviators Hide as Taliban Urge Them to Return to Duty - The New York Times, 13 March 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{267} US, SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 April 2022, \url{url}, p. 70
\textsuperscript{268} Al Jazeera, Taliban to create Afghanistan ‘grand army’ with old regime troops, 22 February 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{269} US, SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 April 2022, \url{url}, p. 70
\textsuperscript{270} UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/862-S/2022/485, 15 June 2022, \url{url}, para. 11
\textsuperscript{271} Al Jazeera, Taliban to create Afghanistan ‘grand army’ with old regime troops, 22 February 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{272} New York Times (The), Afghan Aviators Hide as Taliban Urge Them to Return to Duty, 13 March 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{273} UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/862-S/2022/485, 15 June 2022, \url{url}, para. 11
former workers little incentive to join the Taliban ranks.\textsuperscript{275} According to the New York Times, almost 500 former government employees and ANDSF members had either been killed or forcibly disappeared during the first six months since the Taliban seized power.\textsuperscript{276} Taliban members reportedly used data from screenings of previous ANDSF members to target individuals.\textsuperscript{277} However, Giustozzi and Al Aqeedi suggested in November 2021, that the Taliban had ‘largely delivered on their promise of amnesty’ to former government workers as there were only reports of ‘some tens of violations per month’ out of several hundreds of thousands of possible targets.\textsuperscript{278} For the information on treatment of former ANDSF members, please see chapter 2. ‘Persons affiliated with security institutions of the former government’ of EUAA August 2022 report Afghanistan – Targeting of Individuals.

2.1.3. Internal clashes between Taliban factions

The Taliban remained ‘a largely coherent fighting force’ during the insurgency years\textsuperscript{279} and sources in the months following the Taliban takeover noted the relative unity of the Taliban movement,\textsuperscript{280} although there have been some reports of infighting\textsuperscript{281} over the first half of 2022 as the movement sought to transform itself from an armed insurgency into a functioning government.\textsuperscript{282} Within the movement, whose factions include a political wing, a military wing, and the Haqqani network,\textsuperscript{283} there were reportedly divisions along regional, tribal, and ethnic fault lines as well as some differences over policy.\textsuperscript{284} In June 2022, Michael Semple, a professor at Queen’s University Belfast, said in an interview to RFE/RL service Gandhara that there were ‘unprecedented differences within the Taliban leadership’. However, according to Sami Yousafzai, a veteran Afghan journalist and commentator who has tracked the Taliban since its emergence in the 1990s, ‘most of the rifts within the Taliban are merely differences of opinion and do not amount to factional infighting.’\textsuperscript{285} While some intra-Taliban disputes took place along personality lines as in the past, others were reportedly linked to the new circumstances arising from the Taliban takeover of

\textsuperscript{275} UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, url, para. 35
\textsuperscript{276} Marcolini, B., Sohail, S. and Stockton, A., The Taliban Promised Them Amnesty. Then They Executed Them, New York Times (The), 12 April 2022, url
\textsuperscript{277} HRW, “No forgiveness for people like you”, 30 November 2021, url
\textsuperscript{278} Giustozzi, A. and Al Aqeedi, R., Security and Governance in the Taliban’s Emirate, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 24 November 2021, url
\textsuperscript{279} RFE/RL/Gandhara, ‘Unprecedented Differences’: Riots Within The Taliban Come Out In The Open, 2 June 2022, url
\textsuperscript{280} Afghanistan’s conflict in 2021 (2): Republic collapse and Taleban victory in the long-view of history, 30 December 2021, url
\textsuperscript{281} RFE/RL/Gandhara, ‘Unprecedented Differences’: Riots Within The Taliban Come Out In The Open, 2 June 2022, url
\textsuperscript{282} ISW, Afghanistan in Review January 3 – January 25, 2022, 31 January 2022, url, p. 1
\textsuperscript{283} Norwegian, Landinfo, Afghanistan: Talibans regime – situasjonen etter maktovertakelsen [Afghanistan: the Taliban regime – situation after the takeover of power], 9 March 2022, url, pp. 7–8; USIP, For the Taliban, Governing Will Be the Hard Part, October 2021, url, p. 5
\textsuperscript{284} RFE/RL/Gandhara, ‘Unprecedented Differences’: Riots Within The Taliban Come Out In The Open, 2 June 2022, url
\textsuperscript{285} RFE/RL/Gandhara, ‘Unprecedented Differences’: Riots Within The Taliban Come Out In The Open, 2 June 2022, url
Most fundamentally, this includes a centuries-old tribal rivalry between the Durrani and the Ghilzai Pashtun clans. Many members of the Rahbari Shura, including Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, who represents the political wing of the Taliban, belong to the Durrani clan. Its members mainly live in southern Afghanistan, e.g., in Kandahar, Helmand, and Uruzgan provinces.

Mullah Yaqoob, the de facto defence minister, who along with other senior military commanders like Mullah Abdul Qayum Zakir and Mullah Ibrahim Sadr represents the Taliban’s military wing, is from a branch of the Ghilzai clan of Pashtuns. However, as a fellow southerner he has ‘strong ties and allegiances with Durrani Taliban’. These Taliban factions have been opposing the dominance of the Haqqani network.

The Haqqani network with its leader Sirajuddin Haqqani has its power base in southeastern Afghanistan (particularly, in Khost and Paktya provinces) and Pakistan’s North Waziristan tribal region. In a June 2022 article, RFE/RL/Gandhara referred to unnamed sources claiming that this competition between the eastern-Afghanistan-based Haqqani network and the faction of Taliban co-founders in the south was growing, as has been manifested in the military wing’s disgruntlement with the Haqqani network leaders Anas and Khalil al-Rahman Haqqani who spearheaded the fall of Kabul. Other alleged intra-Taliban divisions were claimed to have been the result of a ‘political-military divide’. While it was claimed that the political wing has been envisaging a more inclusive Afghan state, the military-focused wing reportedly championed the revival of the IEA. Following the announcement of the Taliban interim government in September 2021, some Taliban sources alleged that a row had broken out in the presidential palace in Kabul between two senior Taliban figures from these two camps. However, Michael Kugelman, an Afghanistan specialist at the Wilson Center, a US think tank,
noted that definitive proof about this physical confrontation between representatives of moderate and hard-line factions was lacking.\textsuperscript{302}

There have also been claims regarding policy-related disputes among Taliban members over the implementation of Sharia,\textsuperscript{303} including on the extent to which women should have access to education and employment.\textsuperscript{304} In May 2022, Taliban deputy foreign minister Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai publicly decried that women were being ‘deprived of the right to education’.\textsuperscript{305} Sources commented that it was unusual for Taliban figures to criticise the policies of the Taliban supreme leader in public.\textsuperscript{306} Michael Semple further elaborated that Taliban politicians favouring ties with the West and inclusive governance ‘don’t command the loyalty of fighters’.\textsuperscript{307} Furthermore, it was said that the de facto government itself lacked real power as the true decision-makers were sitting in the ‘secretive’ advisory body (shura) surrounding the Taliban supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada in Kandahar.\textsuperscript{308}

According to Semple, disputes on policy-related matters were only of secondary importance, while the more serious disputes revolved around the division of powers and privilege.\textsuperscript{309} For example, between mid-August 2021 and 15 March 2022, ACLED documented 33 incidents in which Taliban forces clashed with each other, a significant rise from levels observed before the Taliban takeover.\textsuperscript{310} An anonymous security analyst told DW in October 2021 that, in the absence of clear military structures, it happened that several Taliban commanders in Kabul claimed to be in charge of the same area or issue. According to this source, such rivalling claims could ‘result in political, at times even violent, disputes’ when the commanders came from different parts of Afghanistan – which was often the case.\textsuperscript{311}

Besides the main factions described above, there was ‘a smaller and less powerful faction of ethnic Tajik and Uzbek Taliban commanders’ based in northern Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{312} Amid rising tensions between non-Pashtun communities in northern Afghanistan and predominantly Pashtun Taliban fighters moving into these areas, in January 2022 two prominent northern Taliban commanders, Makhduum Mohammad Alem Rabbani (an ethnic Uzbek) and Qari Wakil (an ethnic Tajik), were arrested by Taliban forces. The arrest of Alem, allegedly for involvement in a kidnapping case, was reportedly ordered by the acting deputy defence minister Mullah Fazel.\textsuperscript{313} Following Alem’s arrest, ethnic Uzbek Taliban units revolted, disarming local Pashtun

\textsuperscript{302} Kugelman, M., Opinion: How real is the threat of Taliban infighting? [Opinion], DW, 21 September 2021, url
\textsuperscript{303} RFE/RL/Gandhara, ‘Unprecedented Differences’: Rifts Within The Taliban Come Out In The Open, 2 June 2022, url
\textsuperscript{304} VOA, Afghan Female TV Anchors Forced to Cover Faces on Air, 22 May 2022, url
\textsuperscript{305} TOLOnews, Deputy Foreign Minister Calls for Girls’ Education, 22 May 2022, url
\textsuperscript{306} RFE/RL/Gandhara, ‘Unprecedented Differences’: Rifts Within The Taliban Come Out In The Open, 2 June 2022, url
\textsuperscript{307} VOA, Afghan Female TV Anchors Forced to Cover Faces on Air, 22 May 2022, url
\textsuperscript{308} Al Jazeera, How deep are divisions among the Taliban?, 23 September 2021, url
\textsuperscript{309} RFE/RL/Gandhara, ‘Unprecedented Differences’: Rifts Within The Taliban Come Out In The Open, 2 June 2022, url
\textsuperscript{310} ACLED and APW, Tracking Disorder During Taliban Rule in Afghanistan, A Joint ACLED and APW Report, April 2022, url, p. 11
\textsuperscript{311} DW, Afghanistan: What will the Taliban do without an enemy to fight?, 11 October 2021, url
\textsuperscript{312} RFE/RL/Gandhara, ‘Unprecedented Differences’: Rifts Within The Taliban Come Out In The Open, 2 June 2022, url
\textsuperscript{313} RFE/RL, Taliban’s Arrest of Ethnic Uzbek Commander Sparks Clashes In Northern Afghanistan, 29 January 2022, url
Taliban units and briefly seizing control of Maimana, the provincial capital of Faryab Province. Meanwhile, the arrest of Wakil reportedly prompted a revolt by two ethnic Tajik Taliban commanders in Badghis Province who declared that they would no longer obey the Taliban leadership in their province.\(^{314}\)

In November 2021, intra-Taliban tensions along ethnic lines and disputes over positions reportedly culminated in an armed clash between Taliban fighters in the city of Bamyan.\(^{315}\) In June 2022, clashes were reported in Balkhab District of Sar-e Pul Province as Taliban forces sought to suppress a rebellion that reportedly erupted after Mehdi Mujahid, an ethnic Hazara who was the chief of Taliban intelligence in Bamyan Province (and the Taliban’s highest ranking Hazara security officer), was dismissed from his position.\(^{316}\) According to ISW, revolts like these were said to point to some of the ‘difficulties the Taliban face in trying to preserve unity while simultaneously instituting more centralized command and control’.\(^{317}\)

In a further development in February 2022, Mullah Baradar, a deputy to the Taliban’s supreme leader (and ethnic Pashtun), was appointed as the new de facto deputy prime minister for economic affairs, replacing the ethnic Uzbek deputy prime minister Abdul Salam Hanafi. The ISW commented that this side-lining of Hanafi ‘may contribute to increasing ethnic tensions.’\(^{318}\)

### 2.2. Anti-Taliban resistance groups

There were a number of different groups opposing Taliban rule. In many cases, the groups’ leadership was located abroad.\(^{319}\) While these groups proclaimed identical or very similar goals and welcomed others to fight the Taliban,\(^{320}\) an anonymous international NGO in Kabul consulted by the Swedish Migration Agency in mid-March 2022 indicated there was generally no coordination between these groups.\(^{321}\) Similarly, an April 2022 article by the Swiss Institute for Global Affairs (SIGA), authored by the Afghanistan-based freelance journalist Franz J. Marty, noted that, ‘at least at the moment’, there was ‘no significant cooperation or coordination amongst them’. Indeed, the same source indicated that statements from various groups suggested that there was inter-group rivalry over which group was the most capable and the most successful in absorbing former members of the Afghan security forces—and

\(^{314}\) ISW, Afghanistan in Review January 3 – January 25, 2022, 31 January 2022, [url](#), p. 1  
\(^{315}\) UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, [url](#), para. 15  
\(^{316}\) RFE/RL/Gandhara, Taliban Atrocities Reported In Crackdown On Rebel Hazara Commander, 1 July 2022, [url](#); KP, Taliban’s Highest-Ranking Army Officer Heads to Northern Afghanistan; Clash Between the Taliban and Mawlawi Mujahid Possible at “Any Moment”, 24 June 2022, [url](#)  
\(^{317}\) ISW, Afghanistan in Review January 3 – January 25, 2022, 31 January 2022, [url](#), p. 1  
\(^{318}\) ISW, Afghanistan in Review: Taliban and opposition groups prepare for a new spring fighting season in Afghanistan, 9 March 2022, [url](#)  
\(^{319}\) Sweden, Migrationsverket, Afghanistan: Säkerhetsläget efter talibanrörelsens maktövertagande [Afghanistan: Security situation after Taliban takeover of power] (version 1.0), 29 April 2022, [url](#), pp. 30-31  
\(^{320}\) SIGA, Vive la Résistance in Afghanistan? (English Version) [Blog], 7 April 2022, [url](#)  
\(^{321}\) Sweden, Migrationsverket, Afghanistan: Säkerhetsläget efter talibanrörelsens maktövertagande [Afghanistan: Security situation after Taliban takeover of power] (version 1.0), 29 April 2022, [url](#), pp. 30-31
therefore the most suited to lead the anti-Taliban resistance.\textsuperscript{322} As a result, it was reported that the anti-Taliban groups have not been able to merge into a broader resistance movement.\textsuperscript{323}

Sources indicated that the size\textsuperscript{324} and capabilities\textsuperscript{325} of the various resistance groups were limited or stated that it was difficult to obtain data on these matters.\textsuperscript{326} While these groups had the ability to carry out attacks (including through the use of IEDs) and create insecurity around some roads, the international NGO in Kabul indicated in mid-March 2022 that for the time being they did not pose a concrete threat to the Taliban’s hold of the country.\textsuperscript{327} As of May 2022, there were reports that outside Panjsher, resistance to the Taliban was growing in Baghlan, Kapisa, Parwan, and Badakhshan.\textsuperscript{328} However, according to BBC News, details on the extent of the fighting and casualty figures were difficult to verify as the Taliban appeared to be downplaying the incidents, while claims by representatives of the resistance often seemed exaggerated.\textsuperscript{329}

\subsection*{2.2.1. National Resistance Front}

Formed after the Taliban conquered Kabul in mid-August 2021,\textsuperscript{330} the National Resistance Front (NRF) is led by Ahmad Massoud, son of the former mujahid leader Ahmad Shah Massoud, from headquarters located in Tajikistan. Afghan Vice President Amrullah Saleh, who also left for Tajikistan, is another senior figure in NRF.\textsuperscript{331} The group declared in February 2022 that its goal was to fight the Taliban.\textsuperscript{332} Indeed, the ISW noted that unlike ISKP, NRF has made attempts ‘to seize direct control of territory from the Taliban government’.\textsuperscript{333} In an interview with Foreign Policy (FP) magazine, Amrullah Saleh further stated that NRF was seeking to hold democratic elections and have the Afghan people decide on the country’s future.\textsuperscript{334}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{SIGA} SIGA, Vive la Résistance in Afghanistan? (English Version) [Blog], 7 April 2022, url\textsuperscript{322}
\bibitem{VOA} VOA, Afghan ‘Fighting Season’ Ushers in New Anti-Taliban Groups, 28 April 2022, url\textsuperscript{323}
\bibitem{Sweden} Sweden, Migrationsverket, Afghanistan: Säkerhetsläget efter talibanrörelSENS maktövertagande [Afghanistan: Security situation after Taliban takeover of power] (version 1.0), 29 April 2022, url, p. 30; New York Times (The), Taliban Search Operation Echoes Resented U.S. Tactics, 4 March 2022, url\textsuperscript{324}
\bibitem{Sweden} Sweden, Migrationsverket, Afghanistan: Säkerhetsläget efter talibanrörelSENS maktövertagande [Afghanistan: Security situation after Taliban takeover of power] (version 1.0), 29 April 2022, url, p. 31\textsuperscript{325}; VOA, Afghan ‘Fighting Season’ Ushers in New Anti-Taliban Groups, 28 April 2022, url\textsuperscript{326}
\bibitem{Norway} Norway, Landinfo, Afghanistan: Talibans regime – situasjonen etter maktøvertakelsen [Afghanistan: the Taliban regime – situation after the takeover of power], 9 March 2022, url, p. 16\textsuperscript{327}
\bibitem{Sweden} Sweden, Migrationsverket, Afghanistan: Säkerhetsläget efter talibanrörelSENS maktövertagande [Afghanistan: Security situation after Taliban takeover of power] (version 1.0), 29 April 2022, url, p. 31\textsuperscript{328}; RFE/RL/Gandhara, New Reports Of Fighting In Afghanistan's Panjshir Trigger Fresh Claims Of Taliban War Crimes, 13 May 2022, url\textsuperscript{329}
\bibitem{BBC} BBC News, Afghan resistance attack Taliban, sparking reprisals in Panjshir, 16 May 2022, url\textsuperscript{330}; RFE/RL/Gandhara, New Reports Of Fighting In Afghanistan's Panjshir Trigger Fresh Claims Of Taliban War Crimes, 13 May 2022, url\textsuperscript{331}; FP, Former Afghan VP: ‘We Will Resist Until Our Aim Is Achieved’, 10 February 2022, url\textsuperscript{332}
\bibitem{Norway} Norway, Landinfo, Afghanistan: Talibans regime – situasjonen etter maktøvertakelsen [Afghanistan: the Taliban regime – situation after the takeover of power], 9 March 2022, url, p. 16\textsuperscript{333}; ISW, Islamic State-Khorasan Province expands attacks beyond Afghanistan, 1 June 2022, url, p. 3\textsuperscript{334}; FP, Former Afghan VP: ‘We Will Resist Until Our Aim Is Achieved’, 10 February 2022, url\textsuperscript{334}
\end{thebibliography}
While sources mentioned that NRF was the primary \footnote{ISW, Afghanistan in Review: Taliban and opposition groups prepare for a new spring fighting season in Afghanistan, 9 March 2022, url} or ‘most well-developed' \footnote{VOA, Afghan ‘Fighting Season’ Ushers in New Anti-Taliban Groups, 28 April 2022, url} anti-Taliban resistance movement, there was a lack of clarity as to which groups were affiliated with it. \footnote{Sweden, Migrationsverket, Afghanistan: Säkerhetsläget efter talibanrörelsens maktkbördtagande [Afghanistan: Security situation after Taliban takeover of power] (version 1.0), 29 April 2022, url, pp. 30-31} It has no clear chain of command \footnote{New York Times (The), Taliban Search Operation Echoes Resented U.S. Tactics, 4 March 2022, url} and its capabilities appear to be limited, \footnote{US, SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 April 2022, url, p. 70; RFE/RL/Gandhara, New Reports Of Fighting In Afghanistan's Panjshir Trigger Fresh Claims Of Taliban War Crimes, 13 May 2022, url} with estimates of its strength ranging from ‘several hundred fighters' \footnote{UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, url, para. 15} to a few thousand fighters \footnote{US, SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 April 2022, url, p. 70}.

There were varying accounts regarding NRF’s presence in Afghanistan and the level of support it has been receiving from the population. An anonymous international NGO in Kabul and an anonymous international analyst based in Afghanistan, consulted by the Swedish Migration Agency in mid-March 2022, pointed out that the large public attention the NFR has been receiving through the media and other channels does not reflect the relatively limited number of supporters the group has in Afghanistan. \footnote{Norway, Landinfo, Afghanistan: Talibans regime – situasjonen etter maktovertakelsen [Afghanistan: the Taliban regime – situation after the takeover of power], 9 March 2022, url, p. 15}

NRF has been reported to consist of former civilians, former ANDSF personnel \footnote{New York Times (The), Taliban Search Operation Echoes Resented U.S. Tactics, 4 March 2022, url} (including many low-ranking ex-officers) \footnote{US, SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 April 2022, url, p. 70} and former opposition members \footnote{VOA, Afghan ‘Fighting Season’ Ushers in New Anti-Taliban Groups, 28 April 2022, url} who have in common that they all supported the previous Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and are strong opponents of the Taliban. \footnote{SIGA, Vive la Résistance in Afghanistan? (English Version) [Blog], 7 April 2022, url}

Most of the group’s members are ethnic Tajiks. \footnote{US, SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 April 2022, url, p. 70}

Based on its own account, NRF emerged in Panjsher Province and Andarab District of neighbouring Baghlan Province. \footnote{SIGA, Vive la Résistance in Afghanistan? (English Version) [Blog], 7 April 2022, url} ISW researcher Peter Mills specified in April 2022 that, in addition to its homebase of the Panjsher Valley, NRF operated in nearby Andarab District (Baghlan Province) through an affiliate, the Andarab Resistance Front, described as ‘a collection of small cells headed by local commanders who have declared loyalty to Massoud'. These two groups were said to operate together at times. \footnote{New York Times (The), Taliban Search Operation Echoes Resented U.S. Tactics, 4 March 2022, url}

Ali Maisam Nazary, NRF head of foreign relations, in a claim that could not be corroborated, alleged that as of late March 2022 the group was active in more than 12 provinces, including in the majority of the cities as well as in the southern and eastern parts of the country. \footnote{SIGA, Vive la Résistance in Afghanistan? (English Version) [Blog], 7 April 2022, url}
Several alleged NRF hit-and-run attacks mainly targeting Taliban checkpoints and outposts have been recorded by sources consulted by the New York Times,\textsuperscript{351} with increased fighting reported in January/February\textsuperscript{352} and May 2022.\textsuperscript{353} But at the same time, it was noted that misinformation was ‘rampant’,\textsuperscript{354} with the Taliban disputing the occurrence of such incidents altogether.\textsuperscript{355} Such ‘competing, one-sided narratives’\textsuperscript{356} have made it difficult to assess incidents claimed by NRF.\textsuperscript{357} However, the group’s presence in parts of northern Afghanistan aside from Panjsher and Andarab was confirmed in unnamed Taliban reports mentioned by Franz J. Marty in SIGA blog that reportedly referred to clashes involving NRF in Balkh and Samangan in December 2021/January 2022,\textsuperscript{358} as well as by the Taliban deputy governor of Badakhshan Province who reported about such clashes in his province in April 2022.\textsuperscript{359}

In the Panjsher Valley, residents were reported as saying that attacks on Taliban positions were a regular occurrence and that dozens of people had been killed as of June 2022.\textsuperscript{360} While an anonymous international organisation consulted by Landinfo stated that the group did not control any territory as of February/March 2022,\textsuperscript{361} Peter Mills noted that, as of spring 2022, NRF had shown that they were able to hold some rural, remote valleys and mountainous terrain ‘in places like Baghlan, parts of Takhar, Panjsher, parts of Badakhshan’.\textsuperscript{362}

At the same time, NRF representatives were quoted as saying that the group had limited resources and no significant public support from other states.\textsuperscript{363} In August 2021, NRF fighters were said to be armed with ‘little beyond assault weapons’.\textsuperscript{364} However, Franz J. Marty reported that some photographs emerged in January 2022 showing NRF fighters with ‘new Russian-made weaponry that is, as far as it could be determined, not readily available inside Afghanistan’. As the source noted, this suggested that NRF had found an external source to obtain or purchase these weapons.\textsuperscript{365} In June 2022, a resistance commander in Panjsher was quoted as saying that the opposition was mainly armed with weapons delivered across the border from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, including heavy weaponry like rocket launchers. However, NRF units reportedly suffered from a lack of munitions. In spring 2022, there was a confirmed case of anti-Taliban fighters running out of ammunition and surrendering to the Taliban.\textsuperscript{366}

\textsuperscript{351} New York Times (The), Talibans regime – situation after the takeover of power, 9 March 2022, url
\textsuperscript{352} SIGA, Vive la Résistance in Afghanistan? (English Version) [Blog], 7 April 2022, url
\textsuperscript{353} Washington Post (The), Inside the Taliban's secret war in the Panjshir Valley, 8 June 2022, url
\textsuperscript{354} Ariana News, Badakhshan establishes new anti-insurgency unit, 19 April 2022, url
\textsuperscript{355} New York Times (The), Afghan 'Fighting Season' Ushers in New Anti-Taliban Groups, 28 April 2022, url
\textsuperscript{356} New York Times (The), Talibans regime – situation after the takeover of power, 9 March 2022, url, p. 16
\textsuperscript{357} VOA, Afghan 'Fighting Season' Ushers in New Anti-Taliban Groups, 28 April 2022, url
\textsuperscript{358} New York Times (The), Taliban Search Operation Echoes Resented U.S. Tactics, 4 March 2022, url
\textsuperscript{359} SIRA, Vive la Résistance in Afghanistan? (English Version) [Blog], 7 April 2022, url
\textsuperscript{360} VOA, Afghan 'Fighting Season' Ushers in New Anti-Taliban Groups, 28 April 2022, url
\textsuperscript{361} New York Times (The), Talibans regime – situation after the takeover of power, 9 March 2022, url
\textsuperscript{362} New York Times (The), Taliban Search Operation Echoes Resented U.S. Tactics, 4 March 2022, url
\textsuperscript{363} New York Times (The), An old bastion of anti-Taliban sentiment girds for a new fight., 30 August 2021, url
\textsuperscript{364} Washington Post (The), Inside the Taliban's secret war in the Panjshir Valley, 8 June 2022, url
For further information regarding armed confrontations involving NRF, please refer to section 3.2. Security incidents of this report.

2.2.2. Other Resistance Movements

Sources reported that, from February 2022 onwards, new anti-Taliban resistance groups had been formed in various parts of northern Afghanistan. Some of the groups announced their formation publicly. However, apart from claims published on social media, limited information was available on the numerical strength and operational capabilities of such groups. As noted by Peter Mills (ISW), as of March 2022, none of these groups had demonstrated that they were capable of carrying out significant tangible attacks or conduct any ‘company-sized operations’.

While some groups declared allegiance with NRF and claimed their activities on Twitter accounts linked to NRF, other groups have not been associated with it.

(a) Afghanistan Islamic National and Liberation Movement

The Afghanistan Islamic National and Liberation Movement announced its establishment in mid-February 2022. Believed to be the only large anti-Taliban resistance group dominated by ethnic Pashtuns, it is led by Abdul Matin Suleimankhel, who was a commander of the former ANA Special Operations Corps. The group claimed in mid-March 2022 that it had ‘thousands of people’ across more than two dozen provinces, although it appears that its activities were limited to the mainly Pashtun-inhabited southern and eastern parts of the country (Helmand, Kandahar, Paktika, and Nangarhar provinces) where it claimed ‘a handful of attacks’. While some of these claims were reportedly doubtful, Franz J. Marty in SIGA blog assessed that other claims by the group appeared credible, including a bombing in Lashkar Gah (Helmand Province) on 27 March 2022. According to this source, the Afghanistan Islamic National and Liberation Movement has ‘some capacities to conduct small attacks inside Afghanistan’, although its capabilities were likely much more limited than what the group claimed. Peter Mills similarly assessed that the group’s capabilities seemed to be limited.
(b) Afghanistan Freedom Front

Another new resistant group that seemed to exist on the ground was the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), which declared its establishment on 11 March 2022. While it has not publicly disclosed its leadership, reports suggested that General Yasin Zia, a former defence minister and chief of general staff, was one of the group’s leaders.

The group claimed to be ‘active in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan’ and to have thousands of armed men under its command. However, this could not be corroborated by sources consulted for this report. One source noted that little was known about the group’s actual capabilities. The group regularly posted videos of attacks it claimed. As of late April 2022, these allegedly took place in Kapisa, Parwan, Takhar, Baghlan, Sar-e Pul, Badakhshan, and Kandahar provinces. While independent verification of these claims was reportedly difficult, Peter Mills (ISW) assessed that ‘at least some of these attacks’ claimed by the group were real. One attack targeting a police station in Warsaj District of Takhar Province on 23 March 2022 was confirmed by the Taliban. According to a leader of AFF, as of early April 2022 the group was not receiving any assistance from abroad.

(c) Other groups

Other resistance groups that have announced their presence include the Turkestan Freedom Tigers, which reportedly launched a small-scale attack on a Taliban checkpoint near Sheberghan City (Jawzjan Province) on 7 February 2022, the National Resistance Council (allegedly including a number of prominent exiled anti-Taliban figures such as Ata Mohammad Noor and Abdul Rashid Dostum), the Liberation Front of Afghanistan, the Unknown Soldiers of Hazaristan, the allegedly Hazara-centred Freedom and Democracy Front, and a group named Freedom Corps (allegedly active in parts of Takhar Province). Little is known about the leadership and capabilities of these groups.

As noted by Franz J. Marty on 7 April 2022, in the case of such groups as the Liberation Front of Afghanistan, the Unknown Soldiers of Hazaristan, the Freedom and Democracy Front, and the Freedom Corps, there was ‘no news’ after they announced their existence on social media. Other groups meanwhile appeared to be active and operating, although the veracity of their claimed attacks and alleged capabilities has been questioned at times.

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377 SIGA, Vive la Résistance in Afghanistan? (English Version) [Blog], 7 April 2022, url
378 VOA, Afghan ‘Fighting Season’ Ushers in New Anti-Taliban Groups, 28 April 2022, url
379 SIGA, Vive la Résistance in Afghanistan? (English Version) [Blog], 7 April 2022, url
380 VOA, Afghan ‘Fighting Season’ Ushers in New Anti-Taliban Groups, 28 April 2022, url
381 SIGA, Vive la Résistance in Afghanistan? (English Version) [Blog], 7 April 2022, url
382 SIGA, Vive la Résistance in Afghanistan? (English Version) [Blog], 7 April 2022, url; VOA, Afghan ‘Fighting Season’ Ushers in New Anti-Taliban Groups, 28 April 2022, url
383 SIGA, Vive la Résistance in Afghanistan? (English Version) [Blog], 7 April 2022, url
384 VOA, Afghan ‘Fighting Season’ Ushers in New Anti-Taliban Groups, 28 April 2022, url
385 SIGA, Vive la Résistance in Afghanistan? (English Version) [Blog], 7 April 2022, url
386 ISW, Afghanistan in Review: Taliban and opposition groups prepare for a new spring fighting season in Afghanistan, 9 March 2022, url
387 SIGA, Vive la Résistance in Afghanistan? (English Version) [Blog], 7 April 2022, url
388 VOA, Afghan ‘Fighting Season’ Ushers in New Anti-Taliban Groups, 28 April 2022, url
389 SIGA, Vive la Résistance in Afghanistan? (English Version) [Blog], 7 April 2022, url
2.3. Islamic State Khorasan Province

Activity of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) has traditionally been concentrated in Kabul and in the country’s eastern provinces, notably Kunar and Nangarhar where the group continues to have a strong foothold, especially in rural areas. While during the period of peace negotiations ISKP’s activities aimed to create ‘chaos and confusion’ among different political stakeholders, it was reported that after the Taliban takeover in August 2021 ISKP ‘shifted its focus squarely on undermining the Taliban’s legitimacy.’ Since then, it has reportedly targeted Taliban security convoys, checkpoints and personnel while assassinating civilians of various profiles.

The bulk of ISKP fighters has been reported to be present in rural Kunar, Nangarhar and possibly Nuristan provinces. Abdul Sayed, a security specialist and researcher of radical militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, stated in email correspondence with EUAA in December 2021 that, based on ISKP attacks and Taliban raids against hideouts, ISKP had a strong presence in Eastern Afghanistan (Nangarhar and Kunar provinces), as well as Kabul and northern Afghanistan.

Attacks claimed by or attributed to ISKP, on the other hand, were reported beyond these core areas, although Sayed commented in December 2021 that, while individual ISKP members, particularly escaped prisoners, could have possibly spread across beyond their core areas, this did not mean that they ‘posed a threat in those areas’. An anonymous international NGO in Kabul, interviewed by the Swedish Unit for Migration Analysis, suggested that one reason for ISKP’s enhanced geographical reach was that it was now easier for its members to travel on roads without being checked, given the weak Taliban presence along the country’s road network. Moreover, the group no longer had to face counterterrorism operations led by external forces and has been able to exploit the Taliban’s limited resources and weak control in some parts of Afghanistan. Also, while the Taliban took decisive action in Panjsher that

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391 ACLED and APW, Tracking Disorder During Taliban Rule in Afghanistan, A Joint ACLED and APW Report, April 2022, url, p. 10
392 Norway, Landinfo, Afghanistan: Talibans regime – situasjonen etter maktovertakelsen [Afghanistan: the Taliban regime – situation after the takeover of power], 9 March 2022, url, p. 17
393 Jadoon, A. et al., The Islamic State Threat in Taliban Afghanistan: Tracing the Resurgence of Islamic State Khorasan, January 2022, url, p. 36
394 UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, url, para. 71
395 Sayed, A., email, 6 December 2021. As cited in EASO Afghanistan Country Focus, January 2022, url. Abdul Sayed is a security specialist and researcher on radical militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Sayed is based in Lund, Sweden.
396 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, url, para. 17
397 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, url, para. 17
398 Sweden, Migrationsverket, Afghanistan: Säkerhetsläget efter talibanrörelsens maktovertagande [Afghanistan: Security situation after Taliban takeover of power] (version 1.0) [source: an international NGO in Kabul], 29 April 2022, url, p. 28
399 Jadoon, A. et al., The Islamic State Threat in Taliban Afghanistan: Tracing the Resurgence of Islamic State Khorasan, January 2022, url, p. 36
quickly defeated NRF in early September 2021, it was observed that the new rulers did not launch a similar determined strike against ISKP's stronghold in eastern Afghanistan.400

It was reported that the Taliban were attempting to maintain pressure on ISKP,401 fighting it in its main area of activity in rural Nangarhar as well as in urban centres that have been hit by its attacks (especially Kabul and Jalalabad),402 including by setting up checkpoints and conducting house-to-house searches.403 Mainly open-source-based analysis by the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), quoted by SIGAR, suggested that the Taliban have been unable to prevent most ISKP attacks ‘likely because they lack the intelligence capability’.404

According to UN figures, between 19 August and 31 December 2021, ISKP attacks took place in 16 provinces, compared to five provinces over the same period the year before.405 In the period from 1 January and 21 May 2022, the same source documented attacks by the group in 11 provinces (compared to 6 provinces over the same period in 2021).406 As of June 2022, new areas of ISKP activity included parts of northern and western Afghanistan407 (e.g. Kunduz,408 Balkh,409 Farah,410 and Herat411) as well as southern and south-eastern provinces like Kandahar, Paktya,412 and Parwan.413 Moreover, ISKP appeared to have a presence in nearly all provinces, the UN Special Representative for Afghanistan remarked in November 2021.414 It conducted several large high-profile attacks, including an attack on Kabul’s Hamid Karzai International Airport on 26 August 2021,415 and attacks on Shia mosques in the cities of Kunduz and Kandahar on 8 and 15 October 2021, a military hospital in Kabul on 2 November 2021,416 a Shia Mosque in Mazar-e Sharif in April 2022,417 and a series of bombings in Mazar-e Sharif and Kabul in May

400 Giustozzi, A., The Taliban’s Homemade Counterinsurgency, RUSI, 4 January 2022, url
401 VOA, How Afghanistan’s Militant Groups Are Evolving Under Taliban Rule, 20 March 2022, url
402 Giustozzi, A., The Taliban’s Homemade Counterinsurgency, RUSI, 4 January 2022, url
403 US, SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 April 2022, url, p. 72
404 US, SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 April 2022, url, p. 72
405 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, url, para. 17
406 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/862-S/2022/485, 15 June 2022, url, para. 18
407 ACLED and APW, Tracking Disorder During Taliban Rule in Afghanistan, A Joint ACLED and APW Report, April 2022, url, p. 10
408 Sweden, Migrationsverket, Afghanistan: Säkerhetsläget efter talibanrörelsens maktövertagande [Afghanistan: Security situation after Taliban takeover of power] [version 1.0] [source: an international NGO in Kabul], 29 April 2022, url, p. 28
409 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/862-S/2022/485, 15 June 2022, url, para. 18
410 ACLED and APW, Tracking Disorder During Taliban Rule in Afghanistan, A Joint ACLED and APW Report, April 2022, url, p. 10
411 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/862-S/2022/485, 15 June 2022, url, para. 18
412 ACLED and APW, Tracking Disorder During Taliban Rule in Afghanistan, A Joint ACLED and APW Report, April 2022, url, p. 10
413 Giustozzi, A. and Al Aqeedi, R., Security and Governance in the Taliban’s Emirate, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 24 November 2021, url
414 UNAMA, SRSG Briefing to the Security Council, 17 November 2021, url, p. 2
417 RFE/RL/Gandhara, IS Claims Deadly Shi’ite Mosque Bombing In Northern Afghanistan; Several Dead In Other Attacks, 21 April 2022, url
2022. For further information regarding specific incidents attributed to ISKP, please refer to section 3.2. Security incidents and section 4. Regional description of the security situation in Afghanistan of this report.

Given the frequency of ISKP attacks and anti-ISKP raids by the Taliban, ISKP’s presence outside its eastern core areas was stronger in Kabul and in the northern part on the country, where smaller covert cells were believed to be present in Faryab, Jawzjan, Kunduz, Takhar, and Badakhshan. These cells were said to be difficult to track. Despite its presence being limited to small cells in areas like Kunduz, an anonymous international analyst in Afghanistan told the Swedish Migration Agency that ISKP had clear ambitions to further expand into areas in the north, where it has prospects of capitalising on existing local ethnic tensions.

An anonymous international source consulted by Landinfo stated in March 2022 that there was no indication that ISKP had the capacity to challenge the Taliban in the short term, with a decrease in large-scale attacks seen in late 2021 and the first months of 2022. However, the group re-escalated its attacks in April and May 2022. As noted by ISW, multiple attacks in Mazar-e Sharif and Kunduz cities showed that ISKP had ‘improved its ability to operate and carry out attacks in northern Afghanistan’. During this campaign, ISKP attacks in Kabul and in the north mainly hit civilian targets, while its attacks in other parts of the country targeted the Taliban.

ISKP leader since 2020, Sanaullah Ghafari (alias Al-Muhajir), hails from the Kabul area and has been known as an expert on urban warfare. While there is little reliable information regarding Ghafari’s background, analysts Amira Jadoon, Abdul Sayed, and Andrew Mines noted that, before joining ISKP after the group emerged in Afghanistan (in late 2014), Ghafari was affiliated with Haqqani-linked Taliban factions and had close ties with two senior Haqqani

418 Al Jazeera, Afghanistan: Deadly explosions hit Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, 25 May 2022, [url]
419 Sweden, Migrationsverket, Afghanistan: Säkerhetsläget efter talibanrörelSENS maktovertagande [Afghanistan: Security situation after Talibans takeover of power] (version 1.0) [source: independent Afghan analyst], 29 April 2022, [url], p. 28
420 UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, [url], para. 71
421 Norway, Landinfo, Afghanistan: Talibans regime – situasjonen etter maktovertakelsen [Afghanistan: the Taliban regime – situation after the takeover of power] [source: international source], 9 March 2022, [url], p. 17
422 Sweden, Migrationsverket, Afghanistan: Säkerhetsläget efter talibanrörelsens maktovertagande [Afghanistan: Security situation after Talibans takeover of power] (version 1.0) [source: an international NGO in Kabul], 29 April 2022, [url], p. 28
423 Sweden, Migrationsverket, Afghanistan: Säkerhetsläget efter talibanrörelsens maktovertagande [Afghanistan: Security situation after Talibans takeover of power] (version 1.0) [source: international analyst in Afghanistan], 29 April 2022, [url], p. 29
424 Norway, Landinfo, Afghanistan: Talibans regime – situasjonen etter maktovertakelsen [Afghanistan: the Taliban regime – situation after the takeover of power] [source: international source], 9 March 2022, [url], p. 17
425 Norway, Landinfo, Afghanistan: Talibans regime – situasjonen etter maktovertakelsen [Afghanistan: the Taliban regime – situation after the takeover of power] [source: international source], 9 March 2022, [url], p. 17; ISW, Afghanistan in Review: Taliban and opposition groups prepare for a new spring fighting season in Afghanistan, 9 March 2022, [url]
426 ISW, Islamic State Khorasan Province Expands Attacks beyond Afghanistan, 1 June 2022, [url], p. 3
427 Jadoon, A. et al., The Islamic State Threat in Talibans Afghanistan: Tracing the Resurgence of Islamic State Khorasan, January 2022, [url], p. 36
428 Al Jazeera, US offers $10m reward for information on ISKP leader, 7 February 2022, [url]
429 Kapur, R., The Persistent ISKP Threat to Afghanistan: On Chinas Doorstep, MEI, 6 January 2022, [url]
network commanders in the capital, Taj Mir Jawad and Qari Baryal. However, as of May 2022, the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team assessed that there were no links between ISKP members and the Haqqani network, ‘other than possibly at the local, lower levels’. According to an independent Afghan analyst interviewed by EUAA in November 2021, there were reports of some Taliban commanders being connected to the ISKP in Nangarhar.

Other leadership figures reportedly included Mawlawi Rajab Salahuddin (alias Mawlawi Hanas) as deputy leader, Qari Saleh (head of intelligence), and Qari Fateh (head of military operations). Meanwhile, less was known about ISKP’s wider leadership. While Ghafari has been viewed as an effective leader who is in firm control of the group, it was suggested that, as in the past, different ISKP units may struggle to coordinate with one another, given the geographic distance and different ethnicities of ISKP members.

According to an independent Afghan analyst interviewed by EUAA in November 2021, ISKP, unlike the Taliban, comprised a large number of non-Pashtuns. While Pashtuns from Afghanistan and Pakistan formed the group’s core in the east, local ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks dominated in smaller groups in northern provinces like Badakhshan, Kunduz, and Sar-e Pul.

As of May 2022, UN member states estimated that ISKP strength ranged between 1 500 and 4 000 fighters, and the number of the members of the group has shown an upwards trends since the Taliban takeover, fuelled by releases of imprisoned ISKP members (an independent analyst told EUAA that some 2 000 to 3 000 ISKP members were released in the midst of the Taliban takeover when the Taliban opened Pul-e Charki and Bagram Prisons), tensions within various Taliban factions (with reports of defections of Tajik and Uzbek Taliban commanders in the north), and enhanced financial resources (in late 2021, the group received 500 000 US dollars in new funding from the ISIL core).

ISKP has announced an amnesty for members who had surrendered to the previous Afghan government. According to analysts Amira Jadoon, Abdul Sayed, and Andrew Mines, this may...
have lured hundreds of fighters back into ISKP. Another potential recruiting ground for ISKP were Salafi communities in Kabul and Nangarhar, where the group attempted to exploit anti-Taliban sentiments to mobilise community members against the Taliban. These sentiments had grown as the Taliban imposed harsh measures in these communities in response to ISKP-claimed attacks. In March 2022, it was reported that ISKP had also increased its efforts to recruit among Uzbek, Tajik, and Kyrgyz speakers in the Central Asian region.

Moreover, ISKP is reported to have recruited small numbers of fighters among former ANDSF members, who bring with them useful fighting techniques and intelligence-gathering skills. The DIA (quoted by SIGAR) indicated that the number of ex-ANDSF personnel who joined anti-Taliban militant groups like ISKP was unknown as of mid-March 2022. An independent Afghan analyst interviewed by EUAA in November 2021, referring to information from a former Afghan special forces general, indicated that 13-15 persons from the former Afghan security forces had joined ISKP, while saying that other sources put the number at around two or three dozens.

2.4. Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups

According to May 2022 report of the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, the links between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban remained close and their relationship was underscored by the fact that Al-Qaeda’s core leadership, notably its head Ayman Mohammed Rabie al-Zawahiri, was reportedly residing in eastern Afghanistan. Since the Taliban takeover in August 2021, which was welcomed by Al-Qaeda, al-Zawahiri made several video appearances. On 1 August 2022, US President announced that al-Zawahiri was killed in a US drone strike in downtown Kabul, where he was ‘sheltering […] to reunite with his family.’ The Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid stated via Twitter that ‘an air strike was carried out on a residential house in Sherpur area’ of the Afghan capital on 31 July 2022. The Taliban leadership claimed they had no information about Al-Zawahiri’s moving to and residing in Kabul, while, according to US officials, he was staying in the apartment of a top aide to Sirajuddin Haqqani.

The Taliban did not appoint any Al-Qaeda members to significant positions within the de facto government. Rahmatullah Amiri, an independent researcher focused on security and armed

440 Jadoon, A. et al., The Islamic State Threat in Taliban Afghanistan: Tracing the Resurgence of Islamic State Khorasan, January 2022, url, pp. 37-38
441 Eurasianet, Perspectives | Islamic State in Afghanistan seeks to recruit Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, 17 March 2022, url
442 Jadoon, A. et al., The Islamic State Threat in Taliban Afghanistan: Tracing the Resurgence of Islamic State Khorasan, January 2022, url, p. 38
443 US, SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 April 2022, url, p. 70
444 Independent Afghan analyst, digital interview, 8 November 2021
445 UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, url, para. 39, 41
446 CNN, US kills al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in drone strike in Afghanistan, 2 August 2022, url
447 Guardian (The), Taliban claim they did not know Ayman al-Zawahiri was living in central Kabul, 4 August 2022, url; France 24, Taliban claim 'no knowledge' of slain Al Qaeda leader Al-Zawahiri in Afghanistan, 4 August 2022, url
non-state actors, and Ashley Jackson, an analyst at the United Kingdom-based think tank Overseas Development Institute (ODI) specialised in Afghanistan and armed groups, assessed that links between Taliban and Al-Qaeda appeared to be mainly based on individual connections, although this does not mean that links at the level of the Taliban leadership do not exist.\textsuperscript{449}

According to information provided by member states to the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, as of May 2022 Al-Qaeda was based in its historical areas of presence in the south and east,\textsuperscript{450} with a possible shift of some members (officials and followers)\textsuperscript{451} to locations further west in Farah and Herat Provinces. Al-Qaeda had ‘several dozen’ fighters affiliated to its core organisation, and its operational capabilities were reported to be limited to advising and supporting the Taliban.\textsuperscript{452} According to the DIA, Al-Qaeda ‘continued to maintain a low profile at the behest of the Taliban’.\textsuperscript{453}

Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), an organisation subordinate to Al-Qaeda’s core, has also been reported to keep a low profile inside Afghanistan,\textsuperscript{454} where most of its fighters are based. They are estimated to number between 180 and 400 and include individuals from several south and southeast Asian countries. They were reportedly based in Helmand, Kandahar, Ghazni, Nimroz, Paktika and Zabul.\textsuperscript{455} Its leader Osama Mahmood and his deputy Atif Yahya Ghouri were both believed to reside in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{456} The group reportedly had four operational commanders who were in charge of the six abovementioned provinces. Some AQIS fighters were embedded in Taliban combat units, and the group has been fighting alongside the Taliban, including during the sweeping conquest of Afghanistan in 2021. According to the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, AQIS’s capabilities were assessed to be still in a weakened state as a result of losses from an October 2015 raid carried out by ANDSF and US forces in Shorabak District, Kandahar Province.\textsuperscript{457}

\textsuperscript{449} Amiri, R. and Jackson, A., Taliban narratives on Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, September 2021, ODI (Overseas Development Institute), September 2021, url
\textsuperscript{450} UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, url, para. 45
\textsuperscript{451} VOA, How Afghanistan’s Militant Groups Are Evolving Under Taliban Rule, 20 March 2022, url
\textsuperscript{452} UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, url, para. 45, 46
\textsuperscript{453} US, Lead Inspector General for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel and Operation Enduring Sentinel, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress January 1, 2022 – March 31, 2022, 13 May 2022, url, p. 2
\textsuperscript{454} US, Lead Inspector General for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel and Operation Enduring Sentinel, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress January 1, 2022 – March 31, 2022, 13 May 2022, url, p. 2; UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, url, para. 49
\textsuperscript{455} UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, url, para. 49, 50
\textsuperscript{456} VOA, How Afghanistan’s Militant Groups Are Evolving Under Taliban Rule, 20 March 2022, url
\textsuperscript{457} UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, url, para. 49, 50, 51
2.5. Other armed groups

2.5.1. Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan

Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as the Pakistani Taliban, is a militant group whose objectives are directed against the Pakistani government. However, it also has a history of joining the Afghan Taliban in operations against the Afghan government inside Afghanistan.458

The UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team estimated in May 2022 that the group had 3 000 to 4 000 armed fighters based in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas,459 while an independent Afghan analyst interviewed by EUAA in November 2021 estimated that TTP comprised around 10 000 members in Afghanistan.460

Operating from bases within Afghanistan and with an increasing presence inside Pakistan, the group in 2021 escalated its attacks against Pakistani security forces and Chinese assets in Pakistan. Following the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, TTP leader Noor Wali Mehsud publicly renewed his pledge of allegiance to the Afghan Taliban’s supreme leader.461 After the group pledged allegiance, one could see TTP members ‘moving freely’ in large cities in contrast to the situation before the takeover when the TTP had sanctuaries in remote areas, the abovementioned independent Afghan analyst observed.462

Abdul Sayed, a researcher on jihadism and specialist on security matters in Afghanistan and Pakistan, observed that the Afghan Taliban’s return to power strengthened the TTP. After the Afghan Taliban freed hundreds of TTP members from prisons in Kabul,463 the TTP went on to launch numerous attacks and operations in Pakistan.464 In mid-February 2022, the Pakistani military launched artillery strikes on TTP positions in Naray and Sarkano districts (Kunar Province) after TTP members attacked Pakistani border posts. Following the Pakistani strikes, the Taliban de facto government reportedly sent hundreds of reinforcements to the area.465 In early June 2022, following secret talks between TTP and Pakistani military officials, the TTP announced a ceasefire with Pakistan466 for a duration of three months. These talks had been mediated by the Afghan Taliban.467

458 US, CRS, Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan, 19 April 2022, url, p. 2
459 UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, url, para. 82, 83
460 Independent Afghan analyst, digital interview, 8 November 2021
461 USIP, After the Taliban’s Takeover: Pakistan’s TTP problem, 19 January 2022, url
462 Independent Afghan analyst, digital interview, 8 November 2021
464 UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, url, para. 83
465 ISW, Afghanistan in Review: Taliban and opposition groups prepare for a new spring fighting season in Afghanistan, 9 March 2022, url
466 USIP, Five Things to Watch in the Islamabad-Pakistani Taliban Talks, 21 June 2022, url; Jaffery, S.A.Z., Negotiating with the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan is a bad idea, Atlantic Council, 10 June 2022, url
467 USIP, Five Things to Watch in the Islamabad-Pakistani Taliban Talks, 21 June 2022, url
2.5.2. Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement

The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), also known as the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), seeks to create an independent Islamic state for the Turkic-speaking Uyghurs, who live in western China. ⁴⁶⁸ According to the report of the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team to the UN Security Council, estimates regarding the group’s size range from several dozen to as many as 1,000 members. Several UN Security Council member states indicated that ETIM remained active in Afghanistan. ⁴⁶⁹ Following the Taliban takeover of power, some ETIM members were reportedly relocated from Badakhshan Province to provinces further away from the Chinese border, ⁴⁷⁰ including to locations in Nangarhar Province, ⁴⁷¹ as part of the Taliban’s attempts to both protect the group and to restrain its operations. ⁴⁷²

2.5.3. Jamaat Ansarullah

Jamaat Ansarullah is a group closely associated with Al-Qaeda. In 2021, it fought alongside Taliban forces in Badakhshan Province. As relations between Tajikistan and the Taliban de facto government deteriorated in autumn 2021, Ansarullah fighters were deployed alongside Taliban special forces along the Tajik border in Badakhshan, Takhar and Kunduz provinces. According to the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, the group was believed to comprise 300 fighters who were mostly Tajik nationals, with some Afghan speakers of Persian languages. Jamaat Ansarullah had a presence in Badakhshan’s Registan, Warduj and Jurm districts and in Kunduz’s Dash-t-i Archi and Chapa Dara districts. Its leader is Sajod, the son of the group’s former leader Damullo Amriddin. ⁴⁷³

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⁴⁶⁸ US, CRS, Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan, 19 April 2022, url, p. 2
⁴⁶⁹ UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, url, para. 86, 87
⁴⁷⁰ UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, url, para. 86; RFE/RL, Taliban ‘Removing’ Uyghur Militants From Afghanistan’s Border With China, 5 October 2021, url
⁴⁷¹ RFE/RL, Taliban ‘Removing’ Uyghur Militants From Afghanistan’s Border With China, 5 October 2021, url
⁴⁷² UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, url, para. 88
⁴⁷³ UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, url, para. 88
3. Recent security trends

According to UN figures, between 19 August 2021 and 31 December 2021, there were 985 security incidents recorded across the country, representing a 91 % decrease compared to the same period in 2020. During this period, 148 armed clashes were registered, signifying a decrease by 98 %; air strikes decreased by 99 % with three recorded incidents, detonations of improvised explosive devices decreased by 91 % with 101 recorded incidents and targeted killings decreased by 51 % with 207 recorded incidents. There was, however, an increase in other security incidents such as crime, due to the ‘rapid deterioration of the economic and humanitarian situation.’

