



European Asylum Support Office

EASO Country of Origin Information Report

Pakistan Security Situation



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EASO Country of Origin Information Report

Pakistan

Security Situation

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Reference is made to the [Disclaimer](#) regarding the responsibility of reviewers.

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Disclaimer

This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2012) ⁽¹⁾. The report is based on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced. To the extent possible and unless otherwise stated, all information presented, except for undisputed or obvious facts, has been cross-checked.

The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist.

Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular application for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position.

'Refugee', 'risk' and similar terminology are used as a generic terminology and not in the legal sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.

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The target users are asylum caseworkers, COI researchers, policymakers, and decision-making authorities.

The drafting of this report was finalised in August 2018. Any event taking place after this date is not included in this report. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in the methodology section of the introduction.

It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO.

⁽¹⁾ The EASO methodology is largely based on the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI), 2008, and can be downloaded from the EASO website: <https://www.easo.europa.eu/information-analysis/country-origin-information/coi-methodology-and-guides>

Glossary and Abbreviations

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
Ah-le Sunnat Wal Jama'at	Political Sunni Deobandi organisation, formerly known as Sipah-e-Sahaba
AI	Amnesty International
AJK	Azad Jammu and Kashmir
ANP	Awami National Party
AQIS	Al-Qaeda on the Indian Peninsula
Bazar	Enclosed marketplace or street where goods and services are exchanged or sold.
BLA	Balochistan Liberation Army
BLF	Baloch Liberation Front
BRA	Baloch Republican Army
CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
CRSS	Centre for Research and Security Studies
CTD	Counterterrorism Department
Daesh	See Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)
Deobandi	A conservative Sunni religious movement ⁽²⁾
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FC	Frontier Corps
FRC	FATA Research Center
GB	Gilgit-Baltistan
Haqqani network	Armed insurgent movement led by Sirajuddin Haqqani. This movement is affiliated to the Taliban. Their headquarters are based in North Waziristan (FATA) and in south-east Afghanistan, in areas of the Pashtun tribe of the Zadran ⁽³⁾
Hazara	Ethnic (primarily) Shia Muslim minority group living predominantly in central Afghanistan, western and northern Pakistan and parts of Iran ⁽⁴⁾

⁽²⁾ Nelson, M., EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan; 16-17 October 2017, Rome, February 2018, [url](#), p. 9, p. 27

⁽³⁾ RFE/RL, Pakistan's Strained Alliance With The Haqqani Network, 25 October 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁾ Deutsche Welle, Pakistan's Hazara standoff: why did the army mediate?, 2 May 2018, [url](#)

HM	Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, militant group operating in Azad Jammu and Kashmir, led by Syed Salahuddin ⁽⁵⁾
HuA	Hizbul Ahrar, a breakaway faction of the JuA ⁽⁶⁾
HRCP	Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IBO	Intelligence-Based Operation
ICJ	International Commission of Jurists
ICT	Islamabad Capital Territory
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Internally Displaced Person: persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border ⁽⁷⁾
IJU	Islamic Jihad Union
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: an armed insurgent movement operating in Afghanistan and other countries with fighters originally from Uzbekistan ⁽⁸⁾
ISKP	Islamic State Khorasan Province, also called ISIS, ISIL, IS or <i>Daesh</i>
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan's intelligence agency
ISPR	Inter-Services Public Relations
Jamaat-ul Ansar Al-Sharia	An umbrella organisation of Islamist armed insurgents organisations endeavouring to converge a platform to reintroduce al-Qaeda ⁽⁹⁾
JuA	Jamaat-ul Ahrar: (Assembly of the Free), splinter faction of the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan formed in August 2014 and based in Mohmand Agency, FATA ⁽¹⁰⁾

⁽⁵⁾ Global Security, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), last updated on: 9 August 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁶⁾ Dawn, Taliban splinter group splits further, 13 November 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁾ OCHA, Guiding principles on Internal Displacement, September 2004, [url](#)

⁽⁸⁾ The Mackenzie Institute, Terrorism Profiles-Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 1 July 2016, [url](#)

⁽⁹⁾ Zahid, F., Jamaat ul Ansar al-Sharia: The New al-Qaeda Threat in Pakistan, in: Terrorism Monitor, Volume: 15 Issue: 18, 22 September 2017, [url](#); Zahid, F., The Return of Al-Qaeda to Pakistan, Middle East Institute, 24 August 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁰⁾ Stanford University, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, last updated on: 8 August 2017, [url](#)

JeM	Jaish-e Muhammad: (Muhammad's Army), Islamist armed insurgent group active in Kashmir ⁽¹¹⁾
Jundullah	Soldiers of Allah, a group linked to the TTP and IS ⁽¹²⁾
Khasadar	Pashtun tribal militia, institutionalised by the British. In recent times, they are made responsible for security in Pashtun areas, and receive a salary by the Pakistani authorities ⁽¹³⁾
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Lashkars	Pashtun tribal armies or militias that can be mobilised via traditional tribal decision mechanisms ⁽¹⁴⁾
LB	Lashkar-e-Balochistan
Lel	Lashkar-e Islam: a militant Sunni group with a sectarian agenda formed in 2004 under Mufti Shakir in Khyber Agency in Pakistan. On March 12, 2015, Lashkar-e Islam announced that it was joining Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan ⁽¹⁵⁾
LJA	Lashkar-e Jhangvi Al-Alami: (Jhangvi's Army), faction of Lashkar-e Jhangvi ⁽¹⁶⁾
LeJ	Lashkar-e Jhangvi: an armed Sunni militant group with a sectarian agenda in Pakistan formed in 1995. The group has carried out a number of attacks on minority groups in Pakistan and aims at establishing a Sunni caliphate ⁽¹⁷⁾
LeT	Lashkar-e Taiba: a Sunni militant group, formed in 1990 and initially trained in the Kunar Province of Afghanistan. It is now based near Lahore in Pakistan. LeT fights for the unification of the Kashmir region and its integration into Pakistani territory and also attacks civilian targets in Afghanistan ⁽¹⁸⁾
Khyber-IV	Operation launched by the Pakistani army on 16 July 2017 aimed at clearing Rajgal Valley in Khyber Agency of militants ⁽¹⁹⁾
LoC	Line of Control, disputed border line between India and Pakistan in the regions of Jammu and Kashmir
Madrassa	Islamic school
MQM	Muttahadi Qaumi Movement

⁽¹¹⁾ Stanford University, Jaish-e-Mohammad, last updated on: 15 June 2015, [url](#)

⁽¹²⁾ Reuters, Pakistan Taliban splinter group vows allegiance to Islamic State, 18 November 2014, [url](#)

⁽¹³⁾ The Express Tribune/The International New York Times, Khasadar force personnel deprived of salaries, 28 May 2016, [url](#); TNN, Pro-merger people should now raise their voice for Khassadars', 14 August 2018, [url](#)

⁽¹⁴⁾ Dawn, Death by lashkar: The forgotten protectors of Adezai village, 9 May 2016, [url](#)

⁽¹⁵⁾ Stanford University, Lashkar-e-Islam, updated on: 28 August 2012, [url](#)

⁽¹⁶⁾ Jamestown Foundation (The), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Alami: A Pakistani Partner for Islamic State, 27 January 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁷⁾ Jamestown Foundation (The), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Alami: A Pakistani Partner for Islamic State, 27 January 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁸⁾ Stanford University, Lashkar-e-Taiba, last updated on: 30 January 2016, [url](#)

⁽¹⁹⁾ Dawn, Army launches Operation Khyber-4 in Rajgal Valley, 16 July 2017, [url](#)

NACTA	National Counter Terrorism Authority
NADRA	National Database & Registration Authority
NAP	National Action Plan, Pakistan government plan to eliminate terrorism
NWFP	North West Frontier Province, the former name for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Pashtunwali	The unwritten customary law and set of norms of the Pashtun people ⁽²⁰⁾
PICSS	Pakistani Institute for Conflict and Security Studies
PILDAT	Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency
PIPS	Pak Institute for Peace Studies
PoR	Proof of Registration Card: Administrative document issued to registered Afghan refugees in Pakistan ⁽²¹⁾
PPO	Protection of Pakistan Ordinance
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
PTI	Pakistan Tehreek-e Insaaf
PTM	Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), or Pashtun Protection Movement. Grassroots Pashtun civil rights movement
<i>Radd-ul-Fasaad</i>	Code name for a military operation launched by the Pakistani army on 22 February 2017 ⁽²²⁾
<i>Razakar</i>	Pro government tribal militias ⁽²³⁾
RFE/RL	Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
TTP	Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan: (Pakistan Movement of Taliban), the largest militant group in Pakistan. The organisation was founded in 2007 and is an umbrella of mostly, but not all, Pakistan Taliban groups. TTP had pledged allegiance to Mullah Omar, at that time the leader of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The main goal behind TTP's establishment was to unite the various factions of the Pakistan Taliban in order to organise synchronised attacks on NATO/ISAF forces in Afghanistan. The group also carries out 'defensive jihad' against Pakistani military forces conducting operations in FATA ⁽²⁴⁾
SATP	South Asia Terrorism Portal
SMP	Sipah-e Mohammed Pakistan: Shia militant group ⁽²⁵⁾

⁽²⁰⁾ Daily Times, Change is the name of survival, 17 September 2017, [url](#); AAN, Doing Pashto -Pashtunwali as the ideal of honourable behaviour and tribal life among the Pashtuns, 21 March 2011, [url](#)

⁽²¹⁾ Nation (The), UNHCR lauds Afghan refugees' PoR cards extension, 20 March 2018, [url](#)

⁽²²⁾ Dawn, Pakistan Army launches 'Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad' across the country, 22 February 2017, [url](#)

⁽²³⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, p. 8.

⁽²⁴⁾ Stanford University, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, last updated on: 6 August 2017, [url](#)

⁽²⁵⁾ Nelson M., EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan; 16-17 October 2017, Rome, February 2018, [url](#)

SSP	Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan: (Army of the Prophet Followers), a former political party following the Deobandi school in Islam ⁽²⁶⁾
TBIJ	The Bureau of Investigative Journalism
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (drone)
UBA	United Baloch Army
USDOS	United States Department of State
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGASC	United Nations General Assembly Security Council
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
VBIED	Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
Zakat	Religious alms
Zarb-e-Azb	Code name for a military operation launched by the Pakistani army on 15 June 2014 ⁽²⁷⁾

Introduction

This report was drafted by a Country of Origin Information (COI) specialist from Cedoca, the Belgian COI unit, as referred to in the [Acknowledgements](#) section.

The report aims to provide information on the security situation in Pakistan, which is relevant for international protection status determination (refugee status and subsidiary protection). The terms of reference can be found in [Annex 2](#).

Methodology

- Collecting information / background on key data used

This report is an update of the EASO COI report Pakistan Security Situation first published in August 2015, updated in July 2016, and in August 2017 ⁽²⁸⁾. This report presents general information available from 1 June 2017 to 15 August 2018.

The information in this report results from desk research of public specialised paper-based and electronic sources, which were consulted within the time frame and the scope of the research. The Cedoca researcher, a specialist on Pakistan, conducted extensive interviews with the following experts:

- Matthew Nelson, Reader in Politics, PhD, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, telephone interview, 15 June 2018
- Michael Kugelman, Asia Program Deputy Director and Senior Associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (United States), Skype interview, 14 June 2018
- Mohammad Amir Rana, Security and Political Analyst and director of the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Skype interview, 14 June 2018.

The following paragraphs provide background information on the nature and scope of the data most used in this update.

This report relies on data about security incidents and casualties provided by different institutions such as the Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) and the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) in their reports or on their websites. All four institutions consulted a broad range of credible and reliable sources (for more information about the methodology of these institutions (see Section [1.4.1. Figures on civilian fatalities](#))).

Because of the use of a different methodology and terminology by each institution, the data on security incidents and casualties can differ between the four institutions. This report contains information about security incidents and casualties for the year 2017 and for the first half of 2018. The data for the security incidents in the first half of 2018 was provided by PIPS. This report also uses the quarterly reports of CRSS and the data on the website of SATP on figures about casualties for the first six months of 2018.

To assess the geographic spread of security-related incidents (see Section [2.1. Geographical overview of the violence 2017 - 2018](#)), reference is made to maps provided by the Armed

⁽²⁸⁾ EASO COI reports are available via EASO's website: [url](#)

Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). The data of ACLED is not used in this report, except for verification of incidents.

Further this report contains numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). For this, maps of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and information collected by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) were used. These IDP data are complemented with anecdotal information on IDP movements in or from the provinces and its reasons. This information comes mainly from media sources.

Several consulted sources mentioned that certain areas are considered 'no-go areas' and certain topics are taboo in Pakistan. Therefore some topics, issues and areas do not get a full coverage. The consulted sources suggest that there is underreporting of incidents ⁽²⁹⁾. In this context, journalists and bloggers apply self-censorship ⁽³⁰⁾.

- Quality control

In order to ensure that the author respected the EASO COI Report Methodology, a review was carried out by COI specialists from the countries and organisations listed as reviewers in the [Acknowledgements](#) section. All comments made by the reviewers were taken into consideration and most of them were implemented in the final draft of this report.

Structure and use of this report

This report provides information on elements and indicators that may help in assessing the need for protection. The first part gives a general description on the security situation in Pakistan. The second part explains the security situation per province in more detail. A general description of the province contains information on the geography and population, and on the background of the conflict, including the actors active in the province. A description of the recent trends of the security situation provides information on quantitative (numbers) and qualitative information (examples and description of trends). A sub-chapter focuses on the nature of the violence, frequency, targets, locations, and descriptions of incidents within a timeframe from 1 June 2017 until 15 August 2018. Another sub-chapter includes information about civilian casualties. A final sub-chapter describes population displacements.

Both the general and regional descriptions provide information from various sources on the relevant elements and indicators. Information on an indicator as such should never be taken as conclusive, but as indicative for the assessment of protection needs, and should be read in conjunction with other indicators and information on the region.

In the regional description a government source is used to describe the population figures in the administrative divisions ⁽³¹⁾. This source is used because it describes the most recent population figures in Pakistan. Some sources casted doubts about the results of the 2017 census ⁽³²⁾.

⁽²⁹⁾ Almeida, C., EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan; 16-17 October 2017; Rome, February 2018, [url](#), p. 16; Rana Amir, M., Skype interview, 14 June 2018; HRW, World Report 2018 - Pakistan, 18 January 2018, [url](#)

⁽³⁰⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 210; HRW, World Report 2018 - Pakistan, 18 January 2018, [url](#)

⁽³¹⁾ Pakistan, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Provisional Summary Results of 6th Population & Housing Census-2017, 25 August 2017, [url](#)

⁽³²⁾ Daily Pakistan, Mustafa Kamal challenges census 2017 results in SC, 25 April 2018, [url](#); Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Census 2017: FATA lawmakers dispute census count, 26 August 2017, [url](#); Dawn, Opposition parties suspicious of census results, 27 August 2017, [url](#)

The description of the security situation uses the following administrative divisions:

- The four provinces: Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and Sindh;
- The two territories: the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the Islamabad Capital Territory;
- The two administrative regions: Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan ⁽³³⁾.

On 28 May 2018 the former President of Pakistan Mamnoon Hussain signed the FATA Interim Governance Regulation (2018) which will govern FATA until it merges with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa by 2020. This report will still refer to the FATA and the agencies because the administrative divisions are not yet decided as at the time of drafting of this report ⁽³⁴⁾.

⁽³³⁾ [Map 1](#): the two regions are situated in the north of Pakistan. On [Map 1](#), they are indicated in the grey area in the north of Pakistan

⁽³⁴⁾ Dawn, President signs KP-Fata merger bill into law, 31 May 2018, [url](#); RFE/RL, Pakistani Tribal Areas Face Long Road To Stabilization, 28 May 2018, [url](#)

1. General description of the security situation in Pakistan

1.1. Overview of recent conflicts in Pakistan

The security situation in Pakistan is complex and influenced by factors such as political violence, insurgent violence, ethnic conflicts and sectarian violence. The domestic security situation is also influenced by disputes with neighbouring countries India and Afghanistan that occasionally turn violent ⁽³⁶⁾.

1.1.1. Militant violence and government response

Militant violence in Pakistan is mainly caused by the instability in the north-west of the country resulting from the 2001 toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban settled in the FATA and in the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP, currently Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), having fled the invasion of an international coalition led by the United States (US) in Afghanistan ⁽³⁷⁾. Under their influence, several Pakistani groups with a similar ideology continued working together in what developed into a federation of armed groups. This resulted in the so-called Talibanisation of the region according to the consulted sources. Taliban policies included a strict application of conservative Islamic principles and resulted in violence against civilians and eventually the Pakistani authorities ⁽³⁸⁾. As a result, Pakistan had to forsake the support for a number of Islamist groups in the country ⁽³⁹⁾. Since 2007, the Pakistani army carried out several military operations in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa aimed at breaking the power of the Pakistani Taliban and their affiliated organisations ⁽⁴⁰⁾. Especially from 2009 onwards, operations against the Pakistani Taliban have been one of the main sources of insecurity, causing a large-scale displacement from the region ⁽⁴¹⁾.