From early 2022 to the end of May 2022 security incidents and civilian casualties continued to decrease, when compared to the same period in 2021. According to UN figures, 2 105 security incidents were recorded in the period between 1 January 2022 and 21 May 2022, including 164 armed clashes, 5 air strikes, 123 IED explosions, and 122 assassinations.

In its July 2022 report, UNAMA pointed out that indiscriminate attacks targeting civilian population of Afghanistan, and often its ethnic and religious minority groups, continued, with ISKP claiming responsibility over most of the incidents.

Despite the overall decline in security incidents, SIGAR noted in January 2022 that significant levels of violence persisted, among which it listed mass-casualty attacks perpetrated by ISKP, attacks on civilians carried out by Taliban forces and others, as well as occasional skirmishes mounted by anti-Taliban insurgents. According to an anonymous international NGO based in Kabul, consulted by the Swedish Migration Agency’s Unit for Migration Analysis in March 2022, the conflict-related violence at the time consisted of ‘asymmetrical attacks’, and not drawn out battles between different actors. The same source described the conflict level in the country as ‘very low’ and comprised by only a fraction of the conflict levels before the Taliban takeover.

Contrary to the generally low conflict level, an anonymous international analyst based in Afghanistan, also consulted by the Swedish Unit for Migration Analysis in March 2022, stated that the number of murders and targeted attacks had increased in 2022. The same source stated that the motives behind these attacks had become increasingly difficult to understand. Individuals were previously targeted due to their connections to the former government according to the source, who further stated that murders at the time of the interview took

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474 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, url, para. 15
477 US, SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2022, url, p. 71
478 Sweden, Migrationsverket, Afghanistan: Säkerhetsläget efter talibanrörelsens maktövertagande [Afghanistan: Security situation after Taliban takeover of power] [version 1.0] [source: an international NGO in Kabul], 29 April 2022, url, p. 15
place without such clear connections or apparent reasons.\(^{479}\) The Afghan news outlet Pajhwok Afghan News, which publishes weekly short overviews on the security situation, including general crime and civilian and non-civilian fatalities, noted that the week from April 16 to April 22 had seen 128 people killed and 161 injured across the country, making it the deadliest week since the Taliban takeover in the country.\(^{480}\) Although bomb attacks were reported to have decreased considerably since the Taliban took over power, the month of Ramadan in April 2022 saw several deadly bombings causing many civilian casualties.\(^{481}\)

In their joint report of April 2022, ACLED and APW noted an increase in Taliban infighting, having recorded 33 incidents from September 2021 to March 2022 (one third of these incidents recorded in January 2022 alone), where Taliban forces clashed with each other. Such clashes where registered for example in the provinces of Faryab and Samangan and were in part a result of ethnic tensions within Taliban ranks.\(^{482}\) Further armed clashes between Taliban forces were reported in Bamyan in November 2021\(^ {483}\) and June 2022\(^ {484}\) and in Takhar Province in April 2022\(^ {485}\) and June 2022.\(^ {486}\)

An anonymous international NGO based in Kabul, consulted by the Swedish Unit for Migration Analysis in March 2022, stated that although the main conflict between the Taliban and the former government had ended, other local conflicts remained, such as tribal conflicts, land conflicts and conflicts related to Kuchi migration.\(^ {487}\)

3.1. Regional differences

Several sources reported an overall decrease in violent incidents compared to the time before the Taliban takeover in mid-August 2021.\(^ {488}\) The reduction of violence in the first months following the Taliban takeover was reportedly more noticeable in rural areas, where much of the previous conflict between Taliban and state forces had been carried out.\(^ {489}\) For the period

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\(^{479}\) Sweden, Migrationsverket, Afghanistan: Säkerhetsläget efter talibanrörelsens maktövertagande [Afghanistan: Security situation after Taliban takeover of power] (version 1.0) [source: an international analyst in Afghanistan], 29 April 2022, url, p. 18

\(^{480}\) Pajhwok Afghan News, Last week deadliest since regime change last year, 23 April 2022, url

\(^{481}\) BBC News, Afghanistan: Kunduz mosque attacked during Friday prayers, 22 April 2022, url; France 24, Several killed in string of bomb attacks in Afghanistan, 25 May 2022, url

\(^{482}\) ACLED and APW, Tracking Disorder During Taliban Rule in Afghanistan, A Joint ACLED and APW Report, April 2022, url, p. 11

\(^{483}\) UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, url, para. 15

\(^{484}\) Hasht-e Subh, Clashes Between Tajik and Pashtun Taliban in Bamyan, 24 June 2022, url

\(^{485}\) Hasht-e Subh, A Country in Chaos: Six Taliban Fighters Killed During Clashes Amongst Themselves in Takhar Province, 11 April 2022, url

\(^{486}\) Hasht-e Subh, Clashes Erupt Between Taliban Forces in Takhar: Eight People Killed, Including Civilians, 11 June 2022, url

\(^{487}\) Sweden, Migrationsverket, Afghanistan: Säkerhetsläget efter talibanrörelsens maktövertagande [Afghanistan: Security situation after Taliban takeover of power] (version 1.0) [source: an international NGO in Kabul], 29 April 2022, url, p. 16


\(^{489}\) WSJ, Strange Quiet Arrives in Afghanistan After Decades of War, 11 October 2021, url
from the end of January 2022 to the end of May 2022, the UN Secretary-General noted that
the security situation in the country was becoming ‘increasingly fragile’ due to ISKP and anti-
Taliban armed groups intensifying their attacks.\(^{490}\) The UN Secretary-General reported that
from September 2021 to the end of January 2022, ‘the eastern, central, southern and western
regions accounted for 75 per cent of all recorded incidents, with Nangarhar, Kabul, Kunar and
Kandahar the most conflict-affected provinces’.\(^{491}\) From February to the end of May 2022,
Herat, Nangarhar, Kabul, and Kandahar provinces were reported to be the provinces with
most recorded security incidents.\(^{492}\)

According to an independent Afghan analyst consulted by the EUAA in December 2021, ISKP
had its strongest presence in the eastern parts of the country, namely Nangarhar and Kunar,
but frequent attacks and conducted search operations by the Taliban also suggested that they
had strong presence in Kabul and in the north of Afghanistan.\(^{493}\) According to a UN envoy to
Afghanistan, as of mid-November 2021, ISKP presence had increased and was noted in nearly
all 34 provinces.\(^{494}\) In October 2021, BBC News described Nangarhar’s provincial capital
Jalalabad as the frontline between a secretive war carried out between Taliban forces and
ISKP fighters, adding that the Taliban were assumed to be behind a series of extrajudicial
killings of suspected ISKP members in the province.\(^{495}\) The Taliban cracked down on the
stronghold of ISKP fighters in Nangarhar Province in September 2021\(^{496}\) and further ramped
up their fighting capacities there in November 2021.\(^{497}\) During the campaign, suspected ISKP
collaborators were killed, arrested or disappeared.\(^{498}\) Taliban operations and raids carried out
against ISKP in the province also led to suspected ISKP members being killed in late
March/early April 2022.\(^{499}\)

According to the international issues magazine Modern Diplomacy, by November 2021, ISKP
had strengthened its position in and around Kabul, conducting attacks on ‘minorities, activists,
government employees and personnel of Afghan security forces’.\(^{500}\) Between mid-August
2021 and mid-March 2022, ISKP activities including armed clashes were reportedly focused
on Kabul, Nangarhar and Kunar provinces in the East, while the group was further indicated to

\(^{490}\) UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/862-
S/2022/485, 15 June 2022, url, para. 15
\(^{491}\) UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–
S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, url, para. 15
\(^{492}\) UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/862-
S/2022/485, 15 June 2022, url, para. 16
\(^{493}\) Independent Afghan analyst, email, 6 December 2021
\(^{494}\) UNAMA, SRSG Briefing to the Security Council, 17 November 2021, url, p. 2
\(^{495}\) BBC News, The Taliban’s secretive war against IS, 29 October 2021, url
\(^{496}\) Al Jazeera, Taliban takes on ISKP, its most serious foe in Afghanistan, 27 September 2021, url
(The), Taliban sends hundreds of fighters to eastern Afghanistan to wage war against Islamic State, 22 November
2021, url
\(^{499}\) ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (2–8 April 2022), 13 April 2022, url; ACLED, Regional
Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (26 March – 1 April 2022), 6 April 2022, url
\(^{500}\) Modern Diplomacy, Islamic State Khorasan’s Threat and the Taliban, 16 November 2021, url
be present in Kandahar and Paktya provinces.\textsuperscript{501} In April and May 2022, ISKP attacks targeted urban areas, such as the cities of Herat, Kabul, and Mazar-e Sharif.\textsuperscript{502}

According to the joint report by ACLED and Afghan Peace Watch (APW),\textsuperscript{503} between mid-August 2021 and mid-March 2022 NRF activities were recorded in the northern provinces, including Panjsher, Kapisa, Baghlan and Parwan, with clashes between Taliban and NRF increasing in January and February 2022.\textsuperscript{504} UCDP similarly recorded the majority of clashes between Taliban and NRF to have taken place in Panjsher and Baghlan provinces from mid-August 2021 to the end of May 2022.\textsuperscript{505} Heavy fighting between NRF fighters and Taliban took place in September 2021 in the Panjsher Valley, with both sides claiming to have inflicted a high number of casualties on the other side.\textsuperscript{506}

In early 2022, several anti-Taliban opposition groups announced their intent to start a spring offensive, prompting the Taliban to move military reinforcements to northern Afghanistan and conducting military exercises there.\textsuperscript{507} In April 2022, armed resistance to the Taliban was said to be predominantly present in the Panjsher Valley and Andarab District of Baghlan Province\textsuperscript{508}, but also to have spread to Kapisa, Parwan, Badakhshan, Takhar, Sar-e Pul, Ghor, and Jawzjan provinces as well as north of Kabul City.\textsuperscript{509} In the same month, the Taliban launched operations against NRF in Baghlan and Badakhshan provinces, killing several NRF members.\textsuperscript{510}

In May 2022, the Taliban reportedly sent a large number of reinforcements to Panjsher in order to stave off NRF attacks in the area.\textsuperscript{511} During the first months of 2022, UNAMA documented at least 10 cases of extrajudicial killings of individuals accused of NRF-affiliation by the de facto authorities, representing a marked increase in cases compared to the preceding UN reporting period.\textsuperscript{512} Referring to information provided by UNAMA, the UN Secretary-General as of mid-June 2022 noted the existence of at least a dozen anti-Taliban groups operating in 18 provinces, among them most visibly NRF and AFF in Panjsher and Baghlan provinces. There were reports of further clashes and attacks in the north.

\textsuperscript{501} ACLED and APW, Tracking Disorder During Taliban Rule in Afghanistan, A Joint ACLED and APW Report, April 2022, url, p. 10
\textsuperscript{502} UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/862-S/2022/485, 15 June 2022, url, para. 18
\textsuperscript{503} ‘APW is a local conflict observatory established in 2020 which has expanded its scope to monitor developments on the ground in Afghanistan through a strong network of reporters. APW offers credible information on protests, human rights violations, and other security matters.’ ACLED and APW, Tracking Disorder During Taliban Rule in Afghanistan, A Joint ACLED and APW Report, April 2022, url, p. 1
\textsuperscript{504} ACLED and APW, Tracking Disorder During Taliban Rule in Afghanistan, A Joint ACLED and APW Report, April 2022, url, p. 8
\textsuperscript{505} EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022
\textsuperscript{506} BBC News, Afghanistan Panjshir: Fighting intensifies over holdout Afghan valley, 3 September 2021, url
\textsuperscript{507} ISW, Afghanistan in Review: Taliban and Opposition Groups Prepare for a New Spring Fighting Season in Afghanistan, 9 March 2022, url
\textsuperscript{508} ISW, Afghanistan in Review: Taliban and Opposition Groups Prepare for a New Spring Fighting Season in Afghanistan, 9 March 2022, url; VOA, Afghan ‘Fighting Season’ Ushers in New Anti-Taliban Groups, 28 April 2022, url
\textsuperscript{509} FP, Afghan resistance groups eye spring offensive, 11 April 2022, url
\textsuperscript{510} ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (9–15 April 2022), 20 April 2022, url
\textsuperscript{511} BBC News, Afghan resistance attack Taliban, sparking reprisals in Panjshir, 16 May 2022, url
\textsuperscript{512} UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/862-S/2022/485, 15 June 2022, url, para. 33
(Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz and Baghlan provinces), the centre (Kapisa, Parwan and Kabul provinces), the south-east (Khost Province) as well as the south (Kandahar Province). However, UNAMA had not been able to verify most attack claims and stated that the capabilities and membership of these groups was difficult to assess.\footnote{UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/862-S/2022/485, 15 June 2022, \url{url}, para. 17}

Daykundi Province was reported to be the scene of tensions resulting from competition over resources between Pashtun populations and Hazara, leading to the displacement of Hazara residents in September and October 2021.\footnote{International Crisis Group, Crisiswatch: Tracking Conflict Worldwide, n.d., \url{url}; Filter set to Afghanistan; Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Affiliates Force Hazaras to Migrate From Daykundi, Central Afghanistan, 14 September 2021, \url{url}; RFE/RL/Gandhara, 'Terrified' Afghan Hazara Say Taliban Evicted Them And Seized Homes, 29 November 2021, \url{url}; HRW, Afghanistan: Taliban Forcibly Evict Minority Shia, 22 October 2021, \url{url}} According to Human Rights Watch, at least 2,800 Hazaras were evicted by Taliban in 15 villages in Daykundi and neighbouring Uruzgan provinces in September 2021. Even though Taliban officials in Kabul later retracted eviction orders for some villages, the inhabitants had still not returned by 20 October 2021.\footnote{Etilaat Roz, 'Killing of a nomad in the 1960s – Kuchis demand blood from residents of Sang-e Takht Bandar in Daykundi', 4 June 2022, \url{url}} In the spring of 2022, the encroachment of armed Kuchi nomads on and the destruction of farmland of local Hazaras was reported in Shahrestan and Khair districts.\footnote{Etilaat Roz, 'Kuchis demand blood from residents of Sang-e Takht Bandar in Daykundi', 4 June 2022, \url{url}} According to local media Etilaat Roz, there have been widespread cases of tensions between nomads and residents, including in the central regions, with the nomads being mostly armed and enjoying Taliban support.\footnote{EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url{url}}

### 3.2. Security incidents

In the period between 15 August 2021 and 15 June 2022, UNAMA recorded 2,106 civilian casualties (700 killed and 1,406 injured), including 441 children (159 killed and 282 injured), which were caused predominantly by ISKP-attributed IED attacks and unexploded ordinance (UXO).\footnote{UNAMA, Human Rights in Afghanistan, 15 August 2021 – 15 June 2022, July 2022, \url{url}, p. 10}

As depicted in Figure 1 below, during the reference period, ACLED documented 1,679 security incidents across the country, of which 777 were coded as ‘battles,’ 571 as ‘violence against civilians,’ and 331 as ‘explosions/remote violence.’\footnote{EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url{url}}
According to ACLED, the highest number of security incidents were recorded in provinces of Kabul (226), Panjsher (181), Baghlan (172), Nangarhar (163), and Takhar (104 security incidents). In the provinces of Parwan, Kunar, Kandahar, Badakhshan, Kapisa, Balkh, and Helmand, ACLED recorded between 49 and 82 security incidents. The ACLED figures on security incidents per province are given below:

In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP documented 298 security incidents (incidents with at least one recorded fatality) across the country causing an

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520 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
521 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
522 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
estimated 1,765 fatalities overall. The provinces most affected by these incidents were Nangarhar (71 incidents), Panjsher (55), Baghlan, and Kabul (35 incidents each).

ACLED attributed to the Taliban and the group’s military and police forces 582 security incidents (376 incidents coded as ‘violence against civilians,’ 196 as ‘battles,’ and 10 as ‘explosions/remote violence’), which made it the actor with the most attributed security incidents. UCDP indicated the Taliban as being involved in 264 of the 298 countrywide security incidents (incidents causing at least one fatality), with Nangarhar Province taking the lead in the number of incidents (64), followed by Panjsher Province (55) and Baghlan Province (35).

According to ACLED, 408 security incidents were attributed to unidentified armed groups, making armed actors who could not be assigned to particular groups the second most involved actor in security incidents (after the Taliban). The highest number of incidents were recorded in Kabul Province (53), Nangarhar (42), Helmand (31), and Kundahar (28), Kunar (23), Kunduz (21), and Tahkar (21). The largest share of the incidents attributed to unidentified armed groups was coded by ACLED as ‘violence against civilians’ (166) and involved mostly attacks (152). 13 cases of abduction or forced disappearance were also recorded. Furthermore, 164 incidents attributed by ACLED to unidentified armed groups were coded as ‘explosions/remote violence’, mostly consisting of remote violence such as IED explosions.

ACLED attributed to ISKP 213 of the of 1,679 security incidents in the country during the reference period. UCDP recorded ISKP as being involved in 126 of the 298 countrywide security incidents (incidents causing at least one fatality), with the highest number of incidents recorded in Nangarhar Province (62 incidents), followed by Kabul Province (26 incidents).

According to UN figures, there were 152 attacks either claimed by or attributed to ISKP between mid-August 2021 and the end of the year 2021 compared to only 20 attacks during the same period in 2020. Between 1 January and 21 May, the UN recorded 82 ISKP attacks.

According to ACLED figures, 344 security incidents were attributed to NRF; these incidents were mostly armed confrontations with Taliban forces. UCDP recorded 87 armed

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523 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. Fatality figure taken from the “best” column, which according to UCDP is a best estimate, containing the most reliable estimate of deaths identified in the source material.

524 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022.

525 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url.

526 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url.

527 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url.

528 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url.


531 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url.
confrontations between NRF and Taliban during the same period, mostly in Panjsher and Baghlan provinces.\textsuperscript{532} Other anti-Taliban groups were involved in 79 security incidents according to ACLED, among them most notably AFF with 46 incidents.\textsuperscript{533}

In the reference period, ACLED recorded 571 incidents of violence against civilians for which it recorded a total of 584 fatalities.\textsuperscript{534}

Between January and May 2022, UNAMA documented at least 40 extrajudicial killings, and at least 30 cases of torture and ill-treatment as well as at least 80 cases of arbitrary arrest targeting individuals being accused of affiliation with ISKP or NRF.\textsuperscript{535}

(a) Battles/armed clashes

According to ACLED, 777 of 1,679 security incidents in the country were coded as ‘armed clashes’, the most affected provinces being Panjsher (136), Baghlan (116), Nangarhar (67), Parwan (60), Takhar (55), Kabul (51 incidents).\textsuperscript{536}

The UN Secretary-General noted an increase in attacks by resistance groups such as NRF on Taliban between September and the end of the year 2021.\textsuperscript{537} Anti-Taliban groups were described as engaging in ‘continued, sporadic fighting against the Taliban’ in the northern provinces of Panjsher, Baghlan, Kapisa, Balkh, and Badakhshan in late October 2021.\textsuperscript{538} NRF as well as other groups mounting resistance to the Taliban were described as employing the same tactics of guerrilla warfare that the Taliban had previously employed against the US and NATO as well as Afghan security forces.\textsuperscript{539} In April 2022, NRF reportedly attacked the Taliban in Balkh, Panjsher, Jawzjan, and Takhar provinces and claimed the killing of a Taliban intelligence member in Kabul City.\textsuperscript{540} NRF further stated in April 2022 that clashes with the Taliban had taken place in Baghlan and Badakhshan provinces.\textsuperscript{541}

\textsuperscript{532} EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022

\textsuperscript{533} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url. Filter for column ACTOR 1 set to include Anti-Taliban Forces, Afghanistan Freedom Front; Militia [Ata Noor]; National Liberation Front of Afghanistan, Turkistan Freedom Tigers, Watandost Front and Wolf Unit. Filter for column ACTOR 2 set to include Anti-Taliban Forces, Afghanistan Freedom Front; Rahmadabad Communal Militia and Samarkhel Communal Militia.

\textsuperscript{534} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url. Please note that ACLED does not record specifically civilian fatalities but the overall number of fatalities for each incident. Therefore, fatality figures recorded for incidents of violence against civilians may also include fatalities of non-civilians such as security forces.

\textsuperscript{535} UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, url, para. 15

\textsuperscript{536} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url

\textsuperscript{537} UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, url, para. 15

\textsuperscript{538} US, SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2022, url, p. 75

\textsuperscript{539} Asia Times, Eight months on, Taliban’s rule is far from stable, 2 May 2022, url

\textsuperscript{540} ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (9–15 April 2022), 20 April 2022, url

\textsuperscript{541} Shafaqna, جبهة مقاومت: 16 طالب در بدخشان كشته شدند [Resistance Front: 16 Taliban were killed in Badakhshan], 12 April 2022, url
In late March and early April 2022, clashes between Taliban and AFF were reported in Kapisa, Badakhshan, Kandahar, and Jawzjan provinces.\textsuperscript{542} At the beginning of April 2022, AFF claimed to have carried out attacks on Taliban bases in Parwan, Badakhshan, Kandahar and Baghlan provinces, killing four Taliban fighters and injuring several others. The Taliban on the other hand have generally argued that this kind of attacks was mostly staged on social media but did not actually happen on the ground.\textsuperscript{543}

(b) Explosions/remote violence

According to ACLED figures, 331 of 1,679 security incidents in the country were coded as 'explosions/remote violence', the most affected provinces being Kabul Province (72), Nangarhar (40), Kunar (35), Helmand (20), and Panjsher (20 security incidents). In 254 of these incidents, remote explosives, landmines or IEDs were used, in 20 incidents grenades and in 5 incidents suicide bombs.\textsuperscript{544}

While prior to the airport attack in August 2021, ISKP attacks were described as smaller scale attacks, involving mostly low-grade IEDs (64\% of attacks) and targeted killings using small arms fire (29\% of attacks),\textsuperscript{545} the period following the Taliban takeover witnessed several large-scale attacks consisting of bombings or suicide bombings which ISKP claimed.\textsuperscript{546} From May 2020 onwards, ISKP was reported to have shifted its tactics to targeting urban areas.\textsuperscript{547} The deadliest attack of this kind of urban attack was a bombing at Kabul airport on 26 August 2021 that killed more than 180 people and injured hundreds.\textsuperscript{548} Furthermore, ISKP claimed bomb attacks on public places such as mosques\textsuperscript{549} as well as planting roadside bombs\textsuperscript{550} or placing bombs on passenger vehicles.\textsuperscript{551}

Following the Taliban takeover, ISKP was reported to target the Taliban as well as religious minorities such as Shia.\textsuperscript{552} For example, a suicide bomb attack in a Shia mosque in Kunduz in October 2021 killed at least 50 civilians and injured more than 100.\textsuperscript{553} This attack was followed

\textsuperscript{542} ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (26 March – 1 April 2022), 6 April 2022, [url]
\textsuperscript{543} Hasht-e Subh, Afghanistan Freedom Front Forces Claims of Attacking the Taliban Bases in Four Provinces, 9 April 2022, [url]
\textsuperscript{544} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]
\textsuperscript{545} ExTrac, ISKP - A Threat Assessment, August 2021, [url], p. 13
\textsuperscript{546} BBC News, Afghanistan: ‘Blood and fear everywhere’ after deadly IS blast, 21 April 2022, [url]; France 24, IS group claims responsibility for Kandahar mosque bombing, 16 October 2021, [url]; Guardian (The), Shia mosque bombing kills dozens in Afghan city of Kunduz, 8 October 2021, [url]
\textsuperscript{547} DRC, Global Displacement Forecast 2022, February 2022, [url], p. 12; FRS, L’ Etat islamique au Khorasan: une capacité de nuisance en Afghanistan et au-delà, 16 February 2022, [url]
\textsuperscript{548} Al Jazeera, Taliban takes on ISKP, its most serious foe in Afghanistan, 27 September 2021, [url]
\textsuperscript{549} Pajhwok Afghan News, World once again turns attention to Afghanistan last week, 13 November 2021, [url]
\textsuperscript{550} Pajhwok Afghan News, 42 people suffer casualties in Afghanistan last week, 30 January 2022, [url]
\textsuperscript{551} AFP, Four bombs kill at least 16 in Afghanistan, 26 May 2022; France 24, Islamic State group claims responsibility for Kabul bus bombing, 1 May 2022, [url]; RANE, The Implications of the Latest Islamic State Bombings in Kabul, 17 November 2021, [url]
\textsuperscript{553} BBC News, Afghanistan: Deadly attack hits Kunduz mosque during Friday prayers, 9 October 2021, [url]; Guardian (The), Shia mosque bombing kills dozens in Afghan city of Kunduz, 8 October 2021, [url]
a few days later by a suicide bomb attack in a Shia mosque in Kandahar in October 2021 which killed more than 40 people and wounded dozens more.\textsuperscript{554} On 21 April 2022, ISKP carried out an attack on a Shia mosque in Mazar-e-Sharif, reportedly using a remotely detonated booby-trapped bag,\textsuperscript{555} killing at least 12 people and injuring at least 58.\textsuperscript{556}

The Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) reported on a series of explosive blasts targeting the Hazara-dominated Dasht-e-Barchi neighbourhood in western Kabul from September to December 2021. AAN noted a more systematic and widespread targeting, using magnetic bombs or other forms of explosives placed in civilian passenger vehicles, such as minivans used for public transport.\textsuperscript{557} For example, on 13 November 2021, a magnetic bomb attached to a minivan exploded in Dasht-e-Barchi, reportedly killing six people and wounding several more. The Taliban declared ISKP responsible for the attack, since the group had previously targeted the neighbourhood.\textsuperscript{558} Bomb blasts in Dasht-e-Barchi in December 2021 were claimed by ISKP.\textsuperscript{559} ISKP further displayed its capability of launching complex attacks, in which several attacks were carried out on the same day in different places across the country. For example, on 24 April 2022, ISKP carried out two attacks targeting Taliban security forces in Kunduz and Nangarhar and detonated an explosive charge in Kabul\textsuperscript{560}. On 25 May 2022, a series of explosive devices were set off on passenger vehicles in Mazar-e-Sharif, targeting Hazara citizens and killing 9 persons and injuring more than 40.\textsuperscript{561} ISKP claimed the attack hours later.\textsuperscript{562}

During the reference period there were several bomb blasts targeting crowded places and leading to mass casualties, for which no group claimed responsibility. For example, in November 2021, an explosive charge hidden in a mosque in Spin Ghar District in Nangarhar detonated during prayers.\textsuperscript{563} On 19 April 2022, two explosive devices put into backpacks were left to detonate outside a boys’ school in Kabul.\textsuperscript{564} A few days later, a bomb detonated in a mosque frequented by Sufi worshippers in Kunduz City,\textsuperscript{565} followed by yet another unclaimed

\textsuperscript{554} France 24, IS group claims responsibility for Kandahar mosque bombing, 16 October 2021, url; BBC News, Afghanistan: Suicide attack hits Kandahar mosque during prayers, 16 October 2021, url
\textsuperscript{555} BBC News, Afghanistan: ‘Blood and fear everywhere’ after deadly IS blast, 21 April 2022, url; Al Jazeera, At least 16 killed as explosions rock Afghan cities, 21 April 2022 url
\textsuperscript{556} BBC News, Afghanistan: ‘Blood and fear everywhere’ after deadly IS blast, 21 April 2022, url; Al Jazeera, At least 16 killed as explosions rock Afghan cities, 21 April 2022 url
\textsuperscript{557} AAN, A Community Under Attack: How successive governments failed west Kabul and the Hazaras who live there, 17 January 2022, url
\textsuperscript{558} Reuters, Blast hits Shi’ite area of Afghan capital Kabul, 13 November 2021, url
\textsuperscript{559} Pajhwok Afghan News, 13 people suffer casualties in Afghanistan last week, 13 December 2021, url
\textsuperscript{560} US, SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 April 2022, url, p. 62
\textsuperscript{561} Etilaat Roz, [Three explosions in Mazar-e-Sharif, according to Taliban nine dead and 15 wounded], 25 May 2022, url
\textsuperscript{562} France 24, Several killed in string of bomb attacks in Afghanistan, 25 May 2022, url
\textsuperscript{563} Etilaat Roz, [Explosion in mosque in Spin Ghar district of Nangarhar province kills three and wounds 15 others], 12 November 2021, url; Al Jazeera, Afghanistan: Mosque in Nangarhar province hit by blast, 12 November 2021, url
\textsuperscript{564} BBC News, Kabul blasts kill six and wound 20 at boys’ school, 19 April 2022, url
\textsuperscript{565} BBC News, Afghanistan: Kunduz mosque attacked during Friday prayers, 22 April 2022, url; Al Jazeera, Explosion at Afghan mosque kills dozens of people, 22 April 2022, url
bomb attack on a Sufi mosque in Kabul.\textsuperscript{566} Regional sources later reported that the attack on the Sufi mosque in Kunduz was either blamed on ISKP\textsuperscript{567} or claimed by ISKP\textsuperscript{568}.

ACLED recorded over a dozen grenade attacks across the country following the Taliban takeover, the majority of which were perpetrated by unidentified actors, such as a grenade thrown into a Kabul mosque and another at a market at the beginning of April 2022.\textsuperscript{569} There were reports of unclaimed roadside bomb attacks targeting Taliban members, such as Taliban vehicles being hit by roadside bomb\textsuperscript{570} or an IED explosion near a police station.\textsuperscript{571}

(c) Targeted killings

 Shortly after the Taliban took over government control in August 2021, they announced a general amnesty for all officials of the previous government, urging them to return to work.\textsuperscript{572} They also declared persons who had served in the military sector to be included in this amnesty.\textsuperscript{573} However, UNAMA/UN OHCHR reported to have received credible allegations of more than 130 killings targeting persons working for the former government, former ANDSF personnel or their family members between mid-August 2021 and February 2022. Of these cases ‘around 100 were extrajudicial killings attributed to the de facto authorities or their affiliates’.\textsuperscript{574} In the period between 15 August 2021 and June 2022, UNAMA recorded 160 extrajudicial killings, including 10 instances where women were killed, by the de facto authorities across the country.\textsuperscript{575}

In September 2021, Taliban conducted house searches in Panjsher Province to identify former government workers. At least six civilian men were extrajudicially killed, some of whom had previously worked for the ANDSF.\textsuperscript{576} Human Rights Watch documented the cases of summary execution or enforced disappearance of 47 former members of the ANDSF as well as military personnel, police, intelligence service members, and paramilitary militia between 15 August and 31 October 2021, with most cases being reported in Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, and Kunduz provinces. The former members of the security forces had previously surrendered to

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\bibitem{567} TOLOnews, Grieving Families Demand Justice for Kunduz Blast, 23 April 2022, \url{url}
\bibitem{568} RFE/RL/Gandhara, Fear Grips Afghanistan’s Sufi Community Following Deadly Attacks, 16 May 2022, \url{url}
\bibitem{569} ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (2–8 April 2022), 13 April 2022, \url{url}
\bibitem{570} Etilaat Roz, انفجار در کنر یک کشته و شش زخمی بر جای گذاشت [Explosion in Kunar leaves one dead and six injured], 12 June 2022, \url{url}; Etilaat Roz, انفجار در قندهار؛ پنج نیروی طالبان و یک غیرنظامی کشته شدند [Explosion in Kandahar, five Taliban fighters and one civilian killed], 9 June 2022, \url{url}; Etilaat Roz, چهار نیروی طالبان در انفجار ماین کنار جاده در ننگرهار کشته شدند [Four Taliban killed in roadside mine explosion in Nangarhar], 21 April 2022, \url{url}; BBC News, Afghanistan: ’Blood and fear everywhere’ after deadly IS blast, 21 April 2022, \url{url}; Hasht-e Subh, Consecutive Blasts in Kunar, Kunduz and Badakhshan Leave One Dead and 9 Injured, 12 June 2022, \url{url}
\bibitem{571} Etilaat Roz, انفجار در کنر یک کشته و شش زخمی بر جای گذاشت [Explosion in Kunar leaves one dead and six injured], 12 June 2022, \url{url}
\bibitem{572} France 24, Taliban declares general ‘amnesty’ for Afghan government officials, 17 August 2021, \url{url}; AP, Taliban vow to respect women, despite history of oppression, 18 August 2021, \url{url}
\bibitem{573} Washington Post (The), Taliban leaders are promising peace, order and amnesty in Afghanistan. They promised that last time too., 22 August 2021, \url{url}
\bibitem{575} UNAMA, Human Rights in Afghanistan, 15 August 2021 – 15 June 2022, July 2022, \url{url}, p. 13
\bibitem{576} AI, Afghanistan: Government collapse marked by ‘repeated war crimes and relentless bloodshed’ – new report, 15 December 2021, \url{url}; Washington Post (The), Taliban fighters tighten grip in rebellious Panjshir region with killings and food control, witness says, 10 September 2021, \url{url}
\end{thebibliography}
or were apprehended by the Taliban. Videoclips were shared on social media which allegedly showed members of the former army being tortured or killed, however, these videos could oftentimes not be verified.

An investigation by the New York Times published in April 2022 documented nearly 500 cases of forced disappearance or killings targeting former government officials and members of the Afghan security forces during the first six months of Taliban rule. According to the investigation results, cases of killings were documented across the country in almost all provinces. There were 86 confirmed killings in Baghlan Province alone, a region where many former Afghan special forces were located. A relatively high number of missing persons was documented in Kandahar Province with 114 cases. The investigation results do not reveal the perpetrator in each case but the article goes on to state that the Taliban leadership initially denied the occurrence of such killings and later acknowledged some of them while maintaining that ‘those acts were the work of rogue commanders and not an authorized campaign’. Sporadic news reports indicated family members of former government employees being targeted as well, such as in the case of the killing of a brother of a former parliament member in Jalalabad in Nangarhar Province in October 2021 and the Taliban first arresting, then killing of the brother of a former member of the ANDSF in Takhar Province.

Pajhwok Afghan News repeatedly reported unidentified gunmen killing policemen or members of the security forces of the former government across the country, such as in Khost, Paktika, Uruzgan, Faryab, and Kandahar provinces as well as former government soldiers such as in Takhar and Uruzgan provinces. News media further reported killings of former government prosecutors. According to UN figures, during the second half of 2021, there were two cases in which unidentified armed actors killed civil society activists and one case in which a journalist was killed. According to the UN Secretary-General, three killings of civil society activists as well as the killing of a journalist were attributed to ISKP during the second half of 2021.

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577 HRW, “No forgiveness for people like you”, 30 November 2021, [url]
578 Feroz, Emran, Ein Jahr unter den Taliban [A year under the Taliban], Republik, 21 June 2022, [url]
580 HRW, “No forgiveness for people like you”, 30 November 2021, [url]
581 Pajhwok Afghan News, 70pc of last week’s casualties occurred in Nangarhar, 30 October 2021, [url]
582 Shafaqna, قتل یک کارمند بانک و دو دانشجو در شمال کشور [Killing of a bank employee and two students in the north of the country], 1 March 2022, [url]
583 Pajhwok Afghan News, 28 people suffer casualties in Afghanistan last week, 20 March 2022, [url]; Pajhwok Afghan News, 62 people killed, wounded in Afghanistan last week, 26 February 2022, [url]; Pajhwok Afghan News, Govt organizes conference amid focus on economic rehabilitation, 22 January 2022, [url]; Pajhwok Afghan News, World remains focused on Afghanistan as casualties decline, 25 December 2021, [url]; Pajhwok Afghan News, 70pc of last week’s casualties occurred in Nangarhar, 30 October 2021, [url]; Pajhwok Afghan News, Last week, casualties in Afghanistan fail to record low, 23 October 2021, [url]
584 Pajhwok Afghan News, 28 people suffer casualties in Afghanistan last week, 20 March 2022, [url]; Pajhwok Afghan News, World once again turns attention to Afghanistan last week, 13 November 2021, [url]
585 Pajhwok Afghan News, 62 people killed, wounded in Afghanistan last week, 26 February 2022, [url]; RFE/RL/Gandhara, Afghanistan’s Former Prosecutors Hunted By Criminals They Helped Convict, 21 September 2021, [url]; BBC News, Afghanistan’s female lawyers are on the run from men they prosecuted, 6 October 2021, [url]
586 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, [url], para. 33
587 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, [url], para. 33
more information on targeted killings, please refer to EUAA August 2022 report Afghanistan – Targeting of Individuals.

(d) Arbitrary arrests

On 21 March 2022, AI reported that Taliban authorities had arbitrarily arrested, unlawfully detained or enabled the forceful disappearance of over 60 people, including children, in January and February 2022 in Afghanistan. According to AI, due to the limitations on media imposed by the Taliban, the number could be higher. As stated by the organisation, it remained ‘difficult to distinguish between arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearance’, because some cases started with enforced disappearance by Taliban authorities and ‘led to illegal often incommunicado detention’. Even in cases where the Taliban authorities admitted the detention, ‘they failed to ensure that detainees were brought to courts within a reasonable time or to charge them with a recognizable criminal offence’.588

In the period between 15 August 2021 and June 2022, UNAMA recorded 178 arbitrary arrests and detentions, 23 incommunicado detentions, and 56 cases of torture and ill-treatment of former government officials and former ANDSF members by the de facto authorities across the country.589 For more information, please refer to EUAA August 2022 report Afghanistan – Targeting of Individuals.

(e) Kidnappings

A source interviewed by DIS for the June 2022 report noted that business owners and their children were a frequent target of kidnappers.590 With reference to local media reports, a Foreign Policy (FP) article mentioned that more than 40 businessmen were kidnapped in Balkh Province and other regions in the two months that followed the Taliban takeover. FP elaborated that other sources gave higher numbers and that, due to the absence of a functioning bureaucracy, official statistics were very limited.591 According to the head of the Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Industries (ACCI) cited by TOLOnews in October 2021, some of businessmen had been killed and the kidnappings had happened as a result of the disarming of traders by the Taliban.592 Reportedly, following the Taliban takeover only Taliban members were allowed to carry weapons. However, after security and safety complaints by businessmen due to ‘huge threats of kidnapping, looting, and money heisting’, it was reported in November 2021 that businessmen would be allowed to carry weapons again.593

(f) Explosive remnants of war

In April 2022, UNICEF reported that, since the Taliban takeover, 301 children had either been killed or injured by ERW and landmines. The organisation expected a further rise of such incidents as civilians, due to the improved security situation, venture into areas that were

590 Denmark, DIS, Afghanistan, Taliban’s impact on the population, June 2022, url, p. 80
591 FP, Afghan Crime Wave Adds to Taliban Dystopia, 29 October 2021, url
592 TOLOnews, Kidnapping Cases Surge in Afghanistan, 28 October 2021, url
593 KP, Taliban allows traders to carry weapons for protection, 11 November 2021, url
previously inaccessible. UNAMA documented 51 deaths and 76 injuries due to ERW detonations between 1 January and the end of April 2022.

In its January 2022 report, UNOCHA listed Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzgan, Ghor, Nangarhar, Faryab, and Kunduz provinces as the provinces ‘with the highest priority’ for United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) ‘a village-by-village landmine/explosive impact survey’. Media reports repeatedly covered cases of ERW killing children, such as in Uruzgan, Kandahar, Kunduz, Ghazni, Farah, Herat, Helmand; Daykundi and Nangarhar provinces. For instance, on 10 January 2022, an ERW detonated near a school in Nangarhar Province, killing at least eight children and wounding four more. On 30 March 2022, a 12-year-old child was killed in Daykundi Province, when a rocket-propelled grenade he was playing with exploded. On 20 May 2022, a child who had been looking for scrap iron to sell was killed in Ghazni province when a mortar shell exploded.

3.3. Impact of violence on the civilian population

3.3.1. Civilian casualties

The UN Secretary-General in his report of January 2022 noted that the significant decrease in armed conflict after the Taliban takeover also led to a drastic reduction in civilian casualties resulting from battles on the ground as well as airstrikes. Civilian casualties continued to be reported resulting from IEDs as well as explosive remnants of war (ERW).

The UNAMA data on civilian casualties from 2009, when UNAMA started its systematic documentation, to 15 June 2022 is shown in the table below:

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594 UNICEF, Five children killed by an explosive remnant of war in Afghanistan, 2 April 2022, url
595 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, url, para. 34
596 As of January 2022, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was to conduct ‘a village-by-village landmine/explosive impact survey across the country’. UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Response Plan 2022, 11 January 2022, url, pp. 78-79
597 Xinhua, 2 children killed, 1 wounded in unexploded ordnance blast in Afghanistan, 28 May 2022, url; KP, Explosive Remnant of War Kills a Child in Ghazni Province, 21 May 2022, url; Bakhtar News Agency, 1 Child Killed, 2 Injured in Farah IED Explosion, 18 May 2022, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Last week deadliest since regime change last year, 23 April 2022, url; DW, Afghanistan: Bomb blasts at playing field kill several in Herat, 2 April 2022, url; Hasht-e Subh, Rocket Bullet Explosion Kills Five Children in Helmand Province, 1 April 2022, url; Etilaat Roz, انفجار سرگلوله راکت در دایکندی جان یک کودک را گرفت [Rocket-propelled grenade explodes in Daykundi, killing a child], 30 March 2022, url; UN News, Eight Afghan students die in explosion outside school, 11 January 2022, url
599 Etilaat Roz, انفجار سرگلوله راکت در دایکندی جان یک کودک را گرفت [Rocket-propelled grenade explodes in Daykundi, killing a child], 30 March 2022, url
600 KP, Explosive Remnant of War Kills a Child in Ghazni Province, 21 May 2022, url
601 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, url, para. 34
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Civilians killed</th>
<th>Civilians injured</th>
<th>Total civilian casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 August 2021 – 15 June 2022</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1 406</td>
<td>2 160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 January – 14 August 2021</td>
<td>2 091</td>
<td>5 309</td>
<td>7 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>3 035</td>
<td>5 785</td>
<td>8 820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>3 403</td>
<td>6 989</td>
<td>10 392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>3 804</td>
<td>7 189</td>
<td>10 993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>3 440</td>
<td>7 019</td>
<td>10 459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>3 527</td>
<td>7 925</td>
<td>11 452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>3 565</td>
<td>7 470</td>
<td>11 035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>3 701</td>
<td>6 834</td>
<td>10 535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2 969</td>
<td>5 669</td>
<td>8 638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2 769</td>
<td>4 821</td>
<td>7 590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3 133</td>
<td>4 709</td>
<td>7 842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2 794</td>
<td>4 368</td>
<td>7 162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2 412</td>
<td>3 557</td>
<td>5 969</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1. Civilian casualties from 2009 to 2022, according to UNAMA

In the period between 15 August 2021 and 15 June 2022, UNAMA recorded 2,160 civilian casualties (700 killed and 1,460 injured), including 441 casualties among children (159 killed and 282 injured). The major causes of casualties were ISKP-attributed/claimed IED attacks on non-military targets (mosques, schools, public parks and public transportation) and unexploded ordnance (UXO). UN figures covering a period from mid-August 2021 to the end of 2021 indicated that suicide and non-suicide IEDs accounted for most civilian casualties (more than 850, including nearly 300 fatalities). ERW were recorded as the second largest cause with nearly 100 casualties, most of them children. Armed clashes between the Taliban and ISKP or anti-Taliban resistance groups reportedly caused almost 20 civilian casualties.

In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded 778 civilian deaths, the majority of which occurred in Kabul Province (298), followed by Kunduz Province (121), Balkh (77), Kandahar (65), and Panjshier (61) provinces. Kabul, Kunduz, Balkh, and Kandahar witnessed one or more large scale bombings claiming a high toll of civilian lives.

According to the ACLED/APW report of April 2022, following the Taliban takeover, civilians continued to be targeted by the Taliban as well as by ISKP and unidentified armed groups. According to ACLED/APW figures, between mid-August 2021 and mid-March 2022, the Taliban were the main perpetrator of violence against civilians (53% of recorded security-related events), followed by unidentified armed groups (39%) and ISKP (6%).

There were reports of violent reprisals against civilians during or after armed clashes between Taliban and anti-Taliban groups. The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights following a visit to Afghanistan in May 2022 expressed concern about information he received regarding human rights violations and abuses against civilians in Panjshir, Baghlan, Badakhshan, and Takhar provinces. The violations reportedly happened in areas that saw clashes between the de facto security forces and fighters affiliated with NRF. He added that there had been unverified reports of violations including arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial killings, torture, and forced displacement. In September 2021, during a Taliban offensive to take control of Panjshir Province, there were reports of Taliban detaining and killing civilians. These reports could not be independently verified due to an internet blackout imposed by the Taliban in the province. BBC News counted 20 civilian deaths as a result of the offensive.

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602 UNAMA, Reports on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, n.d., url
603 UNAMA, Human Rights in Afghanistan, 15 August 2021 – 15 June 2022, July 2022, url, p. 10
604 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, url, para. 34
605 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022
606 France 24, IS group claims responsibility for Kunduz mosque bombing, 16 October 2021, url; BBC News, Afghanistan: Kunduz mosque attacked during Friday prayers, 22 April 2022, url; Al Jazeera, Explosion at Afghan mosque kills dozens of people, 22 April 2022, url; Guardian (The), Blast at Kabul mosque kills more than 50 worshippers, 29 April 2022, url; BBC News, Afghanistan: ‘Blood and fear everywhere’ after deadly IS blast, 21 April 2022, url; Al Jazeera, At least 16 killed as explosions rock Afghan cities, 21 April 2022 url
607 ACLED and APW, Tracking Disorder During Taliban Rule in Afghanistan, A Joint ACLED and APW Report, April 2022, url, p. 5
608 UN OHCHR, Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights, Richard Bennett, following his visit to Afghanistan from May 15-26, 2022, 26 May 2022, url, p. 3
among them a shopkeeper accused by the Taliban of selling goods to resistance fighters. He was reportedly arrested and later his dead body was found near his home bearing signs of torture. In May 2022, BBC News once more reported on violations in the context of clashes between the Taliban and NRF in Panjsher, with local residents saying civilians were beaten or shot by the Taliban. According to Afghanistan analyst and founder of Afghan Eye, Ahmad-Waleed Kakar, following the May 2022 clashes, BBC News which reported on reprisals was denied access to Panjsher while the state broadcaster RTA showed villagers denying any such actions taking place. According to Kakar, it was very difficult to assess what actually happened while at the same time there was little evidence to show that NRF had conquered any districts.