In June 2013, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif started negotiating with the Pakistani Taliban. According to The Washington Post, these negotiations were a ‘difficult and complex task’ ⁽⁴²⁾. The negotiations started in the beginning of February 2014 in Islamabad ⁽⁴³⁾, but soon stalled after the Mohmand wing of the Taliban executed 23 soldiers, whom they held hostage since 2010 ⁽⁴⁴⁾. In an effort to restart negotiations, the Taliban announced a ceasefire on 1 March 2014 ⁽⁴⁵⁾, which ended on 17 April 2014 ⁽⁴⁶⁾. What was left of the peace talks finally collapsed after the attack on the Jinnah Airport in Karachi on 8 June 2014. Although the attack was carried out by militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility ⁽⁴⁷⁾.

⁽³⁶⁾ Droogan, J., The perennial problem of terrorism and political violence in Pakistan, 5 June 2018, [url](#)

⁽³⁷⁾ Deutsche Welle, What is Pakistan's militancy issue all about?, 1 December 2017, [url](#)

⁽³⁸⁾ Rashid, A., Descent into Chaos, 2008, pp. 265-270; AI, As if hell fell on me, the human rights crisis in northwest Pakistan, 10 June 2010, [url](#), pp. 10-11

⁽³⁹⁾ Deutsche Welle, What is Pakistan's militancy issue all about?, 1 December 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁰⁾ Dawn, Chronology of military operations, 16 June 2014, [url](#)

⁽⁴¹⁾ AI, As if hell fell on me, the human rights crisis in northwest Pakistan, 10 June 2010, [url](#), p. 7; International Crisis Group, Pakistan: The Worsening IDP Crisis, 16 September 2010, [url](#)

⁽⁴²⁾ Washington Post (The), Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's effort to seek peace with Pakistani Taliban off to rocky start, 19 September 2013, [url](#)

⁽⁴³⁾ BBC News, Pakistan enters peace talks with Taliban, 6 February 2014, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁴⁾ Reuters, Peace Talks between Pakistan and Taliban collapse after killings, 17 February 2014, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁵⁾ Dawn, Pakistani Taliban announce a month-long ceasefire, 2 March 2014, [url](#); Guardian (The), Pakistan Taliban announce one-month ceasefire to aid peace talks, 1 March 2014, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁶⁾ Dawn, TTP ends ceasefire, says talks option open, 17 April 2014, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁷⁾ Dawn, TTP claims attack on Karachi airport, 8 June 2014, [url](#)

On 15 June 2014, the Pakistani army launched a military offensive in order to eradicate ‘foreign and local terrorists’⁽⁴⁸⁾. The main targets were militant strongholds in the North Waziristan tribal region. The operation was codenamed *Zarb-e-Azb* (see Section [1.3.1. Security operations and armed clashes](#))⁽⁴⁹⁾. The militants answer to this military operation were several attacks, including a suicide bombing on 2 November 2014 that claimed 60 lives at the Wagah border crossing near Lahore, a symbolic and sensitive area⁽⁵⁰⁾. On 16 December 2014, seven to nine gunmen, affiliated with the TTP, entered an Army public school in Peshawar. They opened fire on school staff and children, killing 145 people, including 132 minors, mostly children of army personnel⁽⁵¹⁾. The army Chief of Staff urged the Government to take strong action against the Taliban⁽⁵²⁾.

On 25 December 2014, after consultation with different political parties, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif then announced a 20-point comprehensive plan of action, the National Action Plan (NAP), in order to confront the insurgent threat. Special courts ‘would be’ established for the speedy trial of ‘terrorist suspects’ and a moratorium on capital punishment was extended, after being instated earlier in December 2014. Furthermore a 5 000-strong counter terrorism force would be deployed across the country. No armed militias would be allowed to function in the country and their funding would be ‘choked’. Hate speech would be ‘countered’. The Pakistani army confirmed that military operations in the tribal areas ‘would continue’⁽⁵³⁾. However, human rights organisations criticised the speedy trial of ‘terrorist suspects’ and cautioned that ‘hundreds of non-terrorists’ risked execution without the right to a fair trial and due process (see Section [1.5.1. State protection, security forces and justice](#))⁽⁵⁴⁾.

In 2015 and 2016, the military Operation *Zarb-e-Azb* continued. The Pakistani army was targeting a wide array of militant groups in the tribal areas⁽⁵⁵⁾. Besides military operations, the Pakistani army was called upon to provide security backup to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)⁽⁵⁶⁾. In the first months of 2017, the country faced some major attacks in several provinces, most of them claimed by Jamaat-ul Ahrar (JuA). In this context, on 22 February 2017, the government of Pakistan announced a countrywide military operation codenamed *Radd-ul-Fasaad* (see Section [1.3.1. Security operations and armed clashes](#))⁽⁵⁷⁾.

In a Skype interview conducted on 14 June 2018 with Michael Kugelman, scholar and expert on the security situation in South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, he stated that the security situation in Pakistan was improving. He noticed a decline in insurgent attacks. According to Kugelman, the reason for this decline is the army’s extensive

⁽⁴⁸⁾ Dawn, *Zarb-e-Azb operation: 120 suspected militants killed in N Waziristan*, 16 June 2014, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁹⁾ Dawn, *Zarb-e-Azb operation: 120 suspected militants killed in N Waziristan*, 16 June 2014, [url](#); BBC News, *Pakistan army North Waziristan offensive: thousands flee*, 19 June 2014, [url](#); Reuters, *Pakistan army in for long haul in offensive against Taliban*, 17 June 2014, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁰⁾ Dawn, *TTP splinter groups claim Wagah attack: 60 dead*, 3 November 2014, [url](#)

⁽⁵¹⁾ CNN, *In Pakistan school attack, Taliban terrorists kill 145, mostly children*, 17 December 2014, [url](#); New York Times (The), *Taliban Besiege Pakistan School, Leaving 145 Dead*, 16 December 2014, [url](#)

⁽⁵²⁾ Economist (The), *The man with the plan: Pakistan after the school massacre*, 24 January 2015, [url](#)

⁽⁵³⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), *Fight against terrorism: Defining moment*, 25 December 2014, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁴⁾ BBC News, *Justice at risk as Pakistan rushes convicts to the gallows*, 25 December 2014, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁵⁾ Nation (The), *Operation Zarb-e-Azb: Two years of success*, 6 September 2016, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁶⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), *Pakistan Army leaving no stone unturned to protect Chinese investment*, 8 February 2016, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁷⁾ Dawn, *Pakistan Army launches 'Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad' across the country*, 22 February 2017, [url](#)

counterterrorism strategy. However, the environment for insurgent attacks was still present in June 2018. Until the border fence is completed and there is a ‘robust’ border management strategy between the two countries, militant groups based in Afghanistan are still able to stage attacks in Pakistan⁽⁵⁸⁾. Mohammad Amir Rana, Security and Political Analyst and director of the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), stated in a Skype interview on 14 June 2018 that the security situation was improving but that it will be a challenge to maintain the same security level before and during the general elections on 25 July 2018⁽⁵⁹⁾. In the run-up to the general elections Pakistan witnessed a surge in violence with some major attacks in different provinces claimed by militant groups (see Sections [1.1.3 Recent political developments](#) and [1.3.7. Violence in the run-up to the general elections](#))⁽⁶⁰⁾. For instance, the suicide bombing targeting a political gathering in Mastung, in the province of Balochistan causing the death of 149 and wounding more than 200 people was the third deadliest attack ever conducted in Pakistan until then⁽⁶¹⁾.

1.1.2. Ethnic and sectarian violence

Sectarian violence across Pakistan is present. Shias, but also Sunnis, Ahmadis, Christians and Hindus are victims of religiously motivated violence, especially carried out by Sunni militant groups⁽⁶²⁾. Religious minorities in Pakistan are the victims of legal, institutional and social discrimination, according to the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF)⁽⁶³⁾.

According to the report of Pak Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS) the incidents of ethnic violence in Pakistan dropped in 2017 in comparison to 2016⁽⁶⁴⁾. The ‘low-key conflict’ in the province of Balochistan (see Section [2.2.3. Balochistan](#)) is an example of a conflict that erupts when ethnic groups fight for the same powers according to an article of July 2017 by Dr Raza Khan, researcher and political, security and governance expert⁽⁶⁵⁾.

1.1.3. Recent political developments

On 28 July 2017, Nawaz Sharif resigned as Prime Minister after being disqualified by the Supreme Court over corruption charges⁽⁶⁶⁾. One week later, Shahid Khaqan Abbasi was elected by the National Assembly as Prime Minister⁽⁶⁷⁾. Matthew Nelson, scholar at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, stated during a telephone interview on 15 June 2018 that the general elections dominated Pakistan at the end of 2017 and during the first half of 2018. The elections have affected political actors, civil society actors

⁽⁵⁸⁾ Kugelman, M., Skype interview, 14 June 2018. Michael Kugelman is Asia Program Deputy Director and Senior Associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

⁽⁵⁹⁾ Rana Amir, M., Skype interview, 14 June 2018. Mohammad Amir Rana is Security and Political Analyst and Director of the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS).

⁽⁶⁰⁾ Reuters, Fears of more violence in Pakistan election after bomber kills 130, 14 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁶¹⁾ Al Jazeera, Pakistan: Death toll rises to 149 in Mastung attack, 15 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁶²⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), pp. 59-63

⁽⁶³⁾ USCIRF, 2018 Annual Report, April 2018 [url](#), pp. 65-70

⁽⁶⁴⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 24

⁽⁶⁵⁾ Khan, R., Dynamics of ethnic conflicts in Pakistan, in: Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), 21 July 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁶⁶⁾ Reuters, Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif resigns after Supreme Court order to disqualify him: statement, [url](#)

⁽⁶⁷⁾ BBC News, Pakistan lawmakers pick Abbasi to replace ousted PM Sharif, 1 August 2017, [url](#)

and also affected the stability in areas such as Southern Punjab and the FATA⁽⁶⁸⁾. Freedom of speech activists reported an increase in censorship of TV channels, newspapers and social media⁽⁶⁹⁾. Some sources stated that the military is involved in this censorship⁽⁷⁰⁾. In July 2018, ahead of the general elections, Nawaz Sharif was convicted for corruption and given a jail sentence. Upon his return from the United Kingdom to Pakistan on 13 July 2018, Nawaz Sharif was arrested and imprisoned⁽⁷¹⁾.

On 25 July 2018, general elections were held in Pakistan. A series of violent events (see Section [1.3.7. Violence in the run-up the general elections](#)) in different provinces, alongside the arrest of hundreds of political workers and accusations of interference by the military, overshadowed the run-up to the general elections⁽⁷²⁾. On the day of the elections, Quetta witnessed a suicide bombing targeting a police vehicle near a polling station, killing 31 people and leaving many more wounded. This attack was claimed by Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)⁽⁷³⁾. The general elections were a success for the Pakistan Tehreek-e Insaaf (PTI), the political party of Imran Khan. His party won the most seats for the National Assembly⁽⁷⁴⁾. According to the Pakistani newspaper Dawn, Imran Khan will take oath as the new Prime Minister of Pakistan on 18 August 2018⁽⁷⁵⁾.

In 2018, Pakistan witnessed the emerge of the Pashtun Tahafuz (Protection) Movement (PTM), a civil rights movement demanding security and rights for the country's Pashtun minority⁽⁷⁶⁾. Mona Kanwal Sheikh, expert on militant movements in Pakistan, stated during an EASO conference in Malta on 19 June 2018 that the PTM demands transparency about the legal process and about the arrests by the military. According to Mona Kanwal Sheikh the PTM has 'an open verbal war with the army'⁽⁷⁷⁾. Human rights groups claimed that Pashtuns have been the target of harassment, disappearances and extrajudicial killings under the pretext of 'war on terrorism'⁽⁷⁸⁾. Because the Pakistani Taliban is predominantly a Pashtun movement, many ordinary Pashtuns have, by association, been branded as 'Islamists, or militants'⁽⁷⁹⁾. Ahead of their protest manifestations, several activists of the PTM were arrested by the police in April 2018⁽⁸⁰⁾.

⁽⁶⁸⁾ Nelson, M., telephone interview, 15 June 2018. Scholar at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London.

⁽⁶⁹⁾ RFE/RL, 'Everybody Is Scared': Pakistani Media Fighting -- And Losing -- Battle With 'Extreme' Censorship, 3 June 2018, [url](#); Reporters without Borders, Extremist groups and intelligence agencies, 26 April 2017, [url](#); SAFE Newsrooms, Interview: How independent analysts, talk show hosts and columnists are being silenced in Pakistan?, 9 May 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁰⁾ Brookings, Pakistan's censorship model, 30 May 2018, [url](#); HRCP, Curbs on freedom of expression in Pakistan: Summary of HRCP fact-finding exercise, 23 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷¹⁾ Dawn, Nawaz Sharif, Maryam arrested by NAB, shifted to Adiala jail, 13 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷²⁾ BBC News, Pakistan election: Who's who and why it matters, 22 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷³⁾ Dawn, 31 die in suicide bombing outside Quetta polling station, 26 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁴⁾ RFE/RL, Pakistani Opposition Leader Khan Ahead In Early Results, Media Report, 27 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁵⁾ Dawn, Imran to take oath as PM on August 18: PTI, 11 August 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁶⁾ BBC News, Manzoor Pashteen: The young tribesman rattling Pakistan's army, 23 April 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁷⁾ Kanwal Sheikh, M., EASO, COI Specialists Network Meeting, meeting in Valletta, Malta, held on: 19 June 2018

⁽⁷⁸⁾ Deutsche Welle, Pashtuns rise up against war, Taliban and Pakistani military, 9 April 2018, [url](#); Asia Times, Pakistan's 'Pashtun Spring': human rights vs War on Terror, 25 February 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁹⁾ Deutsche Welle, Pashtuns rise up against war, Taliban and Pakistani military, 9 April 2018, [url](#); RFE/RL, Pakistan's Pashtuns Find New 'Frontier Gandhi', 25 March 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁸⁰⁾ Dawn, Crackdown on PTM activists ahead of Lahore rally, 22 April 2018, [url](#)

1.1.4. International context

Pakistan's relations with neighbouring countries and the United States also have an impact on the security situation.

In 2017 and the first half of 2018 Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan were tense. Both countries blamed each other for sheltering terrorists and border tensions escalated⁽⁸¹⁾. Several cross-border attacks occurred and border crossings were temporarily shut⁽⁸²⁾. Pakistan has also started building the border fence and expects that it will be completed by the end of 2018⁽⁸³⁾. According to Michael Kugelman, two new developments have risen over the course of 2017-2018 and have negatively impacted the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan: the start of the building of the border fence and the merger of the FATA into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This last development is seen by Afghanistan as an effort to legitimise the 'Durand Line' (the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan rejected by Afghanistan)⁽⁸⁴⁾. In August 2018, Pakistani military officials were quoted as saying that Pakistan will deploy 60 000 soldiers in the next two years to patrol the border in an effort to curb 'the flow of insurgents' passing between the two countries⁽⁸⁵⁾.

Ongoing tensions with India remain. Cross-border shelling along the Line of Control (LoC) continued, throughout 2017 and into the first half of 2018, with military and civilian deaths on both sides⁽⁸⁶⁾. India and Pakistan have tried to consolidate their bilateral relationship through 'goodwill gestures and reconciliatory statements' according to The Diplomat⁽⁸⁷⁾. In May 2018, Pakistan and India agreed to implement the ceasefire agreement signed between the two countries in 2003, due to the spike in cross-border attacks⁽⁸⁸⁾.

The relationship between Iran and Pakistan shifts over time. The ties between the two countries are shaped by bilateral security concerns, strategic and economic interests. In 2017, border clashes occurred. According to senior analyst and author Anwar Sajidi, this was because of 'the flow of drug trafficking and the rise of Sunni militancy'⁽⁸⁹⁾. In the first half of 2018, the relationship between Pakistan and Iran showed signs of improvement according to the newspaper The Express Tribune⁽⁹⁰⁾.

Relations between Pakistan and the United States have continued to deteriorate. The Trump administration suspended military and security assistance to Pakistan in the beginning of 2018. In return, Pakistan has suspended intelligence-sharing with the United States⁽⁹¹⁾. In

⁽⁸¹⁾ Diplomat (The), Afghan-Pakistani Cross-Border Terrorism Cuts Both Ways, 9 April 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁸²⁾ Al Jazeera, Chaos follows Pakistan-Afghanistan border closure, 19 February 2017, [url](#); Dawn, Pak-Afghan border crossings open after a month of closure, 21 March 2017, [url](#); Tolo News, Pakistan Borders Still Closed To Trade, After A Month, 11 February 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁸³⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Pak-Afghan border fencing to be completed by the end of 2018, 31 December 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁸⁴⁾ Kugelman, M., Skype interview, 14/06/2018. Michael Kugelman is Asia Program Deputy Director and Senior Associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

⁽⁸⁵⁾ Bloomberg, Pakistan Will Add 60,000 Troops to Patrol Afghan Border, 8 August 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁸⁶⁾ Dawn, Pak-India peace, 31 May 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁸⁷⁾ Diplomat (The), Should India Take Pakistan's Overtures Seriously?, 12 May 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁸⁸⁾ Al Jazeera, Pakistan and India vow to implement 2003 ceasefire agreement, [url](#)

⁽⁸⁹⁾ Diplomat (The), Iran-Pakistan at the Crossroads?, 9 July 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁹⁰⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Pakistan to pursue economic ties with Iran despite US sanctions, 9 August 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁹¹⁾ Washington Post (The), The long history of incredibly fraught relations between the U.S. and Pakistan, 5 January 2018, [url](#)

February 2018, the US lobbied to place Pakistan on a ‘grey list’ of nations that are not making enough effort to combat terrorism financing ⁽⁹²⁾. According to Radio Pakistan, cited in the Pakistan newspaper Dawn on 31 July 2018, both countries are trying to restore their bilateral ties ⁽⁹³⁾.