For the period of mid-August 2021 to February 2022, UNAMA/UN OHCHR noted to have received credible allegations in more than 50 cases of persons suspected of ISKP affiliation being killed. 35 of these cases were extrajudicial killings attributed to de facto authorities, mostly in Nangarhar Province. According to the report of the UN Secretary-General, three killings of civil society activists were attributed to the Taliban de facto authorities during the first six months of Taliban rule, and ten more activists were subjected to temporary arrests, beatings and threats by the de facto authorities. For the information on targeted profiles, please refer to EUAA August 2022 report Afghanistan – Targeting of Individuals.

3.3.2. Displacement and return

(a) Internal displacement

In 2021, IOM recorded 1,327,474 new IDPs, of whom around 823,033 (62%) were displaced due to conflict and 504,440 (38%) due to natural disasters. Two out of three IDPs were displaced within their home province. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), however, recorded approximately 723,000 cases of displacement due to fighting in 2021, and around 25,000 displacements due to natural disasters. UNHCR recorded 789,590 conflict induced IDPs between the start of 2021 until mid-April 2022, as well as 791,000 IDP returns in 2021.

IDMC stated that most conflict-induced displacements occurred between May and August 2021, and from September 2021 onwards, many of the newly displaced persons returned to their place of origin after the fighting had died down. IOM stated that about 5.5 million Afghans were living in protracted displacement by mid-August 2021, further noting Nangarhar and Balkh Provinces as hosting the highest numbers of IDPs by the end of 2021.

610 BBC News, Afghanistan crisis: Taliban kill civilians in resistance stronghold, 13 September 2021, [url]
611 BBC News, Afghan resistance attack Taliban, sparking reprisals in Panjsher, 16 May 2022, [url]
612 Kakar, A-W., Afghanistan Quarterly – Newsletter, Afghan Eye, 1 June 2022, [url]
614 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, [url], para. 33
615 IOM, Movement in and Out of Afghanistan Snapshot (14 – 20 May 2022), 27 May 2022, [url], p. 3
616 IDMC, Country Profile Afghanistan, updated 18 May 2022, [url]
617 UNHCR, Flash External Update: Afghanistan Situation #16, 15 April 2022, [url]
618 IDMC, Country Profile Afghanistan, updated 18 May 2022, [url]
619 IOM, IOM Comprehensive Action Plan for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries, 8 February 2022, [url], p. 4
(between 100 000 and 154 000 each), followed by Kabul Province with between 75 000 and 100 000 IDPs.\textsuperscript{620}

According to UNOCHA data on conflict-related internal displacement in Afghanistan,\textsuperscript{621} 107 402 Afghans were internally displaced in the period between 15 August and 30 November 2021. The following table shows the number of IDP movements by province of origin during this period:

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|l|}
\hline
Province of origin & Number of IDPs & Province of origin & Number of IDPs \\
\hline
Kunduz & 24 752 & Helmand & 371 \\
Takhar & 22 603 & Kandahar & 366 \\
Badghis & 15 512 & Ghazni & 273 \\
Herat & 14 352 & Nimroz & 161 \\
Ghor & 7 339 & Balkh & 140 \\
Panjsher & 6 188 & Baghlan & 133 \\
Farah & 3 846 & Kabul & 115 \\
Daykundi & 3 325 & Badakhshan & 105 \\
Kapisa & 3 101 & Kunar & 98 \\
Parwan & 2 907 & Nangarhar & 70 \\
Wardak & 1 029 & Paktika & 35 \\
Faryab & 567 & Logar & 14 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{620} IOM, IOM Comprehensive Action Plan for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries, 8 February 2022, \url{url}, p. 7

\textsuperscript{621} Data cover period between 15 August 2021 and 30 November 2021 and between 1 January 2022 and 14 June 2022. UNOCHA does not provide data for December 2021.
Table 2. IDP movements from 15 August 2021 to 30 November 2021 by province of origin, based on UNOCHA\textsuperscript{622}

The following table shows the number of IDP movements by province of arrival between 15 August and 30 November 2021:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province of arrival</th>
<th>Number of IDPs</th>
<th>Province of arrival</th>
<th>Number of IDPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Herat</td>
<td>32 753</td>
<td>Daykundi</td>
<td>2 856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunduz</td>
<td>24 612</td>
<td>Kapisa</td>
<td>1 750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takhar</td>
<td>22 547</td>
<td>Farah</td>
<td>717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>11 734</td>
<td>Parwan</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badghis</td>
<td>7 122</td>
<td>Kunar</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghor</td>
<td>3 066</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. IDP movements from 15 August to 30 November 2021 by province of arrival, based on UNOCHA\textsuperscript{623}

In the first months of 2022 up until mid-June 2022, UNOCHA recorded a total of 1 155 IDPs, most of them originating from Baghlan Province (763 IDPs) and the rest from Panjsher Province (392 IDPs). These displacement movements were all recorded in April and May 2022 and took place within their respective provinces.\textsuperscript{624}

According to IOM, due to the ongoing complex humanitarian crisis caused by natural disasters and economic collapse, over 500 000 people were expected to be newly displaced in the course of 2022.\textsuperscript{625}

(b) Movements abroad and returnees

IOM conducted an assessment of displacement and return in 368 districts across all 34 provinces, registering from August until the end of 2021 a total of 2 194 472 returned IDPs.

\textsuperscript{622} UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{623} UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{624} UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{625} IOM, Afghanistan Crisis Response Plan 2022, last updated 22 March 2022, \url{url}
Furthermore, the assessment revealed that 89 253 individuals had returned to their home communities from abroad.\textsuperscript{626}

During 2021, according to IOM, 1 358 770 Afghans moved abroad, of whom 66 % went to Iran, 19 % to Pakistan, and 12 % to Europe and Turkey.\textsuperscript{627} The Iranian government estimated an inflow of approximately 500 000 Afghans to Iran during 2021.\textsuperscript{628} During the year 2021, according to IOM, 575 818 Afghans returned from abroad (304,889 or 53 % from Iran, 191,810 or 33 % from Pakistan and 63,360 or 11 % from Europe and Turkey).\textsuperscript{629} IOM noted that 2021 was a record year for forced returns, with close to 800 000 Afghans being forcibly returned from neighbouring Iran and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{630}

From January to April 2022, 1 193 452 Afghans left for Pakistan, while 1 093 388 Afghans returned from Pakistan to Afghanistan. During the same period, 426 533 Afghans left for Iran while 299 670 Afghans returned from Iran to Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{631} In April and May 2022, IOM recorded weekly the in- and outflow of Afghans from and into the neighbouring countries Iran and Pakistan, noting a continued outward movement of between about 23 000 and 111 000 and an inflow of between 26 000 and 84 000 into Afghanistan per week.\textsuperscript{632}

The official issuance of passports was temporarily suspended following the Taliban takeover\textsuperscript{633} and taken up again in October 2021.\textsuperscript{634} However, many embassies remained closed, forcing persons to buy visas on the black market at very high prices.\textsuperscript{635} The sale of passports was reportedly also carried out by Taliban members as intermediaries, with passports costing between 700 to 900 US dollars.\textsuperscript{636} In April 2022, a spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry stated that all Iranian diplomatic missions in Afghanistan were open and working.\textsuperscript{637}

Several sources reported on cases of forced displacement affecting minority populations following the Taliban takeover. In October 2021, Human Rights Watch reported that Taliban officials forcibly displaced members of the Hazara community in order to distribute land to their own supporters in Helmand and Balkh Provinces, with earlier evictions of this kind reported in Daykundi, Uruzgan and Kandahar provinces.\textsuperscript{638} UNAMA/UN OHCHR also received reports of forced evictions of populations in seven provinces, either facilitated or tolerated by the \textit{de facto} authorities and in some cases affecting minority communities. In September 2021,  

\textsuperscript{626} IOM, Afghanistan - Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November – December 2021), url, p. 3  
\textsuperscript{627} IOM, Movement in and Out of Afghanistan Snapshot (14 – 20 May 2022), 27 May 2022, url, p. 3  
\textsuperscript{628} UNHCR, Afghanistan situation: Emergency preparedness and response in Iran, 23 May 2022, url, p. 1  
\textsuperscript{629} IOM, Movement in and Out of Afghanistan Snapshot (14 – 20 May 2022), 27 May 2022, url, p. 3  
\textsuperscript{630} IOM, IOM Comprehensive Action Plan for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries, 8 February 2022, url, p. 5  
\textsuperscript{631} IOM, Movement in and Out of Afghanistan Snapshot (16 – 22 April 2022), 17 May 2022, url, p. 2; IOM, Movement in and Out of Afghanistan Snapshot (14 – 20 May 2022), 27 May 2022, url, p. 2  
\textsuperscript{632} IOM, Movement in and Out of Afghanistan Snapshot (16 – 22 April 2022), 17 May 2022, url, p. 1; IOM, Movement in and Out of Afghanistan Snapshot (14 – 20 May 2022), 27 May 2022, url, p. 1  
\textsuperscript{633} Pajhwok Afghan News, Afghan passports up for grabs in black market, 17 September 2021, url  
\textsuperscript{634} Nikkei Asia, Afghan black market for visas thrives as embassies stay shut, 11 November 2021, url  
\textsuperscript{635} Nikkei Asia, Afghan black market for visas thrives as embassies stay shut, 11 November 2021, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Afghan passports up for grabs in black market, 17 September 2021, url  
\textsuperscript{636} Nimrokh, Passport; The new business for the Taliban, 27 May 2022, url  
\textsuperscript{637} Tehran Times, All diplomatic missions of Iran in Afghanistan are open, 13 April 2022, url  
\textsuperscript{638} HRW, Afghanistan: Taliban Forcibly Evict Minority Shia, 22 October 2021, url
at least 400 Hazara families were forcibly evicted and displaced, with most of the families reportedly allowed to go back to their properties by February 2022. In December 2021, Taliban members were accused of helping Pashtuns to evict more than 1,000 members from Uzbek and Turkmen communities in Jawzjan Province. For more information on forced evictions, please refer to EUAA August 2022 report Afghanistan – Targeting of Individuals.

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640 RFE/RL/Gandhara, Taliban Accused Of Forcibly Evicting Ethnic Uzbeks, Turkmen In Northern Afghanistan, 9 December 2021, url
4. Regional description of the security situation in Afghanistan

4.1. Kabul City

Kabul City is the capital of Afghanistan and of Kabul Province, of which it is a separate district alongside 14 others. Kabul City consists of 22 urban districts, which coincide with Kabul’s 22 Police Districts (PDs).

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by Afghanistan National Statistic and Information Authority (NSIA), the population of Kabul City is 4,775,070, constituting around 85% of the total population of Kabul Province. Population figures for Kabul City before August 2021 were disputed and estimates ranged from 3.5 million up to a possible 6.5 million inhabitants in 2020.

Kabul has been described as an ethnically diverse city, with communities from almost all Afghan ethnicities living there: Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Baluch, people belonging to the religious minority groups of Sikhs and Hindus, with no group clearly dominating. The Dasht-e Barchi neighbourhood in western Kabul has been predominantly inhabited by the Hazara Shia minority. The northern part of the city, in the past 20 years, has predominantly been inhabited by the Tajik minority. A France 24 article from January 2022 mentioned a Sikh man, who estimated that most remaining Sikhs in Afghanistan were located in Kabul and Jalalabad. More information about the ethnic composition in Kabul City could not be found within the time constraints of this report.
4.1.1. Recent security trends

According to ACLED, and as seen in the table below, Kabul City was the most conflict-affected area of Afghanistan. During the reference period, ACLED recorded 193 security incidents in Kabul City, 95 of which were coded as ‘violence against civilians,’ 65 as ‘remote violence,’ and 33 as ‘battles.’

![Security Event Chart](https://example.com/chart)

Figures 3. Kabul City/District - Security events coded as ‘battles’, ‘remote violence/ explosions,’ and ‘violence against civilians’ from 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, based on ACLED data

According to UCPD, in the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, Kabul City had also the highest numbers of civilian fatalities (297 of overall 778 civilian fatalities recorded in Kabul District). ACLED recorded 459 fatalities in Kabul City in the reference period.

ACLED attributed 76 security incidents recorded in the reference period to Taliban military and police forces. 67 incidents attributed to the Taliban were classified as ‘violence against civilians’ and nine as ‘battles.’

Attacks leading to high numbers of casualties in Kabul City were carried out by ISKP. ACLED attributed to ISKP 52 security incidents in Kabul City, which caused 283 fatalities. Between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded 11 incidents carried out by ISKP in Kabul.

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651 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
652 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
653 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. Please note that UCDP only records incidents with at least one fatality. For an explanation of how UCDP records events and fatalities, please refer to the Sources section in the introduction of this report.
654 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
655 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
657 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
District/City resulting in a total of 117 civilian deaths. On 26 August 2021, ISKP carried out an attack at Kabul airport. Depending on the source, 141-175 civilians were killed. On 2 November 2021, suicide blasts and gunfire carried out by ISKP at Kabul's main military hospital killed at least 25 persons and injured dozens more. ACLED recorded 30 fatalities while UCDP recorded four civilian deaths.

ISKP attacks were reported to have targeted Shia mosques and Taliban security forces. A bomb attack, claimed by ISKP, on the Sunni Eid Gah Mosque in Kabul on 3 October 2021 reportedly targeted the Taliban leadership. At least five civilians were killed in the attack. Furthermore, ISKP claimed responsibility for an attack on a Sikh Gurdwara in Kabul City in mid-June 2022. The Gurdwara was reportedly attacked half an hour before morning prayer time by the attackers, who opened fire at the entrance of the prayer site and entered armed with grenades. Moreover, a car bomb exploded close to the Gurdwara. Reportedly, two persons, including one Taliban fighter, were killed and seven were injured in the attack.

ACLED attributed 46 security incidents, which caused 91 fatalities, to unidentified armed groups. The attacks by unknown perpetrators included bomb explosions or the throwing of grenades. On 3 April 2022, the money exchangers market Sarai Shahzada in Kabul City was attacked with a hand grenade. Reportedly, ten people were wounded in the explosion.

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658 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022
659 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022
660 US, SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2022, url, p. 71; Al Jazeera, Kabul airport bombing: What we know, 26 August 2021, url; AOAV, Explosive Violence Monitor 2021, 5 April 2022, url, p. 19
661 Al Jazeera, Afghanistan: Deadly blasts, gunfire hit Kabul military hospital, 2 November 2021, url; Reuters, Dozens killed and wounded as blasts and gunfire hit Kabul hospital, 3 November 2021, url
662 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
663 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022
664 US, SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2022, url, pp. 71-72
666 US, DOS, 2021 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Afghanistan, 12 April 2022, url, p. 21; Al Jazeera, Deadly explosion targets memorial service near Kabul mosque, 3 October 2021, url; DW, Afghanistan: Bomb targets mosque holding memorial for Taliban spokesman's mother, 3 October 2021, url
667 France 24, Islamic State group claims responsibility for Kabul Sikh temple attack, 19 June 2022, url; Reuters, Islamic State claims attack on Sikh temple in Kabul that killed two, 20 June 2022, url
668 BBC News, Afghanistan gurdwara attack: Sikhs say 'We don't feel safe', 19 June 2022, url
669 Al Jazeera, Afghanistan: Two killed as blast hits Sikh temple in Kabul, 18 June 2022, url; Tribune (The), Series of blasts at Kabul gurdwara, two killed, 19 June 2022, url
670 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
671 Pajhwok Afghan News, 14 people suffer casualties in Afghanistan last week, 8 May 2022, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 115 people killed, injured in Afghanistan last week, 30 April 2022, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Last week deadliest since regime change last year, 23 April 2022, url; BBC News, Afghanistan, ‘Blood and fear everywhere’ after deadly IS blast, 21 April 2022, url; HRW, A Bleak Future with Education Under Attack in Afghanistan, 20 April 2022, url; Al, School bombings a ‘reprehensible attack’ on religious and ethnic minorities, 19 April 2022, url; France 24, Bomb attack targets Kabul mosque, kills civilians, 3 October 2021, url; VOA, Bomb Blast Kills at Least 5 Outside Kabul Mosque, 3 October 2021, url
672 KP, Explosion at Kabul stock market wounds 10, 3 April 2022, url; TOLOnews, 1 Killed, 58 Wounded in Blast at Kabul Market, 3 April 2022, url
According to the spokesman of the Kabul security department, the perpetrator was a thief who had planned to steal money.\textsuperscript{673}

Some of the attacks by unknown armed groups targeted mosques\textsuperscript{674} and Shia and/or Hazara neighbourhoods.\textsuperscript{675} On 6 April 2022, unknown perpetrators threw a grenade into the Pul-e Khistī Mosque in Kabul, killing at least six civilians.\textsuperscript{676} On 29 April 2022, an explosion occurred at the Khalīfa Sahīb Mosque frequented by Sufi worshippers on the last Friday of the Islamic month of Ramadan.\textsuperscript{677} As reported by UN News, at least ten people were killed and up to 15 people were injured.\textsuperscript{678} An article by RFE/RL/Gandhara published on 16 May 2022 stated that in this explosion more than 50 people were killed and ‘dozens of others’ were wounded, naming the attack ‘one of the deadliest-ever attacks on Sufis in Afghanistan’.\textsuperscript{679} The perpetrators of the attack remained unknown.\textsuperscript{680} ACLED recorded 50 fatalities,\textsuperscript{681} while according to UCDP data, the attack resulted in 66 civilian deaths.\textsuperscript{682} Another attack on a mosque occurred on 25 May 2022, when a bomb exploded in the Hazrat Zakaria mosque in Kabul City during prayer time. Depending on the source, 10 to 22 people were injured, and 2 to 5 people were killed. As of 26 May 2022, no group claimed responsibility for the attack.\textsuperscript{683}

Attacks on the Hazara Shia community continued to occur in western Kabul City after the Taliban takeover. According to a January 2022 article by AAN, the Hazara Shia community in western Kabul City, while being ‘persistently targeted elsewhere in Afghanistan’, fell victim to ‘some of the city’s deadliest attacks’, since 2016. As reported by AAN, the Taliban takeover was followed by a ‘short-lived respite from attacks’ of more than a month before ‘a new cycle of assassinations and bombings’ began. With reference to several online media reports and Twitter entries, the article goes on to list six attacks that occurred in western Kabul between September and December 2021, some of which took place in the Dasht-e Barchi.

\textsuperscript{673} KP, Explosion at Kabul stock market wounds 10, 3 April 2022, url: TOLONews, Explosion at Kabul stock market wounds 10, 3 April 2022, url
\textsuperscript{674} Pajhwok Afghan News, 115 people killed, injured in Afghanistan last week, 30 April 2022, url: UN News, Deadly mosque explosion ‘another painful blow to the people of Afghanistan’, 29 April 2022, url: ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (2–8 April 2022), 13 April 2022, url: VOA, Bomb Blast Kills at Least 5 Outside Kabul Mosque, 3 October 2021, url: France 24, Bomb attack targets Kabol mosque, kills civilians, 3 October 2021, url
\textsuperscript{676} ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (2–8 April 2022), 13 April 2022, url: Al Jazeera, Afghanistan: Kabul mosque hit by grenade attack, 6 April 2022, url: Pajhwok Afghan News, 11 injured in Pul-i-Khashti mosque grenade attack, 6 April 2022, url
\textsuperscript{677} UN News, Deadly mosque explosion ‘another painful blow to the people of Afghanistan’, 29 April 2022, url
\textsuperscript{678} UNAMA, UNAMA Statement on Deadly Attack in a Mosque in Kabul, 29 April 2022, url
\textsuperscript{679} RFE/RL/Gandhara, Fear Grips Afghanistan's Sufi Community Following Deadly Attacks, 16 May 2022, url
\textsuperscript{680} RFE/RL/Gandhara, Fear Grips Afghanistan's Sufi Community Following Deadly Attacks, 16 May 2022, url; see also AOAV, Up to 50 Killed in Bombing of Khalīfa Sahīb Mosque, Kabul, 3 May 2022, url
\textsuperscript{681} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
\textsuperscript{682} EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022
neighbourhood, which is predominantly inhabited by Hazaras. On 10 December 2021, two to three blasts targeting the Dasht-e Barchi neighbourhood occurred. Reportedly, ISKP claimed responsibility for the attacks. ACLED has recorded two fatalities while UCDP has recorded six civilian deaths. An Al Jazeera article referring to official Taliban sources reported that a minimum of two people were killed and four others were injured in these attacks. Furthermore, on 19 April 2022, a series of bomb blasts took place in the Abdul Rahim Shaheed High School and close to the Mumtaz Education centre in the Dasht-e Barchi neighbourhood. According to a BBC News article citing officials, the blasts killed six people and wounded more than 20. UCDP recorded 30 civilian deaths. A Kabul police spokesman reportedly stated that the blasts were caused by IEDs. According to AAN, the attacks in wider west Kabul, including Dasht-e Barchi, mainly targeted civilian passenger vehicles, particularly the Toyota Town-Ace minivans favoured by young, educated and professional Hazaras. AAN listed three attacks outside of western Kabul between October and December 2021, mainly targeting the Taliban, but also resulting in civilian casualties.

The period immediately following the Taliban takeover of Kabul was described as follows by Human Rights Watch in a November 2021 report: while the ‘takeover of the presidential palace and key ministries happened with little violence, as the buildings had been abandoned when government officials fled’, revenge attacks were carried out by the Taliban in other parts of the city. This included the abduction of four policemen, who were taken from their homes and ‘summarily shot’ in early September 2021. According to a December 2021 Al Jazeera article, the named report by Human Rights Watch and ‘other claims about extrajudicial killings’ were rejected by the Taliban as “not based on evidences.”

Sources reported that in September 2021 Taliban forces carried out large-scale house-to-house raids in several districts in Kabul City. Afghanistan International News outlet quoted reports of Taliban fighters looking for interpreters of foreign troops, embassy personnel and

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686 KP, Daesh claims responsibility for explosions in Kabul, 11 December 2021, [url]; Xinhua, 2 civilians killed, 3 injured in mini-bus blast in Kabul, 10 December 2021, [url]
687 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]
688 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022
689 Al Jazeera, Deadly blasts hit Afghan capital Kabul, 10 December 2021, [url]
690 HRW, A Bleak Future with Education Under Attack in Afghanistan, 20 April 2022, [url]; Al, School bombings a `reprehensible attack’ on religious and ethnic minorities, 19 April 2022, [url]
691 BBC News, Kabul blasts kill six and wound 20 at boys' school, 20 April 2022, [url]
692 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022
693 BBC News, Kabul blasts kill six and wound 20 at boys' school, 20 April 2022, [url]
695 HRW, “No forgiveness for people like you”, 30 November 2021, [url]
696 Al Jazeera, Taliban rule marked by killings, 'litany of abuses', UN says, 14 December 2021, [url]
697 New Arab (The), Taliban going door-to-door searching for 'foreign collaborators' in Kabul, 15 September 2021, [url]
698 New Arab (The), Taliban going door-to-door searching for 'foreign collaborators' in Kabul, 15 September 2021, [url]; Afghanistan International [Facebook], طالبان جستجوی خانه به خانه به خانه را اغاز کردند [Taliban started house-to-house search], 15 September 2021, [url]
former government authorities. In this context, the New Arab quoted sources stating that humanitarian workers and people holding a US Special Immigration Visa (SIV) were also searched for. This information could not be corroborated within the time constraints of this report. Furthermore, a September 2021 article by the New York Times argued that many Afghans were questioning the Taliban leaders’ control over their fighters, and their ability to oversee the August 2021 amnesty. In September 2021, it was also reported that, according to official Taliban sources, soldiers and officers from the former government would be allowed to join the planned new Afghan army. Moreover, according to Reuters, the de facto defence minister Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob stated the same month that some ‘miscreants and notorious former soldiers’ within Taliban units had committed abuses, and issued a rebuke over the misconduct.

On 19 January 2022, Taliban forces in Kabul reportedly carried out raids in houses of several women’s rights activists who had participated in demonstrations. Up to four women were reportedly detained or became victims of enforced disappearance. The Taliban had reportedly denied on several occasions to have detained the women. On 13 February 2022, RFE/RL/Gandhara reported that the two of the women who went missing on January 2022 and two other women who had disappeared in early February, including their relatives who had also gone missing, were released by the Taliban de facto government. In mid-February 2022, the Taliban reportedly started ‘clearing operations’ in Kabul homes. Articles referring to Taliban sources reported that the house searches aimed at catching criminals and looking for weapons. Some residents, however, reportedly indicated that the Taliban were also searching for individuals linked to the former Afghan government or the international forces, or even specifically targeting former security officials in the name of combating crime. Sources further reported that Kabul residents stated that their houses were raided and some

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699 Afghanistan International [Facebook]. طالبان جستجوی خانه به خانه به بازرسی از خانه را اغاز کرده‌اند. [Taliban started house-to-house search], 15 September 2021, url
700 New Arab (The), Taliban going door-to-door searching for ‘foreign collaborators’ in Kabul, 15 September 2021, url
701 New York Times (The), Afghans With Ties to U.S. Who Could Not Get Out Now Live in Fear, 3 September 2021, url
702 TOLonews, Taliban Says it Will Build Regular Army, Include Former Members, 15 September 2021, url
703 Reuters, Afghan Taliban defence minister orders crackdown on abuses, 24 September 2021, url
704 Guardian (The), Taliban launch raids on homes of Afghan women’s rights activists, 20 January 2022, url; Baaghi TV, طالبان دیشب چندین زن معرفی را بازداشت کردند. [The Taliban arrested several women’s protesters last night], 20 January 2022, url
705 Baaghi TV, طالبان دیشب چندین زن معرفی را بازداشت کردند. [The Taliban arrested several women’s protesters last night], 20 January 2022, url; Diplomat (The), Taliban Storm Kabul Apartment, Arrest Activist and Her Sisters, 22 January 2022, url; TOLonews, UN Calls for Investigation Into Missing Female Activists, 27 January 2022, url
706 HRW, Afghan Women’s Rights Activists Forcibly Disappeared, 24 January 2022, url
707 RFE/RL/Gandhara, Four Missing Female Activists Reportedly Released In Afghanistan, 13 February 2022, url
708 RFE/RL/Gandhara, Four Missing Female Activists Reportedly Released In Afghanistan, 13 February 2022, url
709 Print (The), Taliban terms house-to-house searches in Kabul as ‘clearing ops’, 28 February 2022, url; Washington Post (The), Taliban launches sweeping house-to-house raids across Kabul in search of weapons, 27 February 2022, url
710 DW, Taliban conduct sweeping house-to-house searches, 16 March 2022, url
711 VOA, Taliban Defend Door-to-door Searches in Kabul, Bar Future Evacuations of Afghans, 27 February 2022, url
712 Print (The), Taliban terms house-to-house searches in Kabul as ‘clearing ops’, 28 February 2022, url; see also Nikkei Asia, ‘Clearing operations’ bring fresh wave of restrictions on Afghans, 16 March 2022, url; International New York Times, Taliban Search Operation Echoes Resented U.S. Tactics, 8 March 2022; HRW, In Afghanistan, Burning Our Past to Protect Our Future, 1 March 2022, url; BBC Persian, واکنش‌های بین‌المللی به بازرسی خانه به بازرسی خانه و محدودیت سفر زنان از سوی طالبان [International Reaction to the Taliban’s House-to-House Raids and Restriction on Women’s Travel], 28
Afghans claimed to have been mistreated and having their property damaged by Taliban forces.713

Before the Taliban takeover, the city of Kabul was described to be rife with crime,714 with robberies and kidnappings occurring on a nearly daily basis.715 The Taliban reportedly quickly established security forces in the capital with Taliban fighters patrolling the streets to maintain security.716 Some sources reported on residents stating in October 2021 that the crime rates had reduced significantly in Kabul since the Taliban took power.717 However, residents of Kabul have reportedly seen an emergence of robberies conducted by persons in the name of the Taliban.718 There were also reports on the Taliban arresting individuals on charges of ‘misusing the name of the Islamic emirate and perpetrating crimes against the people’.719 According to an October 2021 article by FP, Kabul residents stated that gangs were roaming ‘the streets, stopping, searching, and robbing people at random’. They further stated that armed men were stopping cars and robbing car owners on a regular basis.720

An Afghan human rights expert interviewed by EUAA in November 2021 stated that there were cases of extortion either directly or indirectly through Taliban fighters. The source further stated that, due to the humanitarian situation, there were Taliban fighters also struggling with food insecurity, making some use ‘the Taliban brand’ to go into people’s homes, steal vehicles and threaten people.721 In mid-February 2022, Hasht-e Subh reported that, since the Taliban came to power in the country, there had been numerous reports of gunmen, who seemed to be Taliban-affiliated, arbitrarily entering houses of Afghans.722 An anonymous international NGO based in Kabul and an anonymous international analyst based in Afghanistan, consulted by the Swedish Migration Agency in March 2022, both stated that crime had increased in Kabul and had become more violent. These sources stated that the Taliban government seemed to lack capacity to prosecute crime and keep suspected criminals in custody.723

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 14 incidents classified as abductions/forced disappearances in Kabul City.724 According to the abovementioned October 2021 article by FP, kidnappings and extortions happened daily in Kabul City. The report further stated that

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713 Reuters, Taliban begin house searches, sparking fear, diplomatic criticism, 28 February 2022, url
714 International New York Times, Taliban Search Operation Echoes Resented U.S. Tactics, 8 March 2022, url
715 DW, تلاشی خانه به خانه طالبان هراس و سراسیمگی مردم را برانگیخته است [The Taliban's House-to-House Search Has Created Panic and Fear Among People], 27 February 2022, url
716 Guardian (The), Taliban patrols return to the streets of Kabul – in pictures, 6 October 2021, url
717 Al Jazeera, Taliban: From Afghanistan's rugged mountains to policing streets, 5 October 2021, url
718 Guardian (The), Taliban patrol returns to the streets of Kabul – in pictures, 6 October 2021, url
719 Al Jazeera, Afghanistan: Säkerhetsläget efter talibanrörelsens maktövertagande [Afghanistan: Security situation after Taliban takeover of power] [version 1.0] [source: an international NGO in Kabul and an international analyst based in Afghanistan], 29 April 2022, url
721 Hasht-e Subh, Kabul Residents Tired of Increasing Armed Robberies, 21 October 2021, url
722 Ariana News, Four suspected kidnappers captured in Kabul, hostages freed, 2 October 2021, url
723 FP, Afghan Crime Wave Adds to Taliban Dystopia, 29 October 2021, url
724 TOLONews, Armed Robbers Posing as Islamic Emirate Members Arrested, 18 October 2021, url
725 Al Jazeera, Gunmen Raid University Professor's House in Kabul, Beat His Wife and Daughter, 13 February 2022, url
726 Hasht-e Subh, Kabul Residents Tired of Increasing Armed Robberies, 21 October 2021, url
727 Sweden, Migrationsverket, Afghanistan: Säkerhetsläget efter talibanrörelsens maktövertagande [Afghanistan: Security situation after Taliban takeover of power] [version 1.0] [source: an international NGO in Kabul and an international analyst based in Afghanistan], 29 April 2022, url, p. 43
728 In the ACLED category ‘Sub event type’. EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
Taliban foot soldiers were killing people on contract to earn money because they were not receiving their payments. According to a former Afghan security official cited by the source, the Taliban were ‘not out to stop’ the crime, not because of the inability to do so, but because they were ‘part of it’.\(^{725}\) This information could not be corroborated within the time constraints of this report. With reference to local media reports, FP further mentioned that more than 40 businessmen were kidnapped in Kabul City and in other parts of the country in the two months that followed the Taliban takeover.\(^{726}\) In late September 2021, it was reported that an Indian businessman, who had been abducted from Kabul City in mid-September 2021, was released.\(^{727}\) No further information on releases of abducted businessmen could be found within the time constraints of this report.

In early 2022, two neurosurgeons were kidnapped by gunmen in Kabul City.\(^{728}\) In one kidnapping case, the kidnappers were wearing military uniforms.\(^{729}\) Both victims were reportedly freed by security forces within weeks of their abduction.\(^{730}\) Moreover, in early 2022, two university professors, who had criticized the Taliban, went missing for several days,\(^{731}\) before they were reportedly released. One of the professors, after his release, stated that he had been kept by Taliban intelligence officials in an undisclosed location, but had been ‘treated well’.\(^{732}\)

In the reference period, ACLED recorded 22 instances of violence against journalists in Kabul City, 11 of which were classified as ‘attacks’.\(^{733}\) According to ACLED, all six attacks on journalists by unidentified armed groups, documented countrywide, occurred in Kabul City.\(^{734}\) As recorded by ACLED, NRF was also involved in some security incidents in Kabul City. ACLED recorded nine incidents involving NRF. Eight of the incidents were ‘battles with military and police Taliban forces and two were incidents of ‘explosions/remote violence’ involving Taliban forces.\(^{735}\)

\(^{725}\) FP, Afghan Crime Wave Adds to Taliban Dystopia, 29 October 2021, [url]

\(^{726}\) FP, Afghan Crime Wave Adds to Taliban Dystopia, 29 October 2021, [url]

\(^{727}\) Republic, Afghanistan: Indian Businessman Kidnapped From Kabul Released After 15 Days, 30 September 2021, [url]

\(^{728}\) Insecurity Insight, Attacks on Health Care Bi-Monthly News Brief: 12 - 25 January 2022, 3 February 2022, [url], p. 3; Etilaat Roz, احemspداد پیرزاد، جراح اعصاب شفاخانه علی‌آباد کابل از کلینیک شخصیش رفه شد [Neurosurgeon Ahmadfouad Pirzad from Aliabad Hospital in Kabul abducted in personal clinic], 4 February 2022, [url]; Hasht e Subh, Three Men Arrested in Connection with the Abduction of Dr. Pirzad, 11 February 2022, [url]; Pajhwok Afghan News, Medical university teacher rescued from kidnappers, 20 February 2022, [url]

\(^{729}\) Etilaat Roz, احemspداد پیرزاد، جراح اعصاب شفاخانه علی‌آباد کابل از کلینیک شخصیش رفه شد [Neurosurgeon Ahmadfouad Pirzad from Aliabad Hospital in Kabul abducted in personal clinic], 4 February 2022, [url]

\(^{730}\) Pajhwok Afghan News, Medical university teacher rescued from kidnappers, 20 February 2022, [url]; Etilaat Roz, رپورت کمیته المپیک از راهی نجبای سکدر، جراح اعصاب و رپریسیون‌های تکواندو خبر داد [Head of Olympic’s Committee announced release of Najibullah Sikandar, neurosurgeon and head of Taekwondo Federation], 14 January 2022, [url]

\(^{731}\) Insecurity Insight, Attacks on Health Care Bi-Monthly News Brief: 26 January - 08 February 2022, 17 February 2022, [url], p. 2; ANI, Another Afghan university professor goes missing who criticized Taliban, 6 March 2022, [url]; ANI, Taliban warns retired professors of Kabul University to vacate government homes, 23 March 2022, [url]; TOLONews, Professor Missing Since Friday Evening, 5 March 2022, [url]

\(^{732}\) RFE/RL/Gandhara, Afghan-Canadian Aid Worker Reappears After Weeks In Taliban Detention, 9 March 2022, [url]

\(^{733}\) EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]

\(^{734}\) EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]

\(^{735}\) EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]
4.1.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

For detailed information on the socioeconomic situation in Kabul City after the Taliban takeover, please refer to EUAA August 2022 report Afghanistan – Key socio-economic indicators in Afghanistan and in Kabul City.

The attack on the military hospital in Kabul City by ISKP in November 2021 is the only attack on a health care facility recorded by WHO in the period between August 2021 and April 2022 in the city.\(^{736}\)

The attack on Kabul airport carried out by ISKP on 26 August 2021\(^ {737}\) resulted in serious damages to the airport, ‘crucial for bringing in humanitarian supplies and for enabling post-airlift departures for Afghans vulnerable to Taliban reprisals’.\(^{738}\) In the beginning of September 2021, the airport reportedly reopened for domestic flights and the reception of international aid.\(^{739}\) On 13 September 2021, the first commercial international flight since the Taliban takeover of power, coming from Pakistan, landed in Kabul airport.\(^{740}\)

During the reference period, attacks targeted schools\(^ {741}\) and mosques in Kabul City.\(^{742}\)

(a) Displacement and returns

As stated by Refugees International on 14 August 2021, nearly 120 000 Afghans fled to Kabul due to the Taliban advances in the first half of 2021.\(^{743}\) On 25 August 2021, Al Jazeera reported that Afghans had fled to Kabul City from ‘all over the country’. Individuals with no ‘connections have sought shelter in the city’s public parks and sidewalks.’ The source further elaborated that the capital was hosting nearly 20 000 IDPs.\(^{744}\) According to an International Crisis Group’s briefing note published on 2 September 2021, ‘[t]housands of displaced people in Kabul [were] sleeping in the open air’.\(^{745}\)

\(^{736}\) WHO, Attacks on Health Care in Afghanistan (January – April 2022), 18 May 2022, url; WHO, Attacks on Health Care in Afghanistan (January – December 2021), 12 January 2022, url; WHO, Attacks on Health Care in Afghanistan (November 2021), 26 November 2021, url; WHO, Attacks on Health Care in Afghanistan (September 2021), 13 October 2021, url

\(^{737}\) US, SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2022, url, p. 71; AOAV, Explosive Violence Monitor 2021, 5 April 2022, url, p. 10

\(^{738}\) International Crisis Group, Afghanistan’s Growing Humanitarian Crisis, 2 September 2021, url

\(^{739}\) Al Jazeera, Kabul airport reopens to receive aid, domestic flights restart, 5 September 2021, url; see also France 24, Pakistani plane lands in Kabul in first commercial flight since Taliban takeover, 13 September 2021, url

\(^{740}\) France 24, Pakistani plane lands in Kabul in first commercial flight since Taliban takeover, 13 September 2021, url

\(^{741}\) HRW, A Bleak Future with Education Under Attack in Afghanistan, 20 April 2022, url; Al School bombings a ‘reprehensible attack’ on religious and ethnic minorities, 19 April 2022, url; BBC News, Kabul blasts kill six and wound 20 at boys’ school, 20 April 2022, url; TOLOnews, Students at Abdul Rahim High School return to class, 23 April 2022, url

\(^{742}\) Pajhwok Afghan News, 115 people killed, injured in Afghanistan last week, 30 April 2022, url; UN News, Deadly mosque explosion ‘another painful blow to the people of Afghanistan’, 29 April 2022, url; Al Jazeera, Afghanistan: Kabul mosque hit by grenade attack, 6 April 2022, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 11 injured in Pul-i-Khashti mosque grenade attack, 6 April 2022, url; Al Jazeera, Deadly explosion targets memorial service near Kabul mosque, 3 October 2021, url; VOA, Bomb Blast Kills at Least 5 Outside Kabul Mosque, 3 October 2021, url

\(^{743}\) Refugees International, Statement by Refugees International President Eric P. Schwartz on Establishing a Humanitarian Corridor Out of Afghanistan, 14 August 2021, url

\(^{744}\) Al Jazeera, Kabul residents help fellow Afghans displaced by war, 25 August 2021, url

\(^{745}\) International Crisis Group, Afghanistan’s Growing Humanitarian Crisis, 2 September 2021, url
According to UNOCHA,746 115 persons were displaced due to conflict from Kabul District to Herat Province in August and September 2021.747 There were no displacement movements in the province recorded by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022.748 According to IOM, out of a total of 93 631 IDPs arriving in Kabul Province since August 2021, 74 169 IDPs reached Kabul District and continued to reside there as of 19 December 2021.749

Within Kabul Province, Kabul District was identified as the district with the highest number of IDPs who had fled the province, amounting to 9 987 persons who had left the district since August 2021. According to IOM, 58 938 persons had fled Kabul District to go abroad since August 2021, while 4 166 persons were registered to have returned from abroad.750

4.2. Badakhshan

Badakhshan Province is located in the north-eastern part of Afghanistan. Badakhshan has an international border with Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province and Khatlon Province, through the Wakhan Corridor with China, and with Pakistan’s Chitral and Gilgit-Baltistan.751 The province is divided into the following districts: Arghanj Khwah (Arghanjkhwah), Argo, Baharak, Darayim (Darayem), Darwaz-e Payin (Maimay), Darwaz-e Bala (Nesay), Eshkashim, Fayz Abad (Fayzabad, Faiz Abad), Jurm (Jorm), Khishm (Keshem), Khash, Khwahan, Kufab (Kofab), Kohistan (Kohestan), Kiran Wa Menjan (Koran wa Munjan), Raghistan (Raghestan), Shahri Buzurg (Shahr-e-Buzurg), Shighnan, Shikhi (Shaki), Shuhada, Tagab, Tashkan (Teshkan), Wakhan, Warduj (Wardooy), Yaftal-e-Sufla, Yamgan (Girwan), Yawan, and Zebak.752 The provincial capital is Fayz Abad (Faizabad).753

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, the population of Badakhshan Province is 1 091 760.754 UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated the population as of January 2022 at 1 400 000.755

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746 Data cover period between 15 August 2021 and 30 November 2021 and between 1 January 2022 and 10 May 2022. UNOCHA does not provide data for December 2021.
747 UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022, url.
748 UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022, url.
749 IOM, Afghanistan — Emergency Event Tracking Round 3 - Kabul Province (1 - 19 December 2021), 2 February 2022, url, p. 1
750 IOM, Afghanistan — Emergency Event Tracking Round 3 - Kabul Province (1 - 19 December 2021), 2 February 2022, url, pp. 2-3
751 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Badakhshan Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, url, p. 1
752 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, pp. 63-64; UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Badakhshan Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url, p. 2
754 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, p. 63
755 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 46
The province is largely inhabited by Tajiks and to a lesser degree by Uzbeks. No further information about the ethnic composition in Badakhshan Province after the Taliban takeover could be found within the time constraints of this report.

4.2.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 66 security incidents in Badakhshan Province, 40 of which were coded as ‘battles,’ 17 as ‘violence against civilians,’ and 9 as ‘explosions/remote violence,’ as depicted in the graph below:

Figure 4. Badakhshan province - Security events coded as ‘battles,’ ‘remote violence/explosions,’ and ‘violence against civilians’ from 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, based on ACLED data

In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded nine security incidents in the province, resulting in five civilian deaths. According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province resulted in 96 fatalities. The most affected districts were Faiz Abad (18), Yaftal-e Sufia (8), Kishm (6), and Maymay (5).

ACLED attributed 33 security incidents to Taliban forces, 17 of which were coded as ‘battles’ and 16 as ‘violence against civilians.’ 24 incidents, 20 of which were ‘battles’ were attributed to NRF. In early March 2022, NRF claimed to have taken Ragh town from Taliban forces in Raghistan District. In April 2022, Taliban operations against anti-Taliban groups were reported in Fayz Abad City and Kohistan District. NRF claimed having killed 11 Taliban fighters in attacks in the districts of Raghistan and Arghanj Khwah and in Fayz Abad City.

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756 Ali O. and Ruttig, T., Elections 2014 (22): How disenchantment with General Dostum split the Uzbek vote bank, AAN, 22 May 2014, url
757 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
758 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
759 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
760 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. For an explanation of how UCDP records events and fatalities, please refer to the Sources section in the introduction of this report.
761 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
762 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
763 ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (5–11 March 2022), 16 March 2022, url
764 Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Rebels Arrest Two Sons of a Local Former Commander in Badakhshan, 12 April 2022, url
765 BBC Monitoring, Several said killed in clashes between Afghan Taliban, resistance, 12 April 2022; Xinhua, 7 armed men killed in N. Afghanistan, 11 April 2022, url
766 BBC Monitoring, Several said killed in clashes between Afghan Taliban, resistance, 12 April 2022
Taliban claimed to have killed NRF members in Baghlan and Badakhshan provinces.\(^{766}\) Also in April 2022, Taliban officials said that a new security unit was established in the province and the deputy governor of the province mentioned incidents by groups linked to ISKP and ‘the so-called Resistance Front.’ Eight ‘resistance fighters’ had been killed in the latest clashes in Kohistan District, according to Taliban officials.\(^{767}\) At the end of May 2022, a Taliban operation against NRF forces was reported in Tagab District.\(^{768}\)

At the end of March 2022, AFF and Taliban clashed for the first time in Badakhshan Province.\(^{769}\) At the beginning of April 2022, AFF attacked the Taliban in several provinces, including in Badakhshan.\(^{770}\) On 9 April 2022, AFF claimed attacks on Taliban bases in four provinces, including Badakhshan, killing four and injuring six Taliban.\(^{771}\)

Sources reported that Taliban forces also clashed with each other\(^{772}\), resulting in casualties.\(^{773}\) They also reported that Taliban shot dead\(^{774}\) and beat\(^{775}\) civilians in the reference period, including a former district governor.\(^{776}\) In February 2022, a man and a woman accused of illegal relations were reportedly stoned in Nasi District.\(^{777}\) The Taliban arrested two sons of a former mayor in April 2022,\(^{778}\) and a former member of the Special Police Force in May 2022.\(^{779}\)

Furthermore, there were reports on attacks targeting the Taliban. In early March 2022, according to Bakhtar News Agency, two civilians were injured in a hand grenade explosion in Dasht-e-Ghorooq, in Fayz Abad City.\(^{780}\) According to Mehr News Agency, however, this was a targeted attack and the two persons injured were members of the Taliban security forces.\(^{781}\) On 3 April 2022, the Taliban’s Security Chief in Badakhshan Province, Mawlawi Reshad, was injured in a landmine explosion in Fayz Abad City. Two of his bodyguards were killed.\(^{782}\) On 10

\(^{766}\) ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (9–15 April 2022), 20 April 2022, url
\(^{767}\) Ariana News, Badakhshan establishes new anti-insurgency unit, 19 April 2022, url
\(^{768}\) Hash-e Subh, Taliban Fighters Kill 4 NRF Forces in Tagab, Badakhshan, 31 May 2022, url
\(^{769}\) ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (26 March – 1 April 2022), 6 April 2022, url
\(^{770}\) ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (2–8 April 2022), 13 April 2022, url
\(^{771}\) Hash-e Subh, Afghanistan Freedom Front Forces Claims of Attacking the Taliban Bases in Four Provinces, 9 April 2022, url
\(^{772}\) Hash-e Subh, Clashes Among Taliban Members Leave Three Dead and Four Wounded, 6 January 2022, url; Hash-e Subh, Clashes Among Taliban Members in Badakhshan, 27 December 2021, url
\(^{773}\) Hash-e Subh, Clashes Among Taliban Members Leave Three Dead and Four Wounded, 6 January 2022, url
\(^{774}\) Hash-e Subh, Taliban Rebels Shot Dead Two Civilians in Badakhshan Province, 17 May 2022, url; Hash-e Subh, Taliban Rebels Shot Dead a Worshiper During Taraweeh Prayers in Badakhshan, 12 April 2022, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Faizabad child mistakenly shot dead by security forces, 19 January 2022, url; Hash-e Subh, A Young Boy Killed for Listening to Music in Badakhshan, 11 November 2021, url
\(^{775}\) Hash-e Subh, Taliban Rebels Severely Torture a Shopkeeper in Badakhshan, 23 April 2022, url; Hash-e Subh, Taliban Beats and Tortures Students of Badakhshan University for Not Attending Taraweeh Prayer, 7 April 2022, url
\(^{776}\) ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (26 March – 1 April 2022), 6 April 2022, url
\(^{777}\) Germany, BAMF, Briefing Notes, 21 February 2022, url, p. 1; Vanguard, Man, woman stoned to death for having illegal relations in Afghanistan, 16 February 2022, url
\(^{778}\) Hash-e Subh, Taliban Rebels Arrest Two Sons of a Local Former Commander in Badakhshan, 12 April 2022, url
\(^{779}\) BBC Monitoring, Taliban allegedly kill former police official in east Afghan province [source: Hash-e Subh], 2 May 2022
\(^{780}\) Bakhtar News Agency, A Blast Hit Badakhshan, Wounded Two Civilians, 8 March 2022, url
\(^{781}\) Mehr News Agency, Blast reported in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan, 7 March 2022, url
\(^{782}\) Hash-e Subh, A Blast Injures Taliban’s Security Chief and Kills 2 of His Bodyguards in Faizabad, 3 April 2022, url
April 2022, unidentified gunmen killed a Taliban commander and his bodyguard in Parnah Kham village.\footnote{Hasht-e Subh, Anonymous Gunmen Kill a Taliban Commander in Badakhshan, 10 April 2022, url}

On 16 March 2022, a female student was wounded in a roadside mine explosion in Fayz Abad City.\footnote{Hasht-e Subh, Local Taliban Members: A Female Student Injured Due to Roadside Blast in Faizabad, Badakhshan Province, 16 March 2022, url}

According to a report by UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, smaller ISKP covert cells were thought to be present in Badakhsh Province.\footnote{UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, url, para. 71}

In the reference period, ACLED attributed one security incident in the province to ISKP.\footnote{EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url}

In this incident, the Taliban’s head of Mines and Petroleum Ministry’s department in Badakhshan was killed.\footnote{Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Kidnaps the Residents as Clashes Continue in Panjshir, 12 May 2022, url}

4.2.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

In May 2022, after clashes broke out between NRF and Taliban forces, the Taliban warned the residents of Badakhshan that they would be forcibly displaced if resistance forces did not surrender.\footnote{TOLOnews, TOLOnews Findings: Nearly 90 Killed in Recent Incidents, 25 April 2022, url; RFE/RL/Gandhara, IS-K Attacks Puncture Taliban’s Narrative About Establishing Security In Afghanistan, 5 May 2022, url}

According to UNOCHA figures\footnote{Data cover period between 15 August 2021 and 30 November 2021 and between 1 January 2022 and 10 May 2022. UNOCHA does not provide data for December 2021.} for mid-August to November 2021, 105 persons were displaced due to conflict from Arghanj Khwah District to Herat Province in August 2021.\footnote{UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022, url}

There were no displacement movements in or out of the province recorded by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022.\footnote{UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022, url}

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 19 496 IDP arrivals in Badakhshan Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. According to IOM, during this period, 32 825 IDPs and 6 130 persons from abroad returned to Badakhshan, while 59 039 persons moved from Badakhshan abroad.\footnote{IOM, Afghanistan - Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November – December 2021), 2 March 2022, url, p. 3}

From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 9 511 returns from Iran and 9 from Pakistan to Badakhshan Province.\footnote{UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Badakhshan Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, url, p. 2. Set filter to Badakhshan.}

No further information on the impact of the conflict on the civilian population in Badakhshan Province was found within the time constraints of this report.
4.3. Badghis

Badghis Province is located in north-western Afghanistan and shares an international border with Turkmenistan. Badghis comprises the following districts: Ab Kamari, Murghab (Bala Murghab), Ghormach, Jawand, Muqur, Qadis, and Qala-e Naw. The provincial capital is Qala-e Naw. According to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the district of Ghormach became part of Faryab Province in 2017, however, in 2018, after the Taliban had captured the district, it was decided to shift the administrative affairs to Badghis Province. The Afghan NSIA listed Ghormach in 2022 as part of Badghis Province.

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, the population of Badghis Province is 569,150. UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Profile estimated the population as of May 2022 at 730,566.

An undated profile published by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) noted that the province was mainly inhabited by Tajiks (62 %) and Pashtuns (28 %). No further information about the ethnic composition in Badghis Province after the Taliban takeover could be found within the time constraints of this report.

4.3.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 13 security incidents in Badghis, 6 of which were coded as ‘explosions/remote violence,’ 4 as ‘battles,’ and 3 as ‘violence against civilians.’

In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded two security-related events in the reference period, resulting in no civilian deaths. According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province resulted in 25 fatalities. The most affected district was Qala-e Naw (7 security incidents and 20 fatalities).

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795 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2021 - Cultivation and Production, March 2022, url, p. 16
796 Frontier Post (The), Ghormach falls to Taliban as ANA troops move to Maimana, 28 August 2018, url
797 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, p. 106
798 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, p. 106
800 US, NPS, Badghis Provincial Overview, n.d., url
801 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
802 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. For an explanation of how UCDP records events and fatalities, please refer to the Sources section in the introduction of this report.
803 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
In eight of 13 security incidents recorded by ACLED in the reference period, civilians were involved. These incidents were classified as ‘explosions/remote violence’ (5) and ‘violence against civilians (3) and, according to ACLED, resulted in nine civilian casualties.  

ACLED attributed three security incidents to Taliban forces. One incident was attributed to AFF, which claimed to have conducted an operation on Taliban Intelligence headquarters in Qala-e Naw in April 2022, killing 12 Taliban members. Another security incident was attributed to NRF, which allegedly attacked a Taliban checkpoint in Gerakhshak area (PD1) of Qala-e Naw, killing four Taliban members on 22 April 2022. According to Hasht-e Subh, this attack was claimed by NLFA.

According to Pajhwok Afghan News, on 11 February 2022, one civilian was killed, and 14 or 15 others injured, including children, in a bomb explosion in Qala-e Naw. The blast had occurred in front of the Grand Jami Mosque. In March 2022, unidentified gunmen killed two women of a family in Sarghar Siah village, in Jawand District. The motive for the killing was unclear. Taliban officials said that three other women had prior been killed in a separate incident.

According to Pajhwok Afghan News, in November 2021, four children were injured when landmines exploded while they were playing with them. The two explosions went off in Jawand and Muqur districts.

### 4.3.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

According to UNOCHA, 15 512 persons were displaced due to conflict from several districts between mid-August and October 2021: 7 007 persons were displaced to Qala-e-Naw District in the province, 8 435 persons to Herat Province, and 70 persons to Chaghcharan District in Ghor Province. There were no displacement movements in or out of the province recorded by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022.

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 34 397 IDP arrivals in Badghis Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. According to IOM, 45 544 IDPs and 4 220 persons from abroad returned to Badghis during the abovementioned period.

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804 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url](#)
805 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url](#)
806 Hasht-e Subh, National Liberation Front Kills Four Taliban Fighters in Badghis, Reports, 23 April 2022, [url](#)
807 Republic, Afghanistan: 1 Dead, 15 Injured In Blast Near Mosque In Badghis Province, 11 February 2022, [url](#)
808 Pajhwok Afghan News, 1 person killed, 14 injured in Badghis mosque explosion, 11 February 2022, [url](#)
809 Bakhtar News Agency, Two Young Women Killed by Gunmen in Badghis, 28 March 2022, [url](#)
810 Hasht-e Subh, Two Young Women Shot Death in Badghis Province, 29 March 2022, [url](#)
811 Bakhtar News Agency, Two Young Women Killed by Gunmen in Badghis, 28 March 2022, [url](#)
812 Pajhwok Afghan News, 4 children injured in Badghis blasts, 16 November 2021, [url](#)
813 Data cover period between 15 August 2021 and 30 November 2021 and between 1 January 2022 and 10 May 2022. UNOCHA does not provide data for December 2021. [url](#)
814 UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022, [url](#)
815 UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022. [url](#)
while 83,891 persons moved abroad. From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 11,393 returns from Iran and 163 from Pakistan to Badghis Province.

No further information on the impact of the conflict on the civilian population in Badghis Province was found within the time constraints of this report.

4.4. Baghlan

Baghlan Province is located in the north of the country and comprised of the following districts: Andarab, Baghlan-e Jadid (Baghlan-e Jadeed, Baghlan-e Markazi), Burka (Barka), Dahana-e Ghuri, Deh Salah, Doshi (Dushi), Fereng wa Gharu (Firing Wa Gharu), Guzargah-e Nur (Gozargah-e Noor), Khenjan (Khinjan), Khost Wa Fereng (Khost Wa Firing), Khwaja Hejran (Jalga), Nahrin (Nahreen), Pul-e Hesar (Pul-e Hisar), Pul-e Khumri, and Tala Wa Barfak. The provincial capital is Pul-e Khumri.

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, the population of Baghlan Province is 1,053,200. UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated the population as of January 2022 at 1,300,000.

An undated profile published by NPS listed Tajiks as the majority ethnic group (52%) in Baghlan Province. Pashtuns were estimated to comprise around 20%, Hazaras approximately 15%, Uzbeks 12%, and Tatars 1% of the population. No further information about the ethnic composition in Baghlan Province after the Taliban takeover could be found within the time constraints of this report.

4.4.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 172 security incidents in Baghlan Province, 116 of which were coded as ‘battles’, 51 as ‘violence against civilians,’ and 5 as ‘explosions/remote violence,’ as depicted in the graph below.

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816 IOM, Afghanistan - Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November – December 2021), 2 March 2022, p. 3
UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Baghlan Province – District Atlas, April 2014, p. 2
819 Regarding population figures, only estimates are available, and the official figures appear to be understated. IPC, Afghanistan IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis September 2021 - March 2022, October 2021, p. 13
820 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, p. 39
821 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022, 7 January 2022, p. 46
822 US, NPS, Baghlan Provincial Overview, n.d., p. 46
823 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022,
In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded 35 security incidents, of which 6 resulted in a total of 15 civilian deaths. In 24 of the 35 incidents, NRF was targeted by the Taliban military forces. 

According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province resulted in 372 fatalities. The most affected districts were Andarab (48 security incidents and 113 fatalities), Khost Wa Firing (33 security incidents and 65 fatalities), Deh Salah (28 security incidents and 70 fatalities), and Pul-e Hisar (17 security incident and 43 fatalities).

According to a report by ACLED and APW covering the period until 15 March 2022, the province experienced ‘notable increases in violence targeting civilians’ in the first months of 2022. Violence targeting civilians increased in the province in February 2022. The rise in violence against civilians coincided with a rise in clashes between the Taliban and anti-Taliban groups.

According to the report by the UN Secretary-General for the reporting period from the end of January to mid-May 2022, NRF and AFF conducted attacks primarily in the provinces of Baghlan and Panjsher. UNAMA, however, was unable to verify most of the attack claims. Taliban maintained that this groups did ‘not constitute a significant challenge to their rule’. However they announced the redeployment of Taliban security forces to northern provinces, including Baghlan, in early May.

In an article published in June 2022, an Austrian-Afghan journalist Emran Feroz noted that anti-Taliban militias belonging to NRF had been formed in the districts of Andarab and Khost Wa Fereng. These militias were mostly made up of remnants from the former military personnel and various warlord structures that previously dominated in the province. The

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824 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
825 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022
826 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
827 ACLED and APW, Tracking Disorder During Taliban Rule in Afghanistan, A Joint ACLED and APW Report, April 2022, url, p. 8
effectiveness of the resistance was unclear. As noted by Feroz, some of its official spokespersons had attracted attention in recent months for providing false information and rumours, while most of the news coming out of affected regions was censored by Taliban.\footnote{Feroz, Emran, Ein Jahr unter den Taliban [A year under the Taliban], Republik, 21 June 2022, url}

In October 2021, clashes between the Taliban and NRF were reported in Andarab,\footnote{ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (9–15 October 2021), 21 October 2021, url} Pul-e Hesar, and Deh Salah districts. Several NRF and Taliban fighters, including two NRF commanders, were killed, although the exact number of casualties remained unknown.\footnote{ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (16–22 October 2021), 27 October 2021, url} In January 2022 clashes between NRF and Taliban forces were reported in Khost Wa Fereng District.\footnote{ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (16–22 October 2021), 27 October 2021, url} In March 2022, clashes between NRF and Taliban were reported in Andarab,\footnote{Hasht-e Subh, Two-Day Clashes End Among Taliban and NRF Forces in Baghlan, 25 January 2022, url} especially around the Qassan valley.\footnote{Hasht-e Subh, Four Taliban and One NRF Forces Killed in Baghlan, 24 January 2022, url} In April 2022, NRF forces clashed with Taliban forces in Pul-e Hesar District\footnote{Hasht-e Subh, National Resistance Front Forces Overtake the Qasan Valley of Andarab District in Baghlan, 5 April 2022, url} and Khost Wa Fereng District.\footnote{Hasht-e Subh, Heavy Clash Between Taliban and National Resistance Forces, 11 Taliban Militants and 2 Resistance Forces Killed, 29 March 2022, url} In early April 2022, the takeover of Qassan valley and the Darband area in Andarab District by NRF forces was reported.\footnote{Hasht-e Subh, Heavy Clash Between Taliban and National Resistance Forces, 11 Taliban Militants and 2 Resistance Forces Killed, 29 March 2022, url} On 9 April 2022, the Afghanistan Freedom Front claimed attacks on Taliban bases in Baghlan and three other provinces, killing a total of four and injuring six Taliban.\footnote{Hasht-e Subh, Heavy Clash Between Taliban and National Resistance Forces, 11 Taliban Militants and 2 Resistance Forces Killed, 29 March 2022, url} Sources reported clashes between NRF and Taliban forces in May 2022 in Andarab\footnote{Hasht-e Subh, Heavy Clash Between Taliban and National Resistance Forces, 11 Taliban Militants and 2 Resistance Forces Killed, 29 March 2022, url} and Tala Wa Barfak districts and between NLF and Taliban forces in Khost Wa Fereng district. In one instance reported in the same month, Liberation and Resistance Front forces jointly fought Taliban forces in the province.\footnote{Hasht-e Subh, Heavy Clash Between Taliban and National Resistance Forces, 11 Taliban Militants and 2 Resistance Forces Killed, 29 March 2022, url} Reportedly, Taliban members shot dead two NRF members in their sleep in Andarab District in May 2022.\footnote{Hasht-e Subh, Heavy Clash Between Taliban and National Resistance Forces, 11 Taliban Militants and 2 Resistance Forces Killed, 29 March 2022, url} Sources reported clashes between NRF and Taliban forces in June 2022 in Nahrin\footnote{Hasht-e Subh, Heavy Clash Between Taliban and National Resistance Forces, 11 Taliban Militants and 2 Resistance Forces Killed, 29 March 2022, url} and Andarab\footnote{Hasht-e Subh, Heavy Clash Between Taliban and National Resistance Forces, 11 Taliban Militants and 2 Resistance Forces Killed, 29 March 2022, url} districts. On 8 June 2022, Taliban reportedly killed an NRF member in Tala-wa-Barfak District and on 7 June 2022 beheaded and mutilated
four NRF fighters in Andarab region. According to Hasht-e Subh, “there have been reports indicating that Taliban forces have arbitrarily executed prisoners and even civilians.”

Hasht-e Subh reported clashes resulting from internal conflict between Uzbek and Pashtun Taliban members in Barka District in May 2022. Sources reported that the Taliban arrested and tortured civilians and took hostage family members of resistance fighters. In several cases, civilians, including doctors, were reportedly killed by unknown perpetrators. In February 2022, Pahlawan Tajuddin Larkhawabi, a famous Buzkashi player, was killed by Taliban. According to a police speaker, he was killed unintentionally during a search operation. On 16 February 2022, unknown perpetrators killed a doctor in Deh Salah District. A video investigation published by the New York Times in April 2022 on cases of forced disappearance or killings targeting former government officials and members of the Afghan security forces during the first six months of Taliban rule recorded 86 killings in Baghlan Province.
4.4.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

In January 2022, two people were killed and two injured by an UXO in Pul-e Khumri. In April 2022 a man was killed in an ERW explosion in Baghlan-e Markazi District. Another man was injured in the same incident.

In April 2022 Taliban cut off communication networks in the Andarab and Khost Wa Fereng districts ‘to put pressure on NRF forces.’

(a) Displacement and returns

According to UNOCHA figures, 133 persons were displaced due to conflict from Khinjan and Khost Wa Fereng districts between mid-August and end of September 2021 to Herat and Parwan Provinces. In April 2022 763 people were displaced from Deh Salah District to Pul-e Khumri.

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 28 397 IDP arrivals in Baghlan Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. According to IOM, 20 594 IDPs and 3 146 persons from abroad returned to Baghlan during that period, while 35 022 persons moved abroad. In a January 2022 report IOM noted that Baghlan ranked third among the provinces ‘from which individuals have left since August 2021 and have not returned.’ From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 10 096 returns from Iran and 87 from Pakistan to Baghlan Province.

In May 2022 Hasht-e Subh reported that Taliban had forcibly displaced more than 40 families from Andarab District over the period of one week. The article further notes that Taliban told displaced residents of Pul-e Hesar District that ‘they have no right to live in northern Afghanistan anymore’. According to Hasht-e Subh, local sources said that residents were humiliated and insulted by Taliban.
4.5. Balkh

Balkh Province is located in the north of Afghanistan and borders Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. The province is divided into the following districts: Balkh, Char Bolak (Charbulak), Char Kent (Charkent), Chintal (Chemtal), Dawlat Abad (Dawlatabad), Dehdadi, Kaldar, Kishin (Keshindeh), Khulm, Marmul, Mazar-e Sharif, Nahr-i Shahi (Nahr-e Shahi), Sholgara (Sholgareh), Shortepa, and Zari. The provincial capital is Mazar-e Sharif.868

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, the population of Balkh Province is 1,578,510. Around 516,400 of the overall population of the province were estimated to live in Mazar-e Sharif District.869 UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated the population as of January 2022 at 2 million.870

Undated sources stated that Balkh was an ethnically diverse province, inhabited by Pashtuns, Uzbek, Hazaras (including Sunni Hazaras871), Tajiks, Aimaq, Baluch, Arabs872 and Turkmen873 populations. No information about the ethnic composition in Balkh after the Taliban takeover could be found.

4.5.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 56 security incidents in Balkh Province, 39 of which were coded as ‘violence against civilians’, 11 as ‘battles’, and 6 as ‘explosions/remote violence,’ as depicted in the graph below.874

![Graph showing security incidents in Balkh Province]

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869 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, [url](#), p. 76
870 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022, 7 January 2022, [url](#), p. 46
871 US, NPS, Balkh Provincial Review, n.d., [url](#)
873 US, NPS, Balkh Provincial Review, n.d., [url](#)
874 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url](#)
In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded in Balkh Province 9 security incidents causing 77 civilian deaths.\textsuperscript{876} According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province causing 132 fatalities. The most affected district was Mazar-e Sharif (46 security incidents and 113 fatalities). ACLED attributed to Taliban forces 25 security incidents, 23 of which were coded as ‘violence against civilians’.\textsuperscript{877}

On 4 November 2021, Taliban forces were reported to have entered a private home in Balkh Province, where they shot dead two women and two men. The two women and one of the men were former employees of the former ANDSF.\textsuperscript{878} In early January 2022, the bodies of four young men were found in Balkh Province. According to relatives of one of the men, he had previously been picked up by men identifying themselves as Taliban.\textsuperscript{879} In mid-January 2022, conflicts over land ownership reportedly led to clashes between the local Taliban police chief and residents of a village in the province. Reportedly, one person was killed and five were injured.\textsuperscript{880}

According to ACLED, unidentified armed groups were attributed 18 security incidents—including 15 incidents coded as ‘violence against civilians’—which resulted in overall 30 fatalities. ISKP was attributed five security incidents, which caused 52 fatalities.\textsuperscript{881}

Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, ISKP attacks have reportedly ‘spread to new parts of the country’, including Mazar-e Sharif.\textsuperscript{882} On 25 April 2022, ISKP launched rockets in the direction of Uzbekistan from Balkh Province, which was reportedly the first attack of this character and which ‘indicated that ISKP has a presence in Afghanistan’s Balkh province’. Moreover, the attack was considered the first ISKP claimed activity in the province in the last three years.\textsuperscript{883} Furthermore, ISKP carried out several attacks on the civilian population in the city of Mazar-e Sharif in April and May 2022,\textsuperscript{884} including an attack on the Shia Hazara Seh Dokan mosque in Mazar-e Sharif in late April 2022.\textsuperscript{885} The four explosions on 21 April 2022 were carried out with a hidden remote explosive device when the mosque was full of people.\textsuperscript{886} Depending on the source, 12 to 50 people were killed and 58 to 87 were injured in

\begin{footnotesize}

875 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url[876]{}

876 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022

877 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url[878]{}


879 Hasht-e Subh, جهان قلب مرموتر در بلخ; کشف جسد حومه به چشم‌انداز گورنمنت نشان دهنده است [Four persons mysteriously killed in Balkh: Body of young men found with his eyes pulled out], 9 January 2022, \url[880]{}

880 Hasht-e Subh, One Killed, 5 Injured in Clashes over Land Grabbling in Balkh, 12 January 2022, \url[881]{}

881 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url[882]{}

882 BBC News, Afghanistan pupils in fear after spate of Islamic State attacks, 13 May 2022, \url[883]{}

883 EurasiaNet, Perspectives – ISKP’s Uzbekistan-directed attack bolsters rhetoric with deeds, 25 April 2022, \url[884]{}

884 BBC News, Afghanistan: ‘Blood and fear everywhere’ after deadly IS blast, 21 April 2022, \url[885]{}; AOAV, Nine People Killed and 13 Injured in Sixth Islamic State Attack in Afghanistan this April, 29 April 2022, \url[886]{}; AFP, Four bombs kill at least 16 in Afghanistan, 26 May 2022

885 BBC News, Afghanistan: ‘Blood and fear everywhere’ after deadly IS blast, 21 April 2022, \url[887]{}

886 BBC News, Afghanistan: ‘Blood and fear everywhere’ after deadly IS blast, 21 April 2022, \url[888]{}

\end{footnotesize}
the attack.\(^{887}\) On two occasions, ISKP also targeted minibuses carrying civilians.\(^{888}\) One attack occurred on 28 April 2022, when two minibuses carrying Shia passengers exploded in Mazar-e Sharif, reportedly injuring 13\(^{889}\) to 17 people\(^{890}\) and killing nine\(^{891}\) to eleven persons.\(^{892}\) Another attack occurred on 25 May 2022, when three bombs exploded on separate minibuses in Mazar-e Sharif. The explosions killed at least ten people.\(^{893}\) In another attack in June 2022, a vehicle carrying airport employees of the technical department in Mazar-e Sharif District to the district’s airport was attacked by ISKP\(^{894}\). Two employees were reportedly killed and six others were injured.\(^{895}\) BBC Monitoring with reference to ISKP sources stated that according to the group more than ten passengers were killed or injured.\(^{896}\)

ACLED attributed four security incidents to NRF.\(^{897}\) In a January 2022 RFE/RL article, it was reported that Taliban forces were clashing with guerrilla groups in the northern provinces of the country, including Balkh Province.\(^{898}\) In late January 2022, ACLED reported that NRF targeted the Taliban in Balkh and other Afghan provinces.\(^{899}\) In February 2022, Taliban forces reportedly clashed with NRF-affiliated fighters in the province.\(^{900}\) In April 2022, NRF targeted the Taliban in a number of Afghan provinces, among which Balkh.\(^{901}\) On 13 April 2022, it was reported that NRF claimed to have targeted a Taliban base near the international airport in Mazar-e Sharif.\(^{902}\)

Sources stated that kidnappings of businessmen in Balkh Province had occurred between mid-August and October 2021.\(^{903}\) A January 2022 article by Pajhwok Afghan News reported with reference to local sources, that robberies and kidnappings had decreased in Mazar-e

\(^{887}\) AOAV, Nine People Killed and 13 Injured in Sixth Islamic State Attack in Afghanistan this April, 29 April 2022, [url]
\(^{888}\) Hasht-e Subh, Sources: 50 Martyred Shifted to Balkh Provincial Hospital, 21 April 2022, [url]; BBC News, Afghanistan: 'Blood and fear everywhere' after deadly IS blast, 21 April 2022, [url]; KP, String of Bombings Prompts Questions over Peace in Afghanistan, 22 April 2022, [url]
\(^{889}\) AOAV, Nine People Killed and 13 Injured in Sixth Islamic State Attack in Afghanistan this April, 29 April 2022, [url]; Al Jazeera, Twin blasts kill at least nine in northern Afghanistan, 28 April 2022, [url]; International Crisis Group, Crisiswatch: Tracking Conflict Worldwide, n.d., [url]; AFP, Four bombs kill at least 16 in Afghanistan, 26 May 2022
\(^{890}\) AOAV, Nine People Killed and 13 Injured in Sixth Islamic State Attack in Afghanistan this April, 29 April 2022, [url]; Al Jazeera, Twin blasts kill at least nine in northern Afghanistan, 28 April 2022, [url]; KP, String of Bombings Prompts Questions over Peace in Afghanistan, 22 April 2022, [url]
\(^{891}\) AOAV, Nine People Killed and 13 Injured in Sixth Islamic State Attack in Afghanistan this April, 29 April 2022, [url]; Al Jazeera, Twin blasts kill at least nine in northern Afghanistan, 28 April 2022, [url]; Pajhwok Afghan News, Death toll from Balkh blasts surges to 11, 29 April 2022, [url]
\(^{892}\) ACLED, Regional Overview: South Asia and Afghanistan 23 April-6 May 2022, 12 May 2022, [url]; Pajhwok Afghan News, Death toll from Balkh blasts surges to 11, 29 April 2022, [url]
\(^{893}\) AFP, Four bombs kill at least 16 in Afghanistan, 26 May 2022
\(^{894}\) BBC Monitoring, IS claims attack on airport employees in north Afghanistan, 13 June 2022; SITE, ISKP Claims Armed Attack on Mazar-e Sharif Airport Employees in Balkh, 13 June 2022, [url]
\(^{895}\) KP, Armed Attack on Balkh Airport Staff Leaves Two Dead and Six Wounded, 13 June 2022, [url]; New Arab (The), Two airport workers killed in Afghanistan bus ambush: official, 12 June 2022, [url]
\(^{896}\) BBC Monitoring, IS claims attack on airport employees in north Afghanistan, 13 June 2022; SITE, ISKP Claims Armed Attack on Mazar-e Sharif Airport Employees in Balkh (Screenshot), 13 June 2022, [url]
\(^{897}\) EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]
\(^{898}\) RFE/RL, Taliban’s Arrest Of Ethnic Uzbek Commander Sparks Clashes In Northern Afghanistan, 29 January 2022, [url]
\(^{899}\) ACLED, Regional Overview: South Asia and Afghanistan, 27 January 2022, [url]
\(^{900}\) International Crisis Group, Crisiswatch: Tracking Conflict Worldwide, n.d., [url]
\(^{901}\) ACLED, Regional Overview: South Asia and Afghanistan 9–15 April 2022, 20 April 2022, [url]
\(^{902}\) Hasht-e Subh, Attack Claim by NRF Forces on Taliban Base Near Balkh International Airport, 13 April 2022, [url]
\(^{903}\) FP, Afghan Crime Wave Adds to Taliban Dystopia, 29 October 2021, [url]; TOLOnews, Kidnapping Cases Surge in Afghanistan, 28 October 2021, [url]
Sharif City. In early June 2022, a kidnapping of a businessman in Balkh Province was reported.

4.5.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

According to BBC Monitoring referring to ISKP sources, the group claimed responsibility for blowing up three electricity pylons in May 2022 in Tangi Tashqurghan, between Samangan and Balkh provinces. ISKP reportedly regarded the attacks “as part of its “economic war”.”

In March 2022, UN Human Rights Council reported that conflicts related to land and property occurred in several Afghan provinces. Following the Taliban takeover, such conflicts led to forced evictions, some of which occurred in Balkh. In some instances, these evictions reportedly affected ethnic minorities and seemed to be either tolerated or facilitated by the Taliban de facto authorities. According to Human Rights Watch, the Taliban and its associated forces ‘evicted hundreds of Hazara families’ from Helmand and Balkh provinces in early October 2021. Reportedly, armed men from the local community called Kushani, who were cooperating with Taliban forces, forced resident Hazara families from the Qubat al-Islam area of Mazar-e Sharif to leave within three days. According to Taliban officials, this was based on an order issued by court, while evicted residents claimed to be the owners of the land in question since the 1970s.

(a) Displacement and returns

According to UNOCHA, 140 persons were displaced due to conflict from Balkh Province in August 2021. They were all displaced from Marmul District to Herat District, Herat Province. There were no displacement movements in the province recorded by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022.

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan covering the period between August 2021 and 19 December 2021, IOM identified Balkh Province as second among the Afghan provinces in terms of IDPs arriving in the province and in terms of IDPs fleeing the province since August 2021. Mazar-e Sharif and Nahr-e Shahi districts further came second and third after Kabul District in terms of IDPs arriving in the districts. IOM identified 115 143 IDP arrivals in Balkh Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. According to IOM, 149 475 IDPs and 10 651 persons from abroad returned to Balkh during that period, while 87 011
persons moved abroad. From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 13 064 returns from Iran and 31 from Pakistan to Balkh Province.

4.6. Bamyank

Bamyan Province is located in the mountainous central highlands region and is divided into the following districts: Bamyank, Kahmard, Panjab, Saqghan (Sayghan), Shebar (Shibar), Waras and Yakawlang. NSIA separates Yakawlang District into Yakawlang and Yakawlang No. 2, adding that the status of district Yakawlang No. 2 is temporary. The provincial capital of Bamyank is Bamyank City.

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, the population of Bamyank Province was 513 190. UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated the population as of January 2022 at 659 000.

Bamyan forms part of the Hazarajat region and is predominantly inhabited by the Hazara ethnic group (around 67 %), followed by Sadat (16 %), Tajiks (around 16 %) and very small communities of Tatars, Qizilbash, and Pashtuns. No further information about the ethnic composition in Bamyank Province after the Taliban takeover could be found.

4.6.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded seven security incidents in Bamyank Province, four of which were coded as ‘battles’, two as ‘explosions/remote violence’, and one as ‘violence against civilians’.

According to ACLED, none of the security incidents in the province resulted in fatalities. UCDP did not record any security events in Bamyank Province during the reference period.

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913 IOM, Afghanistan – Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November - December 2021), 2 March 2022, url, p. 3
917 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, p. 42
918 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, p. 42
919 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, p. 42
920 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 46
922 US, NPS, Bamyank Provincial Overview, n.d., url
923 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
924 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
925 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. For an explanation of how UCDP records events and fatalities, please refer to the Sources section in the introduction of this report.
The internal clashes between Taliban members caused civilian casualties, such as in November 2021, when two civilians were injured in an internal clash between two Taliban high-level commanders, allegedly a local chief of intelligence and one of the Taliban special force commanders, at Bamyan central market. According to the report by the UN Secretary-General, the outbreak of violence between Taliban members was caused by tensions along ethnic lines within the group as well as by competition for positions. In June 2022, Taliban defence minister Mullah Yaqoob visited the province to mediate between Hazara and Pashtun factions of the group following renewed clashes.

In February 2022, the Taliban reportedly deployed 1,500 troop reinforcements to the province. A senior Taliban official explained that this deployment was due to ‘efforts by some groups to destabilize the province’, without naming any particular group. In May 2022, following the killing of a local commander, two Taliban members were reportedly killed in retaliation.

Hashte Subh reported on arrests carried out by Taliban members targeting former members of Afghan security forces in April 2022. Bamyan residents were reportedly concerned because of an increase in arrests of former security force members despite the issuance of a general amnesty.

4.6.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

UNOCHA did not record any displacements from or any IDP arrivals in Bamyan Province from mid-August 2021 to November 2021. Furthermore, there were no displacement movements recorded in or out of the province by UNOCHA from January 2022 to the beginning of May 2022.

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 11,644 IDP arrivals in Bamyan Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. According to IOM, 75,070 IDPs and 2,186 persons from abroad returned to Bamyan during that period, while 8,063...
persons moved abroad. From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 5,061 returns from Iran to the province.

No further information on the impact of the conflict on the civilian population in Bamyan Province was found within the time constraints of this report.

4.7. Daykundi

Daykundi Province is located in central Afghanistan and is divided into the following districts: Ashtarlay (Ishterlai), Kejran (Kajran), Khedir (Khadir), Kiti, Miramor, Nili, Sang-e Takht, Shahrestan, Pato (temporary), and Nawamish (temporary). The provincial capital is Nili.

Hasht-e Subh reported in October 2021 that following the Taliban takeover, Gizab, formerly a district in Uruzgan Province, was annexed to Pato District and thereby integrated into Daykundi Province. NSIA lists Pato as a temporary district in Daykundi Province and Gizab as a district in Uruzgan Province while ACLED lists Gizab as part of Daykundi Province and does not mention Pato as a district of any province.

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, the population of Daykundi Province was estimated at 534,680. UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated the population as of January 2022 at 687,000.

Daykundi forms part of the Hazarajat region and is traditionally inhabited by the Hazara ethnic group (86%). Smaller communities were reportedly constituted by Pashtuns (8.5%), Baluch (3.5%), and Sadat (2.5%). No further information about the ethnic composition in Daykundi Province after the Taliban takeover could be found.

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938 IOM, Afghanistan - Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November – December 2021), 2 March 2022, url, p. 3
943 Taliban de facto government in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, p. 85
944 Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Not Allowing the Displaced Villagers in Daikundi to Return Home, 23 October 2021, url
945 Taliban de facto government in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, p. 85
946 Taliban de facto government in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, p. 88
947 ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
948 Taliban de facto government in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, p. 85
949 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 46
951 US, NPS, Dai Kundi Provincial Overview, n.d., url
4.7.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 14 security incidents in Daykundi Province, eight of which were coded as ‘violence against civilians,’ four as ‘battles,’ and two as ‘explosions/remote violence.’

In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP did not record any conflict-related incidents or civilian fatalities in Daykundi Province. According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province resulted in 20 fatalities. The most affected district was Nili (6 security incidents).

ACLED attributed to the Taliban forces nine security incidents, eight of which were coded as ‘violence against civilians.’ An investigation by AI revealed that, on 30 August 2021, in the village of Khedir, 13 persons of Hazara background, among them 11 former members of the ANDSF, were extrajudicially killed after having surrendered to the Taliban. One of the victims was a 17-year-old girl. In December 2021, the body of a former soldier and resident of Khedir District was found. Reportedly, he had been arrested by the Taliban three months before and remained missing. On 5 June 2022, a man whose son was a former member of the Afghan security forces was shot in Pato District. According to an anonymous source, the gunmen were affiliated with the Taliban.

Afghan media reported on arrests of former members of the security forces as well as their family members. In February 2022, local contacts of Hasht-e Subh reported that Taliban were carrying out a two-week-long disarmament campaign in various districts, raiding houses, confiscating weapons and arresting dozens of citizens. Many of the detainees were reportedly former members of the security forces, some were former government officials or their family members. Some locals reported physical abuse. In June 2022, Etilaat Roz reported the arrest of the father of a former soldier as well as the arrest of the brother of a former employee of the National Security Directorate.

According to ACLED, in April 2022 AFF expanded its activities into new provinces, among them Daykundi, by targeting Taliban forces there for the first time.

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952 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]
953 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. For an explanation of how UCDP records events and fatalities, please refer to the sources section in the introduction of this report.
954 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]
955 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]
956 AI, Afghanistan: 13 Hazara killed by Taliban fighters in Daykundi province – new investigation, 5 October 2021, [url]
957 Hasht-e Subh, Two Taliban Officials Arrested in Daikundi for Killing a Former Soldier, 3 December 2021, [url]
958 Etilaat Roz, ن شدیکندی بیز سرباز جامعه ولسوالی نیلی دایکندی [Man shot in Pato district in Daykundi], 5 June 2022, [url]
959 Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Forces Imprison, Torture Daikundi Residents As Staging Massive House-to-House Sweep, Reports, 1 March 2022, [url]
960 Etilaat Roz, طالبان در دایکندی برادر یک نظامی پیشین را بازداشت کردند [Taliban arrest the brother of a former soldier in Daykundi], 9 June 2022, [url]
961 ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (9–15 April 2022), 20 April 2022, [url]
4.7.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

UNOCHA recorded 3,325 displacements from Daykundi Province from mid-August 2021 to November 2021, most of them in September 2021 within the province. There were no displacement movements recorded in or out of the province by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022.

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 7,015 IDP arrivals in Daykundi Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. According to IOM, 8,029 IDPs and 4,732 persons from abroad returned to Daykundi during that period, while 9,150 persons moved abroad. From January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 9,511 returns from Iran to the province.

No further information on the impact of the conflict on the civilian population was found within the time constraints of this report.

4.8. Farah

Farah Province is located in the western part of Afghanistan and borders Iran to the west. It is divided into the following administrative units: Anar Dara, Bakwa, Bala Buluk, Farah, Gulistan, Khak-e Safed, Lash-e Juwayn, Pur Chaman, Pushtrud, Qala-i Kah, and Shib Koh (Shibkoh). The provincial capital is Farah.

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, the population of Farah Province was estimated at 583,420. UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated the population as of January 2022 at 748,000.

Farah was described as sparsely populated and multi-ethnic, mostly characterised by a rural and tribal society. The population was reportedly predominantly Pashtun, with other ethnic groups such as Hazara, Tajik, Sadat, Aimaq, and Baluch also present in the province.

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962 Data cover period between 15 August 2021 and 30 November 2021 and between 1 January 2022 and 10 May 2022. UNOCHA does not provide data for December 2021.
963 UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022.
964 UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022.
965 IOM, Afghanistan - Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November – December 2021), 2 March 2022.
967 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022.
969 IOM, Afghanistan - Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November – December 2021), 2 March 2022.
970 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022.
971 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022.
972 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022.
973 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022.
further information about the ethnic composition in Farah Province after the Taliban takeover could be found.

4.8.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded nine security incidents in Farah Province, six of which were coded as ‘violence against civilians,’ two as ‘battles,’ and one as ‘explosions/remote violence.’ 974

UCDP recorded two conflict-related incidents resulting in one civilian fatality in Farah during the reference period. 975 According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province resulted in 11 fatalities. The most affected district was Farah (seven security incidents). 976

Six security incidents recorded by ACLED in Farah province were coded as ‘violence against civilians’ and involved targeted attacks by unidentified groups or by ISKP. 977 On 10 December, two people were killed and a third person injured when unknown perpetrators on a motorcycle threw a grenade into a shop in Bala Buluk District. 978 On 11 December 2021, a Shiite cleric was assassinated by unknown gunmen.979

In January 2022, ACLED recorded ISKP activities in the province, when ISKP militants reportedly killed a civilian in Farah City. 980 At the end of March 2022, a further ISKP-related incident was reported in Khak-e Safed District, where several bodyguards of a local Taliban commander were killed in a clash with ISKP militants. The Taliban denied that the clash had taken place. 981

According to Hasht-e Subh, in March 2022, Taliban security forces confirmed that unidentified gunmen had shot a former member of the National Directorate of Security (NDS). 982

4.8.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

On 18 May 2022, a child was killed and two more were injured when an IED exploded in Farah Rod District. 983

974 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
975 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. For an explanation of how UCDP records events and fatalities, please refer to the sources section in the introduction of this report.
976 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
977 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
978 Hasht-e Subh, Two Persons Killed As Grenade Thrown at Shop in Farah, 11 December 2021, url
979 Etilaat Roz, یک عالم اهل تشیع در فراه شهید شد، 12 December 2021, url
980 ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (11 December 2021 – 7 January 2022), 13 January 2022, url
981 Hasht-e Subh, Several Bodyguards of a Local Taliban Commander killed by ISKP Fighters in Farah Province, 1 April 2022, url
982 Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Local Security Forces: Armed Men Kill a Former National Security Soldier in Farah Province, 15 March 2022, url
983 Bakhtar News Agency, 1 Child Killed, 2 Injured in Farah IED Explosion, 18 May 2022, url
In February 2022, it was reported that Bala Buluk District still bore signs of destruction left by shelling during fighting between former government forces and Taliban in May 2021, with mud-brick houses and orchards still in ruins and residents being left homeless and without a livelihood.984

(a) Displacement and returns

UNOCHA985 recorded 3,846 displacements from Farah Province from mid-August 2021 to November 2021, 3,129 of them to neighbouring Herat province and the rest within the province.986 There were no displacement movements recorded in or out of the province by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022.987

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 2,480 IDP arrivals in Farah Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. According to IOM, 2,586 IDPs and 1,276 persons from abroad returned to Farah during that period, while 9,484 persons moved abroad.988 From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 7,929 returns from Iran and 115 returns from Pakistan to the province.989

4.9. Faryab

Faryab Province is located in the north-western part of Afghanistan and is divided into the following districts: Almar, Andkhoy, Bilcharagh (Bilchiragh, Balcharagh), Dawlat Abad (Dawlatabad), Gurziwan (Garziwan), Khan-e Char Bagh (Khani Charbagh), Khwaja Sabz Posh Wali (Khvajasabzposh), Kohestan (Kohistan), Mainama (Maymana), Pashtunkot (Pashtun Kot), Qaram Qul (Qaramqol), Qaysar (Qaisar), Qurghan (Qorghman), Shirin Tagab (Shirintagab). The provincial capital is Mainama.990

UNODC noted that the district of Ghormach became part of Faryab in 2017,991 however, in 2018, after the Taliban had captured the district, it was decided to shift the administrative affairs to Badghis Province.992 In April 2022, NSIA listed Ghormach as part of Badghis Province.993

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984 RFE/RL/Gandhara, Afghan District Left To Pick Up The Pieces After Taliban's Advance, 11 February 2022, url
985 Data cover period between 15 August 2021 and 30 November 2021 and between 1 January 2022 and 10 May 2022. UNOCHA does not provide data for December 2021.
986 UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022, url
987 UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022, url
988 IOM, Afghanistan - Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November – December 2021), 2 March 2022, url, p. 3
990 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, p. 100; UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Faryab Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url, p. 2
991 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2021 - Cultivation and Production, March 2022, url, p. 16
992 Frontier Post (The), Ghormach falls to Taliban as ANA troops move to Maimana, 28 August 2018, url
993 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, p. 106
According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, the population of Faryab Province was 1 150 150.\textsuperscript{994} UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated the population as of January 2022 at 1 500 000.\textsuperscript{995}

Uzbeks are the predominant ethnic group in the province.\textsuperscript{996} Other groups include Tajiks, Aimaqs, Pashtuns, Hazaras, Moghol and other smaller ethnicities,\textsuperscript{997} such as the Magats (Jogi, originally a semi-nomadic ethnic group) in Maimana and Andkhoy districts.\textsuperscript{998} No further information about the ethnic composition in Faryab Province after the Taliban takeover could be found within the time constraints of this report.

### 4.9.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 27 security incidents in Faryab Province, 16 of which were coded as ‘battles’, 9 as ‘violence against civilians,’ and 2 as ‘explosions/remote violence.’\textsuperscript{999}

In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded four security incidents, none of which resulted in civilian deaths.\textsuperscript{1000} According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province resulted in 35 fatalities. The most affected districts were Maimana (10 security incidents and 13 fatalities) and Shirin Tagab (4 security incidents).\textsuperscript{1001}

ACLED attributed 8 security incidents to NRF (mainly battles with Taliban military forces) and 11 to the Taliban, including 7 incidents coded as ‘violence against civilians.’ Four security incidents attributed to the Taliban involved infighting between different Taliban groups. Seven incidents recorded by ACLED were attributed to an unidentified armed group, targeting both civilians and Taliban members.\textsuperscript{1002}

In January 2022, fighters of two Taliban commanders, named as Anas and Bilal, clashed in Bilciraghi District, resulting in the wounding of two or three civilians, Pajhwok Afghan News reported.\textsuperscript{1003} According to Hasht-e Subh, Anas and two of Bilal’s bodyguards were killed and Bilal and one of his bodyguards wounded.\textsuperscript{1004} The same month, there were reports of...
infighting between Taliban groups in Maimana. On 12 January 2022, Qari Wakil, the most senior Tajik Taliban commander in Faryab Province, was arrested after trying to negotiate the release of Makhdoom Mohammad Alem Rabbani, a senior Uzbek Taliban commander who had been arrested in Mazar-e Sharif (Balkh Province) the same month. His arrest had ‘led to a revolt of Uzbek Taliban units’, who briefly seized control of Maimana City. According to RFE/RL, at least four people were killed in the gunfire. Hasht-e Subh reported on the killing of one civilian and the wounding of four others. According to ISW, the revolt was ‘the most serious incident so far in an escalating pattern of intra-Taliban conflict.’

In April 2022, NRF claimed to have killed eight Taliban fighters in attacks on Taliban bases in the province. Taliban confirmed the clashes but denied casualties.

In October 2021, ISKP targeted Taliban forces in Faryab Province. According to the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, smaller ISKP covert cells were thought to be present in Faryab Province, as of April 2022.

Among civilian casualties reported by local media sources were children, tribal elders, a community representative, a cleric and other civilians. Perpetrators were unknown in all those incidents. Such incidents took place in Maimana City, and in Garziwan.

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1006 UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, url, para. 20-21
1007 RFE/RL, Taliban’s Arrest Of Ethnic Uzbek Commander Sparks Clashes In Northern Afghanistan, 29 January 2022, url
1008 Hasht-e Subh, Clashes Among Taliban in Faryab: One Civilian Killed and Another Wounded, 14 January 2022, url
1009 ISW, Afghanistan in Review January 3 – January 25, 2022, url
1010 Hasht-e Subh, NRF Forces Claim to Have Killed 8 Taliban Rebels in Faryab, 22 April 2022, url
1011 ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (16–22 October 2021), 27 October 2021, url
1012 UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, url, para. 71
1013 Hasht-e Subh, Unidentified Gunmen Kill Young Boy in Faryab, 26 February 2022, url: Hasht-e Subh, A Child Killed in Faryab Province, 22 December 2021, url
1015 Pajhwok Afghan News, A Mosque Cleric Killed in Afghanistan’s Faryab Province, 29 October 2021, url
1016 Pajhwok Afghan News, Last week deadliest since regime change last year, 23 April 2022, url: Pajhwok Afghan News, Civilian casualties witness rise in Afghanistan last week, 3 April 2022, url: Pajhwok Afghan News, Acting Taliban govt continues to face positive, negative reactions, 2 October 2021, url: Pajhwok Afghan News, Power utility worker gunned down in Faryab, 12 September 2021, url
1017 Pajhwok Afghan News, Community rep killed in Faryab, woman in Badghis, 2 March 2022, url
1018 Pajhwok Afghan News, Civilian casualties witness rise in Afghanistan last week, 3 April 2022, url: Hasht-e Subh, A Man Murdered with Scissors in Faryab Province, 28 March 2022, url: Pajhwok Afghan News, 30 people suffer casualties in Afghanistan last week, 12 February 2022, url
Dawlatabad\textsuperscript{1020} Khan-e Char Bagh\textsuperscript{1021} Kohestan\textsuperscript{1022} Qaysar\textsuperscript{1023} and Almar\textsuperscript{1024} districts. Bodies were recovered in Pashtunkot\textsuperscript{1025} Andkhoy\textsuperscript{1026} and Khan-e Char Bagh\textsuperscript{1027} districts, and in Mainana\textsuperscript{1028} Thus, in September 2021, an employee of Da Afghanistan Breshna Shirkat (DABS), a state-owned electricity company,\textsuperscript{1029} was killed by unknown armed men. According to a hospital source the victim ‘had been beheaded, stabbed four times in the stomach and hit with a bullet as well.’\textsuperscript{1030} On 28 October 2021, a religious scholar was killed in Almar District. The Taliban reportedly arrested a man thought to be involved in the killing.\textsuperscript{1031} In December 2021, a 22-year-old man was killed by unknown perpetrators in Pashtunkot District. Hasht-e Subh noted that the rate of killings had increased in different provinces recently. In most cases, the motives were unclear, with no claims of responsibility.\textsuperscript{1032} On 14 January 2022, a tribal elder was killed by unknown gunmen in Kohestan District. According to the victim’s son he was shot while preparing for Friday prayers.\textsuperscript{1033} On 28 March 2022, a man was killed with scissors in Garziwan District on unknown motive. Taliban members arrested the alleged perpetrator.\textsuperscript{1034}

4.9.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

According to UNOCHA, Faryab is one of the eight provinces ‘with the highest priority’ for United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) survey,\textsuperscript{1035} as an area ‘where threats of improvised mines have been reported as a result of recent conflicts.’\textsuperscript{1036} In March 2022 at least three children were killed and six injured when unexploded ordnances detonated in four Afghan provinces, including in Faryab.\textsuperscript{1037} In April 2022, five children were killed after playing with unexploded ordnance.\textsuperscript{1038}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
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\bibitem{1021} Pajhwok Afghan News, 28 people suffer casualties in Afghanistan last week, 20 March 2022, url
\bibitem{1022} Pajhwok Afghan News, Govt organizes conference amid focus on economic rehabilitation, 22 January 2022, url
\bibitem{1023} Hasht-e Subh, A Child Killed in Faryab Province, 22 December 2022, url
\bibitem{1024} Hasht-e Subh, A Mosque Cleric Killed in Afghanistan’s Faryab Province, 29 October 2021, url
\bibitem{1025} Pajhwok Afghan News, 115 people killed, injured in Afghanistan last week, 30 April 2022, url: Hasht-e Subh, A 22-Year-Old Young Man Mysteriously Killed in Faryab Province, 4 December 2021, url
\bibitem{1026} Hasht-e Subh, Young Man Killed in Faryab, 8 February 2022, url
\bibitem{1027} Hasht-e Subh, Increase in Mysterious Murders: Another Young Man’s Body Found in Faryab, 25 January 2022, url
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\bibitem{1029} DABS, Home, n.d., url
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\bibitem{1032} Hasht-e Subh, A 22-Year-Old Young Man Mysteriously Killed in Faryab Province, 4 December 2021, url
\bibitem{1033} Pajhwok Afghan News, Tribal elder shot dead in Faryab, 2 suspects detained, 15 January 2022, url
\bibitem{1034} Hasht-e Subh, A Man Murdered with Scissors in Faryab Province, 28 March 2022, url
\bibitem{1035} As of January 2022, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was to conduct ‘a village-by-village landmine/explosive impact survey across the country’. UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Response Plan 2022, 11 January 2022, url, pp. 78-79
\bibitem{1036} UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Response Plan 2022, 11 January 2022, url, pp. 78-79
\bibitem{1037} ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (5–11 March 2022), 16 March 2022, url
\bibitem{1038} AP, Death toll in Afghan mosque bombing rises to 33, Taliban say, 23 April 2022, url
\end{thebibliography}
(a) Displacement and returns

According to UNOCHA figures,\textsuperscript{1039} 504 persons were displaced due to conflict from Almar District and 63 persons from Khwajasabzposh District to Herat Province between mid-August and end of September 2021.\textsuperscript{1040} UNOCHA recorded no displacement movements in or out of the province from January to the beginning of May 2022.\textsuperscript{1041}

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 57,697 IDP arrivals in Faryab Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. According to IOM, 438,966 IDPs and 8,843 persons from abroad returned to Faryab during that period, while 64,185 persons moved abroad.\textsuperscript{1042} In a January 2022 report IOM noted that Faryab had been identified as the top province, ‘where IDPs have returned after August 2021 after being displaced at any prior time.’ The province ranked third among the provinces in which the most individuals returned from abroad to their communities of origin since August 2021.\textsuperscript{1043} From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 10,856 returns from Iran and 85 from Pakistan to Faryab Province.\textsuperscript{1044}

4.10. Ghazni

Ghazni Province is located in the south-east of Afghanistan\textsuperscript{1045} and is divided into the following districts: Abband (Ab Band), Ajrstan, Andar, Dehyak, Gelan, Giro, Jaghatu, Jaghuri, Khwajaumari (Khwaja Omari), Malestan, Muqur, Nawa, Nawur, Qarabagh, Rashidan, Waghaz, Wali Muhammad Shahid (Khugyani, Walmihammad-e Shahid), and Zanakhan.\textsuperscript{1046} The provincial capital is Ghazni City.\textsuperscript{1047}

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, the population of Ghazni Province was 1,411,380.\textsuperscript{1048} UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated the population as of January 2022 at 1.8 million.\textsuperscript{1049}

Ghazni is inhabited by Pashtuns (49 %) and Hazaras (46 %), with Jaghuri, Malistan and Nawur Districts being almost entirely populated by Hazara.\textsuperscript{1050} Tajiks (4.5 %) and a small community of

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1039} Data cover period between 15 August 2021 and 30 November 2021 and between 1 January 2022 and 10 May 2022. UNOCHA does not provide data for December 2021. 
\textsuperscript{1040} UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022url. 
\textsuperscript{1041} UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022. url. 
\textsuperscript{1042} IOM, Afghanistan - Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November – December 2021), 2 March 2022, url, p. 3 
\textsuperscript{1043} IOM, Afghanistan — Emergency Event Tracking Round 3 (1 - 19 December 2021), 21 January 2022, url, pp. 2-3 
\textsuperscript{1044} UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Faryab Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, url, p. 2. Set filter to Faryab. 
\textsuperscript{1045} UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Ghazni Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, url, p. 1. Set filter to Ghazni. 
\textsuperscript{1046} Taliban de facto government in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, p. 45; UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Ghazni Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url, p. 2 
\textsuperscript{1047} Taliban de facto government in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, p. 45 
\textsuperscript{1048} Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, p. 45 
\textsuperscript{1049} UNOCHA, Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 46 
\textsuperscript{1050} Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen Ambtsbericht Afghanistan, March 2022, url, p. 24}
Hindu/Sikhs (0.4%) were further reported to be living in the province. No further information about the ethnic composition in Farah Province after the Taliban takeover could be found.