1.2. Actors in the conflict

1.2.1. State armed forces

Pakistan Armed Forces

The Pakistan Armed Forces have around 637 000 active personnel, with a reserve personnel of 282 000 ⁽⁹⁴⁾. Operational control rests with the National Command Authority (NCA). Pakistan’s nuclear and conventional forces have traditionally been oriented and structured against a threat from India. Since 2008, however, a priority for the army has been counter-insurgency operations, mainly against Islamist groups, for which forces have been redeployed from the Indian border ⁽⁹⁵⁾.

Since November 2016, the army is led by General Qamar Jawed Bajwa ⁽⁹⁶⁾. The army is observed as the most powerful institution in Pakistan. Sources believe that the army has a ‘considerable weight on national security, foreign policy, and politics’ ⁽⁹⁷⁾. Pakistan has been under military rule for more than half of its existence ⁽⁹⁸⁾.

Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)

The ISI is Pakistan’s intelligence service tasked with coordinating intelligence between the branches of the military, collecting foreign and domestic intelligence and conducting covert offensive operations ⁽⁹⁹⁾. In December 2016, Naveed Mukhtar replaced Rizwan Akhtar as the new head of the ISI ⁽¹⁰⁰⁾. The ISI reportedly has close ties with a number of extremist Islamist groups ⁽¹⁰¹⁾. In the 1990s, the ISI established close relationships with outfits such as Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e Muhammad (JeM) to put pressure on India, with whom Pakistan has had a conflict over Kashmir for decades. The ISI also reportedly supports the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network and Pakistani jihadist groups allied with al-Qaeda ⁽¹⁰²⁾.

The Frontier Corps (FC)

The Frontier Corps (FC) is an auxiliary paramilitary force, formally under the authority of the Interior Ministry, but commanded by army officers. Their strength is around 70 000 ⁽¹⁰³⁾. There

⁽⁹²⁾ Reuters, Global watchdog to put Pakistan back on terrorist financing watchlist: sources, 23 February 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁹³⁾ Dawn, Envoy Ali Siddiqui meets US Defence Secy James Mattis in Washington, 31 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁹⁴⁾ Global Fire Power, 2018 Pakistan Military Strength, n.d., [url](#)

⁽⁹⁵⁾ IISS, The Military Balance 2018, 14 February 2018, [url](#), p. 291

⁽⁹⁶⁾ New York Times (The), Pakistan Army ‘Has Greatly Increased Its Clout’ Under New Chief, 28 January 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁹⁷⁾ RFE/RL, Reading The Pakistani Debate Over Military Chief’s Doctrine, 3 April 2018, [url](#); Reuters, Pakistani government feels weight of army’s heavy hand, 23 May 2014, [url](#)

⁽⁹⁸⁾ Shackle, S., Imran Khan has won over Pakistan. But real power still lies with the army, opinion in The Guardian, 27 July 2018, [url](#). Samira Shackle is writer for The Guardian and deputy editor of the New Humanist.

⁽⁹⁹⁾ Global Security, Pakistan Intelligence: Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI], n.d., [url](#)

⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ RFE/RL, Pakistan Names New ISI Head, 12 December 2016, [url](#)

⁽¹⁰¹⁾ Kiessling, H., Faith, Unity, Discipline The Inter-Service-Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, October 2016, pp. 1-11

⁽¹⁰²⁾ Reuters, Mattis says will try to work with Pakistan ‘one more time’, 3 October 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁰³⁾ IISS, The Military Balance 2018, 14 February 2018, [url](#), p. 294

are two major subdivisions, one stationed in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa/FATA and one stationed in Balochistan. The FC helps local law enforcement maintain law and order, provides assistance with border control and fights organised crime⁽¹⁰⁴⁾. The UN Committee Against Torture (UNCAT) believes the FC is involved in extrajudicial killings and disappearances⁽¹⁰⁵⁾. In January 2017, for the first time in history, 45 women have been appointed to the FC⁽¹⁰⁶⁾.

The Rangers

The Rangers are a paramilitary force under the authority of the Interior Ministry. There are two major subdivisions: the Punjabi Rangers headquartered in Lahore and the Sindh Rangers headquartered in Karachi. The Rangers help local law enforcement, provide border security and fight smuggling. Their total strength is about 19 475 personnel in Punjab and 24 630 in Sindh, according to an April 2016 publication⁽¹⁰⁷⁾. In April 2018, the Sindh Government decided to extend 'the special policing powers' of the Rangers in Sindh, extending by three months their deployment and mandate to carry out 'operations against militant wings, extortionists, hitmen and militants' in Karachi⁽¹⁰⁸⁾.

The Pakistani police

The Pakistani police as a primary domestic security is responsible for most parts of the country. Local police are under the jurisdiction of provincial governments⁽¹⁰⁹⁾. The Pakistani police (see Section [1.5.1. State protection, security forces and justice](#)), is underfunded and understaffed and facing the difficult task fighting rising crime and, in certain regions, insurgent activity⁽¹¹⁰⁾. The Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) stated in May 2018 that:

'Although Islamabad has a large police department, resource constraints affect the efficacy of police operations. Low salaries and a lack of equipment are pervasive issues throughout the country, although significant resources are devoted to government buildings in Islamabad. Police corruption is an issue throughout Pakistan, but is significantly less of a problem in Islamabad'⁽¹¹¹⁾.

The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) wrote in a September 2017 report:

'Deeply entrenched corruption and embezzlement of funds by all ranks of the police has made it difficult for the common man to approach police for redressal. This gives rise to mob vigilance and deteriorating law and order'⁽¹¹²⁾.

⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ Jaffrelot, C., Pakistan at the Crossroads Domestic Dynamics and External Pressures, April 2016, pp. 140-141; USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Pakistan, 20 April 2018, [url](#), p. 9

⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ UNCAT, Concluding observations on the initial report of Pakistan, 1 June 2017, [url](#), p. 3

⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ TNN, 45 women FC recruits complete training, 11 January 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ Jaffrelot, C., Pakistan at the Crossroads Domestic Dynamics and External Pressures, April 2016, pp. 140-141

⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ The Express Tribune/The International New York Times, Sindh government extends special powers of Sindh Rangers, 11 April 2018, [url](#)

⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Pakistan, 20 April 2018, [url](#), p. 10

⁽¹¹⁰⁾ USIP, A Counterterrorism Role for Pakistan's Police Stations, 18 August 2014, [url](#), pp. 3-4

⁽¹¹¹⁾ OSAC, Pakistan 2018 Crime & Safety Report: Islamabad, 21 May 2018, [url](#)

⁽¹¹²⁾ AHRC, Pakistan: Policing system plagued by pervasive corruption, 6 September 2017, [url](#)

Security forces, including the police, have been accused of being implicated in enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings (see Section [1.5.1. State protection, security forces and justice](#)) ⁽¹¹³⁾.

Pro- government militia

In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and in the FATA, the Pakistani army and police sometimes rely on irregular militia (so-called *Lashkars*) as informal law enforcement ⁽¹¹⁴⁾. They are often called ‘Government Taliban’, according to the newspaper Dawn. They have reportedly used indiscriminate and punitive force, engaging in the destruction of houses belonging to suspected Taliban and their families, arbitrary arrest and unlawful killings. The provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa decided to discontinue their financing. Due to the NAP, the *Lashkars* are being dissolved ⁽¹¹⁵⁾.

1.2.2. Armed Groups

Cyril Almeida, assistant editor and journalist of Dawn newspaper stated during a presentation in October 2017 in Rome organised by EASO that armed groups in Pakistan can broadly be divided into five major groups:

- Anti-Pakistan militants: these are groups that have taken up arms against the state and carry out attacks inside Pakistan. The main group is the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP);
- India-centric militants: main examples are LeT and JeM;
- Afghan-centric militants: mostly Pashtun militants with bases on Pakistani territory such as the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network;
- Sectarian groups: examples are the Punjabi Taliban, Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ);
- Foreign groups: al Qaeda, the Arab militants, the Uzbeks and the Chechens are examples of foreign groups. According to Cyril Almeida, the numbers of foreign groups are rather small ⁽¹¹⁶⁾.

The main armed groups in Pakistan are described below.

Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

The TTP (also called Pakistani Taliban; Tehreek-e Taliban; Tehrik-eTaliban; Tehrik-I Taliban Pakistan) is the largest anti-government militant group active in Pakistan ⁽¹¹⁷⁾. The term Pakistani Taliban is used to describe various groups. As stated by the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), the Pakistani Taliban was not formed as ‘a monolithic organisation’ ⁽¹¹⁸⁾. According to the Counter Extremism Project, ‘the TTP is an umbrella

⁽¹¹³⁾ HRW, World Report 2018 - Pakistan, 18 January 2018, [url](#); New York Times (The), The Slain ‘Militant’ Was a Model, and a Karachi Police Commander Is Out, 23 January 2018, [url](#); USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Pakistan, 20 April 2018, [url](#), p. 2

⁽¹¹⁴⁾ USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Pakistan, 20 April 2018, [url](#), p. 10

⁽¹¹⁵⁾ Dawn, Death by lashkar: The forgotten protectors of Adezai village, 9 May 2016, [url](#); Chaudhry, S., A., Civil Militia in FATA & Its Impact on Society, 9 October 2015, [url](#)

⁽¹¹⁶⁾ Almeida, C., EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan; 16-17 October 2017, Rome, February 2018, [url](#), pp. 22-23

⁽¹¹⁷⁾ USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 - Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), 19 July 2017, [url](#), p. 443

⁽¹¹⁸⁾ IPCS, Pakistan’s Militant Groups in 2015, January 2015, [url](#), p. 4

organisation comprised of 13 distinct Pakistani Taliban factions – approximately half of all Pakistani Taliban factions’⁽¹¹⁹⁾. The TTP was founded in 2007 by Baitullah Mehsud, who was killed in 2009 by a US drone strike, as a loose formation of Deobandi groupings chiefly operating in the Pakistani border area with Afghanistan. The initial objectives of the organisation were the implementation of Sharia law and the ousting of coalition forces from Afghanistan⁽¹²⁰⁾. The group was banned in August 2008 by the Government of Pakistan⁽¹²¹⁾. On 1 November 2013, the TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud was killed by a drone-attack in North Waziristan⁽¹²²⁾. The nomination of hardliner Mullah Fazlullah as his successor was considered a rejection of possible peace talks with the Pakistani authorities⁽¹²³⁾. Under the strain of military operations in North Waziristan in 2014, the rise of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and tensions within the group over the leadership of Fazlullah, the TTP split into different factions⁽¹²⁴⁾. Military operations eliminated the strongholds of the TTP in the FATA. TTP reportedly still holds sanctuaries across the border in eastern Afghanistan⁽¹²⁵⁾. In June 2018, the TTP confirmed that TTP leader Mullah Fazlullah was killed by a US drone strike in the province of Kunar in Afghanistan⁽¹²⁶⁾. The TTP appointed Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud as the new ‘emir’ or TTP leader. According to analyst and managing editor of the Long War Journal Bill Rogio, hereby the leadership of the TTP returned to the Mehsud tribe in its home base of South Waziristan⁽¹²⁷⁾. Mufti Hazratullah was named deputy emir⁽¹²⁸⁾. Journalist and expert on the TTP Rahimullah Yusufzai, quoted in the Pakistani newspaper Dawn, stated that with Wali Mehsud the breakaway factions in the TTP could reunite⁽¹²⁹⁾. Expert on terrorism in Pakistan Farhan Zahid stated in July 2018 that ‘a new TTP can be expected to emerge’⁽¹³⁰⁾. In August 2017, the TTP launched a magazine for women which specifically designed to recruit them. According to Tore Hamming, a researcher on militant Islam, quoted by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) it is an attempt of the TTP to catch up with other extremist groups when it comes to female recruitment⁽¹³¹⁾.

In 2017, according to the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), the TTP was responsible for 70 ‘terrorist attacks’⁽¹³²⁾, compared to 106 in 2016⁽¹³³⁾. These attacks remained concentrated in the FATA and KP in 2017⁽¹³⁴⁾. The Pakistani Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) reported that the TTP was responsible for eleven suicide attacks in 2017. The tactics used by the TTP included the use of IEDs, targeted killings, physical assaults and one sniper attack in 2017⁽¹³⁵⁾.

⁽¹¹⁹⁾ Counter Extremism Project, Pakistan, n.d., [url](#)

⁽¹²⁰⁾ Stanford University, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, last updated on: 6 August 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹²¹⁾ Stanford University, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, last updated on: 6 August 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹²²⁾ BBC News, Obituary: Hakimullah Mehsud, 1 November 2013, [url](#)

⁽¹²³⁾ Guardian (The), Pakistani Taliban select hardliner Mullah Fazlullah as new leader, 8 November 2013, [url](#)

⁽¹²⁴⁾ Jaffrelot, C., The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience, April 2015, p. 212

⁽¹²⁵⁾ Almeida, C., EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan; 16-17 October 2017; Rome, February 2018, [url](#), p. 20

⁽¹²⁶⁾ Dawn, TTP chief targeted in Afghan drone strike: US, 15 June 2018, [url](#); LWJ, Pakistani Taliban appoints new emir after confirming death of Mullah Fazlullah, 23 June 2018, [url](#)

⁽¹²⁷⁾ LWJ, Pakistani Taliban appoints new emir after confirming death of Mullah Fazlullah, 23 June 2018, [url](#)

⁽¹²⁸⁾ Jamestown Foundation (The), Pakistani Taliban: Mullah Fazlullah’s Death Revives Mehsud Clan Fortunes, 13 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽¹²⁹⁾ Dawn, TTP appoints Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud as chief after Fazlullah’s killing, 23 June 2018, [url](#)

⁽¹³⁰⁾ Jamestown Foundation (The), Pakistani Taliban: Mullah Fazlullah’s Death Revives Mehsud Clan Fortunes, 13 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽¹³¹⁾ RFE/RL, Pakistani Taliban Chases Jihadi Pack with New Women’s Magazine, 2 August 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹³²⁾ RFE/RL, Pakistani Taliban Chases Jihadi Pack with New Women’s Magazine, 2 August 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹³³⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 83

⁽¹³⁴⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2016, 10 January 2017, [url](#), p. 67

⁽¹³⁵⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 83

⁽¹³⁶⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 43

The same report concluded that the group in 2017 was ‘very’ active in North Waziristan and especially targeted the security forces ⁽¹³⁶⁾. A breakaway group of the TTP is also active in South Waziristan where they are organized in one of the peace committees (see Section [2.2.5. Federally Administered Tribal Areas](#)) ⁽¹³⁷⁾. In the first half of 2018 and especially in the run-up to the general elections, the TTP claimed responsibility for several attacks (see Section [1.3.7. Violence in the run-up to the general elections](#)) ⁽¹³⁸⁾.

Jamaat-ul Ahrar (JuA)

The JuA is a faction of the TTP but operates with a degree of autonomy ⁽¹³⁹⁾. In the summer of 2014, the JuA split from the TTP ⁽¹⁴⁰⁾. In March 2015, the group re-joined the TTP but releases its own statements on attacks ⁽¹⁴¹⁾. The group is operating from Lalpur in the province of Nangarhar in Afghanistan ⁽¹⁴²⁾.

The leadership of JuA reportedly has ties to al-Qaeda and its emir, Ayman al Zawahiri ⁽¹⁴³⁾. JuA is led by Omar Khalid al Khurasani, a Taliban commander from Mohmand Agency. It has been reported that Khurasani was killed in October 2017 in a US drone strike in Afghanistan ⁽¹⁴⁴⁾. However, Khurasani reportedly released a statement, just days after his presumed death. The United States also didn’t confirm his death ⁽¹⁴⁵⁾. In August 2016, the US Department of State (USDOS) added the JuA to its list of global terrorists’ organisations ⁽¹⁴⁶⁾. In July 2017, JuA was listed as terrorist group by the United Nations Security Council ⁽¹⁴⁷⁾. The group encountered internal rivalry and a faction led by former spokesman Mukarram formed a separate group called the Hizbul Ahrar (HuA) in November 2017 ⁽¹⁴⁸⁾. In February 2017, JuA announced its strategy for 2017 and named their action plan ‘Operation Ghazi’ ⁽¹⁴⁹⁾. The main targets of the group are military and law enforcement personnel, government buildings, politicians, minority groups and lawyers ⁽¹⁵⁰⁾.