4.10.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 31 security incidents in Ghazni Province, 17 of which were coded as ‘violence against civilians,’ 9 as ‘explosions/remote violence,’ and 5 as ‘battles.’

In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded three conflict incidents resulting in two civilian fatalities in Ghazni Province. According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province resulted in 27 fatalities. The most affected districts were Ghazni (20 security incidents) and Giro (5 security incidents).

ACLED attributed 14 security incidents to Taliban forces, of which 13 were coded as ‘violence against civilians.’ Human Rights Watch documented the cases of 23 former members of the Afghan security forces or government-affiliated militia from several districts in Ghazni Province who were detained by the Taliban in August 2021 and subsequently killed. According to Taliban sources, these men had been issued an amnesty in their districts, but chose to still fight the Taliban, which is why a Taliban court ordered their execution. In January 2022, the deputy head of the Journalists Association in Ghazni Province was detained by Taliban forces and severely beaten after he had refused to turn over his mobile phone for investigation.

According to ACLED, ten security incidents were attributed to unidentified armed groups, among them two were armed clashes with the Taliban and others involved the use of remote violence and abductions targeting civilians. On 12 May 2022, a woman was killed and her daughter injured by unknown gunmen in Jaghori District. According to a local source, the woman’s husband was a friend of the local Taliban and had recently hosted them at their home. According to Pajhwok Afghan News in December 2021, residents of Ghazni Province reported a rise in kidnappings since the Taliban takeover, with four cases reported within three months. According to Salam Watandar, on 10 February 2022, head of the Faculty of Sharia at the Ghazni University, who had been abducted by unknown perpetrators four

1051 US, NPS, Ghazni Provincial Overview, n.d., url
1052 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
1053 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. For an explanation of how UCDP records events and fatalities, please refer to the Sources section in the introduction of this report.
1054 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
1055 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
1056 HRW, “No forgiveness for people like you”, 30 November 2021, url
1057 Pajhwok Afghan News, Ghazni journalist detained, severally beaten, 19 January 2022, url
1058 Etilaat Roz, [Armed attack in Jaghori, Ghazni – woman was killed and her daughter injured], 14 May 2022, url
1059 Pajhwok Afghan News, Kidnapping incidents must stop: Ghazni residents, 12 December 2021, url
months before, was found dead. In May 2022, three brothers were kidnapped by unidentified gunmen in Jaghori District.

Furthermore, ACLED attributed five incidents to Afghanistan Liberation Front, which claimed targeting Taliban fighters, either through the use of explosives or in direct attacks.

In October 2021, land disputes led to tribal and ethnic tensions in the centre of Ghazni Province and to the displacement of local Hazara. Afghan local news sources further reported on tensions over land in the spring season of 2022, when Kuchi nomads traditionally travel through the province with their livestock. Thus, Kuchi nomads reportedly invaded fields of residents in Malistan and Jaghori districts with their livestock. In June 2022, Taliban reported that following tensions over grazing land, nomads opened gunfire at local residents in Nawur District.

4.10.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

UNOCHA recorded 273 displacements from Ghazni Province from mid-August 2021 to November 2021, 210 of them to Kabul Province and 91 to Herat Province. There were no displacement movements recorded in or out of the province by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022.

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 27,450 IDP arrivals in Ghazni Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. According to IOM, 672 IDPs and 1,082 persons from abroad returned to Ghazni during that period, while 26,832 persons moved abroad. From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 11,733 returns from Iran and 347 returns from Pakistan to the province.

No further information on the impact of the conflict on the civilian population was found within the time constraints of this report.

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1060 Salam Watandar, Ghazni University’s head of Sharia Faculty found dead, 10 February 2022, url
1061 Hasht-e Subh, Three Brothers Kidnapped in Jaghuri, Ghazni from a Village Where ISKP Used to Harass People Since 2015, 17 May 2022, url
1062 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
1063 International Crisis Group, Crisiswatch: Tracking Conflict Worldwide, n.d., url; Filter set to Afghanistan
1064 Hasht-e Subh, Nomads and the Villagers Unresolved Issues: Nomads Enter Jaghori and Malistan Districts, Ghazni, 24 April 2022, url; Hasht-e Subh, Kuchis Plunder Property and Harass the Residents in Nahur District, Ghazni Province, 16 May 2022, url
1065 Etilaat Roz, به ولسوالی شهرستان دایکندی، هجوم کوچی‌های «مسلح» به وسایل شهرستان دایکندی[Armed Kuchi attack in Shahrestan district of Daykundi], 29 April 2022, url
1066 Hasht-e Subh, نتیجه بررسی هیات طالبان از ولسوالی ناور غزنه، کوچی‌های زورگویی می‌کنند[Result from the Taliban delegation in Nawur district in Ghazni – Oppression by Kuchi nomads], 14 June 2022, url
1067 Data cover period between 15 August 2021 and 30 November 2021 and between 1 January 2022 and 10 May 2022. UNOCHA does not provide data for December 2021.
1068 UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022, url
1069 UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022, url
1070 IOM, Afghanistan – Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November - December 2021), 2 March 2022, url, p. 3
4.11. Ghor

Ghor Province is located in the western part of central Afghanistan and is divided into the following districts: Chighcheran (Chagcharan), Charsada, Dawlatyar, Du Layna (Duleena), Lal Wa Sarjangal, Pasaband, Saghar, Shahrak, Taywara, Tulak and Murghab. The provincial capital of Ghor is Chagcharan, which is also known by the name Firozkoh.

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, the population of Ghor Province was 791,480. This estimation is the result of calculations based on the 2003-2005 census. UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated the population as of January 2022 at 1 million.

The ethnic makeup of the province mostly consisted either of Hazara or Tajiks, with only small pockets of Pashtuns living in the province. No further information about the ethnic composition in Ghor Province after the Taliban takeover could be found.

4.11.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 21 security incidents in Ghor Province, 12 of which were coded as ‘violence against civilians,’ 5 as ‘battles,’ and 4 as ‘explosions/remote violence.’

In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded three incidents resulting in three civilian fatalities in Ghor Province. According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province resulted in 28 fatalities. The most affected districts were Chighcheran (11 security incidents) and Lal Wa Sar Jangal (three security incidents).

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1074 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, p. 82.
1075 Pajhwok Afghan News, Ghor widow begs for her children’s survival, 14 December 2021, Rukhshana Media, ‘We are among the most deprived’: Ghor orphanage closed due to lack of funding, 26 May 2022.
1076 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, p. 82.
1077 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022, 7 January 2022, p. 46.
1078 Acheson, B., Murky Militias in Forgotten Provinces Reveal Why Afghanistan War Isn’t Over, Diplomat (The), 20 January 2022, US, NPS, Ghor Provincial Overview, n.d.,
1079 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022.
1080 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. For an explanation of how UCDP records events and fatalities, please refer to the sources section in the introduction of this report.
ACLED attributed ten security incidents to Taliban forces, on which six were coded as ‘violence against civilians.’ Furthermore, ACLED recorded one armed clash between Taliban and ISKP fighters and one incident, in which NRF targeted the Taliban forces.\(^{1083}\)

Afghan media reported several incidents of targeted killings, such as the killing of a former government official in October 2021\(^{1084}\) as well as former members of the security forces.\(^{1085}\) In September 2021, eyewitnesses reported that a former policewoman was beaten and then shot dead by Taliban fighters in her home in the capital of central Ghor Province, while the Taliban denied being involved in the incident.\(^{1086}\) In April 2022, Taliban forces were further reported to have arrested former members of the security forces\(^{1087}\) as well as individuals they accused of being affiliated with or helping NRF.\(^{1088}\) On 25 June 2022, Taliban fighters killed a former anti-Taliban commander along with two female relatives in his house in Lal Wa Sarjangal District.\(^{1089}\) According to a statement by the Taliban, the group had originally intended to arrest the man. However, he resisted arrest and was killed in the ensuing armed clash.\(^{1090}\)

ACLED attributed to unidentified armed groups ten security incidents, nine of which were instances in which civilians were targeted/involved.\(^{1091}\) According to Pajhwok Afghan News, on 25 November 2021, a former police chief in Shahrak District was attacked and killed in his house by unknown gunmen.\(^{1092}\) On 17 March 2022, an IED planted in a motorcycle by unknown persons exploded in front of the Provincial Hospital in Ghor, injuring one person.\(^{1093}\)

\(^{1083}\) EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]

\(^{1084}\) Hasht-e Subh, Public Uprising Leader in Ghor Killed in an Armed Attack, 14 October 2021, [url]

\(^{1085}\) Etilaat Roz, [Taliban in Ghor: We killed a former popular uprising commander and five others in Lal Wa Sarjangal], 26 June 2022, [url]; APW, Weekly Brief Mar. 05 to Mar. 11, 2022, [url]; ANI, Former Afghan soldier killed in Ghor province, 14 March 2022, [url]; Pajhwok Afghan News, Former Ghor police officer killed home attack, 26 November 2021, [url]; BBC News, Afghanistan: Taliban accused of killing pregnant police officer, 5 September 2021, [url]; RFE/RL/Gandhara, Taliban Accused Of Killing Pregnant Female Police Officer, 5 September 2021, [url]

\(^{1086}\) BBC News, Afghanistan: Taliban accused of killing pregnant police officer, 5 September 2021, [url]; Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Rebels Arrest 4 Former Soldiers During House-to-House Search Operations in Ghor, 29 April 2022, [url]; Taliban Arrests the Former Regional Manager of National Directorate of Security for Ghor Province, 26 April 2022, [url]

\(^{1087}\) Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Rebels Arrest a Former Local Commander and His Nephew in Ghor, 29 April 2022, [url]; Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Arrests 6 Men for Helping the National Resistance Front in Ghor, 27 April 2022, [url]

\(^{1088}\) Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Kill Former Anti-taliban Commander Along With His Wife and Daughter in Ghor Province, 26 June 2022, [url]; Etilaat Roz, [Taliban kill former uprising commander along with his two daughters in Lal Wa Sarjangal district in Ghor], 26 June 2022, [url]; Aamaj News, Taliban shot two prisoners of war Ghor province, 27 June 2022, [url]

\(^{1089}\) Etilaat Roz, [Taliban in Ghor: We killed a former uprisi

\(^{1090}\) Aamaj News, Taliban shot two prisoners of war Ghor province, 27 June 2022, [url]

\(^{1091}\) EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]

\(^{1092}\) Pajhwok Afghan News, Former Ghor police officer killed home attack, 26 November 2021, [url]

\(^{1093}\) Hasht-e Subh, Local Sources: A Blast Leaves One Injured in Ghor Province, 17 March 2022, [url]
4.11.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

According to UNOCHA, Ghor is one of the eight provinces ‘with the highest priority’ for UNMAS survey, as an area ‘where threats of improvised mines have been reported as a result of recent conflicts.’

(a) Displacement and returns

UNOCHA recorded 7,339 displacements from Ghor Province from mid-August 2021 to November 2021, more than half of which to neighbouring Herat Province, the rest mostly within the province and a few to Badghis Province. There were no displacement movements recorded in or out of the province by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022.

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 27,168 IDP arrivals in Ghor Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. According to IOM, 23,310 IDPs and 46 persons from abroad returned to Ghor during that period, while 24,139 persons moved abroad. From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 10,989 returns from Iran to the province.

4.12. Helmand

Helmand is located in southern Afghanistan and has an international border with Pakistan. The province is divided into the following districts: Nad Ali, Nawa-e-Barikzai (Nawa-e-Barikzaï, Nawa), Nahr-e Saraj, Washer, Garm Ser (Garmser), Nawzad, Sangin, Musa Qala (Musaqalah), Kajaki, Reg-e-Khan Nishin (Reg), Baghran, Dishu (Deh-e-Shu), Lashkargah, Marja (temporary district), and Nawamish. The provincial capital is Lashkargah.

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, the population of Helmand Province was 1,498,480. UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated the province’s population at 1,900,000 as of January 2022.
An undated profile by NPS listed Pashtuns as the majority ethnic group. A Baluch minority was reportedly inhabiting the south, mainly Dishu and Garm Ser districts, and a Hazara minority inhabits the north. No further information about the ethnic composition in Helmand Province after the Taliban takeover could be found within the time constraints of this report.

4.12.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 49 security incidents in Helmand Province, 20 of which were coded as ‘explosions/remote violence’, 16 as ‘violence against civilians,’ and 13 as ‘battles.’

In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded one security-related event in Helmand Province, which did not result in civilian deaths. According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province resulted in 57 fatalities. The most affected districts were Lashkargah (16 security incidents), Nahr-e Saraj (10 security incidents), and Nad Ali (9 security incidents).

ACLED attributed 12 security incidents to Taliban forces, including nine incidents involving civilians. According to Hasht-e Subh, on 29 November 2021, a teenager was killed by Taliban forces after criticising the non-payment of teachers’ salaries, his family claimed. Previously, on 25 November 2021, Taliban forces had stormed the family’s house and taken the teenager away. In March 2022, Taliban members killed a former government police officer who had previously served in Lashkargah City. Before being killed, the man was arrested and tortured by Taliban members. Also in March 2022, a soldier of the former National Security Directorate (NDS) reportedly claimed that he had been abducted and tortured by Taliban forces in Lashkargah before being released on bail after several days of detention.

As recorded by ACLED based on Afghan media sources, ‘National Liberation Front of Afghanistan claimed killing two Taliban commanders in Nahr-e Saraj’ district.
In the reference period, sources reported that civilians were killed in Nawa, Garm Ser, Nawzad, Washer, and Nahr-e Saraj districts and in Lashkargah City. In some of the cases, the perpetrators were unknown, while in other cases suspects were arrested. On 20 February 2022, unidentified gunmen killed two civilians in Kakaran village of Nawa District and injured another. The victims had been shopkeepers who were on their way back from a party. On 11 March 2022 a businessman was killed in the Pirabad area of Washer District; three suspects were arrested. On 13 March 2022, one civilian was killed, and four others injured in a hand grenade attack in Kashak village in Nawzad District, after a verbal dispute between the house owner and the attacker. Security forces later detained the attacker. On 26 April 2022, one person was killed and four others were injured in a clash between two families over water sources in Adamzoy village in Lashkargah. The Taliban arrested one person.

According to Pajhwok Afghan News, on 27 January 2022, three civilians were injured in a bomb blast in Nad Ali District and on 26 January 2022, one child was killed and two others injured in a mortar shell blast in Nahr-e Saraj District.

On 30 March 2022, a Taliban weapons depot at Shurab Airport was targeted in an alleged US airstrike. According to local witnesses, 30 Taliban members were killed. Taliban denied reports of an airstrike and claimed that they had detonated old mines on purpose.

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114 Pajhwok Afghan News, Man found dead after going missing in Helmand, 17 March 2022, url
115 Pajhwok Afghan News, 1 killed, 4 wounded in Helmand hand grenade attack, 13 March 2022, url
116 Pajhwok Afghan News, Man beheaded, 2 suspects detained in Helmand, 23 March 2022, url: Hasht-e Subh, Local Sources: A Businessman Mysteriously Murdered in Helmand, 13 March 2022, url
117 Pajhwok Afghan News, Young man’s body found in Helmand’s Greshk district, 26 January 2022, url
118 Hasht-e Subh, Dispute Over Water Sources Leaves One Dead and Four Injured in Helmand Province, 27 April 2022, url: Pajhwok Afghan News, Afghanistan casualties fall to all-time low last week, 5 December 2021, url
119 Pajhwok Afghan News, Man shot dead by unknown gunmen in Helmand, 27 March 2022, url: Pajhwok Afghan News, 2 gunned down, 1 injured in Helmand gun attack, 21 February 2022, url: Pajhwok Afghan News, Young man’s body found in Helmand’s Greshk district, 26 January 2022, url
120 Hasht-e Subh, Dispute Over Water Sources Leaves One Dead and Four Injured in Helmand Province, 27 April 2022, url: Pajhwok Afghan News, Man beheaded, 2 suspects detained in Helmand, 23 March 2022, url: Pajhwok Afghan News, Man found dead after going missing in Helmand, 17 March 2022, url: Hasht-e Subh, Local Sources: A Businessman Mysteriously Murdered in Helmand, 13 March 2022, url: Pajhwok Afghan News, 1 killed, 4 wounded in Helmand hand grenade attack, 13 March 2022, url: Pajhwok Afghan News, Afghanistan casualties fall to all-time low last week, 5 December 2021, url
121 Hasht-e Subh, Gunmen Opened Fire; 2 Killed in Helmand, 21 February 2022, url
122 Hasht-e Subh, Local Sources: A Businessman Mysteriously Murdered in Helmand, 13 March 2022, url
123 Pajhwok Afghan News, 1 killed, 4 wounded in Helmand hand grenade attack, 13 March 2022, url
124 Hasht-e Subh, Dispute Over Water Sources Leaves One Dead and Four Injured in Helmand Province, 27 April 2022, url
125 Pajhwok Afghan News, 3 people injured in Helmand’s Nad Ali district blast, 28 January 2022, url
126 Modern Diplomacy, Taliban’s Islamic Emirate came under the US Airstrike O’er, 7 April 2022, url
127 Hasht-e Subh, U.S. Airstrike on a Weapons Depot Kills 30 Taliban Militants in Helmand Province, 8 April 2022, url
128 TOLOnews, Islamic Emirate Denies Reports of US Airstrike in Helmand, 8 April 2022, url
4.12.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

According to UNOCHA, Helmand is one of the eight provinces ‘with the highest priority’ for UNMAS survey,\textsuperscript{1129} as an area ‘where threats of improvised mines have been reported as a result of recent conflicts.’\textsuperscript{1130} According to Hasht-e Subh, on 11 March 2022, seven persons, including five children, were injured in Marja District in an unexploded ordnance blast.\textsuperscript{1131} Sources reported that on 1 April 2022, five children were killed and two others injured in Marjah District while they were playing with a rocket bullet as it exploded.\textsuperscript{1132}

According to Human Rights Watch, ‘Taliban and associated militias forcibly evicted hundreds of Hazara families from the southern Helmand Province’ early October 2021.\textsuperscript{1133}

(a) Displacement and returns

According to UNOCHA figures,\textsuperscript{1134} 371 persons were displaced due to conflict from the province between mid-August and October 2021, with 203 persons from Nawa-e-Barakzaiy District and 84 persons from Nahr-e-Saraj District. All persons were displaced to Herat Province.\textsuperscript{1135} There were no displacement movements in or out of the province recorded by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022.\textsuperscript{1136}

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 22 410 IDP arrivals in Helmand Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. According to IOM, 226 369 IDPs and 3 354 persons from abroad returned to Helmand during that period, while 2 874 persons moved abroad.\textsuperscript{1137} From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 4 685 returns from Iran and 1 254 from Pakistan to Helmand Province.\textsuperscript{1138}

4.13. Herat

Herat (Hirat) Province is located in the western part of Afghanistan and borders Iran to the west and Turkmenistan to the north.\textsuperscript{1139} The administrative districts of the province are Adraskan, Chisht-e-Sharif (Chishti Sharif), Fersi (Farsi), Ghoryan (Ghorian), Gulran (Golran),

\textsuperscript{1129} As of January 2022, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was to conduct ‘a village-by-village landmine/explosive impact survey across the country’. UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Response Plan 2022, 11 January 2022, \url{url}, pp. 78-79
\textsuperscript{1130} UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Response Plan 2022, 11 January 2022, \url{url}, pp. 78-79
\textsuperscript{1131} Hasht-e Subh, Blast in Helmand: Seven Members of a Family Are Injured, 12 March 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1132} Hasht-e Subh, Rocket Bullet Explosion Kills Five Children in Helmand Province, 1 April 2022, \url{url}; Pajhwok Afghan News, ERW blast leaves 5 children killed in Helmand province, 1 April 2022, \url{url}; UNICEF, Five children killed by an explosive remnant of war in Afghanistan, 2 April 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1133} HRW, Afghanistan: Taliban Forcibly Evict Minority Shia, 22 October 2021, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1134} Data cover period between 15 August 2021 and 30 November 2021 and between 1 January 2022 and 10 May 2022. UNOCHA does not provide data for December 2021.
\textsuperscript{1135} UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1136} UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1137} IOM, Afghanistan – Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November - December 2021), 2 March 2022, \url{url}, p. 3
\textsuperscript{1138} UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Hilmand Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, \url{url}, p. 2. Set filter to Hilmand.
\textsuperscript{1139} UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Hirat Province – District Atlas, April 2014, \url{url}, p. 2
Guzera (Gozareh, Nizam-e Shahid), Injil (Enjil), Herat, Karukh (Karrukh), Kohsan, Kushk (Robat-e Sangi), Kushk-e Kuhna, Obe (Obeh), Pashtun Zarghun, and Zinda Jan (Zendahjan). As of April 2022, NSIA described Shindand, Poshtko (Pushhtko), Koh-e Zore (Kozeor), Zawol, and Zerko as ‘temporary’ districts of Herat Province. The provincial capital is Herat City.

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, Herat Province has a population of 2,234,660. UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated the population as of January 2022 at 2.8 million.

According to an undated provincial profile by Pajhwok Afghan News, Herat was inhabited by Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Turkmen, Uzbeks and Aimaqs. Pashtuns represented the majority in eleven of the fifteen districts. In 2015, it was estimated that Shia Hazaras might constitute up to a fourth of the urban population of the province.

In July 2013 AAN noted that the population of Herat City was largely composed of ‘either Sunni or Shia Farsiwans’ (Persian speakers), with Sunni Farsiwans tending to identify as Tajiks. In 2013 and 2015, it was reported that Herat City had a significant Pashtun minority. In 2015 it was reported that Hazara and Aimaq ethnic groups were also living in Herat City. In 2019, it was reported that the share of Hazaras had been increasing since 2001, due to repatriation from Iran and displacement from central provinces of Afghanistan. No information about the ethnic composition in Herat after the Taliban takeover could be found.

4.13.1. Recent security trends

In a June 2022 report, the UN Secretary-General identified Herat Province as one of the four most conflict-affected provinces in Afghanistan in the period between 1 January and 21 May 2022. In March and April 2022, ACLED reported that, since the Taliban takeover in August 2021, civilians in Herat Province were confronted with violence coming from unidentified...
armed groups and Taliban forces. Furthermore, violence in the province was described as ‘common’ and the situation as ‘highly volatile’.\textsuperscript{1152}

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 33 security incidents in Herat Province, 21 of which were coded as ‘violence against civilians,’ 7 as ‘battles,’ and 5 as ‘explosions/remote violence.’\textsuperscript{1153}

As recorded by ACLED, 23 of 33 incidents recorded in Herat Province occurred in Herat District, resulting in 45 of the 49 fatalities recorded in the province.\textsuperscript{1154} UCDP recorded 4 of overall 6 security-related incidents and 19 out of 32 overall civilian deaths which occurred between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022 in Herat District.\textsuperscript{1155}

ACLED attributed to Taliban forces 14 security incidents, 12 of which were classified as incidents of ‘violence against civilians.’\textsuperscript{1156} Since the Taliban takeover, reportedly up to 500 members of the previous government were killed by Taliban forces in various Afghan provinces, including Herat.\textsuperscript{1157} During the reference period, detentions, and alleged killings by Taliban forces of people working for the former government were reported in Herat Province.\textsuperscript{1158} On 2 October 2021, the head of the women’s prison in Herat went missing after she had responded to a Taliban request to come to work. As of April 2022, she remained missing.\textsuperscript{1159} Reportedly, she had been working as a police officer for the previous government for a period of 17 years. The person’s family had asked Taliban de facto authorities to investigate in her disappearance but was informed that the Taliban considered it ‘a family matter and will not intervene.’\textsuperscript{1160} In early May 2022, a former NDS officer was killed by the Taliban in Herat Province.\textsuperscript{1161} In mid-February 2022, a former police officer and two civilians were reportedly hanged by Taliban forces in Herat City after being shot dead for allegedly

\textsuperscript{1152} ACLED, Regional Overview: South Asia and Afghanistan 26 March-1 April 2022, 6 April 2022, \url{url}; ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (19–25 February 2022), 3 March 2022, \url{url}.

\textsuperscript{1153} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url{url}.

\textsuperscript{1154} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url{url}.

\textsuperscript{1155} EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022.

\textsuperscript{1156} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url{url}.

\textsuperscript{1157} Marcolini, B., Sohail, S., and Stockton, A., The Taliban Promised Them Amnesty. Then They Executed Them, New York Times (The) [Map], 12 April 2022, \url{url}.

\textsuperscript{1158} Germany, BAMF, Briefing Notes, 9 May 2022, \url{url}, p. 1; ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (19–25 February 2022), 3 March 2022, \url{url}; Hasht-e Subh, A Former Security Forces Member and Health Worker Killed and Burnt Brutally in Herat Province, 31 March 2022, \url{url}; Hasht-e Subh, Ex-Police Chief of Tywarah District Assassinated in Herat, 25 January 2022, \url{url}; Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Murders a Former Soldier in Herat Province, 2 May 2022, \url{url}.

\textsuperscript{1159} AI, There is a window of opportunity to negotiate for the rights of Afghan women, but it is rapidly closing, 1 April 2022, \url{url}; HRW, Afghanistan: Herat Women’s Prison Head Missing 6 Months, 20 April 2022, \url{url}.

\textsuperscript{1160} HRW, Afghanistan: Herat Women’s Prison Head Missing 6 Months; Taliban Should Investigate Alia Azizi’s ‘Disappearance,’ Report Whereabouts, 20 April 2022, \url{url}.

\textsuperscript{1161} Germany, BAMF, Briefing Notes, 9 May 2022, \url{url}, p. 1; Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Murders a Former Soldier in Herat Province, 2 May 2022, \url{url}.
planning to kidnap a businessman. The officer’s body was later driven around by the Taliban in the city.\textsuperscript{1662}

In March 2022, the International Crisis Group reported that the Taliban had expanded their security operations against NRF, launched initially in the north of the country, to several other regions and provinces, including Herat Province.\textsuperscript{1663} In May and June 2022, the Taliban reportedly carried out house raids in Herat Province.\textsuperscript{1664} Residents complained about the disrespect of the house’s privacy and harassment of the house owners by Taliban forces. The raids reportedly aimed at ‘looking for former army soldiers and residents from the northern provinces of the country, including Panjshir.’\textsuperscript{1665}

With reference to local media reports, a FP article of October 2021 mentioned that more than 40 businessmen were kidnapped in Herat Province, Balkh Province and other regions within the two months that followed the Taliban takeover.\textsuperscript{1666} In late September 2021, it was reported that the Taliban had hanged the bodies of four alleged kidnappers in Herat City after they had shot them dead.\textsuperscript{1667} The men had allegedly kidnapped a businessman and his son, who were rescued according to Taliban sources.\textsuperscript{1668}

ACLED attributed to ISKP four security incidents, resulting in 29 fatalities.\textsuperscript{1669} ISKP carried out a number of attacks in Herat Province,\textsuperscript{1670} with some of the attacks targeting the Hazara Shia community.\textsuperscript{1671} A January 2022 attack on a vehicle carrying civilians in the Haji Abbas Shia Hazara neighbourhood was reportedly ‘the first attack of its kind’ carried out by ISKP since the Taliban takeover of the province.\textsuperscript{1672} The attack reportedly killed at least seven\textsuperscript{1673} and injured ten people. Women and children were among the civilian victims.\textsuperscript{1674} Furthermore, on first April 2022, two landmines planted by ISKP exploded in the township of Jibraiel in Injil District, ‘one of the Hazara-dominated areas’ of Herat, killing between 5 to 12 people\textsuperscript{1675} and injuring at least

\textsuperscript{1662} Etilaat Roz, [Field court: An Afghan officer educated in Turkey was shot dead], 23 February 2022, url: ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (19–25 February 2022), 3 March 2022, url

\textsuperscript{1663} International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch: Tracking Conflict Worldwide, n.d., url

\textsuperscript{1664} Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Seizes an Illegal Depot of Weapons in Herat Province, 18 May 2022, url; Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Restarts House-to-House Search Operations in Herat, 21 May 2022, url; Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Launches House-to-House Searches in Herat, Asking Money and Weapons from Former Regime Members, 16 June 2022, url

\textsuperscript{1665} Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Restarts House-to-House Search Operations in Herat, 21 May 2022, url

\textsuperscript{1666} FP, Afghan Crime Wave Adds to Taliban Dystopia, 29 October 2021, url

\textsuperscript{1667} BBC News, Afghanistan: Taliban hang bodies as warning in city of Herat, 25 September 2021, url; Guardian (The), Taliban publicly display bodies of alleged kidnappers in Herat, 25 September 2021, url

\textsuperscript{1668} BBC News, Afghanistan: Taliban hang bodies as warning in city of Herat, 25 September 2021, url

\textsuperscript{1669} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url

\textsuperscript{1670} Hasht-e Subh, The Death Toll of Explosion in Jibraiel Township, Anjil District, Herat Rises to Five, 6 April 2022, url; DW, Afghanistan: Bomb blasts at playing field kill several in Herat, 2 April 2022, url; Germany, BAMF, Briefing Notes, 24 January 2022, url, p. 1; Hasht-e Subh, ISKP Claims Responsibility for a Deadly Attack in Herat, 24 January 2022, url

\textsuperscript{1671} Hasht-e Subh, ISKP Claims Responsibility for a Deadly Attack in Herat, 24 January 2022, url; Hasht-e Subh, The Death Toll of Explosion in Jibraiel Township, Anjil District, Herat Rises to Five, 6 April 2022, url

\textsuperscript{1672} Hasht-e Subh, ISKP Claims Responsibility for a Deadly Attack in Herat, 24 January 2022, url

\textsuperscript{1673} Al Jazeera, Several killed in bus blast in western Afghanistan, 22 January 2022, url; ACLED, Regional Overview: South Asia and Afghanistan 26 March-1 April 2022, 6 April 2022, url; Hasht-e Subh, ISKP Claims Responsibility for a Deadly Attack in Herat, 24 January 2022, url

\textsuperscript{1674} Hasht-e Subh, ISKP Claims Responsibility for a Deadly Attack in Herat, 24 January 2022, url

\textsuperscript{1675} Hasht-e Subh, The Death Toll of Explosion in Jibraiel Township, Anjil District, Herat Rises to Five, 6 April 2022, url; TOLOnews [Twitter], posted on 1 April 2022, url
23 others. Reportedly, the explosions occurred on a playground, which had recently been demined according to Taliban sources. The explosives were buried in the ground and the explosions were triggered by young people who were playing.

With reference to statements made by a Shia leader in October 2021 in Herat, the US Department of State (USDOS) reported that the members of the Hazara community in Herat were provided with guns by the Taliban to protect Shia religious sites.

ACLED attributed to unidentified armed groups 15 security incidents, including nine incidents coded as ‘violence against civilians’ and three as ‘explosions/remote violence,’ resulting in overall 11 fatalities.

### 4.13.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

According to UNOCHA, 14,352 persons were displaced due to conflict from mid-August to October 2021 within Herat Province. There were no displacement movements in the province recorded by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022. In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 48,938 IDP arrivals in Herat Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021 with 68% of the IDPs arriving in rural communities.

According to IOM, 21,126 IDPs and 2,351 persons from abroad returned to Herat during that period, while 54,765 persons moved abroad. As of 19 December 2021, IOM reported that 35,485 persons had fled their communities to different parts of Herat Province and had not returned yet. Furthermore, IOM reported that the majority of IDPs arriving in Herat Province since August 2021 and continuing to reside there as of 19 December 2021 had arrived in Herat...

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1176 Hasht-e Subh, The Death Toll of Explosion in Jibraiel Township, Anjil District, Herat Rises to Five, 6 April 2022, url; TOLOnews [Twitter], posted on 1 April 2022, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Civilian casualties witness rise in Afghanistan last week, 3 April 2022, url
1177 International Crisis Group, Afghanistan, April 2022, url
1178 DW, Afghanistan: Bomb blasts at playing field kill several in Herat, 2 April 2022, url
1179 TOLONews [Twitter], posted on 1 April 2022, url
1181 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
1182 Data cover period between 15 August 2021 and 30 November 2021 and between 1 January 2022 and 10 May 2022. UNOCHA does not provide data for December 2021.
1183 UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022, url
1184 UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022, url
1185 IOM, Afghanistan — Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November - December 2021), 2 March 2022, url, p. 3
1186 IOM, Afghanistan — Emergency Event Tracking Round 3 - Herat Province (1 - 19 December 2021), 2 February 2022, url, p. 1
1187 IOM, Afghanistan — Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November - December 2021), 2 March 2022, url, p. 3; IOM, Afghanistan — Emergency Event Tracking Round 3 - Herat Province (1 - 19 December 2021), 2 February 2022, url, pp. 1, 3
From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 40,459 returns from Iran and 69 from Pakistan to Herat Province. No further information on the impact of the conflict on the civilian population was found within the time constraints of this report.

4.14. Jawzjan

Jawzjan Province is located in the northern part of Afghanistan and borders Turkmenistan in the north. The province is divided into the following districts: Aqcha (Aqchah), Darzab, Fayzabad (Faizabad), Khamyab, Khanqa, Khwajadukoh (Khwaja Dukoh), Mardyan, Mingajik, Qarqin, Quhtepa (Qush Tepa) and Shiberghan (Sheberghan). The provincial capital is Shiberghan.

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, Jawzjan Province has a population of 625,070. UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated the population as of January 2022 at 800,000.

The main ethnic groups in the province were Uzbeks and Turkmen. Other groups present included Pashtuns, Arabs, and Tajiks, as well as a varying number of Kuchi nomads. No further information about the ethnic composition in Jawzjan Province after the Taliban takeover could be found within the time constraints of this report.

4.14.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded nine security incidents in Jawzjan Province, seven of which were coded as ‘battles’ and two as ‘violence against civilians’.

In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded no security incidents in Jawzjan Province. According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province resulted in
28 fatalities. The most affected district was Sheberghan (five security incidents and 16 fatalities).\textsuperscript{199}

According to ACLED, between 26 March and 1 April 2022, AFF and Taliban clashed for the first time in Jawzjan.\textsuperscript{200} Between 9 and 15 April 2022, NRF attacked the Taliban in Jawzjan and three other provinces.\textsuperscript{201} On 17 May 2022 unidentified armed men attacked a Taliban convoy in Qushtepa District and killed five Taliban fighters and injured three others.\textsuperscript{202}

In October 2021, as reported by Pajhwok Afghan News, a bride was killed in the province and two other people were wounded, when a hand grenade was thrown at a wedding party.\textsuperscript{203}

In two of the nine security incidents recorded by ACLED civilians were involved, resulting in one fatality.\textsuperscript{204} In one case ethnic Turkmen and Uzbek groups were targeted, the other case involved the killing of a former militia member by Taliban forces. Early January 2022 clashes between Taliban forces and Turkmen troops were reported in Khamyab District. Three days earlier Taliban claimed that Turkmen border guards had killed a civilian and beaten another.\textsuperscript{205}

\textbf{4.14.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns}

In late November and early December 2021, sources quoted by Hash-e Subh reported that ethnic Uzbeks and Turkmen had accused Taliban fighters of helping Pashtuns to seize their homes and land in Qushtepa District. More than 1 000 people were reported to have been forcibly evicted, according to claims.\textsuperscript{206} Residents in Qushtepa District claimed that their ‘homes and thousands of acres of land have been confiscated by Kochis [Kuchis], and that local Taliban officials have detained protesters.’ Taliban rejected the claims.\textsuperscript{207}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{(a) Displacement and returns}
\end{itemize}

UNOCHA\textsuperscript{1208} recorded no IDP movements in Jawzjan Province from mid-August 2021 to November 2021\textsuperscript{1209} or from January 2022 to the beginning of May 2022.\textsuperscript{1210} In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 23 535 IDP arrivals in Jawzjan Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. According to IOM, 34 858 IDPs and 1 269

\textsuperscript{199} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{200} ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (26 March – 1 April 2022), 6. April 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{201} ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (9–15 April 2022), 20 April 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{202} Hasht-e Subh, Armed Men Kill 5 Taliban Fighters in Jowzjan, 18 May 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{203} Pajhwok Afghan News, Last week was again deadliest for Afghans, 10 October 2021, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{204} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{205} Hasht-e Subh, A Clash among Taliban and Turkmen Forces in Jowzjan, 3 January 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{206} RFE/RL/Gandhara, Taliban Accused Of Forcibly Evicting Ethnic Uzbeks, Turkmen In Northern Afghanistan, 9 December 2021, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{207} Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Rejects the Forced Eviction of Jowzjan Residents, 30 November 2021, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{208} Data cover period between 15 August 2021 and 30 November 2021 and between 1 January 2022 and 10 May 2022. UNOCHA does not provide data for December 2021.
\textsuperscript{209} UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{210} UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022, \url{url}
persons from abroad returned to Jawzjan during that period, while 13,438 persons moved abroad.\textsuperscript{1211} From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 3,588 returns from Iran and 222 from Pakistan to Jawzjan Province.\textsuperscript{1212}

### 4.15. Kabul Province

Kabul Province is located in the central region of Afghanistan and is divided into the following 15 districts: Bagrami, Chahar Asyab (Chaharasayab), Dehsabz (Deh Sabz), Estalef, Farza, Guldara, Kabul, Kalakan, Khak-e Jabar, Mir Bacha Kot (Mirbachakot), Musahi (Musayi), Paghman, Qara Bagh (Qarabakh), Shakar Dara (Shakardara Dara), and Surubi (Surobi). The provincial capital is Kabul City, the capital of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{1213}

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, the population of Kabul Province is 5,572,630.\textsuperscript{1214} UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated the population as of January 2022 at 6.9 million.\textsuperscript{1215} With such numbers Kabul Province has the largest share of population of any province, an estimated 16%\textsuperscript{1216} to 16.5% of the national total.\textsuperscript{1217}

In an August 2019 AAN article, Scott Warden\textsuperscript{1218} described Kabul Province as the most ethnically diverse of all provinces. An undated website article of NPS listed Hazara, Tajik and Pashtun, among which the Pashtun Kuchi and Qizilbash, as major ethnic groups in the province.\textsuperscript{1220} No information about the ethnic composition in Kabul Province after the Taliban takeover could be found.

#### 4.15.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 226 security incidents in Kabul Province, 103 of which were coded as ‘violence against civilians,’ 72 as ‘explosions/remote violence’ and 51 as ‘battles,’ as shown in the graph below.\textsuperscript{1221}

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\textsuperscript{1211} IOM, Afghanistan – Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November - December 2021), 2 March 2022, \url{url}, p. 3
\textsuperscript{1212} UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Jawzjan Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, \url{url}, p. 2. Set filter to Jawzjan.
\textsuperscript{1213} Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, \url{url}, p. 11; UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Kabul Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, \url{url}, p. 1. Set filter to Kabul.
\textsuperscript{1214} Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, \url{url}, p. 8
\textsuperscript{1215} UNOCHA, Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022, 7 January 2022, \url{url}, p. 46
\textsuperscript{1216} Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, \url{url}, p. 11
\textsuperscript{1217} UNOCHA, Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022, 7 January 2022, \url{url}, p. 46
\textsuperscript{1218} “Scott Warden is Director of Afghanistan and Central Asia Programmes for the US Institute of Peace. He served as an international member of the Electoral Complaints Commission during the 2009 Afghanistan presidential elections”. Warden, S., Past as Prologue? What the Parliamentary Election Results Tell Us About the September Presidential Election, AAN, 23 August 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1219} Warden, S., Past as Prologue? What the Parliamentary Election Results Tell Us About the September Presidential Election, AAN, 23 August 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1220} US, NPS, Kabul Provincial Overview, n.d., \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1221} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url{url}
Kabul Province was the most conflict-affected region in terms of recorded security incidents and fatalities in the reference period according to ACLED data and in terms of civilian fatalities according to available data of UCDP.

As recorded by ACLED, 193 of the overall number of the security incidents in Kabul Province occurred in Kabul District, which resulted in 459 of 515 recorded fatalities. According to UCPD, 32 of 35 security incidents and 297 out of 298 civilian deaths documented in the reference period in Kabul Province occurred in Kabul District. Information on the security situation and details on the security incidents in Kabul District are covered in section 4.1 Kabul City. The following chapter focuses on the security incidents in the remaining districts of Kabul Province.

Most of the security incidents recorded by ACLED in the reference period, excluding Kabul District, were ‘battles’ (18 incidents resulting in 29 fatalities), followed by ‘violence against civilians’ (eight incidents resulting in 24 fatalities), and ‘explosions/remote violence’ (seven incidents resulting in three fatalities). Apart from Kabul District, ACLED recorded security incidents in Shakar Dara (7), Bagrami (6), Paghman (6), Qara Bagh (4), Mir Bacha Kot (3), Dehsabz (2), Surubi (2), Chahar Asyab (1), and Estalef (1) districts of Kabul Province.

According to ACLED, NRF was involved in nine security incidents, all of which were either armed clashes with the Taliban or attacks by NRF on the Taliban targets and resulted in 16

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1222 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]
1223 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]
1224 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. For an explanation of how UCDP records events and fatalities, please refer to the sources section in the introduction of this report.
1225 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]
1226 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022
1227 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]
fatalities. For all these incidents ACLED recorded Twitter as a source, with two incidents being also reported by local media.\textsuperscript{1228}

Next to clashes with NRF, ACLED recorded two attacks on Taliban targets claimed by NLFA, one by AFF, and one by the Afghan Liberation Movement.\textsuperscript{1229} On 2 May 2022, two Taliban members were reportedly killed in an attack on the road to Panwan Province in Qara Bagh District. According to Hasht-e Subh, NLFA claimed to be responsible for the attack.\textsuperscript{1230} On 7 June 2022, the Afghan Liberation Movement claimed an attack on Taliban intelligence director for Musahi District. As noted by ACLED, NRF ‘was also reported as claiming the attack, but NRF sources did not release any report about it.’\textsuperscript{1231}

Al Jazeera reported in August 2021 that ISKP, has established ‘sleeper cells in Kabul,' besides other provinces.\textsuperscript{1232} According to ACLED, 55 security incidents in Kabul Province were attributed to ISKP, with 52 of them recorded in Kabul District.\textsuperscript{1233} On 7 October 2021, it was reported that Taliban forces conducted an operation in Paghman District, capturing four members of ISKP.\textsuperscript{1234} On 18 November 2021, it was reported that Taliban security forces carried out an operation leading to the destruction of an ISKP sanctuary in Shakar Dara District. During the fighting between Taliban forces and ISKP members, which reportedly lasted five hours, two ISKP fighters were killed. No civilian fatalities were reported.\textsuperscript{1235}

ACLED attributed 53 security incidents to unidentified armed groups, with 46 of these incidents being recorded in Kabul District.\textsuperscript{1236} On 16 January 2022, an IED explosion by unknown perpetrators at a roadside in Bagrami District killed one child and led to the injury of four members of the Taliban security forces.\textsuperscript{1237} On 26 March 2022, a male dermatologist was abducted by unknown perpetrators on the highway between Kabul and Jalalabad.\textsuperscript{1238}

4.15.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

According to the UNOCHA 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan for Afghanistan published in January 2022, conflict-related injuries ‘mainly following suicide attacks, land/roadside mines and MIEDs [magnetic improvised explosive devices]’ were still prevalent in Afghanistan, and

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{EUAA}EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url{url}
\bibitem{AlJazeera}Al Jazeera, What we know about Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISIS-K), 27 August 2021, \url{url}
\bibitem{RFE/RL}RFE/RL/Gandhara, Taliban Claims Arrest Of Four Islamic State Militants Near Kabul, 6 October 2021, \url{url}; NDTV, Taliban Say Four Islamic State Members Captured Near Kabul, 7 October 2021, \url{url}
\bibitem{TOLONews}TOLONews, Daesh Sanctuary Destroyed in Kabul Province: Officials, 18 November 2021, \url{url}; Ariana News, IEA forces kill Daesh member in Kabul, 18 November 2021, \url{url}
\bibitem{ANI}ANI, Doctor abducted by unknown gunmen on Kabul-Jalalabad highway, 29 March 2022, \url{url}
\end{thebibliography}
Kabul Province was among the provinces with the highest numbers of trauma-related injury cases.\textsuperscript{1239} The UN Secretary General identified Kabul Province as one of the four most conflict-affected provinces in Afghanistan in the period between 19 August and 21 May 2022.\textsuperscript{1240}

On 21 October 2021, an explosion in the Qala Murad Beg neighbourhood of Shakardara District reportedly destroyed a power pylon and brought down electricity lines in Kabul Province leading to power outages in Kabul and other provinces.\textsuperscript{1241} Reportedly, ISKP claimed responsibility for the attack.\textsuperscript{1242} The power supply in the affected provinces was restored after four days.\textsuperscript{1243}

\textbf{(a) Displacement and returns}

According to UNOCHA Humanitarian Response Plan for Afghanistan published in January 2022, Kabul Province was one of the provinces with the highest number of IDPs.\textsuperscript{1244} According to UNOCHA\textsuperscript{1245}, the only displacement due to conflict that took place from Kabul Province was the displacement of 115 persons to Herat Province in August and September 2021, covered in the Kabul City section of his report. Between August and November 2021, 11 734 persons were arrived in Kabul District from other provinces: Panjsher (5 691 IDPs), Parwan (2 788 IDPs), Kapisa (1 666 IDPs), Wardak (1 029 IDPs), Daykundi (350 IDPs), and Ghazni (210 IDPs).\textsuperscript{1246} There were no displacement movements in the province recorded by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022.\textsuperscript{1247}

In a report on internal displacement figures in Kabul Province covering the period between August 2021 and 19 December 2021, IOM reported that 93 631 IDPs arrived in Kabul Province since August 2021 and continued to reside there.\textsuperscript{1248} Kabul District (74 169 IDPs) followed by Bagrami (5 628 IDPs) and Paghman (3 248 IDPs) districts were identified as the districts with the highest numbers of IDPs arriving in the province since August 2021, amounting to 83 045 or 89 % of the IDP arrivals in Kabul Province. According to IOM, 19 313 persons fled their communities to other places within Kabul Province or the country: 9 987 of them were displaced from Kabul District, 6 839 from Surobi District and less than 1 000 were displaced.

\textsuperscript{1239} UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Response Plan 2022, 11 January 2022, \url{}, p. 63
\textsuperscript{1241} France 24, Blast cuts power to Afghan capital Kabul, 21 October 2021, \url{}
\textsuperscript{1242} WION, Islamic State claims responsibility for causing Kabul power outage, 23 October 2021, \url{}; Hindustan Times (The), Power supply restored in Kabul, other Afghan provinces after ISIL bomb blast hit main line, 24 October 2021, \url{}
\textsuperscript{1243} Hindustan Times (The), Power supply restored in Kabul, other Afghan provinces after ISIL bomb blast hit main line, 24 October 2021, \url{}
\textsuperscript{1244} UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Response Plan 2022, 11 January 2022, \url{}, p. 49
\textsuperscript{1245} Data cover period between 15 August 2021 and 30 November 2021 and between 1 January 2022 and 10 May 2022. UNOCHA does not provide data for December 2021.
\textsuperscript{1246} UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022, \url{}
\textsuperscript{1247} UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022, \url{}
\textsuperscript{1248} IOM, Afghanistan – Emergency Event Tracking Round 3 – Kabul Province (1 - 19 December 2021), 2 February 2022, \url{}, p. 1
from Musahi District. IOM reported that 82 718 persons went from Kabul Province to other countries since August 2021 and have not returned yet, while 5 713 persons had returned from abroad to Kabul Province. From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 22 973 returns from Iran and 773 from Pakistan to Kabul Province.