PIPS documented that in 2017, the JuA was responsible for 37 ‘terrorist attacks’ ⁽¹⁵¹⁾ compared to 66 in 2016 ⁽¹⁵²⁾. PICSS reported that JuA has claimed responsibility of ten suicide attacks during 2017, including what PIPS described as ‘some of the most devastating attacks in recent history’ ⁽¹⁵³⁾.

⁽¹³⁶⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), pp. 43-44

⁽¹³⁷⁾ Kanwal Sheikh, M., New conflict lines in Pakistan’s tribal areas, 6 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽¹³⁸⁾ HRW, Pakistan: Militant Attacks Escalate As Election Nears, 17 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽¹³⁹⁾ LWJ, Mehsud faction rejoins the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, 4 February 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁴⁰⁾ LWJ, Taliban splinter group Jamaat-ul-Ahrar forms in northwestern Pakistan, 26 August 2014, [url](#); Nation (The), Ex-TTP spokesman surrender a major breakthrough, 18 April 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁴¹⁾ Roggio, B., Weiss, C., Pakistani Taliban faction showcases training camp, suicide attacks, 2 February 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁴²⁾ Diplomat (The), Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the ‘Good Taliban’, 10 March 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁴³⁾ Roggio, B., Weiss, C., Pakistani Taliban faction showcases training camp, suicide attacks, 2 February 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁴⁴⁾ The Express Tribune/The International New York Times, Khorasani confirmed dead in US drone strike, 19 October 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁴⁵⁾ LWJ, Leader of Jamaat-ul-Ahrar emerges after reports of his death, 22 October 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁴⁶⁾ USDOS, State Department Terrorist Designations of Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and Mohamed Abrini, 3 August 2016, [url](#)

⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ Dawn, Pakistan welcomes UNSC sanctions on Jamaatul Ahrar, 7 July 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁴⁸⁾ Dawn, Taliban splinter group splits further, 13 November 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁴⁹⁾ FRC, Strategic Code of Conduct for “Operation Ghazi”, 16 February 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁵⁰⁾ Dawn, Pakistan welcomes UNSC sanctions on Jamaatul Ahrar, 7 July 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁵¹⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 84

⁽¹⁵²⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2016, 10 January 2017, [url](#), p. 68

⁽¹⁵³⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 46

Hizbul Ahrar (HuA)

Hizbul Ahrar is a breakaway faction of the JuA. In November 2017, through a video message Mukkaram Khan, also known as Omar Khurasani, announced the formation of HuA⁽¹⁵⁴⁾. Mukkaram Khan is a commander originating from Mohmand Agency. This group is orientated against the United States and its allies⁽¹⁵⁵⁾. According to PIPS, the group did not launch any major attacks in 2017⁽¹⁵⁶⁾. In May 2018, HuA claimed responsibility for a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack in Attock in the province of Punjab⁽¹⁵⁷⁾.

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

The IMU has been active in the Pakistani tribal region since late 2001, where it regrouped after sustaining heavy losses fighting alongside the Taliban during the US invasion of Afghanistan. Under the leadership of Toher Yuldashev the group targeted the Pakistani security forces from its bases in North and South Waziristan. From 2007, the IMU formed an alliance with the TTP and fought alongside them. In 2009, Yuldashev was killed in a drone attack. Pakistan's military operations forced the IMU to flee to North Waziristan where it started to cooperate with the Haqqani Network. Osman Odil became the new leader of the organisation in 2010. In 2015, a radical splinter group of IMU - the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) - tried to export terrorism from its Pakistan base⁽¹⁵⁸⁾. On 8 June 2014, IMU militants staged a bloody attack on Karachi Airport⁽¹⁵⁹⁾. The Pakistani army subsequently made it a priority to eradicate the group. Most of its militants fled to Afghanistan⁽¹⁶⁰⁾. At the end of March 2015, the IMU reportedly pledged allegiance to ISKP⁽¹⁶¹⁾. No further information is found about the IMU in Pakistan during the reporting period in the consulted sources.

Al-Qaeda

Following the US invasion of Afghanistan, many al-Qaeda operatives withdrew to the Pakistani tribal regions. By 2008, they were so deeply entrenched in Waziristan that, according to American intelligence officials, the area had become al-Qaeda's 'international operations hub'⁽¹⁶²⁾. Among their ranks were also Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens and Chinese Muslims⁽¹⁶³⁾. In the FATA, al-Qaeda has aligned itself with several militant groups, offering support with manpower, training and propaganda. It also attacks the government of Pakistan, which is viewed as apostate for allying itself with the US-led war on terrorism. Al-Qaeda in Waziristan has developed privileged relations with the IJU⁽¹⁶⁴⁾. Operation *Zarb-e-Azb* has pushed the IJU into Afghanistan⁽¹⁶⁵⁾. Since 2014, al-Qaeda has suffered losses and setbacks⁽¹⁶⁶⁾. For instance: in December 2014, al-Qaeda lost two top commanders: the Pakistani army killed

⁽¹⁵⁴⁾ Dawn, Taliban splinter group splits further, 13 November 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁵⁵⁾ Pakistan Today, Hizbul Ahrar takes birth as internal rifts tear Jamaatul Ahrar apart, 13 November 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁵⁶⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 85

⁽¹⁵⁷⁾ Jeffery, F., [Twitter], posted on: 3 May 2018, [url](#)

⁽¹⁵⁸⁾ RFE/RL, What Next For The Islamic Movement Of Uzbekistan?, 23 August 2015, [url](#)

⁽¹⁵⁹⁾ BBC News, Karachi airport: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan claims attack, 11 June 2014, [url](#)

⁽¹⁶⁰⁾ RFE/RL, What Next For The Islamic Movement Of Uzbekistan?, 23 August 2015, [url](#)

⁽¹⁶¹⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Too long a wait: Uzbek militants group joins IS, 2 April 2015, [url](#)

⁽¹⁶²⁾ Guardian (The), Waziristan: the hub of al-Qaida operations, 7 January 2008, [url](#); Rashid, A., Descent into Chaos, 2008, pp. 268-269

⁽¹⁶³⁾ Reuters Alertnet, Analysis - The ties that kill: Pakistan militant groups uniting, 30 May 2010, [url](#)

⁽¹⁶⁴⁾ CSIS, Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, 29 June 2012, [url](#)

⁽¹⁶⁵⁾ McNally, L., Weinbaum, M., G., 'A Resilient Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan', 1 August 2016, [url](#), p. 11

⁽¹⁶⁶⁾ Zahid, F., The Return of Al-Qaeda to Pakistan, Middle East Institute, 24 August 2017, [url](#)

Adnan el Shukrijuma in South Waziristan, while a US drone eliminated Umar Farooq in North Waziristan ⁽¹⁶⁷⁾. In July 2015, a leader of al-Qaeda known as Abdali was killed in a raid in Lahore ⁽¹⁶⁸⁾. In February 2016, the Rangers arrested 97 al-Qaeda militants in Karachi, including Farooq Bhatti, deputy chief of al-Qaeda ⁽¹⁶⁹⁾. In March 2017, the US announced that Qari Yasin, the man behind the Marriott Hotel bombing in 2008, was killed in a drone strike in Afghanistan ⁽¹⁷⁰⁾. A drone strike in April 2017 in North Waziristan killed a ‘key’ (Iraqi) al-Qaeda commander together with seven other jihadists ⁽¹⁷¹⁾. According to Farhan Zahid, al-Qaeda is attempting to resurrect itself in Pakistan, possibly with the help of the Jamaat-ul Ansar al-Sharia (for details of this group see its separate section in this chapter) ⁽¹⁷²⁾.

According to PIPS, al-Qaeda was involved in two ‘terrorist attacks’ in Karachi in 2017 ⁽¹⁷³⁾. Mohammad Amir Rana stated during a presentation in October 2017 in Rome organised by EASO that al-Qaeda was involved in the abduction of businessmen in Peshawar and Karachi in 2017 ⁽¹⁷⁴⁾. According to an article in September 2017, published by Combating Terrorism Center, the presence of al-Qaeda in Karachi has been growing in recent years ⁽¹⁷⁵⁾.

Jamaat-ul Ansar al-Sharia

Jamaat-ul Ansar Al-Sharia is an umbrella organisation of Islamist terrorist organisations endeavouring to converge into a platform to reintroduce al-Qaeda and restart armed activities under its banner ⁽¹⁷⁶⁾. It emerged in Pakistan in April 2017. The group is led by Abdul Karim Saroush Siddiqui and is believed to comprise of highly educated militants ⁽¹⁷⁷⁾. The Jamaat-ul Ansar al-Sharia mainly operates in the provinces of Sindh and Balochistan ⁽¹⁷⁸⁾. According to PIPS, the group was responsible for six ‘terrorist attacks’ in Karachi and Balochistan in 2017 ⁽¹⁷⁹⁾.

The Punjabi Taliban

The Punjabi Taliban is a network consisting of a loose conglomeration of members of banned militant outfits of Punjabi origin, mostly sectarian and previously Kashmir insurgency focused, who have developed strong links with the TTP. The major factions of this network include operatives from Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ), Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and JeM and their splinter groups (for details on these groups, see their separate section in this chapter) ⁽¹⁸⁰⁾. The most influential group of the Punjabi Taliban is led by Maulana Asmatullah Muawiya ⁽¹⁸¹⁾. In September 2014, Muawiya first intended to shift his militant activities from Pakistan to Afghanistan and then some days later announced he would give up the armed struggle in

⁽¹⁶⁷⁾ Dawn, Al Qaeda leader Umar Farooq killed in N Waziristan drone strike, 7 December 2014, [url](#)

⁽¹⁶⁸⁾ Dawn, Al Qaeda Pakistan chief killed in Lahore raid: Punjab home minister, 1 July 2015, [url](#)

⁽¹⁶⁹⁾ Reuters, Pakistan arrests 97 al-Qaeda and other militants; foils jailbreak plan, 12 February 2016, [url](#)

⁽¹⁷⁰⁾ CNN, US drone strike kills man behind Marriott Hotel bombing, Pentagon says, 26 March 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁷¹⁾ LWJ, Iraqi al Qaeda leader reportedly killed in drone strike in Pakistan, 3 May 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁷²⁾ Middle East Institute (Farhan Zahid), The Return of Al-Qaeda to Pakistan, 24 August 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁷³⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 88

⁽¹⁷⁴⁾ Rana Amir, M., EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan; 16-17 October 2017, Rome, February 2018, [url](#), p. 63

⁽¹⁷⁵⁾ Combating Terrorism Center, Al-Qa’ida in Pakistan: A Metric Problem?, September 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁷⁶⁾ Zahid, F., Jamaat ul Ansar al-Sharia: The New al-Qaeda Threat in Pakistan Publication, in: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 15 Issue: 18, 22 September 2017, [url](#); Zahid, F., The Return of Al-Qaeda to Pakistan, Middle East Institute, 24 August 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁷⁷⁾ Dawn, The rise and ‘fall’ of Ansarul Sharia Pakistan, 9 September 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁷⁸⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 177, p. 190

⁽¹⁷⁹⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 177

⁽¹⁸⁰⁾ Abbas, H., Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network, 15 April 2009, [url](#)

⁽¹⁸¹⁾ Centre for International and Strategic Analysis, The Punjabi Taliban, February 2014, [url](#)

Pakistan entirely and use peaceful means instead⁽¹⁸²⁾. In April 2016 it was reported that the Punjabi Taliban was considered weakened and scattered⁽¹⁸³⁾.

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)

The first reports about ISKP (also called ISIS, ISIL, IS or Daesh) appearing in Pakistan date back to the beginning of 2015⁽¹⁸⁴⁾. Antonio Giustozzi, an independent researcher and a visiting professor at King's College London, stated in February 2016 that ISKP has an estimated 2 000 to 3 000 members in Pakistan, including 'fighters and support elements'⁽¹⁸⁵⁾. Different militant groups such as Tehrik-e-Khilafat Pakistan, the Shahidullah Shahid Group of TTP, Jundullah and IMU have pledged allegiance to the leader of IS, al-Baghdadi⁽¹⁸⁶⁾. Farhan Zahid, a terrorism expert on Pakistan, stated that ISKP has managed to increase its influence by forming 'tactical alliances' with similar local militant groups. ISKP asserts its dominance through local affiliates in urban centres of Pakistan⁽¹⁸⁷⁾. Different sources reported that ISKP has recruitment networks in several major urban regions such as Peshawar and Karachi⁽¹⁸⁸⁾. In 2017, it has been reported that the support base of IS seems to be growing in Pakistan⁽¹⁸⁹⁾. The number of attacks claimed by ISKP in 2017 is higher than in previous years and this may suggest that that the group has a 'decreased dependence on local partners'⁽¹⁹⁰⁾.

PIPS documented that ISKP was responsible for six 'terrorist attacks' in 2017, compared to three in 2016. Four of these attacks in 2017 took place in the province of Balochistan and two in the province of Sindh⁽¹⁹¹⁾. In April 2018, ISKP claimed two attacks against Christians in Quetta in Balochistan⁽¹⁹²⁾. On the day of the general elections in July 2018, ISKP claimed responsibility for a suicide attack near a polling station in Quetta, killing 31 people⁽¹⁹³⁾.

Haqqani Network

The Haqqani Network was founded by Afghan warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani, who handed over de facto leadership to his son Sirajuddin Haqqani in 2007⁽¹⁹⁴⁾. In July 2015, Serajuddin Haqqani was appointed as a deputy leader of the Afghan Taliban⁽¹⁹⁵⁾. The group's leadership

⁽¹⁸²⁾ Dawn, Punjabi Taliban call off armed struggle in Pakistan, 13 September 2014, [url](#); Dawn, Punjabi Taliban give up 'armed struggle', 14 September 2014, [url](#)

⁽¹⁸³⁾ International News (The), Who are Punjabi Taliban?, 24 April 2016, [url](#)

⁽¹⁸⁴⁾ Henry Jackson Society (The), ISIS Khorasan: Presence and potential in the Afghanistan Pakistan- region, October 2017, [url](#), pp. 4-7; USIP, The Islamic State in Pakistan, 21 September 2016, [url](#)

⁽¹⁸⁵⁾ Giustozzi, A., The Islamic State in 'Khorasan': A Nuanced View, RUSSI commentary, 5 February 2016, [url](#)

⁽¹⁸⁶⁾ Jamestown Foundation (The), 'Growing Evidence of Islamic State in Pakistan', 4 February 2016, [url](#); Diplomat (The), The Islamic State Threat Is Real in Pakistan, 18 February 2016, [url](#)

⁽¹⁸⁷⁾ Zahid, F., 'IS Footprint in Pakistan: Nature of Presence, Method of Recruitment, and Future Outlook', in: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Volume 9, Issue 5, May 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁸⁸⁾ Jamestown Foundation (The), 'Growing Evidence of Islamic State in Pakistan', 4 February 2016, [url](#); IRIN, Islamic State ramps up recruitment in Pakistan, 11 January 2017, [url](#); Wall Street Journal (The), Pakistan Frets Over Potential Appeal of Islamic State, 23 February 2016, [url](#); VOA, Islamic State Takes Root, Grows Along Afghan-Pakistan Border, 1 March 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁸⁹⁾ Diplomat (The), The Islamic State's Support Base in Pakistan Continues to Grow, 28 September 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁹⁰⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 85

⁽¹⁹¹⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 85

⁽¹⁹²⁾ RFE/RL, Four Pakistani Christians Killed In Attack Claimed By Islamic State, 3 April 2018, [url](#); RFE/RL, Pakistani Christians Killed In Drive-By Shooting, 16 April 2018, [url](#)

⁽¹⁹³⁾ Dawn, 31 die in suicide bombing outside Quetta polling station, 26 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽¹⁹⁴⁾ USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 - Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Haqqani Network (HQN), 19 July 2017, [url](#), pp. 399-400

⁽¹⁹⁵⁾ Ruttig, T., The New Taleban Deputy Leaders: Is there an obvious successor to Akhtar Mansur?, 10 February 2016, [url](#)

has historically maintained a power base around Pakistan's tribal areas⁽¹⁹⁶⁾. According to a USDOS report of July 2017:

‘The Haqqani Network is active along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and across much of southeastern Afghanistan, particularly in Loya Paktia (which consists of Paktia, Paktika, and Khost provinces, and includes parts of Logar and Ghazni) and has repeatedly targeted Kabul in its attacks’⁽¹⁹⁷⁾.

It is the view of analysts that the Haqqani Network and the TTP are allies. The Haqqani Network also has a long-standing relationship with the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) which had led to frictions between Pakistan and the US⁽¹⁹⁸⁾. The leadership of the Haqqani Network belong to the Zadran tribe⁽¹⁹⁹⁾. The Haqqani network was also believed to have ties with al-Qaeda⁽²⁰⁰⁾. American sources stated in November 2014 that ongoing Pakistani military operations in North Waziristan have ‘disrupted’ the military capabilities of the Haqqani⁽²⁰¹⁾. The Haqqani Network relocated in 2016 from North Waziristan to Kurram Agency under pressure of these military operations⁽²⁰²⁾.

Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)

SSP is a former Deobandi political party founded in the early 1980s by Sunni cleric Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi in Jhang, Punjab. Its principal aim is to fight Shia influence in Pakistan⁽²⁰³⁾. Jhangvi was assassinated in 1990 and was replaced by Maulana Azam Tariq. Tariq was killed in 2003 when gunmen fired bullets into the vehicle he was travelling in. He was succeeded by Maulana Ali Sher Hyderi. The organisation has close ties with the Jihadi organisation Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) and the TTP, and is a part of the Punjabi Taliban network. Several reports labelled SSP as a violent group. At the beginning of the century it was responsible for the murder of Shia militants, ordinary Shia citizens and attacks on Shia mosques. Although the group denies involvement in violence, former President Musharraf banned it in 2002, and in 2005 the US listed SSP as a ‘terrorist organisation’⁽²⁰⁴⁾. A part of SSP rebranded itself in more recent years as Ah-le Sunnat Wal Jama’at, which under the leadership of Maulana Muhammad Ahmed Ludhianvi became a political party⁽²⁰⁵⁾. Other members left SSP to form Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ), which observers say is even more radical than the SSP. Other extremist splinter groups of SSP are the Jhangvi Tigers, Al-Haq Tigers, Tanzeem-ul Haq, Al-Farooq and the Al-Badra Foundation⁽²⁰⁶⁾. The core of SSP supporters is made up of Sunni peasantry in the rural Jhang and merchant and trader classes in the urban centres. The *madrassas* are a major recruiting ground for SSP. SSP cadres received *jihadi* training in Afghanistan. To fund its organisation and activities, SSP has relied on contributions from its supporters in the form of

⁽¹⁹⁶⁾ VoA, What is the Haqqani Network?, 1 June 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁹⁷⁾ USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 - Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Haqqani Network (HQN), 19 July 2017, [url](#), p. 400

⁽¹⁹⁸⁾ VoA, Haqqani Network Remains Primary Source of Pakistan-US Tensions, 29 November 2017, [url](#)

⁽¹⁹⁹⁾ Stanford University, Haqqani Network, last updated on: 8 November 2017, [url](#)

⁽²⁰⁰⁾ CSIS, Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, June 2012, [url](#), p. 63

⁽²⁰¹⁾ Dawn, Operation Zarb-e-Azb disrupted Haqqani network; US general, 6 November 2014, [url](#)

⁽²⁰²⁾ LWJ, US drones target jihadist ‘hideouts’ in Pakistan’s tribal areas, 22 February 2016, [url](#)

⁽²⁰³⁾ Nelson, M., EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan; 16-17 October 2017, Rome, February 2018, [url](#), p. 30

⁽²⁰⁴⁾ Dawn, 2009: Southern Punjab extremism battle between haves and have-nots, 21 May 2011, [url](#); NOREF, Sectarian violence: Pakistan’s greatest security threat?, 9 August 2012, [url](#); Rashid, A., Descent into Chaos, 2008, pp. 227-228; Jamestown Foundation (The), ‘Sipah-e-Sahaba: Fomenting Sectarian Violence in Pakistan’, 5 May 2005, [url](#); Abbas, H., Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network, 15 April 2009, [url](#)

⁽²⁰⁵⁾ Nelson, M., EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan; 16-17 October 2017, Rome, February 2018, [url](#), p. 30

⁽²⁰⁶⁾ CSIS, Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, June 2012, [url](#), p. 39

zakat (religious alms). Sunni business people contribute as well. Observers believe that SSP receives considerable financial and logistic backing from Saudi donors who want to curb Iran's influence over the Shia population in Pakistan ⁽²⁰⁷⁾. SSP reportedly has 3 000 to 6 000 members and a political party with one million members; it also has a student wing, an insurance company, many offices and a nationwide network ⁽²⁰⁸⁾.

Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ)

LeJ is a Deobandi militant group founded in 1996, when a number of militants led by Riaz Basra, Akram Lahori and Malik Ishaq broke away from Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan. LeJ is not a political party but a purely paramilitary organisation. Some claim that its creation was prompted by the 1994 establishment of Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan (SMP), a Shia militant group that targeted leaders of SSP. USDOS writes that LeJ was formed as the militant wing of SSP to attack the Shia community and that it became independent when it gained more proficiency ⁽²⁰⁹⁾. LeJ became a strong militant organisation, responsible for 350 armed attacks prior to 2001. USDOS stated that LeJ has 'cordial relations' with JeM and the TTP ⁽²¹⁰⁾. LeJ was openly supported by the ISI, who used the group as a proxy in Afghanistan and India as well as to counter Shia militant groups ⁽²¹¹⁾. LeJ was banned by the Pakistan Government in 2001 and was placed on the US terrorist list in 2003 ⁽²¹²⁾. Its underground violent activities continued, especially against Shias and members of the Hazara community in Quetta ⁽²¹³⁾. Although most of the violence of LeJ targets Shias, the organisation also cultivates a radical stance against Christians, Ahmadi and Sufi Muslims ⁽²¹⁴⁾. A substantial number of the leadership of LeJ have either been killed in 2015, including Malik Ishaq ⁽²¹⁵⁾, or captured in 2016, including Naeem Bukhari ⁽²¹⁶⁾. On 19 January 2017, LeJ's Commander Asif Chuto was killed in an encounter with law enforcement agencies ⁽²¹⁷⁾. In May 2018, security forces killed the Head of LeJ's Balochistan Chapter Salman Badeni ⁽²¹⁸⁾.

According to PIPS, LeJ was responsible for 10 'terrorist attacks' in 2017 in Pakistan, compared to 17 of these attacks in 2016 ⁽²¹⁹⁾. Its main areas of operation are the province of Punjab, the FATA, Karachi and the province of Balochistan ⁽²²⁰⁾.

⁽²⁰⁷⁾ CSIS, Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, June 2012, [url](#), p. 39

⁽²⁰⁸⁾ SATP, Pakistan: Extremist Group: Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, n.d, [url](#); Hussain, Z., Frontline Pakistan, The struggle with militant Islam, 2007, p. 92

⁽²⁰⁹⁾ USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 - Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ), 19 July 2017, [url](#), p. 424

⁽²¹⁰⁾ USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 - Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ), 19 July 2017, [url](#), p. 424

⁽²¹¹⁾ Reuters, Special Report: Pakistan's threat within - the Sunni-Shia divide, 24 October 2012, [url](#); National (The), Pakistan arrests 97 Al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militants, 12 February 2016, [url](#); Guardian (The), Pakistan military intelligence under fire for failing to prevent Quetta bombing, 18 February 2013, [url](#)

⁽²¹²⁾ USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 - Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ), 19 July 2017, [url](#), p. 424

⁽²¹³⁾ RFE/RL, Pakistan's Army Kills Commander Of Islamist Militant Group In Balochistan, 17 May 2018, [url](#)

⁽²¹⁴⁾ LWJ, State designates leader of Lashkar-e-Jhanghvi as global terrorist, 6 February 2014, [url](#)

⁽²¹⁵⁾ LWJ, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi emir killed in shootout with Pakistani police, 29 July 2015, [url](#)

⁽²¹⁶⁾ Daily Times, LeJ leads international terrorist organisations in Pakistan, 10 March 2017, [url](#)

⁽²¹⁷⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Sheikhpura raid: LeJ chief Asif Chotu, three aides killed in gunfight, 19 January 2017, [url](#)

⁽²¹⁸⁾ Nation (The), Security forces kill senior Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militant in Balochistan raid, 17 May 2018, [url](#)

⁽²¹⁹⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 87

⁽²²⁰⁾ USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 - Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ), 19 July 2017, [url](#), p. 424

Lashkar-e Jhangvi Al-Alami (LJA)

Over the past decade, LeJ broke up in different factions as a result of the military operations of the Pakistan State⁽²²¹⁾. One of those emerging factions is called LeJ Al-Alami (LJA)⁽²²²⁾, designated by Pakistan as a ‘terrorist organisation’ in November 2016⁽²²³⁾. The main difference between LeJ and LJA is that LeJ only targets minority groups whilst LJA also carries out attacks on law enforcement agencies and government installations⁽²²⁴⁾. Sources stated that the group is led by Yousaf Mansoor Khurasani and a *shura* (council) composed of six members⁽²²⁵⁾. The leadership is based in southern Afghanistan, in the province of Zabul⁽²²⁶⁾.

According to PIPS, in 2017, LJA was responsible for eight ‘terrorist attacks’, mostly carried out in all regions of Pakistan except in the province of Sindh⁽²²⁷⁾.

Lashkar-e-Islam (LI)

LI is a small group active in the Khyber Agency of the FATA. The government of Pakistan banned LI in June 2008⁽²²⁸⁾. Pakistani military operations in 2014 reportedly crippled the group’s operational capabilities in Khyber Agency. As a result, members of LI relocated to Afghanistan⁽²²⁹⁾. It has been reported that LI works together with ISKP in Afghanistan and both are ‘strategic allies’⁽²³⁰⁾. In 2015, LI announced its merger into the TTP⁽²³¹⁾. The leader of LI, Mangal Bagh, was reportedly killed by a drone attack in Afghanistan in the summer of 2016⁽²³²⁾. This was not confirmed by the Pakistani government or by experts. A regional expert stated to Voice of America (VoA) that Bagh is still alive and active in eastern Afghanistan⁽²³³⁾.

PIPS documented that LI carried out 21 ‘terrorist attacks’ during 2017, which is a slightly higher number than in 2016 (18 attacks). Most of these attacks took place in Khyber Agency⁽²³⁴⁾.

Sipah-e Muhammad Pakistan (SMP)

SMP is a Shia militant group whose aim is to protect the Shia community and target hostile Sunni Deobandi organisations such as SSP and LeJ. SMP is an armed offshoot of a mainstream Shia political party, the Tehrik-e Jaferia Pakistan⁽²³⁵⁾. The origins are unclear but it was

⁽²²¹⁾ RFE/RL, Pakistani Extremists Carve A Sanctuary In Southern Afghanistan, 23 January 2017, [url](#)

⁽²²²⁾ Jamestown Foundation (The), ‘Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Alami: A Pakistani Partner for Islamic State’, 27 January 2017, [url](#)

⁽²²³⁾ Daily Times, From sectarian to anti-state outfit, journey of al-Alami, 2 April 2017, [url](#)

⁽²²⁴⁾ Jamestown Foundation (The), ‘Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Alami: A Pakistani Partner for Islamic State’, 27 January 2017, [url](#)

⁽²²⁵⁾ Jamestown Foundation (The), ‘Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Alami: A Pakistani Partner for Islamic State’, 27 January 2017, [url](#)

⁽²²⁶⁾ RFE/RL, Pakistani Extremists Carve A Sanctuary In Southern Afghanistan, 23 January 2017, [url](#)

⁽²²⁷⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 87

⁽²²⁸⁾ Dawn, Pakistan bans 25 militant organisations, 6 August 2009, [url](#); Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), List of banned organisations in Pakistan, 24 October 2012, [url](#)

⁽²²⁹⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2016, 10 January 2017, [url](#), p. 68

⁽²³⁰⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 85

⁽²³¹⁾ LWJ, 3 jihadist groups merge with Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, 6 May 2015, [url](#)

⁽²³²⁾ Nation (The), Mangal Bagh ‘is dead’, 25 July 2016, [url](#)

⁽²³³⁾ VoA, IS, Lashkar-e-Islam Clash in Eastern Afghanistan, 11 February 2018, [url](#)

⁽²³⁴⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 85

⁽²³⁵⁾ Dawn, Pakistan bans 25 militant organisations, 6 August 2009, [url](#); Jamestown Foundation (The), ‘Sipah-e-Sahaba: Fomenting Sectarian Violence in Pakistan’, 5 May 2005, [url](#)

probably founded around 1993 by Maulana Mureed Abbas Yazdani. The organisation claims to have some 30 000 followers ⁽²³⁶⁾. SMP was banned in Pakistan in August 2001 ⁽²³⁷⁾.

In 2017, SMP carried out one ‘terrorist attack’ in the province of Sindh, according to PIPS ⁽²³⁸⁾.

Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)

JeM was founded in the beginning of 2000 by Harakat ul-Mujahideen leader Masood Azhar. USDOS states in July 2017 that ‘the group aims to annex the state of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan and expel international forces from Afghanistan. JeM has openly declared war against the United States’ ⁽²³⁹⁾. JeM and the Pakistani army have been accused of having an alliance ⁽²⁴⁰⁾.

The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)

The BLA is a Baloch armed nationalist movement. Its objective is an independent Balochistan, free of Pakistani and Iranian rule. Because of its violent methods, such as bomb attacks, it was banned in Pakistan in April 2006 ⁽²⁴¹⁾. In 2017, BLA targeted primarily CPEC-related projects, Chinese workers and other people and entities related to CPEC ⁽²⁴²⁾.

PIPS stated that the BLA carried out 42 ‘terrorist attacks’ in Balochistan in 2017, which is a decrease compared to 2016 ⁽²⁴³⁾. On 11 August 2018, the BLA claimed responsibility for an attack on a bus carrying Chinese engineers together with an escort of FC troops in Dalbandin area of Chagai district. Six people were injured ⁽²⁴⁴⁾.

The Baloch Liberation Front (BLF)

The BLF is an insurgent group, led by Dr Allah Nazar Baloch. This group operates across Balochistan, but is primarily active in the southern coastal Makran belt ⁽²⁴⁵⁾. BLF was banned in September 2010 ⁽²⁴⁶⁾. In October 2017, the BLF accused local journalists of collaborating with the Pakistani army and threatened and boycotted the local media ⁽²⁴⁷⁾. According to PIPS,

⁽²³⁶⁾ SATP, Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan, Terrorist Group of Pakistan, n.d., [url](#)

⁽²³⁷⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), List of banned organisations in Pakistan, 24 October 2012, [url](#)

⁽²³⁸⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 86

⁽²³⁹⁾ USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 - Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), 19 July 2017, [url](#), p. 415

⁽²⁴⁰⁾ Lowy Institute, Pakistan and Jaish-e-Mohammad: An unholy alliance, 7 July 2017, [url](#)

⁽²⁴¹⁾ Dawn, Pakistan bans 25 militant organisations, 6 August 2009, [url](#); Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), List of banned organisations in Pakistan, 24 October 2012, [url](#)

⁽²⁴²⁾ Jamestown Foundation (The), Chinese Projects in Pakistan Prove Tempting Targets for Terrorist Groups, 8 February 2018, [url](#)

⁽²⁴³⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 89

⁽²⁴⁴⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Six injured in suicide attack on bus carrying Chinese engineers in Dalbandin, 11 August 2018, [url](#)

⁽²⁴⁵⁾ Firstpost, Pakistan releases wife, children of Baloch Liberation Front chief Allah Nazar after detaining them for ‘illegal travelling’, 4 November 2017, [url](#); RFE/RL, Pakistan’s Balochistan Conflict Reverberates In Europe, 7 December 2017, [url](#)

⁽²⁴⁶⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), List of banned organisations in Pakistan, 24 October 2012, [url](#)

⁽²⁴⁷⁾ BBC News, Balochistan journalists caught ‘between the stick and the gun’, 26 November 2017, [url](#)

the group's operational capacities grew in 2017 because of a merger with smaller insurgents groups ⁽²⁴⁸⁾. In 2017, this group was responsible for 39 'terrorist attacks' ⁽²⁴⁹⁾.

The Baloch Republican Army (BRA)

The banned BRA is the militant wing of the separatist Baloch Republican Party (BRP) and is headed by Brahmdagh Bugti, the grandson of a former Balochistan Chief Minister ⁽²⁵⁰⁾. The most prominent BRA attack was in January 2015 against the electricity network of Pakistan, which caused a blackout in 80 % of Pakistan ⁽²⁵¹⁾. The BRA carried out 30 attacks in 2017, mainly in Dera Bugti, Nasirabad and Kholu districts of Balochistan province ⁽²⁵²⁾.

United Baloch Army (UBA)

The UBA is a nationalist insurgent group in Balochistan and a splinter group of the BLA ⁽²⁵³⁾. The UBA is led by Mehran Marri, the youngest son of Khair Bux Marri ⁽²⁵⁴⁾. The Balochistan Post reported in February 2018 that the BRA, the UBA and the Lashkar-e-Balochistan (LB), will work together for an independent Balochistan ⁽²⁵⁵⁾.

In February and March 2018, the UBA claimed responsibility for two attacks on the Pakistani army in Bolan, Dazi Wadh and Kalat ⁽²⁵⁶⁾.

1.3. Recent security trends and armed confrontations

According to sources systematically collecting information on terrorist and anti-state violence in Pakistan, the overall security situation improved in 2017 compared to previous years. The nature of the violence in 2017 and in the first half of 2018 is diverse and is described in detail in the following sections.

The 2017 report of the Pakistani Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) ⁽²⁵⁷⁾ recorded 950 incidents of anti-state violence by militants and counter-insurgency operations by the Pakistani government, in which 1 395 people were killed including 561 militants, 585 civilians, 249 security forces personnel. While 1 965 were injured including 1 580 civilians, 54 militants and 331 security forces personnel ⁽²⁵⁸⁾. Compared to 2016, this represents a 41 % decrease in the number of incidents. PICSS mentions a decrease of 25 % in the number of deaths but a 2 % increase in the number of those injured ⁽²⁵⁹⁾.