4.16. Kandahar

The province of Kandahar is situated in the south of Afghanistan and borders Pakistan to the east and south. Kandahar is divided into the following administrative units: the provincial capital Kandahar, Arghandab, Daman, Panjwayee (Panjwayi), Zhire (Zheray), Shah Wali Kot, Khakrez, Arghistan, Ghorak, Maiwand (Maywand), Spin Boldak, Nesh, Miyanishin, Shorabak, Maruf, Reg (Shiga). As of April 2022, NSIA described Dand and Takhta Pul as temporary districts.

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, the population of Kandahar Province is 1 464 890. UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated the population as of January 2022 at 1.9 million.

The majority of Kandahar’s population is constituted by Pashtuns with the confederation of the Durrani Pashtuns being the largest one. The confederation was reportedly divided into the sub-confederations of Panjpayi and Zirak. There were also small groups of the Ghilzai Pashtuns. Parts of Kandahar’s desert were inhabited by the Baluch, who often followed a nomadic life. Hazaras and Tajiks are reportedly found mainly in urban areas of the province. A group of Persian speaking persons, usually referred to as Farsiwan,
4.16.1. Recent security trends

In a June 2022 report, the UN Secretary-General identified Kandahar Province as one of the four most conflict-affected provinces in Afghanistan in the period between 1 January and 21 May 2022.\footnote{UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/862-S/2022/485, 15 June 2022, url, para. 16}

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 67 security incidents in Baghlan Province, 35 of which were coded as ‘violence against civilians,’ 20 as ‘battles,’ and 12 as ‘explosions/remote violence,’ as shown in the graph below:\footnote{EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url}

![Graph showing security incidents in Kandahar Province from 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022.](image)

Figure 8. Kandahar Province - Evolution of security events coded as ‘battles’, ‘remote violence/explosions,’ and ‘violence against civilians’ from 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, based on ACLED data\footnote{EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url}

In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded six security incidents in Kandahar Province, leading to overall 65 civilian deaths, 63 of which resulted from one ISKP attack in October 2021.\footnote{EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. For an explanation of how UCDP records events and fatalities, please refer to the sources section in the introduction of this report.} According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province resulted in 142 fatalities. The most affected districts were Kandahar District (47), followed by Spin Boldak (8 security incidents).\footnote{EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. For an explanation of how UCDP records events and fatalities, please refer to the sources section in the introduction of this report.}

ACLED attributed to Taliban military forces 6 incidents coded as ‘battles’ and 20 incidents of ‘violence against civilians,’ which in total resulted in 34 fatalities.\footnote{EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url} In early September 2021, a
female doctor, and civil activist according to one source\(^{1269}\), was reportedly beaten by Taliban forces alongside her family members and a neighbour during a raid on her home in the night in search of the women’s brothers.\(^{1270}\) Reportedly, the doctor’s two brothers and her brother-in-law were subsequently arrested.\(^{1271}\) According to Hasht-e Subh, on 28 June 2022, it was reported that Taliban forces had opened fire on two civilians in Kandahar City and had injured them. The reason for the attack remained unknown.\(^{1272}\)

With reference to social media and local news outlets, ACLED reported that, on 29 November 2021, NRF conducted an attack on a checkpoint on a road in the third district of Kandahar City, killing at least two Taliban members and injuring civilians. AFF reportedly conducted six attacks on the Taliban targets, killing at least six Taliban members. NLFA reportedly attacked the Taliban on two instances, including by an IED, planted by the NLFA members in Senzelei village of Zhire District on 23 April 2022.\(^{1273}\)

ACLED attributed to unidentified armed groups 26 security incidents, resulting in 37 fatalities. These incidents were mostly attacks against civilians, and some were battles with Taliban forces. ISKP was attributed 5 security incidents in the province, consisting of 3 attacks on civilians, which caused 49 fatalities, and 2 battles with Taliban forces.\(^{1274}\)

In April 2022, ACLED and APW reported that ISKP, besides the regions it has traditionally concentrated its activities on, has also become active in Kandahar Province.\(^{1275}\) On 15 October 2021, the Bibi Fatima Mosque,\(^{1276}\) Kandahar City’s largest Hazara Shia mosque, was attacked by ISKP.\(^{1277}\) The attack was carried out by three suicide bombers who activated their explosives when they were surrounded by worshippers\(^{1278}\), killing at least 47\(^{1275}\) and wounding more than 80 people.\(^{1280}\) In November 2021, Taliban security officials stated that several ISKP

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\(^{1269}\) Hasht-e Subh, The Taliban Have allegedly Arrested Two Brothers and a Brother-in-Law of a Civil Activist in Kandahar, Afghanistan, 12 September 2021, url\(^{1269}\)
\(^{1270}\) KP, Female doctor in Kandahar claims to be beaten by Taliban, 12 September 2021, url\(^{1270}\)
\(^{1271}\) Hasht-e Subh, The Taliban Have allegedly Arrested Two Brothers and a Brother-in-Law of a Civil Activist in Kandahar, Afghanistan, 12 September 2021, url\(^{1271}\)
\(^{1272}\) Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Open Fire on Two Civilians in Kandahar, 28 June 2022, url\(^{1272}\)
\(^{1273}\) EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url\(^{1273}\)
\(^{1274}\) EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url\(^{1274}\)
\(^{1275}\) ACLED and APW, Tracking Disorder During Taliban Rule in Afghanistan, A Joint ACLED and APW Report, April 2022, url, p. 10; Giustozzi, A., How Much of a Threat is the Islamic State in Khorasan?, RUSI, 28 March 2022, url\(^{1275}\)
\(^{1276}\) WION, Islamic State claims responsibility for causing Kabul power outage, 23 October 2021, url; AAN, A Community Under Attack: How successive governments failed west Kabul and the Hazaras who live there, 17 January 2022, url; Tagesschau, Der Exodus der Hazara, 21 December 2021, url\(^{1276}\)
\(^{1278}\) AAN, A Community Under Attack: How successive governments failed west Kabul and the Hazaras who live there, 17 January 2022, url\(^{1278}\)
\(^{1279}\) WION, Islamic State claims responsibility for causing Kabul power outage, 23 October 2021, url; HRW, Afghanistan: Surge in Islamic State Attacks on Shia, 25 October 2021, url; Al Jazeera, Deadly explosion hits Shia mosque in Afghanistan’s Kandahar, 15 October 2021, url\(^{1279}\)
hideout had been destroyed by the Taliban in Kandahar Province. On 26 December 2022, four civilians, including a religious cleric, were reportedly injured when ISKP members attacked a Shia mosque in Kandahar City.

In November 2021, Human Right Watch reported on cases of detainment, enforced disappearance and killings of members of the former security forces, such as former police forces or members of the former national security forces, by Taliban forces in Kandahar Province. Human Right Watch reported that Kandahar stood out in the months following the Taliban takeover ‘as a target for Taliban revenge killings’ with Taliban forces going from house to house and asking for people to come in for questioning. As stated by Human Rights Watch, members of the former security forces were first targeted for killing. According to the source as of November 2021, the killings and enforced disappearances had since then continued. According to Hasht-e Subh, on 29 May 2022, it was reported that the former police chief of Ghorak District was arrested by Taliban forces. Within the time constraints of this report, no further information on this case could be found.

According to Hasht-e Subh, on 26 June 2022, it was reported that Taliban forces had killed a former soldier and his companion in the Chaharbagh neighbourhood of Kandahar City. In a different article, however, Hasht-e Subh reported that the companion was injured.

In February 2022, clashes between Taliban forces and Pakistani forces occurred along the Durand border line in Spin Boldak District. Reportedly, up to 26 persons, including a minimum of ten civilians, were killed or wounded. Tensions between the Taliban de facto government and Pakistan had reportedly developed since the Taliban takeover. Pakistan accused the Taliban of allowing militant groups to carry out attacks on its soil while the Taliban were opposing the construction of a fence along the Durand Line.

With reference to local media reports, a FP article mentioned that more than 40 businessmen were kidnapped in Herat Province, Balkh Province, Kandahar Province and other regions in the two months that followed the Taliban takeover.

**4.16.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns**

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1281 KP, Taliban arrests 11 Daesh suspects in central Daikundi province, 16 November 2022, url; TOLOnews, Daesh Sanctuary Destroyed in Kabul Province: Officials, 18 November 2021, url
1282 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
1283 HRW, “No forgiveness for people like you”, 30 November 2021, url
1284 Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Arrests Ex-Police Chief of Ghorak District, Kandahar, 29 May 2022, url
1285 Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Fighters in Kandahar Kill Two People, Including a Former Soldier, 26 June 2022, url
1286 Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Open Fire on Two Civilians in Kandahar, of 28 June 2022, url
1287 ANI, Pakistan using Durand line dispute with Taliban as a pretext to target Pashtuns, 20 April 2022, url; ACLED, Regional Overview: South Asia and Afghanistan (19-25 February 2022), 3 March 2022, url; France 24, Pakistan-Afghan border reopens days after deadly clash, 27 February 2022, url
1288 FP, Afghan Crime Wave Adds to Taliban Dystopia, 29 October 2021, url
Between August 2021 and April 2022, the WHO recorded one attack on a healthcare facility in Kandahar on 18 in November 2021.\(^{1289}\)

According to UNOCHA, Kandahar is one of the eight provinces ‘with the highest priority’ for UNMAS survey,\(^ {1290}\) as an area ‘where threats of improvised mines have been reported as a result of recent conflicts.’\(^ {1291}\) In late-September 2021, UNOCHA reported that the presence of IED was affecting people’s access to certain parts of the province.\(^ {1292}\) Sources reported about civilian casualties caused by unexploded ordnance in the reference period.\(^ {1293}\) In March 2022, for example, four children were killed when an unexploded mortar shell blew up in Shah Wali Kot District. The children were playing with it.\(^ {1294}\) According to Pajhwok Afghan News, on 11 June 2022, one civilian was killed and another injured when an old roadside landmine exploded.\(^ {1295}\)

Residents of Kandahar Province were reportedly affected by forced evictions carried out by Taliban forces around September 2021\(^ {1296}\) ‘in apparent retaliation for the residents’ perceived support for the former government’.\(^ {1297}\)

(a) Displacement and returns

According to UNOCHA\(^ {1298}\), 366 persons were displaced due to conflict from Kandahar Province to Herat Province in September and October 2021.\(^ {1299}\) There were no displacement movements in the province recorded by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022.\(^ {1300}\)

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 15 022 IDP arrivals in Kandahar Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. According to IOM, 25 188 IDPs and 597 persons from abroad returned to Kandahar during that period, while 4 308


\(^{1290}\) As of January 2022, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was to conduct ‘a village-by-village landmine/explosive impact survey across the country’. UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Response Plan 2022, 11 January 2022, [url], pp. 78-79

\(^{1291}\) UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Response Plan 2022, 11 January 2022, [url], pp. 78-79

\(^{1292}\) UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Weekly Humanitarian Update (13-19 September 2021), 23 September 2021, [url], p. 1

\(^{1293}\) BAAG, Afghanistan in March 2022 – Key News, 7 April 2022, [url]; Pajhwok Afghan News, 4 children killed in Kandahar mortar shell explosion, 18 March 2022, [url]; Pajhwok Afghan News, 15 people killed, 4 injured in Afghanistan last week, 11 June 2022, [url]

\(^{1294}\) BAAG, Afghanistan in March 2022 – Key News, 7 April 2022, [url]; Pajhwok Afghan News, 4 children killed in Kandahar mortar shell explosion, 18 March 2022, [url]

\(^{1295}\) Pajhwok Afghan News, 15 people killed, 4 injured in Afghanistan last week, 11 June 2022, [url]

\(^{1296}\) Reuters, Thousands protest against Taliban in Kandahar over evictions, 14 September 2021, [url]

\(^{1297}\) HRW, World Report 2022, 13 January 2022, [url], p. 19

\(^{1298}\) Data cover period between 15 August 2021 and 30 November 2021 and between 1 January 2022 and 10 May 2022. UNOCHA does not provide data for December 2021.

\(^{1299}\) UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022, [url]

\(^{1300}\) UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022, [url]
persons moved abroad. From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 976 returns from Iran and 19 151 from Pakistan to Kandahar Province.

4.17. Kapisa

Kapisa Province is located in the central region of Afghanistan and is divided into the following districts: Alasay (Alasai), Hisa-e Awal-e Kohestan (Hissa-e-Awali Kohistan), Hisa-e Duwum-e Kohestan (Hissa-e-Duwumi Kohistan), Kohband (Koh Band), Mahmud-e Raqi (Mahmood Raqi), Nejrab (Nijrab) and Tagab. The provincial capital is Mahmud-e Raqi.

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, the population of Kapisa Province was estimated at 505 510. UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated the population as of January 2022 at 649 000.

According to NPS, the main ethnic groups in the province were Tajik, Pashtun, and Nuristani. NPS also mentioned the tribal groups of Pashai, Safi, Ghilzai, Kata and Ashtu Nuristani. No further information about the ethnic composition in Kapisa Province after the Taliban takeover could be found within the time constraints of this report.

4.17.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 59 security incidents in Kapisa Province, 43 of which were coded as ‘battles,’ 9 as ‘explosions/remote violence,’ and 7 as ‘violence against civilians,’ as shown in the graph below.

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1301 IOM, Afghanistan - Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November - December 2021), 2 March 2022, url, p. 3
1302 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Kandahar Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, url, p. 2. Set filter to Kandahar.
1303 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, p. 17; UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Kapisa Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url
1304 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, p. 17
1305 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 46
1306 US, NPS, Kapisa Provincial Overview, n.d., url
1307 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded five security incidents, resulting in one civilian death. According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province resulted in 100 fatalities. The most affected districts were Hisa-e Awali Kohistan (22), Hisa-e Duwumi Kohistan (18), and Mahmood Raqi (9 security incidents).

ACLED attributed to NRF 39 security incidents, 32 of which were classified as ‘battles’ and consisted of clashes with the Taliban forces or attacks on the Taliban targets. Six instances were coded as ‘explosions/remote violence.’ NRF claimed that its forces launched a rocket attack on a building in Hisa-e Awali District on 15 January 2022 after Taliban had arrested six women and three children. The Taliban denied that such an incident had taken place. AFF was involved in 6 of the 48 security incidents with Taliban military forces as opponent. All these incidents occurred between 15 and 27 March 2022. Most security incidents were recorded by ACLED in Hisa-e Duwum-e Kohestan and Hisa-e Awali Kohistan districts.

ACLED reported that Taliban forces clashed with AFF, NRF, and unknown gunmen. In eight security incidents, recorded by ACLED in the reference period, civilians faced violence by either an unidentified armed group or Taliban forces. In April 2022, the Liberation Front of Afghanistan claimed it had killed a Taliban commander.

In April 2022, Hasht-e Subh reported on armed clashes between members of the former security forces and Taliban members in Kohestan District. One member of the former security forces was killed and nine Taliban members were injured. The clashes in Pol-e-Shahra area started after Taliban had launched an operation to arrest two former security forces members.

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1308 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
1309 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. For an explanation of how UCDP records events and fatalities, please refer to the sources section in the introduction of this report.
1310 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
1311 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
1312 Hasht-e Subh, NRF Claims to Have Fired a Rocket on a District of Kapisa, 16 January 2022, url
1313 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
1314 ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (26 March – 1 April 2022), 6 April 2022, url; ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (19–25 March 2022), 31 March 2022, url
1315 ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (5–11 March 2022), 16 March 2022, url; ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (19–25 February 2022), 3 March 2022, url; ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (15 – 21 January 2022), 27 January 2022, url; ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (11 December 2021 – 7 January 2022), 13 January 2022, url
1316 ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (25 September – 1 October 2021), 6 October 2021, url
1317 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
1318 Hasht-e Subh, The Liberation Front Forces Kill a Taliban Badri Commander in Kapisa, 22 April 2022, url
1319 Hasht-e Subh, End of Clashes in Kapisa, 1 Former Security Force Martyred and 9 Taliban Rebels Injured, 24 April 2022, url
1320 Hasht-e Subh, Six-Hour Clash, Taliban Fighters with Two Former Security Forces in Kapisa, 23 April 2022, url
Civilians, including religious scholars, were killed by unidentified perpetrators in Mahmud-e Raqi, the Jamal Agha area of Hesa-e Dowom District, Nijrab District and Tagab District. For example, on 24 November 2021 two clerics were killed in Rayg-e Rawan area of Mahmud-i-Raqi. Three students of a madrasa (religious school) were injured. On 14 February 2022, unknown gunmen attacked a car with relatives of Habib Afghan, a former jihadi commander and member of parliament. Taliban claimed that two security members and three civilians were killed. The attack occurred in Jamal Agha area of Hesa-e-Dowom District and two people were reportedly arrested.

Taliban forces killed alleged armed robbers in the reference period while, according to Hasht-e Subh, residents alleged that ‘Taliban are killing former soldiers under the guise of unidentified gunmen and armed robberies.’

**4.17.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns**

As of December 2021, hundreds of the more than 4,000 families who had been displaced in Kapisa province after the outbreak of clashes between former government and Taliban forces five months earlier still had not returned to their homes.

According to UNOCHA figures, 3,101 persons were displaced due to conflict from the province between 15 August and the end of November 2021: 308 persons from Hisa-e Awali Kohestan, 1,113 from Hisa-e Duwum-e Kohestan, 560 from Alasay, 217 from Nejrab, 623 from Tagab, and 280 from Mahmud-e-Raqi districts. Of these, 1,330 persons were displaced within Kapisa Province, 1,666 persons to Kabul Province and the remaining 105 to Herat Province.

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1321 Pajhwok Afghan News, World accelerates efforts to avert economic crisis in Afghanistan, 28 November 2021, url; Hasht-e Subh, 2 Clerks Killed, 3 Others Injured in Kapisa, 24 November 2021, url
1322 Hasht-e Subh, Local Sources: Armed Gunmen Kill a Craftswoman in Kapisa, 13 March 2022, url; Hasht-e Subh, 2 Soldiers, 3 Civilians Killed in Kapisa, 16 February 2022, url; Hasht-e Subh, A Man Accused of a Crime Killed in Kapisa, 29 December 2021, url
1323 Pajhwok Afghan News, 28 people suffer casualties in Afghanistan last week, 20 March 2022, url; Hasht-e Subh, Local Sources: Armed Gunmen Kill a Craftswoman in Kapisa, 13 March 2022, url; Hasht-e Subh, 2 Clerks Killed, 3 Others Injured in Kapisa, 24 November 2021, url
1324 Hasht-e Subh, 2 Soldiers, 3 Civilians Killed in Kapisa, 16 February 2022, url; TKG, Armed Men Gun down Relatives of Former MP, 16 February 2022, url
1325 Hasht-e Subh, A Man Accused of a Crime Killed in Kapisa, 29 December 2021, url
1326 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
1327 Hasht-e Subh, 2 Clerks Killed, 3 Others Injured in Kapisa, 24 November 2021, url
1328 Hasht-e Subh, 2 Soldiers, 3 Civilians Killed in Kapisa, 16 February 2022, url
1329 TKG, Armed Men Gun down Relatives of Former MP, 16 February 2022, url
1330 Germany, BAMF, Briefing Notes, 21 February 2022, url, p. 1
1331 Pajhwok Afghan News, 13 people suffer casualties in Afghanistan last week, 13 December 2021, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Last week was again deadliest for Afghans, 10 October 2021, url
1332 Hasht-e Subh, A Man Accused of a Crime Killed in Kapisa, 29 December 2021, url
1333 Hasht-e Subh, Unfavorable Situation of 4,000 Displaced Families in Afghanistan’s Kapisa, 21 December 2021, url
1334 Data cover period between 15 August 2021 and 30 November 2021 and between 1 January 2022 and 10 May 2022. UNOCHA does not provide data for December 2021.
1335 UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022, url
UNOCHA recorded no displacement movements in or out of the province from January to the beginning of May 2022.\textsuperscript{1336}

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 9,863 IDP arrivals in Kapisa Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. According to IOM, 41,610 IDPs and 607 persons from abroad returned to Kapisa during that period, while 13,056 persons moved abroad.\textsuperscript{1337} From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 6,025 returns from Iran and 37 from Pakistan to Kapisa Province.\textsuperscript{1338}

No further information on the impact of the conflict on the civilian population was found within the time constraints of this report.

4.18. Khost

Khost Province is located in the southeast Afghanistan, bordering Pakistan, and comprises 13 districts: Bak (Baak), Gurbuz, Jajimaydan (Jaji Maidan), Khost District (Matun), Mandozayi (Manduzay or Esmayel khil), Musakhel (Musa Khel), Nadirshahkot (Nadir Shah Kot), Qalandar, Sabari (or Yaqubi), Shamal (Shamul), Spera, Tani (Tanay), Terezayi (Tirzayee or Ali Sher). The provincial capital Khost City (Matun\textsuperscript{1339}) is situated in the Khost District.\textsuperscript{1340}

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, the population of Khost Province was 659,100.\textsuperscript{1341} UNOCHA estimated it to be at 846,134, as of May 2022.\textsuperscript{1342}

Together with the provinces of Paktya and Paktika, Khost forms the so-called Loya Paktya region, a region described as ‘Pashtun heartland’\textsuperscript{1343} that also depicted the Haqqani network’s original ‘power base.’\textsuperscript{1344} The population of Khost Province consists predominantly of Pashtuns, while Tajiks reportedly constitute only 1% of the province’s population.\textsuperscript{1345}

\textsuperscript{1336} UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022, url
\textsuperscript{1337} IOM, Afghanistan – Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November - December 2021), 2 March 2022, url, p. 3
\textsuperscript{1338} UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Kapisa Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, url, p. 2. Set filter to Kapisa.
\textsuperscript{1339} UNOCHA, Afghanistan: South Eastern Region – District Atlas, April 2014, url, p. 26
\textsuperscript{1340} UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Khost Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, url, pp. 1-2. Set filter to Khost;
\textsuperscript{1341} Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated Population of Afghanistan 2022-23, April 2022, url, p. 6
\textsuperscript{1342} UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Khost Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, url, p. 1. Set filter to Khost.
\textsuperscript{1343} RFE/RL/Gandhara, In Afghanistan’s Pashtun Heartland, Tribal Rule Supersedes State Law, 15 February 2021, url
\textsuperscript{1344} Bacon, T. and Byman, D., De-Talibanization and the Onset of Insurgency in Afghanistan, 14 January 2021, url, p. 9
\textsuperscript{1345} US, NPS, Khost Provincial Overview, n.d., url
4.18.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 18 security incidents in Khost Province, 8 of which were coded as 'explosions/remote violence', 5 as 'battles,' and 5 as 'violence against civilians.'

In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded 1 security incident, which resulted in 41 civilian deaths. According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province resulted in 44 fatalities. The most affected districts were Khost (eight security incidents), followed by Gurbuz and Tanay districts (two incidents in each).

During the reference period, the Taliban were reportedly involved in clashes with NLFA. In May 2022, NLFA claimed it had killed 12 Taliban members, including the chief of Alisher District, while Taliban officials disregarded the claims and instead stated that a fire had erupted at the military base in Alisher District.

ACLED attributed to unidentified armed groups seven security incidents involving both civilians (five incidents) as well as Taliban forces (two incidents).

The data indicate that one incident in particular is responsible for the majority of civilian fatalities in Khost Province during the reference period, being the Pakistani airstrikes of 15 April 2022 in Spera District. The attacks, that targeted four villages near the Pakistani border, reportedly killed 41 people, mostly women and children, and injured 22 others. According to RFE/RL’s Gandhara news, the attacks were caused by rising tension between Pakistan and the Taliban de facto authorities in regard to Afghanistan hosting members of TTP, the so-called Pakistani Taliban, an extremist group aligned with the Afghan Taliban and responsible for 'cross-border attacks against Pakistani security forces.'

Other security incidents reportedly included abductions and killings of former security personnel or other persons associated with the former government or the US forces, including

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Footnotes:

1346 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. For an explanation of how UCDP records events and fatalities, please refer to the sources section in the introduction of this report.

1347 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url

1348 Etilaat Roz، ادعای جبهه آزادگان بوسهال طالبان برای ازبین‌گیری خون‌سرد و 11 عضو دیگر این گروه را کشتی [Azadegan Front claims: Taliban district governor killed Alishir Khost and 11 other members of the group], 2 May 2022, url

1349 Etilaat Roz، ادعای جبهه آزادگان بوسهال طالبان برای ازبین‌گیری خون‌سرد و 11 عضو دیگر این گروه را کشتی [Azadegan Front claims: Taliban district governor killed Alishir Khost and 11 other members of the group], May 2022, url

1350 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url

1351 Please note, that ACLED double-coded the incident because it attributed it to two districts (Spera and Tani District). ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, as of 2 August 2022

1352 EUAA analysis based on UCdata and on publicly available ACLED data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022; ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022

1353 Al Jazeera, At least 47 dead in Afghanistan after Pakistan attacks: Officials, 17 April 2022, url; AOAV, Pakistani airstrike leaves 47 civilians dead, 22 injured in Afghanistan’s Khost and Kunar provinces, 22 April 2022, url

1354 RFE/RL/Gandhara, Pakistan’s Deadly Air Strikes Inside Afghanistan Increase Tensions With Taliban, 21 April 2022, url
members of the former Khost Protection Force (KPF), by the Taliban or unidentified armed groups. On 30 August, the former chairman of Afghanistan’s Ulema Council was arrested by the Taliban in Khost Province without providing reasons for the arrest. Moreover, cases of beatings and arrests of civilians for raising the Afghan national flag were reported.

4.18.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

According to UNOCHA, there were no conflict-induced displacements from Khost Province neither in the period between 15 August and 30 November 2021, nor in the period from January to the beginning of May 2022.

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 22 627 IDP arrivals in Khost Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. According to IOM, 16 202 IDPs and 736 persons from abroad returned to Khost during that period, while 16 124 persons moved abroad. From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 455 cross-border returnees from Iran and 830 from Pakistan to Khost Province.

No further information on the impact of the conflict on the civilian population was found within the time constraints of this report.

4.19. Kunar

Kunar is located in eastern Afghanistan and is divided into the following districts: Asad Abad (Asadabad), Bar Kunar (Barkunar), Chapa Dara (Chapadara), Sawkai (Chawkay), Dangam, Dara-e Pech, Ghazi Abad (Ghaziabad), Khas Kunar (Khaskunar), Mara Wara (Marawara), Narang (Narang Wa Badil), Nari, Noorgul (Nurga), Sar Kani (Sarkani), Shigal, Watapur (Watapoor), and

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1356 SATP, Detail of Terrorism Update, 24 November 2021, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Ex-policeman found dead in Khost, 21 October 2021, url.
1357 Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban detain former head of Ulema Council, 30 August 2021, url.
1358 Baaghi TV, طالبان سوی از ملی پرچم برافراشتن دلیل به خوست در فعالان شکنجه [Torture of activists in Khost by the Taliban for raising the national flag], 1 March 2022, url.
1359 Data cover period between 15 August 2021 and 30 November 2021 and between 1 January 2022 and 10 May 2022. UNOCHA does not provide data for December 2021.
1360 UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022, url.
1361 IOM, Afghanistan – Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November - December 2021), 2 March 2022, url, p. 3
1362 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Khost Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, url, p. 2. Set filter to Khost.
Sheltan.\textsuperscript{1364} In its April 2022 report, NSIA indicated that Sheltan District was ‘temporary.’\textsuperscript{1365} The provincial capital is Asad Abad.\textsuperscript{1366}

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, Kunar Province has population of 517 180.\textsuperscript{1367} UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated the population as of January 2022 at 664 000.\textsuperscript{1368}

NPS listed Pashtuns (95 \%) as the major ethnic groups in the province. Nuristani made up the remaining 5 \% according to NPS.\textsuperscript{1369} No further information about the ethnic composition in Kunar Province after the Taliban takeover could be found within the time constraints of this report.

4.19.1. Recent security trends

In a January 2022 report, the UN Secretary-General identified Kunar Province as one of the four most conflict-affected provinces in Afghanistan in the period between 19 August and 31 December 2021.\textsuperscript{1370}

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 79 security incidents in Kunar Province, 36 of which were coded as ‘battles,’ 35 as ‘explosions/remote violence,’ and 8 as ‘violence against civilians,’ as depicted in the graph below:\textsuperscript{1371}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure10.png}
\caption{Kunar Province - Security events coded as ‘battles’, ‘remote violence/explosions,’ and ‘violence against civilians’ from 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, based on ACLED data\textsuperscript{1372}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{1364} UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Kunar Province – District Atlas, April 2014, \url{url}; Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, \url{url}, p. 57
\textsuperscript{1365} Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, \url{url}, p. 57
\textsuperscript{1366} US, NPS, Kunar Provincial Overview, n.d., \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1367} Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, \url{url}, p. 57
\textsuperscript{1368} UNOCHA, Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022, 7 January 2022, \url{url}, p. 46
\textsuperscript{1369} US, NPS, Kunar Provincial Overview, n.d., \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1370} UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, \url{url}, para. 15
\textsuperscript{1371} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1372} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url{url}
In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded 12 security incidents which resulted in eight civilian deaths in Kunar Province in the reference period. According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province resulted in 74 fatalities. The most affected districts were Shigal (15), Sawkai (13), Asad Abad, Sar Kani (9 each), Dara Pech, Noorgal (7 each), Dangam, and Nari (4 security incidents each).

Several sources stated that ISKP has traditionally been present in the eastern Afghan provinces. In an October 2021 article, BBC News stated that ISKP had previously established bases in Kunar Province but was forced back from the province by Taliban forces and army units of the previous Afghan government supported by US-airstrikes. According to an independent Afghan analyst consulted by EUAA in December 2021, ISKP continued to have its strongest foothold in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces. The German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in February 2022 stated that ISKP has been aiming to establish a safe base of retreat since 2014. To this end, it focused on the provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar and Nuristan, on the one hand because of their strategic location along the Pakistani border, on the other hand because of the deeply rooted Salafist ideology in this region.

ACLED attributed 37 security incidents resulting in 39 fatalities to ISKP. In 35 of these incidents Taliban forces were involved: 23 of them were coded as ‘battles’ and 12 as ‘explosions/remote violence’. On 19 January 2022, a Taliban commander and four civilians, including the commander’s son, were reportedly shot dead in Narang District by an ISKP member, who had formerly belonged to the Taliban. According to a local elder, interviewed by RFE/RL’s Gandhara services, six persons, including four Taliban members, were killed. According to the Taliban director of information and culture of Kunar cited by RFE/RL’s Gandhara, nine other persons were injured.

Apart from the incidents involving ISKP, Taliban forces were involved in three incidents recorded by ACLED as ‘violence against civilians’. Hasht-e Subh, for example, reported that Taliban forces had attacked a wedding convoy in Shigal District in the beginning of March.
2022, killing one person and injuring two others.\textsuperscript{1384} However, in a different article, Hasht-e Subh reported that one man was killed and another injured.\textsuperscript{1385} Reportedly, the convoy was attacked for playing loud music in a car.\textsuperscript{1386} In June 2022, the Taliban forces reportedly fatally shot a civilian over alleged ISKP links in Narang Wa Badil District.\textsuperscript{1387}

The Swedish Migration Agency reported in April 2022 with reference to an international analyst based in Afghanistan that TTP was assumed to have its main presence in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces.\textsuperscript{1388} Reportedly, tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan were rising at the border. Pakistan was claiming that militant groups, in particular TTP, were launching attacks on Pakistan from Afghanistan, while the Taliban was opposing the completion of a fence along the Durand Line.\textsuperscript{1389} In May 2022, International Crisis Group reported on an easing of tensions between the two countries and the participation of Pakistan in talks with the TTP hosted by the Taliban on 18 May 2022.\textsuperscript{1390}

According to ACLED, military forces of Pakistan were involved in 14 security incidents, consisting of 6 incidents of battles with Taliban forces and 8 instances of the explosions/remote violence, resulting in a total in 13 fatalities. Four of the incidents caused casualties among civilians.\textsuperscript{1391} On 26 January 2022, a boy was reportedly killed by a rocket fired by Pakistani forces to Sarkani (Sarkano) District.\textsuperscript{1392} In mid-April 2022, rockets, allegedly fired by Pakistani aircraft over Sheltan (Shelton) District, reportedly killed six civilians.\textsuperscript{1393} On 15 April 2022, two women and three children were reportedly killed in a shelling by Pakistani military forces in Shigal District. A month later, at least six children were reportedly injured in a shelling in Nari district.\textsuperscript{1394}

According to ACLED, TTP was involved in four incidents, three of them with unidentified armed groups and one with military forces of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{1395}

\textsuperscript{1384} Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Bans Playing Music in Public, 12 March 2022, \textsuperscript{url}
\textsuperscript{1385} Hasht-e Subh, Playing Music Is Fiercely Forbidden: The Taliban Have Imposed New Restrictions on Local Artists in Kapisa, 6 March 2022, \textsuperscript{url}
\textsuperscript{1386} Hasht-e Subh, Playing Music Is Fiercely Forbidden: The Taliban Have Imposed New Restrictions on Local Artists in Kapisa, 6 March 2022, \textsuperscript{url}; Hasht-e Subh, فردی که در پی شلیک نظامیان در کنر زخمی شده‌بود، جان باخت [Men injured in military shooting in Kunar has died], 12 March 2022, \textsuperscript{url}
\textsuperscript{1387} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \textsuperscript{url}
\textsuperscript{1388} Sweden, Migrationsverket, Afghanistan: Säkerhetsläget efter talibanrörelsens maktövertagande [Afghanistan: Security situation after Taliban takeover of power] (version 1.0) [source: an international analyst based in Afghanistan], 29 April 2022, \textsuperscript{url}, p. 45
\textsuperscript{1389} Al Jazeera, Taliban issues warning over civilians killed by Pakistan rockets, 16 April 2022, \textsuperscript{url}; International Crisis Group, Afghanistan, April 2022, \textsuperscript{url}; AP, Pakistan warns neighbor Afghanistan not to shelter militants, 17 April 2022, \textsuperscript{url}; TRT World, Taliban stops Pakistan army from fencing border at Nangarhar, 22 December 2021, \textsuperscript{url}
\textsuperscript{1390} International Crisis Group, Afghanistan, April 2022, \textsuperscript{url}
\textsuperscript{1391} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \textsuperscript{url}
\textsuperscript{1392} Pajhwok Afghan News, Boy killed as Pakistani forces fire rockets into Kunar, 26 January 2022, \textsuperscript{url}
\textsuperscript{1393} France 24, Five Afghan children die in Pakistan rocket attacks: officials, 16 April 2022, \textsuperscript{url}; Al Jazeera, Taliban issues warning over civilians killed by Pakistan rockets, 16 April 2022, \textsuperscript{url}
\textsuperscript{1394} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \textsuperscript{url}
\textsuperscript{1395} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \textsuperscript{url}
ACLED attributed 23 security incidents to unidentified armed groups. Civilians were involved in 12 incidents, three of which were targeted attacks by unknown gunmen. Nine other incidents were caused by the use of explosive devices in either targeted bomb attacks, including IEDs attached to vehicles, or indiscriminate IED explosions, comprising roadside bomb explosions and ERW. On 14 October 2021, a Taliban police chief was killed, and eleven persons, including seven civilians, were injured in a bomb attack by unknown perpetrators in Asad Abad. Reportedly, the bomb targeted a vehicle carrying the police chief. In April 2022, three civilians were injured in an explosion of a bomb planted on a motorbike in Asad Abad city. In June 2022, at least four members of a family, including two or three children, were reportedly killed in a grenade attack on their house in Nari district.

4.19.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

According to figures provided by UNOCHA for mid-August to November 2021, 98 persons were displaced due to conflict from Sarkani District in September 2021. All persons were displaced within the district. There were no displacement movements in the province recorded by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022.

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 35 497 IDP arrivals in Kunar Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. According to IOM, 3 921 IDPs and 487 persons from abroad returned to Kunar during that period, while 23 084 persons moved abroad. From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 629 returns from Iran and 173 from Pakistan to Jawzjan province.

No further information on the impact of the conflict on the civilian population was found within the time constraints of this report.

4.20. Kunduz

Kunduz Province is located in the northern part of Afghanistan and borders Tajikistan to the north. Kunduz Province is divided into the following administrative units: Ali Abad, Chahar Darah, Dasht-e Archi, Imam Sahib (Hazrati Imam Sahib, Imamsaheb), Khan Abad, Kunduz and...
Qala-e Zal. As of April 2022, Calbad, Gulptipa, and Aqtash districts are described as ‘temporary.’ The provincial capital is Kunduz City.

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, Kunduz Province has a population of 1,184,020. UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated the population as of January 2022 at 1.5 million.

Sources describe Kunduz Province as ethnically heterogenous, with UNOCHA, in May 2022, describing the province as ‘one of Afghanistan’s most ethnically diverse provinces.’ According to estimations presented by the political scientist Niels Terpstra in a 2022 publication, Pashtuns constituted around 34% of the Kunduz Province’s population, while Uzbeks made up 27%, Tajiks 20%, Turkmen 9%, Arabs 5% and Hazaras 3%. Another ethnic group present in the province was the Pashai. No further information about the ethnic composition in Kunduz Province after the Taliban takeover could be found within the time constraints of this report.

4.20.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 44 security incidents in Kunduz Province, 16 of which were coded as ‘violence against civilians,’ 14 as ‘battles,’ and 14 as ‘explosions/remote violence.’

In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded ten security incidents in Kunduz Province, resulting in 121 civilian deaths. According to UCDP, 114 civilian deaths resulted from two separate ISKP attacks. According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province resulted in 143 fatalities. The most affected districts were Kunduz (20 incidents resulting in 70 fatalities), Hazrati Imam Sahib (12 incidents resulting in 50 fatalities), followed by Chahar Darah (5 incidents resulting in 4 fatalities).

1406 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, URL, p. 70
1408 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, URL, p. 70
1411 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, URL
1412 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. For an explanation of how UCDP records events and fatalities, please refer to the sources section in the introduction of this report.
1413 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, URL
In April 2022, NRF reportedly increased its operations against Taliban forces in several Afghan provinces, including Kunduz.\(^{1417}\) The only NRF-launched attack recorded by ACLED in the reference period was an attack by NRF on the Taliban forces in Daulatha village of Kunduz City in March 2022, in which one Taliban member was killed and another one wounded.\(^{1418}\)

ACLED attributed to Taliban forces 11 security incidents, 2 of which were classified as ‘battles’ and 9 as ‘violence against civilians.’\(^{1419}\) One of the recorded ‘battles’ was a clash between the Taliban and military forces of Tajikistan near Sher Khan Bandar, Imam Sahib District; the Taliban reportedly denied the incident.\(^{1420}\) In another incident recorded as ‘battles’ the Taliban killed an ISKP member who reportedly tried to place a bomb in a mosque in Imam Sahib District.\(^{1421}\)

In November 2021, Human Right Watch reported cases of killings of members of the former security forces, such as former police forces or members of the former national security forces, by Taliban forces in Kunduz Province.\(^{1422}\) On 28 March 2022, for example, a member of the ‘former military’ was reportedly arrested by Taliban forces.\(^{1423}\) On 31 May 2022, a former local commander was reportedly shot by Taliban forces in Kunduz City.\(^{1424}\)

During the reference period, ISKP continued carrying out attacks in Kunduz Province,\(^{1425}\) including attacks on mosques with high numbers of casualties.\(^{1426}\) ACLED attributed to ISKP 11 security incidents, which resulted in 59 fatalities.\(^{1427}\) On 8 October 2021, a suicide bombing claimed by ISKP occurred during Friday prayers, when over 400 worshippers had reportedly gathered at the Sayed Abad Shia Mosque\(^{1428}\) in Khan Abad District.\(^{1429}\) Depending on the

\(^{1417}\) UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, [url], para. 38

\(^{1418}\) EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]

\(^{1419}\) EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]

\(^{1420}\) Geopolitical Report, Taliban clashes with Tajik Border Guards, 16 May 2022, [url]

\(^{1421}\) EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]

\(^{1422}\) HRW, “No forgiveness for people like you”, 30 November 2021, [url]

\(^{1423}\) Germany, BAMF, Briefing Notes, 4 April 2022, [url], p. 1

\(^{1424}\) Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Rebels kill an Ex-Local Commander in Kunduz, 31 May 2022, [url]


\(^{1426}\) HRW, Afghanistan: Surge in Islamic State Attacks on Shia, 5 October 2021, [url]; AAN, A Community Under Attack: How successive governments failed west Kabul and the Hazaras who live there, 17 January 2022, [url]; RFE/RL/Gandhara, Fear Grips Afghanistan’s Sufi Community Following Deadly Attacks, 16 May 2022, [url]

\(^{1427}\) EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]

\(^{1428}\) AAN, A Community Under Attack: How successive governments failed west Kabul and the Hazaras who live there, 17 January 2022, [url]

\(^{1429}\) RFE/RL/Gandhara, Scores Killed, Wounded In IS-K Suicide Blast Inside Afghan Shi'ite Mosque, 8 October 2021, [url]
source, between 20\textsuperscript{1430} and 150 people were killed,\textsuperscript{1431} and 90\textsuperscript{1432} to 290 were injured,\textsuperscript{1433} including at least 38 boys (13 killed, 25 injured).\textsuperscript{1434} On 21 April 2022, a vehicle exploded near a police station in Kunduz. In the attack was claimed by ISKP and reportedly killed four people while 18 others were injured.\textsuperscript{1435} On 22 April 2022, a bomb exploded in the Sunni Maulavi Sekandar Sufi Mosque\textsuperscript{1436} during the Muslim month of Ramadan\textsuperscript{1437} in Imam Sahib District.\textsuperscript{1438} The attack killed around 33 people,\textsuperscript{1439} including children,\textsuperscript{1440} and injured dozens of others.\textsuperscript{1441} Several sources indicated that the perpetrators remained unknown,\textsuperscript{1442} while one source reported that ISKP claimed responsibility.\textsuperscript{1443} In October 2021, it was reported that small scale ISKP attacks on Taliban security forces occurred countrywide on a daily basis, including in Kunduz Province. As a response, Taliban forces carried out searches in ISKP hideouts in some provinces, including in Kunduz. During the raids, reportedly ISKP members and family members were killed, and suspects were arrested.\textsuperscript{1444} As of March 2022, ISKP had claimed five attacks in Kunduz Province since the Taliban takeover.\textsuperscript{1445}

According to ACLED, 21 security incidents were attributed to unidentified armed groups and resulted 71 fatalities. 7 of these incidents were coded as ‘battles’ with Taliban forces, resulting in 20 fatalities, 9 as incidents of ‘explosions/remote violence’ involving civilians, resulting in 42 fatalities, and 5 as incidents of ‘violence against civilians’, resulting in 11 fatalities.\textsuperscript{1446} In mid-June 2022, a bomb explosion, carried out by unknown perpetrators, occurred during Friday

\textsuperscript{1430} RFE/RL/Gandhara, Scores Killed, Wounded In IS-K Suicide Blast Inside Afghan Shi'ite Mosque, 8 October 2021, \url{https://www.rferl.org/a/scores-killed-wounded-in-is-k-suicide-blast-inside-afghan-shiite-mosque/42224944.html}
\textsuperscript{1432} AAN, A Community Under Attack: How successive governments failed west Kabul and the Hazaras who live there, 1 January 2022, \url{https://aamorgam.org/a-community-under-attack/}
\textsuperscript{1433} Al Jazeera, ‘Blood and pieces’: Kunduz residents describe blast aftermath, 9 October 2021, \url{https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/11/kunduz-residents-describe-blast-aftermath}
\textsuperscript{1435} Pajhwok Afghan News, Kunduz mosque bombing leaves scores of worshipers killed, injured, 22 April 2022, \url{https://pajhwok Afghan News}
\textsuperscript{1437} AAN, A Community Under Attack: How successive governments failed west Kabul and the Hazaras who live there, 1 January 2022, \url{https://aamorgam.org/a-community-under-attack/}
\textsuperscript{1438} Al Jazeera, ‘Blood and pieces’: Kunduz residents describe blast aftermath, 9 October 2021, \url{https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/11/kunduz-residents-describe-blast-aftermath}
\textsuperscript{1442} Pajhwok Afghan News, Kunduz mosque bombing leaves scores of worshipers killed, injured, 22 April 2022, \url{https://pajhwok Afghan News}
\textsuperscript{1443} Al Jazeera, ‘Blood and pieces’: Kunduz residents describe blast aftermath, 9 October 2021, \url{https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/11/kunduz-residents-describe-blast-aftermath}
\textsuperscript{1445} ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (16–22 April 2022), 28 April 2022, \url{https://aled.org/}
\textsuperscript{1446} Pajhwok Afghan News, Kunduz mosque bombing leaves scores of worshipers killed, injured, 22 April 2022, \url{https://pajhwok Afghan News}
\textsuperscript{1447} ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (16–22 April 2022), 28 April 2022, \url{https://aled.org/}
\textsuperscript{1448} RFE/RL/Gandhara, Fear Grips Afghanistan’s Sufi Community Following Deadly Attacks, 16 May 2022, \url{https://www.rferl.org/a/fear-grips-afghanistans-sufi-community-following-deadly-attacks/42265337.html}
\textsuperscript{1450} EurasiaNet, Perspectives – Islamic State in Afghanistan seeks to recruit Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, 17 March 2022, \url{https://eurasianet.org/}
\textsuperscript{1451} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url{https://aled.org/}

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prayers in a mosque in Imam Sahib District. At least one civilian was killed, and at least seven others were injured, according to Taliban sources. Other local sources reportedly estimated that a minimum of 12 people were killed and 30 injured.

With reference to local media reports, a FP article mentioned that more than 40 businessmen were kidnapped in Kunduz Province and other regions in the two months that followed the Taliban takeover.

4.20.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

According to UNOCHA, Kunduz is one of the eight provinces 'with the highest priority' for UNMAS survey, as an area 'where threats of improvised mines have been reported as a result of recent conflicts.' Several instances of explosions of war remnants killing or injuring individuals, including children were reported in the reference period. On 28 February 2022, for example, two children were killed and two injured in a landmine explosion in Khan Abad District.

Residents of Kunduz Province were reportedly affected by forced evictions carried out around September by Taliban forces 'in apparent retaliation for the residents’ perceived support for the former government'.

(a) Displacement and returns

According to figures provided by UNOCHA, 24,752 individuals were displaced due to conflict from Kunduz Province between mid-August and November 2021. The majority (24,612 persons) was displaced within Kunduz Province while 35 persons were displaced to Parwan Province and 105 persons to Herat Province. Furthermore, there were no displacement movements in the province recorded by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022.
In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 33 327 IDP arrivals in Kunduz Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. 156 666 IDPs and 2 692 persons from abroad returned to Kunduz during that period according to IOM, while 33 530 persons moved abroad. From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 10 479 returns from Iran and 369 from Pakistan to Kunduz Province.

4.21. Laghman

Laghman Province is located in eastern Afghanistan, bordering Kabul Province to the west, and comprises six districts: Alingar, Alishang (Alishing), Dawlatshah (Dawlat Shah), Mehterlam, Bad Pash (Badpash, Badpakh) and Qarghayi (Quarghayee). The provincial capital is Mehterlam.

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, Laghman Province has a population of 510 930. As of May 2022, UNOCHA estimated the population of the province at 655 998.

The population of Laghman Province was reported to consist of Pashtuns (58 %), Tajiks (21 %), and Pashai (21 %). No further information about the ethnic composition in Laghman Province after the Taliban takeover could be found within the time constraints of this report.

4.21.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 13 security incidents in Laghman Province, 7 of which were coded as ‘battles,’ 3 as ‘explosions/remote violence,’ and 3 as ‘violence against civilians.’

In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded no security incidents in Laghman Province in the reference period. According to ACLED, the security incidents in

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1458 IOM, Afghanistan - Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November - December 2021), 2 March 2022, p. 3
1460 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated Population of Afghanistan 2022-23, April 2022, p. 31
UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Laghman Province – District Atlas, April 2014, p. 1. Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan,
NSIA, Estimated Population of Afghanistan 2022-23, April 2022, pp. 6, 31
1462 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated Population of Afghanistan 2022-23, April 2022, p. 6
1463 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Laghman Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, p. 1. [set filter to Laghman]
1465 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering
15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, p. 1
1466 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy
of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. For an explanation of how UCDP records events and fatalities, please refer to the
sources section in the introduction of this report.
the province resulted in 14 fatalities. The most affected districts were Aリングar and Mehterlam (five security incidents each).\footnote{EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url{}}

In March 2022, the governor of Laghman Province announced that, neither the ‘resistance front’\footnote{Please note that the source did not further specify this actor.} nor the ISKP were present in the province.\footnote{BBC Monitoring, Programme summary of Afghan TOLOnews TV in Dari 1330 gmt 28 Mar 22, 29 March 2022} There were, however, occasional reports on armed clashes between the Taliban and ISKP as well as on targeted killings in Laghman Province in August and October 2021 and in June 2022.\footnote{BBC Monitoring, IS claims targeting of two Afghan Taliban commanders, 14 June 2022; Germany, BAMF, Briefing Notes, 11 October 2021, \url{url}; UNOCHA, Afghanistan – Weekly Humanitarian Update (16 – 22 August 2021), 25 August 2021, \url{url}, p. 2;} On 6 October 2021, a religious scholar was shot and killed by unidentified gunmen in Qarghayi District.\footnote{Pajhwok Afghan News, Religious scholar gunned down in Laghman, 6 October 2021, \url{}}

In January, April, and May 2022, clashes between the Taliban and resistance forces, including NRF and AFF,\footnote{ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (23 April – 6 May 2022), 12 May 2022, \url{url}; ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (2 – 8 April 2022), 13 April 2022, \url{url}; ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (11 December 2021 – 7 January 2022), 13 January 2022, \url{}} were reported in Laghman Province. In early March 2022, the Taliban had reportedly expanded their search operations to Laghman Province in an attempt to prevent an NRF spring offensive.\footnote{International Crisis Group, Crisiswatch: Tracking Conflict Worldwide, n.d., \url{url}; Filter set to Afghanistan.}

ACLED attributed three security incidents, consisting of instances of internal clashes and one incident of violence against civilians, to the Taliban. In January 2022, the Taliban reportedly fatally shot one or two women ‘near the passport office’ in Mehterlam City, allegedly by a mistake.\footnote{EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url{}} According to local news reports, in August 2021, four former provincial officials, including the former governor, the former police chief, the chairman of the provincial council, and the former head of the national security agency, were arrested and held by the Taliban\footnote{BBC Monitoring, Programme summary of Afghan TOLOnews TV in Dari 1330 gmt 19 Aug 21, 20 August 2021} for ten days, even though the province had been peacefully handed over to the new de facto authorities.\footnote{Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban release 4 former officials of Laghman, 28 August 2021, \url{}} In December, a former police officer was reportedly fatally shot by unidentified gunmen in Mehterlam City.\footnote{EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url{}}
4.21.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

According to UNOCHA, there were no conflict-induced displacements from Laghman Province in the periods between 15 August and 30 November 2021 and 1 January 2022 and 10 May 2022.

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 24,500 IDP arrivals in Laghman Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. According to IOM, 64,508 IDPs and 1,617 persons from abroad returned to Laghman during that period, while 32,049 persons moved abroad. From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 3,737 cross-border returnees from Iran and 320 from Pakistan to Laghman Province.

No further information on the impact of the conflict on the civilian population was found within the time constraints of this report.

4.22. Logar

Logar province is located in eastern Afghanistan, about 65 kilometres south of Kabul. Azra District, in the eastern part of the province has an international border of a few kilometres with Pakistan. The province is divided into the following districts: Azra, Baraki Barak (Barakibarak), Charkh, Khar War (Kharwar), Khoshi (Khushi), Mohammad Agha (Mohammadagha) and Pul-e Alam (Puli Alam). The provincial capital of Logar is Pul-e Alam.

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, Logar Province has a population of 449,820. UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated the population as of January 2022 at 577,000.
The main ethnic groups in Logar were Pashtuns while Tajiks and Hazaras were also present in the province, although in smaller numbers. According to a May 2022 publication by UNOCHA, Logar Province had a Tajik and Pashtun majority. As of July 2020, Khar War and Azra districts were entirely Pashtun-inhabited, and Charkh District had a Tajik majority. In the remaining districts, Tajiks constituted between 20 and 40% of the population. According to an undated website article by NPS, Hazara resided in Khoshi and Pul-e Alam districts and Kuchi nomads could be found in Khar War and Pul-e Alam districts. No further information about the ethnic composition in Logar Province after the Taliban takeover could be found within the time constraints of this report.

4.22.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 21 security incidents in Logar Province, 13 of which were coded as ‘battles,’ 5 as ‘explosions/remote violence,’ and 3 as ‘violence against civilians.’

In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP has recorded one security incident in Logar Province. According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province resulted in 44 fatalities. The most affected district was Pul-e Alam (17), followed by Mohammad Agha (3 security incidents).

NRF was involved in one battle with the Taliban military forces. Two fatalities were recorded by ACLED. Taliban security operations against NRF, which had taken place on 25 February 2022 in the north of the country, were expanded in early March 2022 to Logar and Laghman provinces. As recorded by ACLED, on 1 May 2022, NRF reportedly killed two Taliban members in Babus City, Pul-e Alam District. In the beginning of June 2022, the Afghan Liberation Movement claimed to have attacked Taliban checkpoints in Pul-e Alam City and ‘on a secondary road’ in Mohammad Agha District.

According to ACLED, ISKP was attributed seven security incidents, six of which were clashes with the Taliban military forces. In early December 2021, ISKP attacked the Taliban in Logar
Province for the second time since 2018.\textsuperscript{1500} Reportedly, ISKP killed a dozen Taliban members with attacks carried out in December and January 2022 in several Afghan provinces, among which Logar.\textsuperscript{1501} Furthermore, ACLED reported that there were clashes between ISKP and the Taliban in late March 2022 in Logar Province.\textsuperscript{1502}

According to a June 2022 article of Salam Watandar, criminal offences such as the killing of individuals by unknown gunmen had recently increased in Pul-e Alam City and in other districts of Logar Province.\textsuperscript{1503} ACLED attributed to unidentified armed groups seven security incidents, four of which caused civilian casualties.\textsuperscript{1504} On 4 November 2021, an explosion, caused by unknown perpetrators, occurred in front of a Shia mosque in Pul-e Alam District, reportedly killing two civilians.\textsuperscript{1505} On 24 November 2021, a woman and her daughter were reportedly killed in Pul-e Alam District by a hand grenade that was thrown into their home by unknown perpetrators.\textsuperscript{1506} On 16 March 2022, it was reported that a young man was killed in Pul-e Alam District by unidentified gunmen, after they had abducted him.\textsuperscript{1507} On 18 April 2022, unidentified armed men reportedly attacked a Taliban base in Pul-e Alam District, causing no casualties. According to the source, this was the first attack on a Taliban base in Logar Province since the Taliban takeover of power in August 2021.\textsuperscript{1508} On 11 June 2022, unknown gunmen reportedly shot dead a former member of ANDSF in front of his home in Pul-e Alam City.\textsuperscript{1509}

\subsection*{4.22.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns}

According to figures provided by UNOCHA,\textsuperscript{1510} 14 persons were displaced due to conflict from Logar Province to Herat province in October 2021.\textsuperscript{1511} There were no displacement movements in the province recorded by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022.\textsuperscript{1512}

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 18 470 IDP arrivals in Logar Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. 18 470 IDPs and 675 persons from abroad returned to Logar during that period according to IOM, while 6 965

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item ACLED, Regional Overview: South Asia and Afghanistan 4-10 December 2021, 16 December 2021, \url{url}
\item Steinberg, G. and Albrecht, A., Terror Against the Taliban: Islamic State Shows New Strength in Afghanistan [Opinion], SWP, 21 February 2022, \url{url}, p. 6
\item ACLED, Regional Overview: South Asia and Afghanistan 26 March-1 April 2022, 6 April 2022, \url{url}
\item Salam Watandar, Unknown gunmen kill a civilian in Logar, 9 June 2022, \url{url}
\item EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url{url}
\item Pajhwok Afghan News, 2 civilians killed in Logar bomb blast, 4 November 2021, \url{url}
\item Pajhwok Afghan News, Mother, daughter killed in grenade attack in Logar, 24 November 2021, \url{url}
\item Pajhwok Afghan News, Gunmen abduct, kill young man in Logar, 16 March 2022, \url{url}
\item Hash-e Subh, Unidentified Armed Men Attack a Taliban Base in Logar, 18 April 2022, \url{url}; Al Arabiya, حملة أفراد [Unidentified armed men attack Taliban base in Logar], 18 April 2022, \url{url}
\item EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url{url}
\item Data cover period between 15 August 2021 and 30 November 2021 and between 1 January 2022 and 10 May 2022. UNOCHA does not provide data for December 2021.\textsuperscript{1513}
\item UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022, \url{url}
\item UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022, \url{url}
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
persons moved abroad. From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 3,588 returns from Iran and 222 from Pakistan to Logar Province.

No further information on the impact of the conflict on the civilian population in the province was found within the time constraints of this report.

4.23. Nangarhar

Nangarhar is located in eastern Afghanistan, bordering Pakistan, and is divided into the following districts: Achin, Batikot (Bati Kot), Behsud, Chaparhar, Dara-i Nur (Darah-e-Noor), Deh Bala (Haska Mena, Haska Meyna), Durbaba (Dor Baba), Goshta, Hesarak, Jalalabad, Kama, Khogyani (Khugyani), Kot, Kuzkunar (Kuz Kunar, Khiva), Lalpur (Lalpoor, Lalpora), Muhamand Dara, Nazyan, Pachiragam (Pachir wa Agam), Rodat, Sherzad, Shinwar (or Ghanikhel) and Surkhrod. According to NSIA, Spinghar is a temporary district. The provincial capital of Nangarhar is Jalalabad.

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, Nangarhar Province has a population of 1,769,990. UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated the population as of January 2022 at 2.3 million.

According to undated profile by NPS, Pashtuns (90 %) were the main ethnic group in the province, followed by Pashai (3.6 %), Arabs (2.6 %), Tajiks (1.6 %) and others (2 %). In September 2021 and January 2022, it was reported that some Sikhs were residing in Jalalabad. According to 2019 and 2020 estimates, there were also between 80,000 and 100,000 nomad families (Kuchis) in Nangarhar Province. No further information about the
ethnic composition in Nangarhar after the Taliban takeover could be found within the time constraints of this report.

Nangarhar borders the tribal areas of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. It has served as an unofficial crossing-point for local and foreign militants. In 2020, London School of Economics expert David Mansfield listed Garo, Dawtakhel, Ghwaraky, Kama Dakah, Sasobai and Tabai as unofficial crossings, some of the crossings being hubs for all types of illicit trafficking. The Torkham border crossing on the border to Pakistan is one of Afghanistan’s major border crossings to Pakistan and ‘the busiest port of entry between the two countries’, according to UNOCHA.

4.23.1. Recent security trends

According to the UNOCHA 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan for Afghanistan published in January 2022, conflict-related injuries ‘mainly following suicide attacks, land/roadside mines and MIEDs [magnetic improvised explosive devices]’ were still prevalent in Afghanistan, and Nangarhar Province was among the provinces with the highest numbers of trauma-related injury cases. The UN Secretary General identified Nangarhar Province as one of the four most conflict-affected provinces in Afghanistan in the period between 19 August and 21 May 2022.

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 163 security incidents in Nangarhar Province, 67 of which were coded as ‘battles,’ 56 as ‘violence against civilians,’ and 40 as ‘explosions/remote violence,’ depicted in the graph below.

1527 Merged in May 2018 with Pakistan’s former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Germany, GIZ, FATA Development Programme (FDP), n.d., url
1528 Osman, B. Descent into chaos: Why did Nangarhar turn into an IS hub?, AAN, 27 September 2016, url
1529 Osman, B. Descent into chaos: Why did Nangarhar turn into an IS hub?, AAN, 27 September 2016, url; New Arab (The), In Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan, violence is committed by all sides, 25 January 2018, url; Guardian (The), ‘We are happy to fight you’: tensions rise on Afghan-Pakistani border, 9 February 2022, url
1530 Mansfield, D., Mules, Pick-ups and Container Traffic: Cross-Border Production and Trade and the Shaping of the Political Economy of Nangarhar, AREU, 6 July 2020, url, p. 16
1531 Mansfield, D., Business as Usual: The Uninterrupted Illicit Supply Chain across the Borders of Afghanistan, Medium, 5 May 2020, url
1535 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCPD recorded 71 security incidents, resulting in 24 civilian deaths. Of these, 40 security incidents and 11 civilian deaths were recorded by UCPD in Jalalabad District.\footnote{EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022}

According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province resulted in 288 fatalities. Jalalabad was the most affected district with 75 security incidents recorded by ACLED (41 security incidents coded as ‘battles,’ 22 as ‘violence against civilians,’ and 15 as ‘explosions/remote violence’), which overall caused 163 fatalities. Other affected districts were Muhmand Dara (six security incidents), Shinwar (five), Kama (four), Achin (three), Chaparhar (two), Khugyani (two), Darah-e Noor (one), and Pachir Waagam (one security incident).\footnote{EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url{url}}

ACLED attributed to the Taliban forces 44 security incidents, which caused 62 fatalities and comprised 18 incidents coded as ‘battles’ and 26 as ‘violence against civilians.’ Most incidents coded as ‘battles’ (14) were clashes with ISKP and operations against its militants.\footnote{EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url{url}}

Several sources stated that ISKP has traditionally been present in the eastern Afghan provinces.\footnote{Independent Afghan analyst, email, 6 December 2021; ACLED and APW, Tracking Disorder During Taliban Rule in Afghanistan, A Joint ACLED and APW Report, April 2022, \url{url}, p. 10; USCIRF, United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2022 Annual Report: USCIRF — Recommended for Countries of Particular Concern (CPC): Afghanistan, April 2022, \url{url}, p. 1} In February and April 2022, Nangarhar Province was referred to as being the group’s stronghold.\footnote{Al-Monitor, Border crossings and foreign fighters rise after Taliban takeover, 22 February 2022, \url{url}; ACLED and APW, Tracking Disorder During Taliban Rule in Afghanistan, A Joint ACLED and APW Report, April 2022, \url{url}, p. 7} An article published by SWP in February 2022 stated that ISKP has been aiming to establish a safe base of retreat since 2014. To this end, it focused on the provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar and Nuristan, on the one hand because of their strategic location along the Pakistani border, on the other hand because of the deeply rooted Salafist ideology in this region.\footnote{Steinberg, G. and Albrecht, A., Terror Against the Taliban: Islamic State Shows New Strength in Afghanistan [Opinion], SWP, 21 February 2022, \url{url}, p. 4} Reportedly, 111 of 200 attacks carried out by ISKP in Afghanistan in the first half of 2021 occurred in Nangarhar Province and 80 of them in Jalalabad City.
alone.\textsuperscript{1543} However, according to an October 2021 BBC News article, the group had previously been pushed back from the province by Taliban forces and army units of the previous Afghan government supported by US-airstrikes. BBC News further reported extra-judicial killings of alleged ISKP members in Jalalabad, for which the Taliban forces were ‘widely assumed to be responsible’ although no one claimed responsibility. As stated in the article, the Taliban and ISKP were ‘now engaged in a murky and bloody battle’ with Jalalabad as the frontline.\textsuperscript{1544}

As reported by USDOS, the Taliban conducted a ‘crackdown’ on ISKP in Nangarhar Province in November 2021, during which they arrested, killed, or disappeared many suspected ISKP collaborators. According to the USDOS report, Nangarhar sources stated to have observed ‘dozens of decapitated bodies of alleged ISIS-K [ISKP] sympathizers in the crackdown’s aftermath’.\textsuperscript{1545} According to a UN report of March 2022, more than 50 persons suspected to be affiliated with ISKP were killed since August 2021, 35 of whom by the de facto authorities. The report stated that the vast majority was killed in Nangarhar Province in October and November 2021, with no killings documented in January 2022 and three extrajudicial killings recorded there in February 2022.\textsuperscript{1546} According to an assessment made by the Taliban in February 2022, ISKP was weakened in Jalalabad, but still present in the province.\textsuperscript{1547}

According to an independent Afghan analyst interviewed by EUAA in November 2021, ISKP still had its strongest foothold in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces.\textsuperscript{1548} In the seven months following the Taliban takeover of power in Afghanistan, civilians in Nangarhar were frequently targeted by ISKP militants.\textsuperscript{1549} In October 2021, for example, it was reported that the group had attacked a civil society activist by shooting him dead in his car on the road on his way back from a wedding.\textsuperscript{1550} The independent Afghan analyst stated that at the time three to four people were killed daily in Nangarhar. According to him, this indicated a ‘massive’ support network of the ISKP in the province. According to the analyst, there were also reports of ISKP abducting Taliban members in Jalalabad City and beheading them. The analyst elaborated that ISKP used violence ‘to spread terror and fear’ while the Taliban retaliated to deter people from joining ISKP.\textsuperscript{1551}

ACLED attributed to ISKP 69 security incidents, which resulted in 144 fatalities, and comprised 39 security incidents coded as ‘battles,’ 21 as ‘explosions/remote violence,’ and 9 as ‘violence against civilians.’\textsuperscript{1552} Between 16 August 2021 to 10 May 2022, UCDP recorded ten incidents carried out by ISKP in Nangarhar Province, resulting in a total of six civilian deaths.\textsuperscript{1553} For instance, on 18 and 19 September 2021, several blasts in Nangarhar Province targeting Taliban...
forces reportedly injured over 25 people\textsuperscript{1554} and killed 5 others\textsuperscript{1555}. According to a KP article, the attacks were carried out by ISKP\textsuperscript{1556} while an article by RFE/RL's Gandhara stated that no one had claimed responsibility for the attacks yet\textsuperscript{1557}. Another explosion in a mosque on 12 November 2021 was reported in the Spin Ghar area during Friday prayers. It reportedly killed three people and injured 15 others\textsuperscript{1558}. VOA stated that eyewitnesses reported a higher number of casualties and that the mosque was ‘attended by Sunni Muslims’.\textsuperscript{1559} According to a Pajhwok article, 15 individuals were injured and ISKP claimed responsibility for the bomb blast\textsuperscript{1560}

According to ACLED, unidentified armed groups were involved in 42 security incidents, which caused 60 fatalities. Civilians were involved in 29 of these incidents, resulting in overall 52 fatalities.\textsuperscript{1561} On 31 October 2021, for example, a wedding in Surkh Rod District was attacked by three unknown gunmen who ‘identified themselves as Taliban’. Two people were reportedly killed while ten others were injured. The Taliban denied that the gunmen had acted on their behalf.\textsuperscript{1562} In the beginning of November 2021, an IED explosion in Jalalabad City killed three persons while an IED explosion in Hesarak District killed one child and injured another one.\textsuperscript{1563} On 20 June 2022, an explosion, carried out by unknown perpetrators, occurred in a market\textsuperscript{1564} in the crowded morning hours, reportedly killing at least 2 persons and injuring 28 others, including 5 Taliban members.\textsuperscript{1565}

The Swedish Migration Agency, with reference to an interviewed analyst, reported in April 2022 that TTP,\textsuperscript{1566} and recently particularly the Haqqani network,\textsuperscript{1567} was assumed to be present in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces.\textsuperscript{1568} For further information on the TTP, please refer to section 2.5.1. Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan.

On 27 August 2021, Pakistani security forces reportedly opened fire at Afghans trying to enter Pakistan at the Torkham border crossing in Nangarhar, killing six people and injuring another

\textsuperscript{1554} KP, ISIS-K claims responsibly for blasts in Nangarhar Province, 20 September 2021, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1555} RFE/RL/Gandhara, At Least Five Killed In Attacks Targeting Taliban In Eastern Afghanistan, 22 September 2021, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1556} KP, ISIS-K claims responsibly for blasts in Nangarhar Province, 20 September 2021, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1557} RFE/RL/Gandhara, At Least Five Killed In Attacks Targeting Taliban In Eastern Afghanistan, 22 September 2021, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1558} Al Jazeera, Afghanistan: Mosque in Nangarhar Province hit by blast, 12 November 2021, \url{url}; see also Der Spiegel, Mindestens 15 Verletzte bei Explosion in Moschee [At least 15 injured in mosque explosion], 12 November 2021, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1559} VOA, Bomb Explodes in Eastern Afghanistan Mosque, 12 November 2021, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1560} Pajhwok Afghan News, World once again turns attention to Afghanistan last week, 13 November 2021, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1561} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1562} BBC News, Afghanistan: Gunmen attack wedding to stop music being played, 31 October 2021, \url{url}; Pajhwok Afghan News, 2 suspected Nangarhar wedding ceremony attackers arrested, 31 October 2021, \url{url}; TOLOnews, 2 Killed by Gunmen at Nangarhar Wedding: Family, 30 October 2021, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1563} Pajhwok Afghan News, World once again turns attention to Afghanistan last week, 13 November 2021, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1564} UNAMA, [Twitter], posted on: 20 June 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1565} RFE/RL/Gandhara, Two Killed, Almost 30 Wounded In Afghan Market Attack Amid Spate Of Attacks, 20 June 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1566} BBC News, Violence surges in Pakistan's tribal belt as Taliban, IS-K go on attack, 13 October 2021, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1567} Giustozzi, A., The Resurgence of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, RUSI, 12 August 2021, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1568} Sweden, Migrationsverket, Afghanistan: Säkerhetsläget efter talibanrörelsen maktövertagande [Afghanistan: Security situation after Taliban takeover of power] (version 1.0) [source: independent Afghan analyst], 29 April 2022, \url{url}, p. 45
two.\textsuperscript{1569} On 22 December 2021, tensions between Pakistani and Taliban forces at the Nangarhar border to Pakistan were reported, as Taliban forces prevented Pakistani soldiers from continuing to fence the border along the Durand Line.\textsuperscript{1570} On 24 December 2021, an understanding regarding the border issue was reached between the two countries.\textsuperscript{1571} However, on 6 June 2022, the \textit{de facto} Taliban government announced it maintained its opposition to the fencing of the Durand Line, while the Pakistani government had no intention to stop it.\textsuperscript{1572}

With reference to local media reports, a FP article mentioned that more than 40 businessmen were kidnapped in Nangarhar Province and other regions in the two months that followed the Taliban takeover.\textsuperscript{1573}

\textbf{4.23.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns}

According to UNOCHA, Nangarhar is one of the eight provinces ‘with the highest priority’ for UNMAS survey,\textsuperscript{1574} as an area ‘where threats of improvised mines have been reported as a result of recent conflicts.’\textsuperscript{1575} Sources reported about civilian casualties caused by unexploded ordnance in the reference period.\textsuperscript{1576} On 10 January 2022, for example, an explosion occurring near a school reportedly killed eight to nine children and injured four others in Lalpur District.\textsuperscript{1577} According to UN News, the explosion was caused by explosive remnants of war.\textsuperscript{1578} With reference to local sources, Hasht-e Subh reported that a mortar shell explosion occurred in Deh Bala District on 8 April 2022, while a child was playing with it. Reportedly, one child was killed, and one woman was injured.\textsuperscript{1579}

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textbf{Displacement and returns}
\end{enumerate}

On 31 January 2022, TOLOnews reported that the \textit{de facto} authorities started an initiative to launch a return process for individuals previously displaced by the war. Reportedly, ‘thousands’ of displaced people had started to return to the Shinwari area (Achin, Spingar,
Nazyan, Deh Bala, Durbaba and Shinwar districts), but were having difficulties due to the destruction of their homes and a lack of support and aid.\textsuperscript{1580}

According to UNOCHA,\textsuperscript{1581} 70 persons were displaced due to conflict from Jalalabad District to Herat Province in October 2021. No further displacements were recorded between mid-August and the end of November 2021.\textsuperscript{1582} There were no displacement movements recorded in the province by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022.\textsuperscript{1583}

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan covering the period between August 2021 and 19 December 2021, IOM identified Nangarhar Province as the Afghan province with the largest proportion of IDPs arriving since August 2021.\textsuperscript{1584} IOM identified 153,799 IDPs who arrived in Nangarhar Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. 165,243 IDPs and 9,026 persons from abroad returned to Nangarhar during that period, while 78,694 persons from Nangarhar moved abroad.\textsuperscript{1585} From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 5,161 returns from Iran and 2,101 from Pakistan to Nangarhar Province.\textsuperscript{1586}

4.24. Nimrooz

Nimrooz Province is located in the south-west of Afghanistan and is divided into the following districts: Chakhansur (Asl-e Chakhansur), Char Burjak (Charburjak), Kang, Khashrod, Dularam (according to NSIA, a temporary district), and Zaranj. The provincial capital is Zaranj City. Nimrooz has international borders with Iran and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{1587}

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, Nimrooz Province has a population of 190,430.\textsuperscript{1588} UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated the population as of January 2022 at 244,000.\textsuperscript{1589}

An undated profile published by NPS listed Baluch, Pashtun, Brahui, Tajik, and Uzbek ethnic groups inhabiting the province. The further groups reportedly comprised Barakzai, Noorzai, and Kuchi.\textsuperscript{1590} No further information about the ethnic composition in Nimrooz Province after the Taliban takeover could be found within the time constraints of this report.

\textsuperscript{1580} TOLOnews, Nangarhar: 1000s of War-Displaced Families Return Home, 31 January 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1581} Data cover period between 15 August 2021 and 30 November 2021 and between 1 January 2022 and 10 May 2022. UNOCHA does not provide data for December 2021.
\textsuperscript{1582} UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1583} UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1584} IOM, Afghanistan — Emergency Event Tracking Round 3 (1 - 19 December 2021), 21 January 2022, \url{url}, p. 1
\textsuperscript{1585} IOM, Afghanistan - Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November - December 2021), 2 March 2022, \url{url}, p. 3
\textsuperscript{1586} UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Jawzjan Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, \url{url}, p. 2. Set filter to Nangarhar
\textsuperscript{1587} Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, \url{url}, p. 115; UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Nimrooz Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, \url{url}, p. 1. Set filter to Nimrooz;
UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Nimrooz Province – District Atlas, April 2014, \url{url}, p. 115
\textsuperscript{1588} Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, \url{url}, p. 115
\textsuperscript{1589} UNOCHA, Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022, 7 January 2022, \url{url}, p. 46
\textsuperscript{1590} US, NPS, Nimroz Provincial Overview, n.d., \url{url}
4.24.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded three security incidents in Nimroz Province, two of which were coded as ‘battles’ and one as ‘violence against civilians’.\footnote{EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url 1591}

In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022 UCDP recorded no security-related events.\footnote{EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. For an explanation of how UCDP records events and fatalities, please refer to the sources section in the introduction of this report. 1592}

All three security incidents recorded by ACLED were attributed to Taliban military forces and overall resulted in two fatalities. The districts affected were Char Burjak, Kang, and Zaranj. In May 2022, the Taliban reportedly beat shopkeepers in Zaranj City who allowed women without a proper hijab to enter their shops. In the remaining two security incidents military forces of Pakistan and Iran were involved in one event each.\footnote{EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url 1593}

Clashes between Taliban and Iranian forces were reported in Kang District in December 2021,\footnote{Pajhwok Afghan News, Afghan-Iran border skirmish in Nimroz ends, 2 December 2021, url 1594} March 2022,\footnote{Pajhwok Afghan News, Afghan, Iranian forces clash in border area, 8 March 2022, url 1595} and June 2022.\footnote{KP, Recurrent Border Clashes; Taliban Forces Engage in Another Border Skirmish with the Iranian Border Guards, 12 July 2022, url 1596} According to unconfirmed reports four Iranian border guards were killed in the incident on 7 March 2022.\footnote{RFE/RL/Gandhara, Taliban, Iranian Border Guards Exchange Fire, 8 March 2022, url 1597} In the December incident no casualties were reported by either side.\footnote{RFE/RL/Gandhara, Iranian Border Guards Clash With Taliban In ‘Misunderstanding’, 1 December 2021, url 1598} According to Hasht-e Subh, in mid-April 2022 Pakistani border forces reportedly opened fire on Afghan protesters and severely injured six people.\footnote{Pajhwok Afghan News reported that late December 2021 students in Zaranj were reportedly arrested and beaten by security forces after they protested the dismissal of a high school principal. The students were released after mediation by tribal elders. 1600}

4.24.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

According to figures provided by UNOCHA\footnote{UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022, url 1602} for mid-August to November 2021, 161 persons were displaced due to conflict from Charburjak and Zaranj districts in September 2021. All persons were displaced to Herat Province.\footnote{UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 29 May 2022, url 1603} There were no displacement movements in or out of the province recorded by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022.
In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 18 062 IDP arrivals in Nimroz Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. 7 063 IDPs and 1 005 persons from abroad returned to Nimroz during that period according to IOM, while 22 120 persons moved abroad.\textsuperscript{1604} From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 9 705 returns from Iran to Nimroz Province.\textsuperscript{1605} In mid-June 2022, the Nimroz Department of Immigration reported that 6 105 immigrants had been forcibly deported from Iran over the period of one week.\textsuperscript{1606}

No further information on the impact of the conflict on the civilian population was found within the time constraints of this report.

4.25. Nuristan

Nuristan (Nurestan, Nooristan) Province is located in eastern Afghanistan, directly bordering Pakistan, and comprises eight districts: Barg-e-Matal (Barg-i Matal, Bargi Matal), Duab (Du Ab), Kamdesh, Mandol, Nurgeram (Nurgaram, Nurgram, Noor Gram), Parun (Paroon, Poruns), Wama, Waygal. The provincial capital is Parun.\textsuperscript{1607}

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, Nuristan Province has a population of 169 580.\textsuperscript{1608} UNOCHA estimated the population to be at 217 760, as of May 2022.\textsuperscript{1609}

According to a provincial profile published by Pajhwok Afghan News, the majority of the province’s population are Nuristanis, followed by Pashai (15 \%) and small communities of Pashto and Tajik speakers (1 \%).\textsuperscript{1610} An undated profile by NPS listed Nuristanis as composing more than 99 \% of the population.\textsuperscript{1611} No further information about the ethnic composition in Nuristan Province after the Taliban takeover could be found within the time constraints of this report.

4.25.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded four security incidents in Nuristan Province, two of which were coded as ‘battles’, one as ‘explosions/remote violence,’ and one as ‘violence against civilians.’\textsuperscript{1612}

\textsuperscript{1604} IOM, Afghanistan – Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November - December 2021), 2 March 2022, \url{url}, p. 3
\textsuperscript{1605} UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Nimroz Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, \url{url}, p. 2. Set filter to Nimroz.
\textsuperscript{1606} Hasht-e Subh, Iran Deported 6,000 Afghan Refugees During the Past Week, 16 June 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1607} UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Nuristan Province Humanitarian Profile [Map], May 2022, \url{url}, pp. 1-2. Set filter to Nuristan; UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Nuristan Province – District Atlas, April 2014, \url{url}; Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated Population of Afghanistan 2022-23, April 2022, \url{url}, pp. 6; 60
\textsuperscript{1608} Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated Population of Afghanistan 2022-23, April 2022, \url{url}, p. 6
\textsuperscript{1609} UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Nuristan Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, \url{url}, p. 1. Set filter to Nuristan.
\textsuperscript{1610} Pajhwok Afghan News, Elections 2019 - Background profile of Nuristan province, n.d., \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1611} NPS, Nuristan province, n.d., \url{url}
\textsuperscript{1612} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url{url}
In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded no security incidents and no civilian deaths in Nuristan Province. According to ACLED, the affected districts were Kamdesh, Parun, and Wama. One of the recorded security incidents – an attack by NRF on a Taliban vehicle in Parun District – resulted in three fatalities, all of whom were Taliban members.

In May 2022, the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team reported on ISKP’s main presence in Kunar and Nangarhar Province, while adding that ISKP may also have a presence in Nuristan Province, where 40 to 50 Uighurs were reported to be among ISKP’s ranks. An article published by SWP in February 2022 stated that ISKP has been aiming to establish a safe base of retreat since 2014. To this end, it focused on the provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar and Nuristan, on the one hand because of their strategic location along the Pakistani border, on the other hand because of the deeply rooted Salafist ideology in this region. The Afghan Salafists, of whom there are several hundred thousand in Afghanistan, reside mainly in the eastern provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar, and Nuristan. Since August 2021, the Taliban have reportedly been cracking down on Salafists, allegedly arresting and killing members of their community and raiding and closing dozens of their mosques and madrasas. This crackdown on Salafists is linked to the ongoing war against ISKP fighters, many of whom are Salafists.

In April 2022, AFF claimed to have attacked Taliban forces in Nuristan province. According to ACLED this was the first AFF attack in the province. In addition, an April 2022 article by the Jordan media website Al-Bawaba News mentioned that a group called the Independent West Nuristan Front had declared resistance to the Taliban, as well as armed guerilla groups present in Nuristan Province, as reported by the Shia news agency Shafaqna in May 2022.

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1613 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. For an explanation of how UCDP records events and fatalities, please refer to the sources section in the introduction of this report.

1614 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022.

1615 UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, para. 71, para. 87

1616 Steinberg, G. and Albrecht, A., Terror Against the Taliban: Islamic State Shows New Strength in Afghanistan [Opinion], SWP, 21 February 2022, p. 4


1618 Hahst-e Subh, 14 Taliban Fighters Killed and Injured in Attacks Carried Out by Afghanistan’s Freedom Front Forces in Three Provinces, 13 April 2022.

1619 ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (9–15 April 2022), 20 April 2022.

1620 Al-Bawaba News, Taliban’s Military Opposition and Civil War or Peace in Afghanistan, 19 April 2022.

1621 Shafaqna, جريدة: نور جمعيت نور جنرال نورستان اعلام موجودت كردن + فيديو [“Jamiat Noor” guerrillas announced their existence in Nuristan + video], 12 May 2022.
4.25.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

According to figures provided by UNOCHA, there were no conflict-induced displacements from Nuristan Province neither in the period between 15 August and 30 November 2021, nor in the period from January to the beginning of May 2022.

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 567 IDP arrivals in Nuristan Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. 1925 IDPs returned to Nuristan during that period according to IOM, while 414 persons moved abroad. From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 37 cross-border returnees from Iran and 11 from Pakistan to Nuristan Province.

No further information on the impact of the conflict on the civilian population was found within the time constraints of this report.

4.26. Paktika

Paktika Province is located in the south-east of Afghanistan, bordering Pakistan, and comprises 19 districts: Bermel (Barmal), Dila (Dila Wa Khushamand), Gomal, Gyan (Giyun, Gayan), Janikhel (Jani Khel), Mata Khan (Matakan), Naka (Niqa), Omna, Sarobi (Surubi, Surobi), Sarrawzah (Sar Rawza, Sar Hawza), Sharan (Sharana), Turwo (Terwa), Urgun (Urgoon), Wazakhan (Wazakhwah), Wor Mamay (Wormamay), Yahya Khel (Yahyakhel), Yosuf Khel (Yosufkhel), Zargunshahr (Kharikot), Ziruk (Zerok). The provincial capital is Sharan (Sharana).

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, Paktika Province has a population of 802 860. As of May 2022, UNOCHA estimated the population of the province at 1 030 877.
Together with the provinces of Khost and Paktya, Paktika forms the so-called Loya Paktya region, \(^{1629}\) a region described as ‘Pashtun heartland’\(^{1630}\) that was also depicted as the Hafqani network’s original ‘power base’.\(^{1631}\)

The population of Paktika Province is predominantly Pashtun,\(^{1632}\) with Tajik enclaves in the capital and in the second-largest town Urdun, situated in the southeast of the province.\(^{1633}\)

### 4.26.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 14 security incidents in Paktika Province, 8 of which were coded as ‘violence against civilians,’ 4 as ‘remote violence,’ and 2 as ‘battles’.\(^{1634}\)

In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded only one security incident and no civilian death in Paktika Province.\(^{1635}\) According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province resulted in 13 fatalities. The most affected district was Zargun Shahr (four security incidents).\(^{1636}\)

During the reference period, Paktika Province experienced security incidents linked to tensions between the Taliban government and the Pakistani government. In addition to direct border skirmishes in December 2021 and January 2022,\(^{1637}\) the province was also affected by the Pakistani airstrikes in April 2022, according to some sources.\(^{1638}\) (for more detailed information, please refer to section 4.18.1. Recent security trends in Khost Province, which was affected the most by these airstrikes). Hasht-e Subh reported in June 2022 that Pakistani security forces shot and killed an Afghan civilians on the Durand Line, according to local officials.\(^{1639}\)

According to a February 2022 report of the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, between 3 000 and 5 500 members of the TTP were present in Afghanistan.\(^{1640}\) These TTP members have reportedly found ‘safe havens’ in Paktika, Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, \(^{1632}\) UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Paktika Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, url, p. 1. Set filter to Paktika.

\(^{1633}\) EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022 as of 2 August 2022, url.

\(^{1634}\) EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. For an explanation of how UCDP records events and fatalities, please refer to the sources section in the introduction of this report.

\(^{1635}\) UN Security Council, Twenty-ninth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaeda and associated individuals and entities, S/2022/83, 3 February 2022, url, para. 66.
Nimroz, and Zabul, according to a June 2022 article by the Pakistani Express Tribune. In addition, in May 2022, the UN Monitoring Team reported on Al-Qaeda's (Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, AQIS) presence of 180 to 400 fighters in Paktika, Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz and Zabul provinces. Moreover, according to a November 2021 Reuters article, Paktika Province has been affected by frequent, small-scale atrocities by ISKP.

As indicated by ACLED, unidentified armed groups were involved in eight security incidents, mainly targeting civilians in acts of remote violence or acts of violence against civilians. The Taliban military forces were recorded by ACLED as being involved in five security incidents, 4 of which were incidents targeting civilians.

A November 2022 Human Rights Watch report and an article published in April 2022 in the New York Times indicated human rights abuses carried out by Taliban against individuals associated with the former Afghan government in Paktika Province. In an article published in November 2021, Pajhwok Afghan news reported on the killing of two tribal elders who had family ties to former government employees. According to a provincial resident quoted in the article, ‘officials of the previous government were being targeted and killed’.

4.26.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

In October 2021, residents of Mata Khan, Sarrawzah, and Yahya Khel districts reportedly called for the clearance of unexploded ordnance, landmines, and other explosives remnants of the recent fighting after three children were killed and another one injured by an unexploded ordnance in Mata Khan District.

In April 2022, Pajhwok reported on residents of Paktika demanding repairs to roads damaged by conflict and rain.

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1641 Express Tribune (The), TTP Talks: Lasting peace may still be a longshot, 12 June 2022, url
1642 UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, 26 May 2022, url, para. 50
1643 Reuters, Islamic State violence dents Taliban claims of safer Afghanistan, 9 November 2021, url
1644 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
1646 Pajhwok Afghan News, Tribal elder gunned down in Paktika, 19 November 2021, url
1647 Pajhwok Afghan News, 3 children killed, 1 injured in Paktika blast, 20 October 2022, url
1648 Pajhwok Afghan News, Paktika people ask government to repair damaged roads, 4 April 2022, url
(a) Displacement and returns

According to UNOCHA,\(^{1649}\) 35 individuals were displaced from Sarobi District to Herat Province in September 2021 due to conflict.\(^{1650}\) There were no displacement movements in the province recorded by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022.\(^{1651}\)

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 5 644 IDP arrivals in Paktika Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. According to IOM, 23 118 IDPs and 327 persons from abroad returned to Paktika during that period, while 3 634 persons moved abroad.\(^{1652}\) From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 654 cross-border returnees from Iran and 233 from Pakistan to Paktika Province.\(^{1653}\)

4.27. Paktya

Paktya is located in eastern Afghanistan, on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.\(^{1654}\) The province is divided into the following districts: Ahmadabad (Ahmadaba), Jaji (Jaji Aryub or Alikhel), Samkani (Chamkani), Dand Patan (Dand-e Patan, Dand Wa Patan), Garda Siray (Gerda Tserai), Gardez, Jani Khel (Janikhel), Laja Ahmad Khel, Laja Mangel (Laja Mangal), Mirzaka, Rohany Baba (Rohani Baba), Sayyid Karam (Sayed Karam, Sayedkaram), Shwak (Shawak), Wuza Zadran (Waza Zadran) and Zurmat.\(^{1655}\) The provincial capital is Gardez.\(^{1657}\)

As of April 2022, NSIA defined Garda Siray, Laja Mangel, Mirzaka and Rohany Baba as ‘temporary’ districts within the province.\(^{1658}\) In a 2018 article, AAN defined Laja Mangel and Mirzaka as ‘temporary districts’, meaning that they were considered to belong to Paktya Province and were approved by the former presidency, but their status as such had not been granted parliamentary approval.\(^{1659}\) AAN specified that Rohany Baba had been created out of Zurmat District.\(^{1660}\) However, in its 2014 provincial atlas, UNOCHA presented Sayyid

\(^{1649}\) Data cover period between 15 August 2021 and 30 November 2021 and between 1 January 2022 and 10 May 2022. UNOCHA does not provide data for December 2021.

\(^{1650}\) UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022, [url]

\(^{1651}\) UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022, [url]

\(^{1652}\) IOM, Afghanistan – Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November - December 2021), 2 March 2022, [url], p. 3

\(^{1653}\) UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Nuristan Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, [url], p. 2. Set filter to Nuristan.

\(^{1654}\) US, NPS, Paktya Provincial Overview, n.d., [url]

\(^{1655}\) UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Paktya Province – District Atlas, April 2014, [url], p. 2


\(^{1657}\) Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, [url], p. 51

\(^{1658}\) Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, [url], p. 51

\(^{1659}\) AAN, The Afghanistan Election Conundrum (12): Good news and bad news about district numbers, 16 August 2018, [url]

\(^{1660}\) Khan, P. and Ruttig, T., The 2018 Election Observed (1) in Zurmat, Paktia: Real voting only in the district centre, AAN, 29 October 2018, [url]
Karam/Mirzaka and Laja Ahmad Khel/Laja Mangel as different names referring to the same district.\textsuperscript{1661}

Together with the provinces of Paktika and Khost, Paktya forms the so-called Loya Paktya region, a region described as ‘Pashtun heartland’\textsuperscript{1662} that was also depicted as the Haqqani network’s original ‘power base’.\textsuperscript{1663}

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, Paktya Province has a population of 633,870.\textsuperscript{1664} UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated the population as of January 2022 at 813,000.\textsuperscript{1665}

NPS listed Pashtuns (91\%) as the main ethnic group in the province, followed by Tajiks (9\%).\textsuperscript{1666} In 2018, AAN noted that a small Shia community of mostly bilingual (Dari as a first language and Pashtu as a second) residents lived in Khwajah Hassan village, in the north-east of the provincial capital Gardez. They belong to a group called Sadat (singular Sayyed).\textsuperscript{1667} No information about the ethnic composition in Paktya Province after the Taliban takeover could be found within the time constraints of this report.

\subsection*{4.27.1. Recent security trends}

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 27 security incidents in Paktya Province, 12 of which were coded as ‘violence against civilians,’ 8 as ‘battles’, and 7 as ‘explosions/remote violence.’\textsuperscript{1668}

In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded no security incidents in Paktya Province.\textsuperscript{1669} According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province resulted in 25 fatalities. The most affected districts were Gardez (10), Ahmadabad (5), and Dand Patan (4 security incidents).\textsuperscript{1670}

ACLED attributed 17 incidents to unidentified armed groups.\textsuperscript{1671} On 25 December 2021, for example, a civilian was reportedly shot down by unidentified armed men in Gardez City.\textsuperscript{1672} In another incident in the first week of March 2022, a bomb exploded at the gate of a mosque in Dand Patan District, while reportedly hundreds of people were leaving the mosque after

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{[1661]} UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Paktya Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url, p. 2
\item \textsuperscript{[1662]} RFE/RL/Gandhara, In Afghanistan’s Pashtun Heartland, Tribal Rule Supersedes State Law, 15 February 2021, url
\item \textsuperscript{[1663]} Bacon, T. and Byman, D., De-Talibanization and the Onset of Insurgency in Afghanistan, 14 January 2021, url
\item \textsuperscript{[1664]} Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, p. 51
\item \textsuperscript{[1665]} UNOCHA, Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 46
\item \textsuperscript{[1666]} US, NPS, Paktya Provincial Overview, n.d., url
\item \textsuperscript{[1667]} Foschini, F., Hitting Gardez: A vicious attack on Paktia’s Shias, AAN, 18 August 2018, url
\item \textsuperscript{[1668]} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
\item \textsuperscript{[1669]} EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. For an explanation of how UCDP records events and fatalities, please refer to the sources section in the introduction of this report.
\item \textsuperscript{[1670]} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
\item \textsuperscript{[1671]} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
\item \textsuperscript{[1672]} Xinhua, Unknown armed men kill man in Afghanistan’s eastern Paktia province, 26 December 2021, url
\end{itemize}
Friday prayer. At least two individuals were killed and over 20 injured. As of March 2022, no group had claimed responsibility for the attack. However, according to ACLED and APW, the incident in Patan District ‘had the hallmarks of previous IS attacks on mosques’. Taliban forces were involved in 12 security incidents, including 6 coded as ‘battles’, resulting in 9 fatalities, 5 coded as ‘violence against civilians’, resulting in 2 fatalities, and 1 incident coded as ‘explosions/remote violence’, resulting in no fatalities.

According to ACLED, Pakistani military forces and unidentified Pakistani groups, respectively, were involved in one security incident each, resulting in no fatalities. According to a confidential source referred to in a report of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), two battles between Taliban forces and Pakistani security forces occurred in late January 2022 in Paktya Province.

In an August 2021 report by ExTrac, it was stated that, although ISKP had ‘had an active presence […] in provinces like Badakhshan, Khost, or Paktia’, it was ‘unclear if those cells are still present or were dismantled or disbanded’. In October 2021, it was reported with reference to provincial officials that five individuals with alleged ISKP ties were arrested in Paktya Province in a special operation. In early November 2021, it was reported that Paktya Province belonged to the areas affected by frequent, small-scale atrocities carried out by ISKP in Afghanistan. In April 2022, ACLED and APW reported that ISKP, besides the regions it has traditionally concentrated its activities on, had also become active in Paktya Province.

In a November 2021 report, Human Rights Watch stated that it had documented 47 cases in which Taliban fighters had extrajudicially executed or forcibly disappeared former security forces in the provinces of Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, and Kunduz. Human Rights Watch reported that it had indications that more than one hundred members of the former security forces had been killed in this manner, and that these incidents were part of a broader pattern that also manifested itself in other provinces such as Paktya. On 13 November 2021, Hasht-e Subh with reference to other sources reported that two female officers with affiliation to the army of the previous government were found dead in Gardez.

In May 2022, it was reported that house-to-house raids were carried out by the de facto authorities in Paktya Province, during which at least ‘100 weapons and 20 vehicles’ were...
seized. They had reportedly started in ‘Gardez city and neighboring areas’ a month earlier. According to a Taliban police official cited by Pajhwok Afghan News, the raid was launched ‘in suspected areas and houses’ and 20 persons were arrested during the raids, but later released on bail.\textsuperscript{1684} On 24 May 2022, according to a CPJ article, Taliban intelligence forces reportedly detained the owner of the local radio station Saday-e-Gardez (Gardez Voice Radio) in Gardez City. He was detained to an unknown location as stated by the detainee’s brother.\textsuperscript{1685} However, according to other sources, he went missing in Kabul.\textsuperscript{1686}

On 12 May 2022, ACLED reported that NLFA, ‘an anti-Taliban group that declared its formation in February [2022]’ had claimed a number of attacks against the Taliban in several Afghan provinces, among which Paktya Province.\textsuperscript{1687} On 6 May 2022, for example, it was reported that NLFA claimed to have killed five Taliban members in Ahmadabad.\textsuperscript{1688}

\subsection{4.27.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns}

According to UNOCHA,\textsuperscript{1689} no individuals were displaced due to conflict from Paktya Province between August and November 2021.\textsuperscript{1690} Furthermore, there were no displacement movements in the province recorded by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022.\textsuperscript{1691}

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 31 320 IDP arrivals in Paktya Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. According to IOM, 155 566 IDPs and 1 181 persons from abroad returned to Paktya during that period, while 7 847 persons moved abroad.\textsuperscript{1692} From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 704 returns from Iran and 180 from Pakistan to Paktya Province.\textsuperscript{1693}

No further information on the impact of the conflict on the civilian population in the province was found within the time constraints of this report.
4.28. Panjsher

Panjsher Province is located in north-eastern Afghanistan. The main area in Panjsher Province is the Panjsher Valley. The province is divided into the following districts: Bazarak, Dara (Darah), Ab Shar (Abshar; temporary district), Khenj (Khinj, Hes-e Awal, Hissa-e Awal), Onaba (Anawa, Unaba), Paryan, Rukha, and Shutul. The provincial capital is Bazarak. The Panjsher valley is about 120 kilometres long and protected by high mountain peaks. The valley is home to hydroelectric dams and a wind farm.

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, the population of Panjsher Province was estimated to be 175,910. UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Profile estimated the population as of May 2022 at 225,884.

Panjsher is mainly inhabited by ethnic Tajiks, but also by Hazaras, Pashai, Nuristanis, Ghilzai Pashtuns and other ethnic groups. No further information about the ethnic composition in Panjsher Province could be found after the Taliban takeover within the time constraints of this report.

4.28.1. Recent security trends

On 6 September 2021, Taliban declared that they had taken over Panjsher province.