⁽²⁴⁸⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 90

⁽²⁴⁹⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 89

⁽²⁵⁰⁾ RFE/RL, Pakistan's Balochistan Conflict Reverberates In Europe, 7 December 2017, [url](#)

⁽²⁵¹⁾ Diplomat (The), Understanding Pakistan's Baloch Insurgency, 24 June 2015, [url](#)

⁽²⁵²⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 89

⁽²⁵³⁾ RFE/RL, Pakistan's Balochistan Conflict Reverberates In Europe, 7 December 2017, [url](#)

⁽²⁵⁴⁾ Dawn, Situationer: Who's who of Baloch insurgency, 1 June 2015, [url](#)

⁽²⁵⁵⁾ Balochistan Post (The), Baloch pro-freedom groups to work unitedly, 25 February 2018, [url](#)

⁽²⁵⁶⁾ United Baloch Army [Twitter], posted on: 11 February 2018, [url](#); United Baloch Army [Twitter], posted on: 5 March 2018, [url](#); United Baloch Army [Twitter], posted on: 8 April 2018, [url](#)

⁽²⁵⁷⁾ For a description of this source, see section [1.4.1. Figures on civilian fatalities](#)

⁽²⁵⁸⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 11

⁽²⁵⁹⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 11

The annual security situation report of Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) ⁽²⁶⁰⁾ documented 713 incidents of violence, resulting in 1 611 deaths and 2 121 injured in 2017 ⁽²⁶¹⁾. More than half of the number of violent incidents (370) were labelled as ‘terrorist attacks’ ⁽²⁶²⁾, according to PIPS ⁽²⁶³⁾. Compared to 2016, the number of violent incidents decreased by approximately 5 % ⁽²⁶⁴⁾. Similar to PICSS, PIPS observed in 2017 that the number of deaths decreased and the number of injured slightly increased compared to 2016 ⁽²⁶⁵⁾.

Figure 1 presents a breakdown of the nature of violent incidents and the number of casualties recorded by PIPS in 2017:

Nature of violence incidents 2017	No of incidents	No of deaths	No of injured
‘Terrorist attacks’	370	815	1 736
Political / ethnic violence	4	10	4
Clashes & encounters security forces & militants	68	251	31
Inter-tribal clashes/attacks	6	9	24
Border clashes/attacks	171	188	348
Operational attacks sec. forces	75	296	47
Drone attacks	9	30	4
Sectarian clashes	1	3	9
Inter-militant clashes/attacks	2	2	0
Clashes sec. forces & criminal gangs	1	3	0
Communal/ fait-based violence	1	2	0
Mob violence	5	2	9
Total 2017	713	1 611	2 121
Total 2016	749	1 887	1 956

Figure 1: Overall incidents of violence 2017, (PIPS) ⁽²⁶⁶⁾

1.3.1. Security operations and armed clashes

PIPS stated that in 2017, security operations and armed clashes were reported in all four provinces of Pakistan and in the FATA. The security forces carried out 75 operations and raids against militants in 2017, compared to 95 attacks in 2016 ⁽²⁶⁷⁾. Most of these operational strikes were carried out in Balochistan (39), followed by FATA (18), Sindh (3), Punjab (7) and in the KP (8). According to PIPS, 296 people were killed, including 281 militants (compared to

⁽²⁶⁰⁾ For a description of this source, see section [1.4.1. Figures on civilian fatalities](#)

⁽²⁶¹⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 20

⁽²⁶²⁾ Sectarian and political (etc.) ‘terrorist attacks’ are counted as ‘terrorist attacks’ and not included in the other categories; PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 20

⁽²⁶³⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 20

⁽²⁶⁴⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 20

⁽²⁶⁵⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 20

⁽²⁶⁶⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 20

⁽²⁶⁷⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 97

492 in 2016), 14 security forces personnel and one civilian ⁽²⁶⁸⁾. Besides these operational attacks, security forces engaged in 68 armed clashes with militants in 2017. This is a decrease of 35 % compared to 2016 ⁽²⁶⁹⁾. These clashes claimed 251 lives in 2017, of which 243 militants and eight security forces personnel. In total 31 people sustained injuries: 24 security forces personnel, three civilians and four militants ⁽²⁷⁰⁾.

For further information on the varying numbers of civilian casualties and the various methodologies used by these research institutions, see Section [1.4.1. Figures on civilian fatalities](#).

Operation *Zarb-e-Azb*

Operation *Zarb-e-Azb* was launched on 15 June 2014 by the Pakistani armed forces in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and in the FATA. The purpose of the operation was to target the militants in North Waziristan ⁽²⁷¹⁾. Operation *Zarb-e-Azb* reduced the level of violence. Most areas were cleared of militants, except a few pockets and sleeper cells. Therefore, the Pakistani state has to some extent regained public trust but the operation was conducted ‘in a violent manner’ ⁽²⁷²⁾. Critics of the operation claim it did not destroy the TTP, who were able to relocate to Afghanistan to carry out attacks from there. Also, intolerance and extremism allegedly increased. Another critique holds that the operation did not gain as much regional and international recognition as expected, owing to poor strategic communication and ‘dull diplomacy’ ⁽²⁷³⁾. The operation also caused internal displacement ⁽²⁷⁴⁾.

Operation *Radd-ul-Fasaad*

Operation *Radd-ul-Fasaad* was launched on 22 February 2017, after a series of attacks conducted by JuA in the country in the beginning of 2017. This operation is not confined to one area, but is carried out across the whole of Pakistan ⁽²⁷⁵⁾. The operation is aimed at eliminating the threat of terrorism and at consolidating the gains of Operation *Zarb-e-Azb*. It is further aimed at ensuring the security of Pakistan's borders. The operation includes the involvement of Pakistan's air force, Pakistan's navy, Pakistan's police and other civil armed forces ⁽²⁷⁶⁾. The Rangers were given ‘special powers’ to operate in Lahore and different parts in the province of Punjab ⁽²⁷⁷⁾. The strategy of the operation is to use Intelligence-Based Operations (IBOs). Operation *Radd-ul-Fasaad* reduced the level of ‘terrorist attacks’ in Pakistan but has failed to prevent attacks on security forces and civilians ⁽²⁷⁸⁾. This military operation has led to criticism that some groups such as Pashtuns and Afghan refugees in the country have been indiscriminately targeted ⁽²⁷⁹⁾.

⁽²⁶⁸⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 97

⁽²⁶⁹⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), pp. 99-100

⁽²⁷⁰⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 100

⁽²⁷¹⁾ Zulfqar, S., An Overview of Pakistan's Security Situation after Operation *Zarb-e-Azb*, October 2017, in: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, [url](#), pp. 117-118

⁽²⁷²⁾ Diplomat (The), Pakistan's Counterterrorism Operation: Myth vs. Reality, 27 June 2016, [url](#)

⁽²⁷³⁾ Diplomat (The), Pakistan's Counterterrorism Operation: Myth vs. Reality, 27 June 2016, [url](#)

⁽²⁷⁴⁾ Dawn, Nearly 40pc IDPs have returned to North Waziristan, army chief told, 19 December 2015, [url](#)

⁽²⁷⁵⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Army launches Operation *Radd-ul-Fasaad* against terrorists across the country, 22 February 2017, [url](#)

⁽²⁷⁶⁾ Dawn, Pakistan Army launches 'Operation *Radd-ul-Fasaad*' across the country, 22 February 2017, [url](#)

⁽²⁷⁷⁾ Al, Pakistan: Wave of violence shows a horrific disregard for human life, 23 February 2017, [url](#)

⁽²⁷⁸⁾ Critical Threats, Pakistan's Counter-Militant Offensive: Operation *Raddul Fasaad*, 25 August 2017, [url](#)

⁽²⁷⁹⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Operation *Radd-ul-Fasaad*: 'Punjab police focus on Pakhtuns and Afghans', 4 March 2017, [url](#)

Operation Khyber-IV

On 16 July 2017, the Pakistani army launched Operation Khyber-IV to clear Rajgal Valley in Khyber Agency of militants ⁽²⁸⁰⁾. The main goals of Operation Khyber-IV were to eradicate the threat of IS in Khyber Agency, although security forces also targeted other militant groups and focused on the border security at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border ⁽²⁸¹⁾. The Pakistani army announced the completion of Operation Khyber-IV on 21 August 2017 ⁽²⁸²⁾.

1.3.2. Attacks by militant groups

PIPS defined ‘terrorist attacks’ as follows: ‘terrorist attacks include militant, nationalist, insurgent and sectarian attacks’. These attacks can be carried out through different methods (suicide attacks, beheadings and destruction of educational institutions, CD/video shops, etc.) ⁽²⁸³⁾. Militant groups continued to conduct attacks in 2017. Tactics used are targeted killings, different types of IEDs, suicide attacks, kidnappings, grenade blasts, rocket attacks, and sabotage and mortar attacks ⁽²⁸⁴⁾.

Below is a description of the number of these attacks and the most common methods used by militants.

Numbers

According to the PIPS 2017 annual report, 370 ‘terrorist attacks’ were carried out by militant, nationalist, insurgent and violent sectarian groups in Pakistan in 2017. This is a decrease of 16 % compared to 2016. PIPS mentioned that in 2017 those attacks killed 815 people and injured 1 736. The number of people killed decreased by 10 % but the number of injured increased by 7 % compared to 2016 ⁽²⁸⁵⁾. Those killed in these attacks in Pakistan in 2017 included 536 civilians, 217 security forces personnel and 35 militants, whilst those injured included 1 430 civilians, 305 security forces and one militant ⁽²⁸⁶⁾.

According to numbers provided by PIPS, in the first six months of 2018, 145 ‘terrorist attacks’ were documented. These attacks killed 207 people ⁽²⁸⁷⁾.

Suicide attacks

The PICSS 2017 annual year report stated that militants carried out 23 suicide attacks in which 299 people were killed and 799 were injured ⁽²⁸⁸⁾. Of all insurgent tactics, suicide attacks

⁽²⁸⁰⁾ Dawn, Army launches Operation Khyber-4 in Rajgal Valley, 16 July 2017, [url](#)

⁽²⁸¹⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), pp. 98-99

⁽²⁸²⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Rajgal cleansed of terrorists as military concludes Operation Khyber-IV, 21 August 2017, [url](#)

⁽²⁸³⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 9

⁽²⁸⁴⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 253

⁽²⁸⁵⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 17

⁽²⁸⁶⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 17

⁽²⁸⁷⁾ Rana Amir, M., e-mail, 2 July 2018 - data (01/01/2018-30/06/2018) courtesy of PIPS

⁽²⁸⁸⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 17

caused the highest number of deaths ⁽²⁸⁹⁾. Geographically, Balochistan witnessed the most suicide attacks compared to other provinces, according to PICSS ⁽²⁹⁰⁾.

Bomb explosions and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

PIPS mentioned that militants used various types of IEDs in 159 attacks ⁽²⁹¹⁾. PICSS reported that 254 people were killed and 714 were injured in 138 IED attacks in 2017. The number of IED attacks decreased by 24 % in 2017. In 2017, the number of deaths increased by 63 % and the number of injured increased by 55 % compared to 2016. According to PICSS, the higher number of casualties in 2017 caused by IED explosions is because of the ‘improving quality of the IEDs’ ⁽²⁹²⁾.

The highest number of IED explosions was recorded in the province of Balochistan followed by the FATA ⁽²⁹³⁾.

Targeted killings

According to PIPS, about 39 % of the ‘terrorist attacks’ (141) in 2017 were targeted killings or shootings ⁽²⁹⁴⁾. PICSS reported that most of the targeted killings took place in Balochistan province, followed by the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh ⁽²⁹⁵⁾. During the last few years, targeted killing has become a major tactic for all militant actors, whether sectarian or Islamic militants or nationalist insurgents ⁽²⁹⁶⁾. Also, the militants in Balochistan appear to have adopted targeted killings as their foremost strategy, according to PIPS and PICSS ⁽²⁹⁷⁾.

Of the total reported attacks, 160 attacks were against personnel, convoys and check posts of the security forces and law enforcement agencies across Pakistan. Civilians were the apparent targets of 86 attacks (23 %). Sixteen attacks targeted government officials, departments and offices and another 13 attacks hit political leaders/workers and offices of political parties. Pro-government tribal elders, or members of tribal peace committees, came under 12 attacks. Non-Baloch workers, settlers in Balochistan were targeted in 10 attacks. Nine attacks targeted media and journalists. Meanwhile 16 reported attacks targeted members of Shia community and 4 attacks, also including one non-sectarian, hit members of the Sunni community. Two lethal attacks also targeted worship places and shrines in 2017 ⁽²⁹⁸⁾.

Kidnappings

PICSS reported a slight increase in kidnappings in 2017 compared to 2016. Most kidnappings executed by militants in 2017 took place in Balochistan followed by KP ⁽²⁹⁹⁾. GEO News

⁽²⁸⁹⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 17

⁽²⁹⁰⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 17

⁽²⁹¹⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 18

⁽²⁹²⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 18

⁽²⁹³⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), pp. 18-19

⁽²⁹⁴⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 18

⁽²⁹⁵⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 20

⁽²⁹⁶⁾ Rana Amir, M., EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan; 16-17 October 2017, Rome, February 2018, [url](#), p. 60

⁽²⁹⁷⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 20; PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 30 Rana Amir, M., EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan; 16-17 October 2017, Rome, February 2018, [url](#), p. 60

⁽²⁹⁸⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), pp. 17-18

⁽²⁹⁹⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), pp. 21-22.

reported in April 2018 that most kidnappings in Pakistan are organised by criminal networks in Afghanistan ⁽³⁰⁰⁾.

1.3.3. Sectarian-related violence

The number of sectarian-related violent incidents declined in 2017 compared to 2016 according to PIPS. The numbers decreased by 41 % in 2017 compared to 2016. The number of people killed also decreased by about 29 % in 2017. Most victims of sectarian-related violence were documented in Kurram Agency in the FATA, Quetta in Balochistan and Dera Ismael Khan in KP ⁽³⁰¹⁾. According to PIPS, main perpetrators were Sunni militant groups such as LeJ, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami, SeM and JuA. Most of the violence was directed against Shias ⁽³⁰²⁾. In contrast, CRSS documented an increase in victims of sectarian-related violence. According to the same source, 955 sectarian-related casualties were counted in 2017 with 319 killed and 636 wounded ⁽³⁰³⁾.

1.3.4. Ethnic and political violence

According to PIPS there was a decline in ethnic and political violence in 2017 compared to 2016, during which there were four incidents compared to twelve in 2016. These incidents took place in Sindh (particularly in Karachi), in Punjab and in Islamabad ⁽³⁰⁴⁾.

1.3.5. Border attacks

In 2017, PIPS counted in total 171 cross-border attacks at the borders with Afghanistan, India and Iran by foreign forces, Pakistani forces and militants. This is an increase of 131 % in comparison to 2016. Most of these attacks (131) took place at the border with India, followed by 28 at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and twelve at the Pakistan-Iran border. The main targets were security forces and their check posts and militants ⁽³⁰⁵⁾. In the first half of 2018, PIPS mentioned in total 90 cross-border attacks at the borders with Afghanistan, India and Iran ⁽³⁰⁶⁾.

According to PIPS, 28 cross-border attacks at the border with Afghanistan killed 117 and injured 102 people in the border area, mostly militants in 2017 ⁽³⁰⁷⁾. At the end of 2017, the Pakistani army started fencing the border and build border fortifications. These attempts to improve security at the border triggered numerous border clashes ⁽³⁰⁸⁾. In the first half of 2018, clashes at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border continued. PIPS reported ten attacks in the first half of 2018. These attacks killed 32 people ⁽³⁰⁹⁾. Frequent cross-border attacks were documented by the media. In June 2018, it was reported that six militants were killed at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border ⁽³¹⁰⁾.

⁽³⁰⁰⁾ GEO News, Kidnappings in Pakistan being controlled from Afghanistan, 24 April 2018, [url](#)

⁽³⁰¹⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), pp. 60-61

⁽³⁰²⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), pp. 60-61

⁽³⁰³⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 59

⁽³⁰⁴⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 24

⁽³⁰⁵⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 71

⁽³⁰⁶⁾ Rana Amir, M., e-mail, 2 July 2018 - data (01/01/2018-30/06/2018) courtesy of PIPS

⁽³⁰⁷⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 71

⁽³⁰⁸⁾ RFE/RL, Afghanistan Returns Captured, Dead Pakistani Soldiers After Cross-Border Clash, 16 April 2018, [url](#)

⁽³⁰⁹⁾ Rana Amir, M., e-mail, 2 July 2018 - data (01/01/2018-30/06/2018) courtesy of PIPS

⁽³¹⁰⁾ Dawn, Security forces kill 6 'terrorists', repulse multiple attacks from across Afghan border, 3 June 2018, [url](#)

The situation at the Line of Control (LoC) and the de facto border between the Indian and Pakistani controlled parts of Kashmir stayed more volatile in terms of the number of cross-border violations documented in 2017 according to PIPS. At the Pakistan-India border 131 cross-border attacks occurred, claiming the lives of 69 and injuring 245 people ⁽³¹¹⁾. In the beginning of 2018 tension rose at the LoC ⁽³¹²⁾. At the end of May 2018, Pakistan and India reached an agreement about a cease-fire ⁽³¹³⁾. Cross-border attacks nevertheless still occurred in June 2018 ⁽³¹⁴⁾. In total in the first six months of 2018, 76 cross-border attacks caused the death of 52 people ⁽³¹⁵⁾.