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 181 security incidents in Panjsher Province, 136 of which were coded as ‘battles’, 25 as ‘violence against civilians,’ and 20 as ‘explosions/remote violence,’ as depicted in the graph below:

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1694 DW, Why Afghanistan's Panjshir remains out of Taliban's reach, 20 August 2022, url
1695 Washington Post (The), Inside the Taliban’s secret war in the Panjshir Valley, 8 June 2022, url
1697 BBC News, Afghanistan: The 'undefeated' Panjshir Valley - an hour from Kabul, 26 August 2021, url
1698 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, p. 97
1700 BBC News, Afghanistan: The 'undefeated' Panjshir Valley - an hour from Kabul, 26 August 2021, url
1701 US, NPS, Panjsher Provincial Overview, n.d., url
1702 SIGA, Vive la Résistance in Afghanistan? (English Version), 7 April 2022, url
1703 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
According to UCDP, 55 security-related events where registered in the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, of which 12 resulted in 61 civilian deaths. In 41 of the 55 events NRF was targeted by Taliban forces and in 14 events civilians were targeted.\(^{1706}\) According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province caused 488 fatalities. The most affected districts were Rukha (40), Unaba (35), Hisa-e Awal (25), Shutul (25), and Bazarak (23 security incidents).\(^{1706}\)

ACLED attributed 107 security incidents to NRF: 95 of these incidents were coded as ‘battles’ and 10 as ‘explosions/remote violence.’ Besides, among the security incidents attributed to Taliban, 38 incidents that involved NRF, mostly clashes and attacks, were recorded.\(^{1707}\)

According to an anonymous international source consulted by Landinfo in February 2022, there was no information suggesting that the Taliban were significantly challenged by armed rebel groups deriving from the previous regime. There were sporadic reports of resistance in the Panjsher Valley but it was difficult to tell the strength of the groups.\(^{1708}\) In December 2021, local sources claimed according to Hasht-e Subh that armed clashes between Taliban forces and forces of Abdul Hamid Khorasani, a high-ranking member of the Panjsher police force, had taken place in Anaba District.\(^{1709}\) In January 2022, Khorasani was targeted in an explosion while traveling in his vehicle in Rukha District, but survived the attack.\(^{1710}\)

According to the UN Secretary-General’s June 2022 report, NFF and AFF conducted attacks primarily in the provinces of Panjsher and Baghlan in the period between the end of January to mid-May 2022. UNAMA, however, was unable to verify most of the attack claims. Taliban maintained that this groups did ‘not constitute a significant challenge to their rule’. However, it

\(^{1704}\) EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]

\(^{1705}\) EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022

\(^{1706}\) EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]

\(^{1707}\) EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]

\(^{1708}\) EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]

\(^{1709}\) Norway, Landinfo, Afghanistan: Talibans regime – situasjoner etter maktovertakelsen [Afghanistan: the Taliban regime – situation after the takeover of power] [source: international source], 9 March 2022, [url], p. 16

\(^{1710}\) Hasht-e Subh, Armed Clashes between Taliban Forces and Hamid Khorasani's Men in Panjshir, 26 December 2021, [url]

\(^{1711}\) Pajhwok Afghan News, Panjsher’s deputy police chief survives bomb attack, 29 January 2022, [url]
announced the redeployment of Taliban security forces to northern provinces, including Panjshir, in early May.\footnote{UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/862-S/2022/485, 15 June 2022, \url{https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/disasters/rapeseed/}, para. 17} In May 2022, Taliban claimed that clearing operations were conducted in two valleys of Panjshir Province and acknowledged that ‘illegal armed men’ were present in the areas. Nevertheless, Taliban denied that clashes had occurred.\footnote{Pajhwok Afghan News, 42 people killed and injured in Afghanistan last week, 14 May 2022, \url{https://www.pajhwok.com/en/news}, No military incident happened in Panjsher, Takhar: Mujahid, 7 May 2022, \url{https://www.mujahidnews.com/news/17256031}}


ACLED attributed eleven security incidents an unidentified armed group. Seven of these incidents involved IEDs or other planted bombs or mines and shelling.\footnote{Pajhwok Afghan News, 42 people killed and injured in Afghanistan last week, 14 May 2022, \url{https://www.pajhwok.com/en/news}} On 18 and 21 January 2022, for example, Taliban vehicles were targeted in IED attacks in Rukah District.\footnote{PAW, Security incidents surge amid Taliban violence, 19 May 2022, \url{https://www.pajhwok.com/en/news}}
On 24 May 2022, a Taliban military vehicle was reportedly hit by a magnetic roadside mine in Astana area of Bazarak District.\textsuperscript{1729}

ACLED attributed 62 security incidents to Taliban military forces. Civilians were reportedly targeted/involved in 22 incidents, which caused overall 24 fatalities.\textsuperscript{1730} Taliban reportedly continued to detain civilians\textsuperscript{1731} and affiliates of the former government.\textsuperscript{1732} Several examples of the killing\textsuperscript{1733} of civilians by Taliban in the reference period were reported, including former members of the security forces.\textsuperscript{1734} On 12 March 2022, local residents claimed that Taliban members arrested and killed a shopkeeper in Matai village. Local Taliban said that seven Taliban members were arrested in connection with the killing.\textsuperscript{1735}

In June 2022, Human Rights Watch reported that Taliban forces had ‘unlawfully detained and tortured residents’ accused of association with NRF. Taliban fighters carried out ‘search operations targeting communities they allege are supporting NRF’ and ‘committed summary executions and enforced disappearances of captured fighters and other detainees.’ Human Rights Watch noted that Taliban forces detained residents of Khenj District and accused them of having links to NRF.\textsuperscript{1736}

### 4.28.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

In September 2021, three health facilities in Kenjh, Anawa, and Shutul districts were used as military bases, including the Panjsher Provincial Public Health Directorate. The directorate had been damaged, and equipment stolen or destroyed.\textsuperscript{1737}

\textsuperscript{1729} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url{https://www.acled.org/}
\textsuperscript{1730} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url{https://www.acled.org/}
\textsuperscript{1731} Hasht-e Subh, 30 to 40 Civilians Arrested in the First District of Panjshir, Says Taliban Spokesperson, 4 June 2022, \url{https://www.hashtsubh.com/en/2022/06/04/30-to-40-civilians-arrested-in-the-first-district-of-panjshir-says-taliban-spokesperson/}
\textsuperscript{1732} Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Continues Alleged Jailing of Innocent Residents in Panjshir, 2 June 2022, \url{https://www.hashtsubh.com/en/2022/06/02/taliban-continues-alleged-jailing-of-innocent-residents-in-panjshir/}
\textsuperscript{1733} Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Detains Dozens of Panjshiri Residents for Affiliation with NRF, 2 June 2022, \url{https://www.hashtsubh.com/en/2022/06/02/taliban-detains-dozens-of-panjshiri-residents-for-affiliation-with-nrf/}
\textsuperscript{1734} Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Raids, Tortures and Harasses the Residents of Paryan in Panjshir, 26 May 2022, \url{https://www.hashtsubh.com/en/2022/05/26/taliban-raids-tortures-and-harasses-the-residents-of-paryan-in-panjshir/}
\textsuperscript{1735} Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Kidnaps the Residents as Clashes Continue in Panjshir, 12 May 2022, \url{https://www.hashtsubh.com/en/2022/05/12/taliban-kidnaps-the-residents-as-clashes-continue-in-panjshir/}
\textsuperscript{1736} HRW, Afghanistan: Taliban Torture Civilians in Panjshir, 10 June 2022, \url{https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/10/afghanistan-taliban-torture-civilians-panjshir}
\textsuperscript{1737} WHO, Afghanistan: Attacks on Health Care (September 2021), 13 October 2021, \url{https://www.who.int/countries/afg/en/}
In May 2022, it was reported that Taliban cut off telecommunication antennas in Abshar District, due to clashes with NRF forces.\(^{1738}\)

(a) Displacement and returns

In May 2022 the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, Richard Bennett, expressed concern about allegations of ‘forced displacement in Panjsher and other northern provinces, which have recently seen clashes between the de facto security forces and fighters affiliated with the National Resistance Front.’\(^{1739}\)

According to UNOCHA,\(^{1740}\) 6 188 persons were displaced due to conflict from several districts in September 2021. The persons were displaced to Kabul, Kapisa, and Parwan provinces.\(^{1741}\) In the end of April and beginning of May 2022, 392 people were internally displaced to Bazarak, Rukha, and Onaba districts in the province as well as from Panjsher province to Kabul and Parwan provinces.\(^{1742}\)

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 1 605 IDP arrivals in Panjsher Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. According to IOM, 69 013 IDPs and 164 persons from abroad returned to Panjsher during that period, while 7 214 persons moved abroad.\(^{1743}\) From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 1 362 returns from Iran to Panjsher Province.\(^{1744}\)

4.29. Parwan

Parwan Province is located north of Kabul Province and comprises the following districts: Bagram, Charikar, Ghorband (Syahgird, Ghurband), Jabalussaraj, Koh-e Safi, Salang, Saydkhel (Sayyid Khel), Shekhali (Shaykh Ali), Shinwari and Surkh-e Parsa (Surkhi Parsa). The provincial capital is Charikar.\(^{1745}\)

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, Parwan Province has a population of 764 580.\(^{1746}\) UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Profile estimated the population as of May 2022 at 980 635.\(^{1747}\)

\(^{1738}\) Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Cuts off the Telecommunication Antennas of Abshar, Panjshir, 6 May 2022, url
\(^{1739}\) OHCHR, Facing critical human rights challenges, Afghanistan at a crossroads, says UN expert in Kabul, 26 May 2022, url
\(^{1740}\) Data cover period between 15 August 2021 and 30 November 2021 and between 1 January 2022 and 10 May 2022. UNOCHA does not provide data for December 2021.
\(^{1741}\) UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022, url
\(^{1742}\) UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022, url
\(^{1743}\) IOM, Afghanistan – Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November - December 2021), 2 March 2022, p. 3
\(^{1744}\) UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Panjsher Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, url, p. 2. Set filter to Panjsher.
\(^{1746}\) Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, p. 20
An undated profile published by NPS noted that the province was mainly inhabited by Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Qizilbash, Kuchis, Hazaras. No further information about the ethnic composition in Parwan Province after the Taliban takeover could be found within the time constraints of this report.

**4.29.1. Recent security trends**

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 82 security incidents in Parwan Province, 60 of which were coded as ‘battles’, 12 as ‘violence against civilians,’ and 10 as ‘explosions/remote violence,’ as depicted in the graph below:

![Graph showing security events coded as 'battles', 'remote violence/explosions,' and 'violence against civilians' from 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, based on ACLED data]

Figure 13. Parwan Province - Security events coded as ‘battles’, ‘remote violence/explosions,’ and ‘violence against civilians’ from 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, based on ACLED data.

In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded seven security incidents, resulting in three civilian deaths. According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province caused 153 fatalities. The most affected districts were Jabulussaraj (36), Charikar (23), and Bagram (12 security incidents).

ACLED attributed 40 security incidents to NRF, consisting of 35 ‘battles’ and 5 incidents of ‘explosions/remote violence.’ Besides, NRF was involved in seven of the Taliban-attributed security incidents. Clashes between NRF and Taliban forces were reported in March and May 2022.

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1748 US, NPS, Parwan Provincial Overview, n.d., url
1749 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
1750 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
1751 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. For an explanation of how UCDP records events and fatalities, please refer to the sources section in the introduction of this report.
1752 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
1753 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
1754 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
1755 ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (5–11 March 2022), 16 March 2022, url
1756 ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (7–13 May 2022), 19 May 2022, url

1748 US, NPS, Parwan Provincial Overview, n.d., url
1749 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
1750 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
1751 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. For an explanation of how UCDP records events and fatalities, please refer to the sources section in the introduction of this report.
1752 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
1753 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
1754 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url
1755 ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (5–11 March 2022), 16 March 2022, url
1756 ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (7–13 May 2022), 19 May 2022, url
According to ACLED, AFF was involved in 11 security incidents. Thus, in early April 2022, AFF attacked the Taliban in several provinces, including Parwan. An AFF attack was also reported in February 2022 and AFF also claimed to have carried out attacks on Taliban bases in Jabalussaraj District in May and June 2022.

ACLED attributed 19 security incidents to Taliban forces, including eight incidents coded as ‘violence against civilians.’ In April 2022, for example, a man was reportedly detained and killed by Taliban fighters for allegedly being a member of NRF. Family members claimed that the Taliban also took away the victim’s brother-in-law.

In total, as recorded by ACLED, civilians faced violence in 12 events, which caused 13 fatalities, and involved Taliban forces, or an unidentified armed group, or in one security incident a Kuchi tribal militia. On 4 May 2022, as reported by Hasht-e Subh, unidentified gunmen reportedly killed a former army soldier.

In April 2022, according to Hasht-e Subh, residents of the province reported an increase in armed robberies over the past months. In May 2022, armed robbers killed a muezzin in April 2022, a student in Gul Bahar District and in March 2022 an old man in Charikar City.

4.29.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

In April 2022, unidentified persons blew up two power pylons in Takhma area in Salang District. According to ACLED, the power pylons were destroyed by ‘IS[KP] explosives.’ People in 11 Afghan provinces faced blackouts after the blasts. Temporary repairs to partially restore power would be performed, but the full restoration would take two weeks, the power company claimed.

EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (2–8 April 2022), 13. April 2022, ACLED and APW, Tracking Disorder During Taliban Rule in Afghanistan, A Joint ACLED and APW Report, April 2022, Hasht-e Subh, The Freedom Front Forces Kill 3 and Injure 4 Taliban Fighters in Parwan, 17 May 2022, Hasht-e Subh, AFF Forces Kill Three Taliban Fighters and Injure Five Others in Parwan, 16 June 2022, EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data, ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Kills a Young Man Accused of Affiliation with NRF Forces in Parwan, 10 April 2022, EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data, ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, Hasht-e Subh, Anonymous Gunmen Shot Dead a Former Army Soldier in Parwan, 5 May 2022, Hasht-e Subh, Armed Robberies Unprecedently Increase in Afghanistan’s Parwan: Perpetrators Use Military Outfits and Taliban Title, 27 April 2022, Hasht-e Subh, Armed Robbers Kill a Muezzin in Parwan, 29 May 2022, Hasht-e Subh, Armed Robbers Kill a Young Boy, Second Year Student at Parwan University, 21 April 2022, Hasht-e Subh, Local Taliban Forces: Armed Thieves Murder an Old Man in Parwan Province, 25 March 2022, Pajhwok Afghan News, 2 arrested over destroying power pylons in Salang, 30 April 2022, Pajhwok Afghan News, Power pylon fixed in Salang, says DABS, 11 May 2022.

Al Jazeera, Blasts cut power to millions in Afghanistan before Eid holiday, 30 April 2022, Pajhwok Afghan News, 2 arrested over destroying power pylons in Salang, 30 April 2022
(a) Displacement and returns

According to figures provided by UNOCHA for mid-August to November 2021, 2,907 persons were displaced due to conflict from Charikar (2,249), Jabalussaraj (553), and Koh-e-Safi (105) districts. All persons were displaced to Kabul (2,788) and Herat (119) provinces. There were no displacement movements in or out of the province recorded by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022.

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 25,095 IDP arrivals in Parwan Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. 97,057 IDPs and 3,768 persons from abroad returned to Parwan during that period according to IOM, while 36,061 persons moved abroad. From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 9,688 returns from Iran and 21 from Pakistan to Parwan Province.

4.30. Samangan

Samangan Province is located in the northern part of Afghanistan. It is divided into the following districts: Aybak, Dara-e-Suf-e-Payin (Dara-e-soof-i-Payin), Dara-e Suf-e-Bala (Dara-e-soof-e-Bala), Feroznakchir (Feroz Nakhcheer), Hazrat-e-Sultan, Khuram Wa Sarbagh and Ruy-e-Duab (Rui-Do-Ab). The provincial capital is Aybak.

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, Samangan Province has a population of 446,100. UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Profile estimated the population as of May 2022 at 572,253.

An undated profile published by NPS noted that the province is ethnically diverse with Tajiks (65%), Uzbeks (30%), Pashtuns, Hazaras, Tartars, and Turkmen. A minority population of Arabs is also present. No further information about the ethnic composition in Samangan Province after the Taliban takeover could be found within the time constraints of this report.
4.30.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 17 security incidents in Samangan Province, 10 of which were coded as ‘violence against civilians,’ and 7 as ‘battles.’

In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded three security-related events, resulting in seven civilian deaths. According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province resulted in 25 fatalities. The most affected districts were Dara Sof Balla (five security incidents) and Aybak (four security incidents).

ACLED attributed 11 security incidents to Taliban military forces, consisting of four ‘battles’ and seven instances of ‘violence against civilians.’ In January 2022, for example, a 65-year-old man was reportedly beaten by Taliban in Nakhjir District, and had his arm and leg broken, when he tried to oppose the alleged usurpation of parts of his land. In three incidents involving civilians recorded by ACLED, members of former police or military forces were targeted.

In the reference period, ACLED recorded three instances of clashes between Taliban military forces and NRF in the province. Furthermore, one incident was attributed to AFF. In early April 2022, AFF attacked the Taliban in several provinces, including—for the first time—in Samangan Province. In February 2022, according to a Taliban police statement, a ‘militant’ was killed and another arrested during a security force operation in Dara-e-Suf-e-Payin District.

In late April 2022, the arrest of at least ten former local commanders by Taliban was reported. In early May 2022, Taliban arrested an Uzbek Taliban commander for helping NRF. On 9 May 2022, Taliban fighters killed a former local commander, who had joined NRF, and in late May 2022, a former local police commander in Hazrat-e-Sultan District was reportedly tortured and possibly killed. At the time of the report, his whereabouts were unknown.

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1784 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]
1785 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. For an explanation of how UCDP records events and fatalities, please refer to the sources section in the introduction of this report.
1786 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]
1787 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]
1788 Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Affiliates Beat Up an Old Man in Samangan, 3 January 2022, [url]
1789 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]
1790 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url]
1791 Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Detains at Least 10 Local Commanders of the Former Government in Samangan, 29 April 2022, [url]
1792 Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Detains at Least 10 Local Commanders of the Former Government in Samangan, 29 April 2022, [url]
1793 Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Arrests Their Local Uzbek Commander in Samangan, 5 May 2022, [url]
1794 Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Murders a Former Local Commander of Samangan, 9 May 2022, [url]
unknown. Also in May 2022, Taliban arrested and killed a tribal leader, who had been accused of affiliation with NRF.

ACLED attributed four security incidents to an unidentified armed group, including three incidents in which civilians were involved. In one of the incidents, Hazaras were targeted when on 26 April 2022, unidentified gunmen robbed and killed five ethnic Hazara coal miners in Dara-e Suf Bala District.

4.30.2. **Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns**

In May 2022, unidentified men blew up three power pylons importing electricity from Uzbekistan, and Taliban reportedly used a school as a military base in the village of Khwaja Ismail in the city of Aybak.

(a) **Displacement and returns**

According to figures provided by UNOCHA for mid-August to November 2021, no persons were displaced due to conflict in or out of the province. There were also no displacement movements in or out of the province recorded by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022.

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 8,358 IDP arrivals in Samangan Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. According to IOM, 40,356 IDPs and 1,273 persons from abroad returned to Samangan during that period, while 14,676 persons moved abroad. From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 1,458 returns from Iran and 6 from Pakistan to Samangan Province.

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1796 Hasht-e Subh, An Ex-Local Police Commander Killed by Taliban in Samangan, 1 June 2022,
1797 Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Rebels Shot Dead a Tribal Leader in Samangan, 17 May 2022,
1798 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022,
1799 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022,
1800 KP, Five Coal Miners gunned Down in Samangan province, 27 April 2022,
1801 Pajhwok Afghan News, 3 power pylons blown up in Samangan, 23 May 2022,
1802 Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Changes a Public School into Military Base in Samangan, 28 May 2022,
1803 Data cover period between 15 August 2021 and 30 November 2021 and between 1 January 2022 and 10 May 2022. UNOCHA does not provide data for December 2021.
1804 UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022,
1805 UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022,
1806 IOM, Afghanistan – Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November - December 2021), 2 March 2022, p. 3
1807 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Samangan Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022,
4.31. Sar-e Pul

Sar-e Pul Province is located in the north of Afghanistan and is divided into the following districts: Balkhab, Gosfandi, Kohistanat, Sancharak, Sar-e Pul, Sayyad and Sozma Qala. The provincial capital is Sar-e Pul.

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, Sar-e Pul Province has a population of 643,530. UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated the population as of January 2022 at 826,000.

The population of Sar-e Pul was described as multi-ethnic and mostly tribal, with Uzbeks making up the majority. Other ethnic groups comprised Pashtuns, Hazara, Tajiks, Turkmen, Baluch, and Aimaq. No further information about the ethnic composition in Sar-e Pul Province after the Taliban takeover could be found.

4.31.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded nine security incidents in Sar-e Pul Province, seven of which were coded as ‘battles’, and two as ‘violence against civilians’.

In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP did not record any conflict-related incidents or civilian fatalities in Sar-e Pul. According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province resulted in 61 fatalities. The most affected district was Balkhab (seven security incidents).

ACLED attributed five security incidents to the Taliban, comprising five ‘battles’ and two incidents of ‘violence against civilians.’ AFF was attributed one and anti-Taliban forces another one security incident.

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1810 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, p. 79.
1811 Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, p. 79.
1812 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 46.
1814 New York Times (The), The fall of Sar-i-Pul threatens a commercial hub in Afghanistan’s north, 8 August 2021, url.
1816 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url.
1817 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. For an explanation of how UCDP records events and fatalities, please refer to the sources section in the introduction of this report.
1818 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url.
1819 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url.
In January 2022, the Taliban deployed more than 2,500 troops to Sar-e Pul Province.\footnote{ANI, Taliban deploys more than 2,500 troops to Sar-e-Pul to provide security, 18 January 2022, \url{url}} In March 2022, AFF claimed to have killed at least six Taliban members in several provinces, among them Sar-e Pul.\footnote{ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (19–25 March 2022), 31 March 2022, \url{url}} In June 2022, Afghan media reported clashes between the Taliban and a renegade Taliban commander in Balkhab District lasting for several days and leading to casualties.\footnote{Hashsh-e Subh, Fierce Clashes Resume in Balkhab District, Sar-e-Pul Province, 25 June 2022, \url{url}; Etilaat Roz, حمله و تلفات نیروهای طالبان در بلخاب؛ قاری فصیح‌الدین برای مدیریت جنگ به سر زد [Attack repelled and casualties among the Taliban in Balkhab, Qari Fasihuddin went to Sar-e-Pul to manage the war], 23 June 2022, \url{url}} On 28 June 2022, Taliban forces launched an attack on Balkhab District and captured the district capital.\footnote{International Crisis Group, Crisiswatch: Tracking Conflict Worldwide, n.d., \url{url}} International human rights organisations received reports of extrajudicial killings, displacement and other human rights abuses against civilians in the course of the clashes.\footnote{VOA, Taliban’s Alleged Extrajudicial Killings in Afghan District Worry UN, Rights Groups, 27 June 2022, \url{url}; RFE/RL/Gandhara, Taliban Atrocities Reported In Crackdown On Rebel Hazara Commander, 1 July 2022, \url{url}; ACLED and APW, Tracking Disorder During Taliban Rule in Afghanistan, A Joint ACLED and APW Report, April 2022, \url{url}, p. 12}

4.31.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

ACLED and APW mentioned that a communal militia with backing from a Taliban commander seized lands from Uzbeks in the province in January 2022.\footnote{International Crisis Group, Crisiswatch: Tracking Conflict Worldwide, n.d., \url{url}}

(a) Displacement and returns

UNOCHA\footnote{UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022, \url{url}, p. 12} did not record any displacements from Sar-e Pul Province from mid-August 2021 to November 2021.\footnote{UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022, \url{url}} Moreover, there were no displacement movements recorded in or out of the province by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022.\footnote{UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022, \url{url}}

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 15,368 IDP arrivals in Sar-e Pul Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. According to IOM 62,364 IDPs and 3,101 persons from abroad returned to Sar-e Pul during that period, while 40,548 persons moved abroad.\footnote{IOM, Afghanistan – Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November - December 2021), 2 March 2022, \url{url}, p. 3} From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 6,610 returns from Iran and 77 returns from Pakistan to the province.\footnote{UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Sar-e Pul Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, \url{url}, p. 2. Set filter to Sar-e-Pul.}

4.32. Takhar

Takhar Province is located in the north-eastern part of Afghanistan, borders Tajikistan to the north\footnote{UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Takhar Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, \url{url}, p. 1. Set filter to Takhar.} and is divided into the following districts: Baharak, Bangi, Chahab, Chal, Darqad,
Dasht-e Qala (Dashti Qala), Eshkamesh, Farkhar, Hazar Sumuch (Hazarsumuch), Kalafgan, Khwajabahawuddin (Khwaja Bahawuddin), Khwaja Ghar (Khwajaghar), Namakab (Namak Ab), Rostaq (Rustaq), Taloqan (Taluqan), Warsaj and Yangi Qala.\textsuperscript{1832} The capital of the province is Taloqan.\textsuperscript{1833}

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, Takhar Province has a population of 1,133,570.\textsuperscript{1834} UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated the population as of January 2022 at 1.5 million.\textsuperscript{1835}

The province was described as multi-ethnic and mostly rural\textsuperscript{1836}, with Uzbeks and Tajiks as the main ethnic groups in the province\textsuperscript{1837}. Other groups present in the province include Pashtuns and Hazaras.\textsuperscript{1838} No information about the ethnic composition in Takhar Province after the Taliban takeover could be found within the time constraints of this report.

### 4.32.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 104 security incidents in Takhar Province, 55 of which were coded as ‘battles’, 41 as ‘violence against civilians’ and 8 as ‘explosions/remote violence,’ as depicted in the graph below.\textsuperscript{1839}

Figure 14: Takhar Province - Security events coded as ‘battles’, ‘remote violence/explosions,’ and ‘violence against civilians’ from 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, based on ACLED data\textsuperscript{1840}

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\textsuperscript{1833} Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, \textit{url}, p. 67

\textsuperscript{1834} Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, \textit{url}, p. 67

\textsuperscript{1835} UNOCHA, Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022, 7 January 2022, \textit{url}, p. 46


\textsuperscript{1837} AAN, A Maelstrom of Militias: Takhar, a case study of strongmen co-opting the ALP, 14 November 2019, \textit{url}


\textsuperscript{1839} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \textit{url}

\textsuperscript{1840} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \textit{url}
In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded 13 security incidents resulting in 14 civilian fatalities in Takhar Province. According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province resulted in 134 fatalities. The most affected districts were Taluqan (32), Warsaj (15), and Dasht-i Qala (10 security incidents).

ACLED attributed 42 security incidents to the Taliban, seven of which were coded as ‘battles.’ NRF was attributed 26 security incidents and AFF six security incidents, all of which were clashes with and attacks on the Taliban forces. Seven battles were coded as internal clashes between Taliban factions. On 11 June 2022, for example, internal clashes between Taliban factions occurred in Taloqan City. Reportedly, at least two civilians were killed during the fighting. According to Taliban sources, these were not clashes between Taliban factions but between Taliban forces and ISKP fighters during an operation on an ISKP hideout.

In May 2022, APW reported that the activity of anti-Taliban forces had recently risen in some provinces, including Takhar. In April and May 2022, NRF reportedly carried out attacks on the Taliban while the Taliban launched counter-operations in Takhar. In early-May 2022, it was reported that NRF had attacked Taliban bases in Warsaj District and had captured a number of the district’s villages. Reportedly, the Taliban deployed their ‘Badri suicide bomber brigade’ to the area on 7 May 2022. The Taliban, though denying that the attacks have occurred, confirmed they had deployed new forces to the province.

According to NRF, Taliban forces had ‘arrested, tortured, and killed innocent civilians on alleged charges of affiliation with NRF’ in the province. In May 2022, the UN Human Rights Committee in a statement expressed its concern about ‘information, received directly, of

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1841 EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. For an explanation of how UCDP records events and fatalities, please refer to the sources section in the introduction of this report.

1842 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url

1843 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url

1844 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url

1845 EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, url

1846 Ariana News, Seven Daesh members killed in Takhar operation, 12 June 2022, url

1847 BBC Monitoring South Asia, Taliban claim killing IS members in Afghan city, 12 June 2022; KP, The Taliban Claims Killing 8 ISIS Militants in Taloqan City, 12 June 2022, url; Ariana News, Seven Daesh members killed in Takhar operation, 12 June 2022, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Takhar clash claims lives of 2 civilians, 12 June 2022, url

1848 Hasht-e Subh, Clashes Erupt Between Taliban Forces in Takhar: Eight People Killed, Including Civilians, 11 June 2022, url

1849 Hasht-e Subh, Clashes Erupt Between Taliban Forces in Takhar: Eight People Killed, Including Civilians, 11 June 2022, url

1850 Hasht-e Subh, Clashes Erupt Between Taliban Forces in Takhar: Eight People Killed, Including Civilians, 11 June 2022, url

1851 Hasht-e Subh, Clashes Erupt Between Taliban Forces in Takhar: Eight People Killed, Including Civilians, 11 June 2022, url

1852 Hasht-e Subh, Clashes Erupt Between Taliban Forces in Takhar: Eight People Killed, Including Civilians, 11 June 2022, url

1853 Hasht-e Subh, Clashes Erupt Between Taliban Forces in Takhar: Eight People Killed, Including Civilians, 11 June 2022, url

1854 Hasht-e Subh, Clashes Erupt Between Taliban Forces in Takhar: Eight People Killed, Including Civilians, 11 June 2022, url

1855 Hasht-e Subh, NRF in Panjshir Claims Irreparable Damage on the Taliban, But The Taliban Rejects Ground Realities, 8 May 2022, url; ACLED, Regional Overview – South Asia and Afghanistan (23 April – 6 May 2022), 12 May 2022, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, No military incident happened in Panjsher, Takhar: Mujahid, 7 May 2022, url; Germany, BAMF, Briefing Notes, 9 May 2022, url, p. 1

1856 Germany, BAMF, Briefing Notes, 9 May 2022, url, p. 1; Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Deploys Badri Suicide Bombers Unit Forces in Versaj District, Takhar, 7 May 2022, url

1857 Pajhwok Afghan News, No military incident happened in Panjsher, Takhar: Mujahid, 7 May 2022, url

1858 Hasht-e Subh, NRF in Panjshir Claims Irreparable Damage on the Taliban, But The Taliban Rejects Ground Realities, 8 May 2022, url

1859 Hasht-e Subh, NRF in Panjshir Claims Irreparable Damage on the Taliban, But The Taliban Rejects Ground Realities, 8 May 2022, url

1860 Hasht-e Subh, NRF: Taliban Deploys 30,000 Special Fighters in Panjshir, Baghlan and Takhar, 3 June 2022, url
human rights violations and abuses against civilians’ in provinces, including Takhar, were
clashes between Taliban forces and NRF affiliated fighters had occurred. The allegations,
according to the source, included ‘arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial killings, torture, and forced
placement’. The reference period, several incidents of killings of persons with alleged
NRF affiliation by Taliban forces were reported. In mid-May 2022, reportedly three
residents of Warsaj District accused of NRF affiliation were shot dead by Taliban forces. On
19 June 2022, a local commander of the former government was arrested in Taloqan City by
Taliban forces. According to an Hasht-e Subh article, he was arrested on accusations of
NRF affiliation.

The Taliban were furthermore involved in 34 incidents coded as ‘violence against civilians.’
Among them there were different forms of attacks, resulting in 23 recorded fatalities. During
the reference period, several incidents of killings of members of the security forces of
the previous government by Taliban forces were reported. On 12 May 2022, for example, a
police officer affiliated with the previous government was reportedly shot dead by Taliban
forces in Taloqan City. Furthermore, on 16 May 2022, a former soldier of the Afghan
National Army was shot and killed by Taliban forces.

In December 2021, ACLED reported that the first ISKP attack since the beginning of ACLED’s
Afghan coverage in 2017, had occurred in Takhar Province. Furthermore, in May 2022, ISKP
reportedly claimed to have fired rockets from Khwaja Ghar District toward Tajikistan on 7 May
2022. According to Tajikistan officials, bullets were accidentally fired into its territory during a
clash between ISKP and Taliban forces, not rockets.

1855. UN OHCHR, Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights, Richard
Bennett, following his visit to Afghanistan from May 15-26, 2022, 26 May 2022, url. p. 3
1856. Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Shot Dead a Former Police Officer Along With Three Civilians in Takhar, 15 May 2022,
url; Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Fighters Kill a Shepherd for Affiliation with NRF in Takhar, 2 June 2022, url; Hasht-e
Subh, Residents in Versaj District, Takhar: Taliban Commander Mass Murders the Residents, 11 May 2022, url
1857. Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Shot Dead a Former Police Officer Along With Three Civilians in Takhar, 15 May 2022,
url
1858. NRF, Taliban Arrested a Former Commander in Takhar, 22 June 2022, url; aamaj news, یطالبان در تخار یک یک
فراصت فرمانده [Taliban arrested a former commander of popular uprisings in Takhar], 21 June
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1859. Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Arrests an Ex-Local Commander in Takhar, 21 June 2022, url
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ACLED attributed to unidentified armed groups 21 security incidents, consisting of incidents involving civilians, armed clashes with Taliban forces and IED explosions. Furthermore, six armed clashes were recorded between ISKP militants and Taliban forces in Taloqan City.\footnote{EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, }\footnote{Hasht-e Subh, Clashes Erupt Between Taliban Forces in Takhar: Eight People Killed, Including Civilians, 11 June 2022, }\footnote{BBC Monitoring South Asia, Taliban claim killing IS members in Afghan city, 12 June 2022; KP, The Taliban Claims Killing 8 ISIS Militants in Taloqan City, 12 June 2022, }\footnote{Ariana News, Seven Daesh members killed in Takhar operation, 12 June 2022, }\footnote{Pajhwok Afghan News, Takhar clash claims lives of 2 civilians, 12 June 2022, }

4.32.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

Armed clashes on 11 June 2022\footnote{BBC Monitoring South Asia, Taliban claim killing IS members in Afghan city, 12 June 2022; KP, The Taliban Claims Killing 8 ISIS Militants in Taloqan City, 12 June 2022, Ariana News, Seven Daesh members killed in Takhar operation, 12 June 2022, Pajhwok Afghan News, Takhar clash claims lives of 2 civilians, 12 June 2022, } reportedly led to the closure of the Takhar-Badakhshan highway. Furthermore, in parts of Taloqan City, electricity has been cut off due to the intense fighting.\footnote{Hasht-e Subh, Clashes Erupt Between Taliban Forces in Takhar: Eight People Killed, Including Civilians, 11 June 2022, }

(a) Displacement and returns

UNOCHA\footnote{Data cover period between 15 August 2021 and 30 November 2021 and between 1 January 2022 and 10 May 2022. UNOCHA does not provide data for December 2021.}\footnote{UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022, }\footnote{UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022, } recorded 22 603 displacements from Takhar Province in the period from August to November 2021, almost all of them displaced within the province and 56 to Herat Province.\footnote{UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022, UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022, }\footnote{IOM, Afghanistan – Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November - December 2021), 2 March 2022, }\footnote{UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Takhar Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, p. 2. Set filter to Takhar.} There were no displacement movements recorded in or out of the province by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022.\footnote{UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Takhar Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, p. 2. Set filter to Takhar.}

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 29 503 IDP arrivals in Takhar Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. According to IOM, 73 421 IDPs and 6 577 persons from abroad returned to Takhar during that period, while 84 818 persons moved abroad.\footnote{UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Takhar Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, p. 2. Set filter to Takhar.} From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 11 240 returns from Iran and 56 returns from Pakistan to the province.\footnote{UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Takhar Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, p. 2. Set filter to Takhar.}

4.33. Uruzgan

Uruzgan (Urozgan) Province is located in the central part of Afghanistan and is also spelled as ‘Rozgan’ or ‘Uruzganis’.\footnote{Pajhwok Afghan News, Elections 2019 - Brief introduction of Uruzgan province, n.d., } Uruzgan is divided into the following administrative units: Tirinkot,
Dehrawud (Dehraoud), Chora, Chinarto (temporary district), Gizab, Shahid-e Hassas (Shahidhassas), and Khas Urozgan (Khas Urozgan). The provincial capital is Tirinkot.\textsuperscript{1876}

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, Uruzgan Province has a population of 451,640.\textsuperscript{1877} UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated the population as of January 2022 at 580,000.\textsuperscript{1878}

An undated profile published by NPS notes that the main ethnic groups in the province are Durrani Pashtuns and Hazaras.\textsuperscript{1879} No further information about the ethnic composition in Uruzgan Province after the Taliban takeover could be found within the time constraints of this report.

\textbf{4.33.1. Recent security trends}

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 18 security incidents in Uruzgan Province, 9 of which were coded as ‘explosions/remote violence,’ 5 as ‘violence against civilians,’ and 4 as ‘battles.’\textsuperscript{1880}

In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded no security-related events.\textsuperscript{1881} According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province resulted in 18 fatalities. The most affected district was Tirinkot (ten security incidents).\textsuperscript{1882}

According to ACLED, civilians were involved in 14 security incidents, comprising 2 incidents attributed to Taliban military forces and 12 events an unidentified armed group.\textsuperscript{1883}

In three recorded by ACLED, members of the security forces of the former government were targeted.\textsuperscript{1884} In March 2022 sources noted that recent killings included the killing of a former police officer\textsuperscript{1885} and a former soldier.\textsuperscript{1886} On 20 March 2022, Hasht-e Subh reported that 12 former soldiers had been killed in Tirinkot (Tarinkot) and other districts so far.\textsuperscript{1887}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
4.33.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns

According to UNOCHA, Uruzgan is one of the eight provinces ‘with the highest priority’ for UNMAS survey, as an area ‘where threats of improvised mines have been reported as a result of recent conflicts.’ In November 2021, Pajhwok Afghan News reported on ERW resulting in casualties in some parts of the province. The article mentioned an incident in Tirinkot District with one fatality and the existence of ERW in Chora District. On 7 November 2021, Pajhwok Afghan News reported that three children were killed in an ERW explosion in Chashma Miran area of Tirinkot District. In March 2022 at least three children were killed and six injured when UXO detonated in four Afghan provinces, including in Uruzgan. In April 2022 two children were injured when playing with a hand grenade, two children were injured in a bullet explosion and at least one child was killed and another injured in a landmine explosion.

In May 2022, the education department of the province announced the reopening of 32 schools. The buildings had been damaged due to conflict.

(a) Displacement and returns

Human Rights Watch reported in October 2021 on displacements in villages in Daykundi and Uruzgan provinces, resulting in the eviction of at least 2 800 Hazara by Taliban in September 2021. In April 2022, according to Hasht-e Subh, residents claimed that Taliban fighters looted houses in Tirinkot and other districts and turned them into military bases. Particularly properties of former government and security affiliates were used for this purpose, Hasht-e Subh noted.

According to numbers provided by UNOCHA for mid-August to November 2021, no persons were displaced due to conflict in or out of the province. There were also no displacement movements in or out of the province recorded by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022.

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 1 624 IDP arrivals in Uruzgan Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. According to IOM, 2 079

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1888 As of January 2022, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was to conduct ‘a village-by-village landmine/explosive impact survey across the country’. UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Response Plan 2022, 11 January 2022, url, pp. 78-79
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1890 Pajhwok Afghan News, Uruzgan residents want authorities to remove landmines, 16 November 2021, url
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1899 UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022, url
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IDPs and 64 persons from abroad returned to Uruzgan during that period, while 392 persons moved abroad.\textsuperscript{1901} From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 1 535 returns from Iran and 452 from Pakistan to Uruzgan Province.\textsuperscript{1902}

### 4.34. Wardak

Wardak (Maidan Wardak) Province is located in central Afghanistan\textsuperscript{1903} and comprises the following districts: Chak-e Wardak (Chak-e Maidan Wardak), Daymirdad (Daimir Dad), Hesa-e Awal-e Behsud (Hissa-e awali Behsud), Jaghatu, Jalrez, Markaz-e Behsud, Maydan Shahr, Nerkh and Saydabad (Sayyid Abad). The provincial capital is Maydan Shahr.\textsuperscript{1904}

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, Wardak Province has a population of 683 540.\textsuperscript{1905} UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Profile estimated the population as of May 2022 at 877 687.\textsuperscript{1906}

The main ethnic group in Wardak is Pashtuns, followed by Hazaras and Tajiks.\textsuperscript{1907} The districts of Hesa-e Awal-e Behsud, Markaz-e Behsud and Daymirdad are predominantly inhabited by Hazaras, as well as periodically visited by migrating Kuchi nomads.\textsuperscript{1908} No further information about the ethnic composition in Wardak Province after the Taliban takeover could be found within the time constraints of this report.

#### 4.34.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 11 security incidents in Wardak Province, 6 of which were coded as ‘violence against civilians,’ 3 as ‘explosions/remote violence,’ and 2 as ‘battles.’\textsuperscript{1909}

\textsuperscript{1901} IOM, Afghanistan – Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November - December 2021), 2 March 2022, \url{url}, p. 3

\textsuperscript{1902} UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Uruzgan Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, \url{url}, p. 2. Set filter to Uruzgan.

\textsuperscript{1903} UNOCHA, Afghanistan Wardak Province - District Atlas, April 2014, \url{url}


\textsuperscript{1905} Taliban de facto authority in Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, \url{url}, p. 23

\textsuperscript{1906} UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Wardak Province Humanitarian Profile, May 2022, \url{url}, p. 1. Set filter to Wardak.

\textsuperscript{1907} Arab News, In the Line of Fire: Wardak Residents Struggle to Stay Afloat in Afghanistan, 23 June 2019, \url{url}; Adili, A.Y., Afghanistan’s 2019 Elections (29): A Statistical Overview of the Preliminary Results, AAN, 8 February 2020, \url{url}

\textsuperscript{1908} ACCORD, Query Response on Afghanistan: Wardak Province, Behsud District: Land Disputes, 6 August 2019, \url{url}; Giustozzi, A., Nomad-Settler Conflict in Afghanistan Today, AREU, 13 November 2019, \url{url}, pp. 8, 19, 21

\textsuperscript{1909} EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, \url{url}
In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded one security incident with no recorded civilian deaths.\(^{1910}\) According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province resulted in 15 fatalities. The most affected district was Sayyid Abad.\(^{1911}\)

In eight security incidents civilians were involved, including members of the former government forces in three incidents. Two incidents involved the explosion of ERW, wounding children.\(^{1912}\)

ACLED attributed five security incidents, all of them coded as ‘violence against civilians,’ to Taliban forces. In two incidents in Markaz-e Behsud and Hesa-e Awal-e Behsud districts local residents were targeted by Taliban forces.\(^{1913}\) According to Hasht-e Subh, in late April 2022 tensions between Kuchis and the sedentary population escalated in the Hesa-e Awal-e Behsud and Markaz-e Behsud districts, after an agreement had been reached a month before.\(^{1914}\) Hasht-e Subh further mentioned, that in May 2022, local sources claimed that Taliban members ‘arrested, tortured and extorted a large sum of money’ from residents of Hesa-e Awal-e Behsud and Markaz-e Behsud districts. In most incidents Taliban reportedly detained residents ‘on charges of collaborating with Abdul Ghani Alipour, a former local commander.’\(^{1915}\) On 12 June 2022, the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan in a statement claimed that its forces had killed five Taliban members, including, Mawlawi Mohammad Omar, the Deputy District Governor for Chak-e Wardak District.\(^{1916}\)

NRF was attributed one security incident (a clash with the Taliban forces in October 2021).\(^{1917}\)

**4.34.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement and returns**

According to UNOCHA,\(^{1918}\) 1,029 persons were displaced due to conflict from Saydabad and Hesa-e Awal-e Behsud districts in October and November 2021, all to Kabul District.\(^{1919}\) There

\(^{1910}\) EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 16 August 2021 to 1 June 2022 provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 1 July 2022. For an explanation of how UCDP records events and fatalities, please refer to the sources section in the introduction of this report.

\(^{1911}\) EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url](#).

\(^{1912}\) EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url](#).

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\(^{1914}\) Hasht-e Subh, Tensions Escalate Between Nomads and Villagers in Behsud District, Maidan Wardak Province, 30 April 2022, [url](#).

\(^{1915}\) Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Spreads Panic in Central Afghanistan: Arrests, Tortures and Extortions Intensify in Behsud, Maidan Wardak, 11 May 2022, [url](#).

\(^{1916}\) Hasht-e Subh, Islamic Movement Kills Taliban’s Deputy District Governor for Maidan Wardak with 4 Others, 12 June 2022, [url](#).

\(^{1917}\) EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, as of 2 August 2022, [url](#).

\(^{1918}\) Data cover period between 15 August 2021 and 30 November 2021 and between 1 January 2022 and 10 May 2022. UNOCHA does not provide data for December 2021.

\(^{1919}\) UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2021 (01 Jan to 30 Nov 2021), updated 24 April 2022, [url](#).
were no displacement movements in or out of the province recorded by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022.\textsuperscript{1920}

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 18 721 IDP arrivals in Wardak Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. According to IOM, 11 670 IDPs and 317 persons from abroad returned to Wardak during that period, while 2 421 persons moved abroad.\textsuperscript{1921} From 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 4 434 returns from Iran and 32 from Pakistan to Wardak Province.\textsuperscript{1922}

No further information on the impact of the conflict on the civilian population was found within the time constraints of this report.

4.35. Zabul

Zabul Province is located in the southern part of Afghanistan and shares an international border with Pakistan. Zabul is divided into the following districts: Qalat, Tarnak Wa Jaldak (Tarang Wa Jaldak), Shinkay (Shinkai), Mizan, Arghandab, Shahjoy (Shah Joi), Daychopan (Daichopan), Atghar, Nawbahar (Naw Bahar), Shomulzay (Shemel Zayi), Kakar (Khak-e Afghan). The provincial capital is Qalat.\textsuperscript{1923}

According to estimates for 2022–2023 by NSIA, Zabul Province has a population of 398 050.\textsuperscript{1924} UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated the population as of January 2022 at 511 000.\textsuperscript{1925}

A profile published by NPS noted that the province is mainly inhabited by Pashtuns. The profile mentions the following major ethnic tribal groups: Tokhi, Hotaki, Ghilzai, Noorzai and Panjpai Durrani.\textsuperscript{1926} No further information about the ethnic composition in Zabul Province after the Taliban takeover could be found within the time constraints of this report.

4.35.1. Recent security trends

During the reference period, ACLED recorded 12 security incidents in Zabul Province, 10 of which were coded as ‘violence against civilians,’ and 2 as ‘battles.’\textsuperscript{1927}
In the period between 16 August 2021 and 1 June 2022, UCDP recorded one security incident, resulting in no civilian deaths. According to ACLED, the security incidents in the province resulted in 10 fatalities. The most affected district was Qalat (eight security incidents).

According to ACLED, civilians were involved in ten security incidents. In six of the nine events involving civilians, members of the security/police forces of the former government were involved. June 2022, for example, a former member of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) was reportedly tortured and killed by Taliban for affiliation to the former government. It was further reported that family members were also tortured.

ISKP was attributed two security incidents, including an attack on a checkpoint in Arghandab District in March 2022, killing three Taliban fighters. Three of the security incidents, all coded as ‘violence against civilians’, were attributed to an unidentified armed group. In two instances former police officers were targeted.

4.35.2. Impact on the civilian population, displacement, and returns

According to UNOCHA, Zabul is one of the eight provinces ‘with the highest priority’ for UNMAS survey, as an area ‘where threats of improvised mines have been reported as a result of recent conflicts.’

In June 2022, Taliban reportedly ordered the eviction of soldiers of the former government from their houses in some parts of the province. Taliban used a hotel owned by a resident of Qalat and a former prison, built on private land, as bases. They also set up bases in Senk, Mullah Barat, Qalat, and other areas on privately owned land.

(a) Displacement and returns

According to numbers provided by UNOCHA for mid-August to November 2021, no persons were displaced due to conflict in or out of the province. There were also no...
displacement movements in or out of the province recorded by UNOCHA from January to the beginning of May 2022.\textsuperscript{1939}

In a report on displacement in Afghanistan, IOM identified 5,483 IDP arrivals in Zabul Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. 27,785 IDPs and 40 persons from abroad returned to Zabul during that period, while 926 persons moved abroad.\textsuperscript{1940} According to IOM, from 1 January to 21 May 2022, UNOCHA documented 1,076 returns from Iran and 725 from Pakistan to Zabul Province.\textsuperscript{1941}

\textsuperscript{1939} UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2022 (01 Jan 2022 to 10 May 2022), updated 14 June 2022, url
\textsuperscript{1940} IOM, Afghanistan – Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 (November - December 2021), 2 March 2022, url, p. 3
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Annex 2: Terms of Reference

The goal of this report is to provide security-related information relevant for international protection status determination.

The reference period should be 15 August 2021 – 30 June 2022. The report should outline general security trends and regional differences and provide details on regional, provincial, and, if relevant, district level.

1. General description of the security situation
   a. Overview of security developments in Afghanistan
   b. Political developments
   c. Political landscape, government, and state administration under the Taliban
   d. Public reactions, demonstrations, and protests
   e. Territorial control
   f. Implementation of Sharia

2. Actors
   a. The Taliban
      1 Geographic presence, structure, and numbers
      2 Transition of government security forces to Taliban command
      3 Internal clashes between Taliban factions
   b. National Resistance Front
      1 Geographic presence, structure, and numbers
      2 Capacity to carry out armed violence
      3 Armed confrontations
   c. ISKP
      1 Geographic presence, structure, and numbers
      2 Capacity to carry out armed violence
      3 Armed confrontations
   d. Other armed groups
      1 Al Qaeda and affiliated groups, foreign armed groups and fighters, etc
      (incl. presence in different regions of the country, and their relationship with the Taliban)

3. Security trends and armed confrontations
   a. Security incidents (national picture/trends), frequency, territorial spread/locations
   b. Nature of violence, arms and methods used
   c. Attribution of violence/actors involved
   d. Civilian casualties and fatalities
   e. Conflict-induced displacement and returns

4. Security situation on provincial level

The following information is included per province, with particular attention paid to Kabul and any provinces with particularly active security/conflict issues:
1. Security incidents data
2. Civilian casualties/fatalities
3. Representative security incidents
4. Conflict-induced displacement and returns
5. Further impact of the conflict (such as closure of healthcare facilities; schools, infrastructure, and housing damage, etc.)