In 2017, Iranian border security forces carried out twelve cross-border attacks in Chagai, Kech and Panjgur districts of Balochistan, resulting in two deaths and one injured ⁽³¹⁶⁾. In total in the first six months of 2018 four cross-border attacks caused the death of two people ⁽³¹⁷⁾. In June 2018, three Iranian security personnel and three militants were killed in a cross-border attack at the border with Pakistan ⁽³¹⁸⁾.

1.3.6. Drone strikes

The first US drone strike in Pakistan took place in 2004 in the Waziristan region. The number of drone strikes between 2004 and 2014, and of those killed or injured by them, varies according to the source consulted ⁽³¹⁹⁾. Most of the US drone strikes in Pakistan have taken place in the FATA, where the US military believed al-Qaeda, Taliban and other militant groups sought refuge ⁽³²⁰⁾. Under the Trump administration, aerial drone strikes in Pakistan increased in comparison to the Obama administration ⁽³²¹⁾.

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ) compiled its own data on aerial drone strikes. In 2017, TBIJ recorded five strikes. These US drone strikes killed between fifteen and twenty-one people and injured between one and five. Whether the casualties belonged to armed groups or civilians is not specified in the reporting ⁽³²²⁾.

As of 17 June 2018, South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) counted three US drone strikes in the first half of 2018 ⁽³²³⁾. On 17 January 2018, one person was injured in a drone strike allegedly carried out by a US plane in Badshah Kot area in Kurram Agency ⁽³²⁴⁾. The Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed at the end of January 2018 an aerial drone strike was carried out by

⁽³¹¹⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 71

⁽³¹²⁾ Al Jazeera, Tensions soar along India, Pakistan border in Kashmir, 19 January 2018, [url](#)

⁽³¹³⁾ Dawn, Pakistan, India agree to restore LoC ceasefire, 30 May 2018, [url](#)

⁽³¹⁴⁾ Dawn, AJK man injured in cross-LoC firing despite Pak-India commitment on truce agreement, 1 June 2018, [url](#); Dawn, Woman, child killed in Indian shelling, 4 June 2018, [url](#)

⁽³¹⁵⁾ Rana Amir, M., e-mail, 2 July 2018 - data (01/01/2018-30/06/2018) courtesy of PIPS

⁽³¹⁶⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 78

⁽³¹⁷⁾ Rana Amir, M., e-mail, 2 July 2018 - data (01/01/2018-30/06/2018) courtesy of PIPS

⁽³¹⁸⁾ Reuters, Iranian Forces and Militants Killed in Clash Near Pakistan: Revolutionary Guards, 28 June 2018, [url](#)

⁽³¹⁹⁾ Watson Institute for International Studies, Costs of War: War-related Death, Injury, and Displacement in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001-2014, 22 May 2015, [url](#), p. 11

⁽³²⁰⁾ TBIJ, CIA drone strikes in Pakistan, 2004 to present, n.d, [url](#); Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Explore the data: Drone strikes in Pakistan, 9 February 2018, [url](#)

⁽³²¹⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Explore the data: Drone strikes in Pakistan, 9 February 2018, [url](#)

⁽³²²⁾ TBIJ, CIA drone strikes in Pakistan, 2004 to present, n.d, [url](#)

⁽³²³⁾ SATP, Drone attack in Pakistan: 2005-2018, last updated on: 17 June 2018, [url](#)

⁽³²⁴⁾ Dawn, Drone strikes on both sides of Pak-Afghan border kill 2, injure 1 suspected militant, 17 January 2018, [url](#)

the US on an Afghan refugee camp in Kurram Agency⁽³²⁵⁾. On 9 February 2018, it was reported that three ‘suspected militants’ were killed in a US drone strike at a compound close to the Afghan border in North Waziristan Agency⁽³²⁶⁾. The Pakistani Taliban confirmed that the group’s deputy chief, Khalid Mehsud, was killed in the drone attack of 9 February 2018⁽³²⁷⁾. On 4 July 2018, a US drone strike killed a commander of the Pakistan Taliban near North Waziristan⁽³²⁸⁾.

In September 2015, for the first time, the Pakistani army launched a Pakistani-made drone, a ‘Burraq Drone’, to strike at terrorists in Shawal Valley in the FATA⁽³²⁹⁾.

1.3.7. Violence in the run-up to the general elections

Pakistan held general elections on 25 July 2018. In the run-up to these elections many violent incidents and some major attacks occurred⁽³³⁰⁾. The Pakistan Taliban and ISKP carried out attacks against political candidates and targeted political gatherings⁽³³¹⁾. On 27 July 2018, PIPS published a report about the election violence. According to this report from 1 May 2018 to 25 July 2018, eighteen election-related attacks have taken place. These attacks killed 183 and injured 323⁽³³²⁾. In the same timeframe, 13 incidents of political violence took place and claimed the lives of three people and injured 32⁽³³³⁾. Some incidents targeting political candidates and gatherings are listed below. These include also major attacks related to the elections with civilian casualties.

- On 3 July 2018, a bomb blast took place in North Waziristan at the office of Malik Aurangjeb Khan, a candidate for the PTI. Ten people were injured⁽³³⁴⁾.
- Seven people including a candidate of the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) were injured when a remotely controlled IED planted in a motorcycle went off near a convoy⁽³³⁵⁾.
- Twenty people were killed and 63 injured when a suicide bomber targeted an election rally of Awami National Party (ANP) candidate Haroon Bilour in Peshawar on 10 July 2018. The attack was claimed by the TTP⁽³³⁶⁾.
- In a suicide attack on a convoy of former Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Chief Minister Akram Khan Durrani in Bannu on 12 July 2018 at least four people were killed and 32 injured⁽³³⁷⁾.

⁽³²⁵⁾ Government of Pakistan-Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan condemns drone strike by RSM forces in Kurram Agency, 24 January 2018, [url](#)

⁽³²⁶⁾ Dawn, US drone kills three ‘militants’ in N Waziristan, 9 February 2018, [url](#)

⁽³²⁷⁾ RFE/RL, Pakistani Taliban Confirms Deputy Chief Killed In Drone Strike, 12 February 2018, [url](#)

⁽³²⁸⁾ Dawn, Taliban commander killed in suspected US drone strike near Pak-Afghan border, 5 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽³²⁹⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Why Pakistan’s first drone strike should worry Obama, 1 October 2015, [url](#)

⁽³³⁰⁾ USIP, After a Volatile Election Season, What Now for Pakistan?, 26 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽³³¹⁾ Diplomat (The), Pakistan’s Election: Unique for All the Wrong Reasons, 25 July 2018, [url](#); HRW, Pakistan: Militant Attacks Escalate As Election Nears, 17 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽³³²⁾ PIPS, General election 2018: Trends of terrorist and political violence, 27 July 2018, [url](#), p. 1

⁽³³³⁾ PIPS, General election 2018: Trends of terrorist and political violence, 27 July 2018, [url](#), p. 2

⁽³³⁴⁾ Dawn, 10 injured in blast at PTI candidate’s election office in North Waziristan, 3 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽³³⁵⁾ Dawn, 7 including MMA candidate injured in Bannu blast, 7 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽³³⁶⁾ Dawn, TTP claims responsibility for Peshawar blast; ANP’s Haroon Bilour laid to rest, 10 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽³³⁷⁾ Dawn, Blast targets convoy of JUI-F leader Akram Khan Durrani in Bannu, 4 killed, 13 July 2018, [url](#)

- A suicide bomber killed at least 149 people and injured at least 189 more in an attack on 12 July 2018 in Mastung in the province of Balochistan targeting an election rally of Nawabzada Siraj Raisani, claimed by ISKP and a faction of the Pakistan Taliban ⁽³³⁸⁾.
- On 22 July 2018, PTI candidate Ikramullah Gandapur and his driver were killed after a suicide bomber blew himself up near the car of Gandapur in the outskirts of Dera Ismail Khan. The attack was claimed by the TTP ⁽³³⁹⁾.
- On the election day, in an attack claimed by ISKP, a suicide attacker targeted a police vehicle near a polling station in Quetta, killing 31 people and injured at least 40 people ⁽³⁴⁰⁾.

In all four provinces skirmishes, clashes and deadly violence were documented between candidates of different political parties ⁽³⁴¹⁾.

1.4. Impact of the violence on the civilian population

1.4.1. Figures on civilian casualties

Sources

Varying figures on civilian casualties are provided by four different research institutes based on different definitions and variables. It is difficult to interpret these figures since not all of these institutes outline clear methodologies.

The four research institutes that present figures about the situation in 2017 are the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), the Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) and the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS).

The **Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)**, established in Islamabad, was founded in 2006 by its director, Muhammad Amir Rana, an expert on Pakistani security issues ⁽³⁴²⁾. The basic sources for the annual and monthly reports of PIPS are the PIPS conflict/security database and archives. PIPS monitors every relevant incident in Pakistan on a daily basis. PIPS collects information from sources such as correspondents in the different regions, newspapers, magazines, journals and television news channels ⁽³⁴³⁾.

PIPS divides 'attacks' into five categories:

- ‘(i) terrorist attacks, including militant attacks, nationalist insurgent attacks and sectarian-related attacks;
- (ii) incidents of ethno-political violence;
- (iii) cross-border attacks;
- (iv) drone attacks; and

⁽³³⁸⁾ Al Jazeera, Pakistan: Death toll rises to 149 in Mastung attack, 15 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽³³⁹⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), PTI's Ikramullah Khan Gandapur martyred in DI Khan suicide blast, 22 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽³⁴⁰⁾ Al Jazeera, Quetta: Death toll jumps to 31 in election day blast, 25 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽³⁴¹⁾ Dawn, Clashes, violence mar polling in various constituencies; at least 2 killed, 25 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽³⁴²⁾ PIPS, PIPS Team, n.d., [url](#)

⁽³⁴³⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 8

(v) operational attacks by security forces against militants' ⁽³⁴⁴⁾.

PIPS defines 'casualties' as follows: 'casualties include both the number of people killed and injured' ⁽³⁴⁵⁾.

The **Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS)** is a Pakistani research institute that analyses politics in the country. Established in 2008, it is based in Islamabad and headed by Imtiaz Gul, a journalist and author of several books on Pakistan ⁽³⁴⁶⁾. CRSS publishes annually a report on security in Pakistan and quarterly reports, written by senior research associate Mohammad Nafees ⁽³⁴⁷⁾. Violence as defined by CRSS includes terrorism, militant attacks, sectarian violence, crime, targeted killings, security operations and drone strikes ⁽³⁴⁸⁾. CRSS uses open sources such as national print and electronic media ⁽³⁴⁹⁾.

The **South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)** is a website run by the Institute for Conflict Management, a non-profit organisation set up in 1997 in New Delhi, India. Headed by its founder K.P.S. Gill, former Director General of Indian Punjab Police, it is committed to the continuous evaluation and resolution of problems of internal security in South Asia ⁽³⁵⁰⁾. SATP has established 'a comprehensive, searchable and continuously updated database on all available information relating to terrorism, low intensity warfare and ethnic/communal/sectarian strife in South Asia' ⁽³⁵¹⁾.

The **Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS)** is an independent research think-tank based in Islamabad. This institution collects statistical data regarding Pakistan-specific anti-state violence. PICSS integrated the data of the Conflict Monitoring Center in its findings ⁽³⁵²⁾. PICSS publishes annual security reports. PICSS divided incidents of violence mainly in two categories: 'violent militant activities and security forces actions'. PICSS focuses on anti-state violence and related responses. Sectarian violence, general crimes, ethnic or language-based violence are not mentioned in the annual report ⁽³⁵³⁾. The data collected by PICSS is based on open sources such as newspapers, government sources and own correspondents ⁽³⁵⁴⁾.

As the four sources cited above use different definitions of violent attacks and of victims, it is impossible to give one overview of the impact of the violence on the population. Therefore, the following paragraphs present data from the different sources separately to allow comparison and clearer understanding of the situation.

⁽³⁴⁴⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 8

⁽³⁴⁵⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 9

⁽³⁴⁶⁾ Imtiaz Gul Official Website, Biography, n.d., [url](#)

⁽³⁴⁷⁾ For example: CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#); CRSS, Quarterly Security Report Q1, 2018, 13 April 2018, [url](#)

⁽³⁴⁸⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#)

⁽³⁴⁹⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), pp. 6-7

⁽³⁵⁰⁾ SATP, Institute for Conflict Management - An Introduction, n.d., [url](#)

⁽³⁵¹⁾ SATP, South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d., [url](#)

⁽³⁵²⁾ PICSS, About PICSS, n.d., [url](#)

⁽³⁵³⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 2

⁽³⁵⁴⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 2

Civilian casualties in 2017

In 2017, **PIPS** recorded 713 violent incidents, resulting in 1 611 deaths and 2 212 injured (including deaths from ‘terrorist attacks’): 657 civilians, 683 militants and 271 security personnel (Police/FC/Army/Levies/Rangers) were killed ⁽³⁵⁵⁾. Compared to 2016, the number of violent incidents decreased by 5 %, from 749 in 2016 to 713 in 2017. The number of people killed in overall incidents of violence in Pakistan decreased by 15 %, from 1 887 in 2016 to 1 611 in 2017. The number of people injured in overall incidents of violence increased by 13 % from 1 956 in 2016 to 2 212 in 2017 ⁽³⁵⁶⁾. This trend included the deaths of 683 militants in 2017, compared to 921 in 2016, a decrease of 26 % ⁽³⁵⁷⁾. In addition, the PIPS data show that ‘terrorist attacks’ (370) accounted for nearly 52 % of all violent incidents ⁽³⁵⁸⁾. The number of people killed in these attacks in 2017 decreased by 10 % compared to 2016. The number of people injured in 2017 increased by 7 % compared to 2016 ⁽³⁵⁹⁾.

SATP recorded 1 260 fatalities in ‘terrorist violence’ in 2017 (540 civilians, 280 security forces personnel, 592 terrorists/insurgents). Compared to 2016 (1 803 deaths), this number is considerably lower, due to a decrease in the number of killed terrorists/insurgents ⁽³⁶⁰⁾.

Data provided by **CRSS** shows 4 131 casualties, 2 057 fatalities and 2 074 injured from violence in 2017: 959 civilians, 786 militants, and 312 security officials ⁽³⁶¹⁾. Compared to fatalities in 2016, the number of victims of violence decreased by roughly 21 % ⁽³⁶²⁾. CRSS is the only institute that conducted research on the professions of the victims. It observed that, among the civilian casualties, the identifiable people were found to have a link with political/religious parties or belonging to professions such as media personnel, judicature, health professionals or businessmen ⁽³⁶³⁾. According to CRSS, a slight reduction of 15 % in violence-related fatalities was observed for security personnel compared to 2016 ⁽³⁶⁴⁾. ‘Security personnel’, according to CRSS, includes: the Police, the Pakistani army, FC personnel, Pakistan Air Force, Levies, Khasadars and others ⁽³⁶⁵⁾.

PICSS recorded 950 incidents of violence by militants and counter-insurgency operations by the state in 2017. In total 1 395 people were killed: 561 militants, 585 civilians, 249 security forces personnel ⁽³⁶⁶⁾. PICSS reported 1 965 injured: 1 580 civilians, 54 militants and 331 security forces personnel. Compared to 2016, a 41 % decrease in the overall number of incidents is noted, with a 25 % decline in deaths and a 2 % increase in injured people ⁽³⁶⁷⁾.

Figure 2 gives a comparison of the persons killed in 2016 and in 2017 between the four sources (based on the definitions described above)

⁽³⁵⁵⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 20, p. 24

⁽³⁵⁶⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 20

⁽³⁵⁷⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 24

⁽³⁵⁸⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 20

⁽³⁵⁹⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 17

⁽³⁶⁰⁾ SATP, Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2000-2018, last updated on: 29 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽³⁶¹⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 8

⁽³⁶²⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 12

⁽³⁶³⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), pp. 16-23

⁽³⁶⁴⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 24

⁽³⁶⁵⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 25

⁽³⁶⁶⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 11

⁽³⁶⁷⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 11

2016 by source	Total killed	Civilians killed	Militants killed	Security forces killed
PIPS ⁽³⁶⁸⁾	1 887	619	921	347
SATP ⁽³⁶⁹⁾	1 803	612	898	293
CRSS ⁽³⁷⁰⁾	2 613	1003	1 222	388
PICSS ⁽³⁷¹⁾	1 858	514	986	358
2017 by source	Total killed	Civilians killed	Militants killed	Security forces killed
PIPS ⁽³⁷²⁾	1 611	657	683	271
SATP ⁽³⁷³⁾	1 260	540	592	280
CRSS ⁽³⁷⁴⁾	2 057	959	786	312
PICSS ⁽³⁷⁵⁾	1 395	585	561	249

Figure 2: Comparison of the number of fatalities in 2016 and 2017 (PIPS, SATP, CRSS, PICSS) ⁽³⁷⁶⁾

Patterns in fatalities in 2017

In this section the data compiled by CRSS, PICSS and SATP are compared, because they have collected data throughout 2017 for every month.

Data compiled by CRSS shows certain stability in the number of fatalities throughout most of the year 2017, except in February (see Figure 3). Most fatalities occurred in February and August 2017. January 2017 witnessed the least fatalities of the year ⁽³⁷⁷⁾

The same trend is visible in monthly data recorded by SATP as well, although the figures differ slightly. In February 2017, SATP counted 262 fatalities, 131 in June 2017 and 72 in

⁽³⁶⁸⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2016, 10 January 2017, [url](#), p. 14

⁽³⁶⁹⁾ SATP, Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2000-2018, last updated on: 29 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽³⁷⁰⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, 22 March 2017, [url](#), pp. 8-9

⁽³⁷¹⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, [url](#), p. 12

⁽³⁷²⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 20, p. 24

⁽³⁷³⁾ SATP, Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2000-2018, last updated on: 29 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽³⁷⁴⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 8

⁽³⁷⁵⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 11

⁽³⁷⁶⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2016, 10 January 2017, [url](#), p. 14; SATP, Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2000-2018, last updated on: 29 July 2018, [url](#); CRSS, Annual Security Report 2016, 22 March 2017, [url](#), pp. 8-9; PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, [url](#), p. 12; PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 20, p. 24; CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 8; PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 11

⁽³⁷⁷⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 11

August 2017. According to SATP, the most fatalities occurred in the months of February, June and July 2017 ⁽³⁷⁸⁾.

Data compiled by PICSS shows the highest number of fatalities in February, June and August 2017. PICSS noted a decline in the numbers of fatalities in the last six months of 2017 ⁽³⁷⁹⁾.




Figure 3: Violence-Related Deaths in 2017 per month

© CRSS ⁽³⁸⁰⁾

Civilian casualties during the first half of 2018

In the first six months of 2018, PIPS recorded 268 violent incidents, resulting in 397 deaths (including deaths from 'terrorist attacks') ⁽³⁸¹⁾.

SATP recorded 277 fatalities in 'terrorist violence' in the first half of 2018 (77 civilians, 92 security forces personnel, 92 terrorists/insurgents). Compared to the first six months of 2017 (863 deaths), this number is considerably lower, due to a decrease in the number of killed civilians ⁽³⁸²⁾.

Data provided by CRSS counted 1 004 casualties (533 fatalities, 488 injured) in the first and second quarter analysis report of 2018 ⁽³⁸³⁾.

⁽³⁷⁸⁾ SATP, Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2000-2018, last updated on: 29 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽³⁷⁹⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), pp. 11-12

⁽³⁸⁰⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 11

⁽³⁸¹⁾ Rana Amir, M., e-mail, 2 July 2018 - data (01/01/2018-30/06/2018) courtesy of PIPS

⁽³⁸²⁾ SATP, Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2000-2018, last updated on: 29 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽³⁸³⁾ CRSS, CRSS Quarterly Security Report Q1, 2018, 13 April 2018, [url](#); CRSS Quarterly Security Report Q2, 2018, 11 July 2018, [url](#)

Patterns in fatalities during the first half of 2018

In this section the data compiled by CRSS and SATP are compared, because they have collected data for the first half of 2018 per month.

The monthly data recorded by SATP, shows that the most fatalities in the first half of 2018 fell in January 2018, followed by March 2018 ⁽³⁸⁴⁾.

According to CRSS, in the second quarter of 2018, fatalities decreased and the number of injured increased slightly compared to the first quarter of 2018 ⁽³⁸⁵⁾. Especially in the provinces of Sindh Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa the number of casualties related to violence fell significantly in the second quarter of 2018. In the tribal areas CRSS documented more casualties in the second quarter of 2018 than in the first quarter (see Figure 4) ⁽³⁸⁶⁾.




Figure 4: Violence-relates casualties by region-Q1, 2018 vs. Q2, 2018

© CRSS ⁽³⁸⁷⁾

1.4.2. Children

Human Rights Watch stated in a report dated March 2017 that attacks carried out by militant groups have ‘a devastating impact on education’ in Pakistan ⁽³⁸⁸⁾. According to follow up

⁽³⁸⁴⁾ SATP, Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2000-2018, last updated on: 29 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽³⁸⁵⁾ CRSS Quarterly Security Report Q2, 2018, 11 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽³⁸⁶⁾ CRSS Quarterly Security Report Q2, 2018, 11 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽³⁸⁷⁾ CRSS Quarterly Security Report Q2, 2018, 11 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽³⁸⁸⁾ HRW, Dreams Turned into Nightmares: Attacks on Students, Teachers, and Schools in Pakistan, 27 March 2017, [url](#)

articles, in May 2018 and August 2018 Human Rights Watch writes that Islamist militant violence has disrupted ‘the education of hundreds of thousands of children, particularly girls’. According to Human Rights Watch, the government of Pakistan fails ‘to stop or to mitigate’ attacks on educational institutes ⁽³⁸⁹⁾. A report of Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA) stated in May 2018 that ‘between 2013 and 2017, armed non-state groups and unknown parties reportedly attacked hundreds of schools in Pakistan, typically using explosive devices’ ⁽³⁹⁰⁾.

According to statistics from the FATA secretariat, cited in an article published by Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) in January 2018, more than 2 300 of the 5 994 government-run schools in the FATA are ‘effectively shuttered’ ⁽³⁹¹⁾. The article stated further that parents and advocates fear that when the education problems in the tribal areas are ignored, this will lead to ‘a new generation of extremism and militancy’ ⁽³⁹²⁾. During the year 2017, PIPS reported seven attacks on educational institutions in the country causing twelve civilian casualties (one death and eleven injured) ⁽³⁹³⁾. Five of these attacks occurred in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ⁽³⁹⁴⁾. In May 2018, the Pakistani newspaper Dawn reported that two girls’ schools in North Waziristan were attacked. Dawn further stated that militants distributed pamphlets demanding authorities to shut down girls’ schools in the area ⁽³⁹⁵⁾. In August 2018, at least twelve schools were destroyed by militants in Balochistan ⁽³⁹⁶⁾.

Remnants of IEDs and landmines put children in danger in several areas, especially in the provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and in the FATA, according to an article published by Inter Press Service (IPS) in April 2018 ⁽³⁹⁷⁾.

According to the annual report of the Society for the Protection of the Rights of the Child (SPARC), exact figures of child casualties are not available, but children are affected by both sectarian violence and indiscriminate attacks. Suicide bombs and IEDs put children in danger in several areas, especially in the provinces of Balochistan, FATA (especially South Waziristan) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ⁽³⁹⁸⁾.

1.4.3. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Since 2008, approximately 5.3 million people have been displaced by insurgency, counter-insurgency and other related violence in Pakistan. Around 5.05 million IDPs returned since 2008 according to figures of UNOCHA ⁽³⁹⁹⁾. As of 28 February 2018, 441 754 families returned

⁽³⁸⁹⁾ HRW, Rise in Militant Attacks on Schools in Pakistan, 14 May 2018, [url](#); HRW, Pakistan: Surge in Militant Attacks on Schools, 3 August 2018, [url](#)

⁽³⁹⁰⁾ GCPEA, Education under attack 2018, May 2018, [url](#), p. 186

⁽³⁹¹⁾ IRIN, “Ghost schools” risk breeding militancy in Pakistan tribal areas, 25 January 2018, [url](#)

⁽³⁹²⁾ IRIN, “Ghost schools” risk breeding militancy in Pakistan tribal areas, 25 January 2018, [url](#)

⁽³⁹³⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 246

⁽³⁹⁴⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 45

⁽³⁹⁵⁾ Dawn, Two girls’ schools hit by bomb explosions in North Waziristan, 10 May 2018, [url](#)

⁽³⁹⁶⁾ HRW, Pakistan: Surge in Militant Attacks on Schools, 3 August 2018, [url](#)

⁽³⁹⁷⁾ IPS, Displaced Pashtuns Return to Find Homes “Teeming” with Landmines, 26 April 2018, [url](#)

⁽³⁹⁸⁾ SPARC, The State of Pakistan’s Children 2017, July 2018, [url](#), pp. 89-90

⁽³⁹⁹⁾ UNOCHA, Pakistan: Displacements and returns in KP and FATA 2008 - 2017 (as of 30 September 2017), 25 October 2017, [url](#)

to the FATA since December 2010 and 29 372 families remain displaced according to UNOCHA ⁽⁴⁰⁰⁾.

In its Global Report on Internal Displacement for 2018, the International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) stated that there were 75 000 new conflict induced displacements in Pakistan during 2017. IDMC identified Chaman (an area at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border) and Abbasur and Sialkot sectors (at the Pakistan-India border) as areas where displacement occurred in 2017 ⁽⁴⁰¹⁾.

UNHCR stated in its Protection Cluster Strategy for 2017-2019, published in October 2017, the following about IDPs: 'IDPs and returning displaced women continue to be exposed to grave risks of abuse and different forms of gender-based violence' ⁽⁴⁰²⁾.

In the second part of this report, internal displacements are explained in greater detail and by geographic division (see Section [2. Security situation per region](#)).

Afghan Refugees

Pakistan is also hosting one of the world's largest refugee communities, housing 1.4 million registered Afghan refugees and an estimated one million undocumented Afghan migrants ⁽⁴⁰³⁾.

The Pakistani government has extended its Proof of Registration cards (PoR-cards) issued by NADRA (the National Database & Registration Authority) three times in 2018. On 30 June 2018, RFE/RL reported that the Caretaker Government decided 'to grant an interim extension of three months to the registered refugees present in the country' ⁽⁴⁰⁴⁾. As of 8 August 2018, UNOCHA reported that between 1 January 2018 and 4 August 2018, 10 107 registered Afghans returned to Afghanistan. In the same period 20 813 undocumented Afghans returned ⁽⁴⁰⁵⁾.

1.5. State ability to secure law and order

This chapter does not provide a detailed description of the state's ability to secure law and order and the human rights violations committed by the Pakistani security forces, but rather focuses on those elements that are important to understand the current security situation in Pakistan. For a detailed description, see the EASO Country Overview report on Pakistan (August 2015) ⁽⁴⁰⁶⁾.

⁽⁴⁰⁰⁾ UNOCHA, Pakistan: FATA Returns Update (from 15 Sep, 2017 to 28 Feb 2018) - Humanitarian Snapshot, 28 February 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁰¹⁾ IDMC, Pakistan. Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID 2018), 2018, [url](#), p. 3

⁽⁴⁰²⁾ UNHCR, Pakistan: Protection Cluster Strategy, 2017 - 2019; From displacement to sustainable return, 24 October 2017, [url](#), p. 4

⁽⁴⁰³⁾ UNHCR, Global Trends Forced displacement in 2017, 21 June 2018, [url](#), p. 17

⁽⁴⁰⁴⁾ RFE/RL, Pakistan Grants New Extension Before Forced Return Of Afghan Refugees, 30 June 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁰⁵⁾ UNOCHA, Pakistan: Afghan Refugees and Undocumented Afghan Repatriation (29 July – 4 August 2018), 8 August 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁰⁶⁾ EASO, Pakistan Country overview, August 2015, [url](#)

1.5.1. State protection, security forces and justice

Rule of law

Pakistan has an elected civilian government. The constitution provides that the political authority is divided between the legislative, the executive and the judiciary. The military has a substantial influence on national security, foreign policy and economic policy, according to a report of Freedom House that covers 2017⁽⁴⁰⁷⁾. Freedom House further states that corruption, lack of accountability and lack of transparency are pervasive problems at all levels of government, in politics, and in the military⁽⁴⁰⁸⁾.

According to the World Justice Project's 2017-2018 Rule of Law Index, Pakistan ranked 105th on a list of 113 countries in the world on overall rule-of-law scores. Pakistan scored 'very low' in several categories: 'right to life and security', 'due process of law', 'sanctions for official misconduct', 'effective investigations' and 'no improper government influence' in the criminal justice system. This index was composed based on a set of questionnaires sent to experts (on average more than 300 per country) and to the general public⁽⁴⁰⁹⁾.

Justice

The formal court system, as established by the Constitution, consists of the Supreme Court, a High Court for the four provinces and Islamabad and a Federal Shariat Court⁽⁴¹⁰⁾. However, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Courts do not extend to areas such as Azad Jammu and Kashmir or Gilgit-Baltistan that operate under separate judicial systems⁽⁴¹¹⁾.

USDOS stated in a report of April 2018 covering 2017:

'The law provides for an independent judiciary, but according to NGOs and legal experts, the judiciary often is subject to external influences. The judiciary is influenced by the reprisal from extremist elements in terrorism or blasphemy cases and public politicization of high-profile cases.'

[...]

'Many lower courts remained corrupt, inefficient, and subject to pressure from wealthy persons and influential religious or political figures.'

[...]

'Informal justice systems lacking institutionalized legal protections continued, especially in rural areas, and often resulted in human rights abuses'⁽⁴¹²⁾.

In August 2017, the UN Human Rights Committee issued concerns about:

⁽⁴⁰⁷⁾ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018-Pakistan, 5 January 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁰⁸⁾ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018-Pakistan, 5 January 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁰⁹⁾ World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2017-2018, 31 January 2018, [url](#), p. 7, p. 122

⁽⁴¹⁰⁾ Hussain, F., The Judicial system of Pakistan, May 2015, [url](#)

⁽⁴¹¹⁾ USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Pakistan, 20 April 2018, [url](#), pp. 14-15

⁽⁴¹²⁾ USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Pakistan, 20 April 2018, [url](#), pp. 14-15

‘the challenges facing the judiciary in strengthening its independence and effectiveness, including the lack of transparency of judicial appointment procedures; the shortage of judges and long-term judicial vacancies; insufficient budget allocation; the considerable backlog of cases; the lack of high-quality legal education and continuing professional training for legal professionals; and corruption in the judiciary (art. 14)’⁽⁴¹³⁾.

On 6 January 2015, the 21st Constitutional Amendment Bill of 2015 and the Pakistani Army Amendment Act 1952 were signed. Those amendments gave military courts the jurisdiction until February 2017 to convict civilians for terrorism-related offences⁽⁴¹⁴⁾. In August 2015, the Supreme Court upheld the parliamentary amendments⁽⁴¹⁵⁾. The military courts disbanded on 7 January 2017 after the legal provision expired. In March 2017, Parliament, the Senate and the President passed legislation to reinstate the military courts⁽⁴¹⁶⁾. Numbers of the ministry of Defence, quoted in the Express Tribune on 13 March 2018, reveal that 486 cases have come before the military courts since their inauguration in 2015. The army courts have concluded 333 cases and awarded capital punishment to 186 persons⁽⁴¹⁷⁾. Sources have criticised the establishment of the military courts and warned that those courts could be used as a mechanism against political dissidents or groups that had disturbed the military in the past⁽⁴¹⁸⁾.

Security Forces

Amnesty International (AI) stated in its 2018 annual report, covering events in 2017, that enforced disappearances by security forces continued⁽⁴¹⁹⁾. USDOS and Human Rights Watch reported in their annual year reports covering 2017 that extrajudicial killings, violence and harassment, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture and abuse of detainees and other human rights abuses by security forces occurred throughout the country⁽⁴²⁰⁾.

In June 2017, The UN Committee Against Torture (UNCAT) expressed in its concluding observations on the initial report of Pakistan, its concerns about the ‘widespread practice’ of torture by the Police, the military and intelligence agencies in Pakistan⁽⁴²¹⁾. Also the UN Human Rights Committee stated in August 2017 that ‘the Committee is concerned by the high incidence of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings allegedly perpetrated by the police and military and security forces’⁽⁴²²⁾.

⁽⁴¹³⁾ UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the initial report of Pakistan, 23 August 2017, [url](#), paragraph 31

⁽⁴¹⁴⁾ International Crisis Group, Revisiting Counter-terrorism Strategies in Pakistan: Opportunities and Pitfalls n°271, 22 July 2015, [url](#), pp. 1-3

⁽⁴¹⁵⁾ Deutsche Welle, Pakistan’s military courts - a solution or a problem?, 7 August 2015, [url](#)

⁽⁴¹⁶⁾ BBC, Pakistan to reinstate secret military courts despite criticism, 22 March 2017, [url](#); Dawn, Military courts resume in Pakistan, 31 March 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁴¹⁷⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Army courts awarded death to 186 persons since 2015, 13 March 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁴¹⁸⁾ Deutsche Welle, Pakistan’s military courts - a solution or a problem?, 7 August 2015, [url](#); Diplomat (The), No Sunset for Pakistan’s Secret Military Courts, 24 April 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁴¹⁹⁾ AI, Amnesty International Report 2017/18 - The State of the World's Human Rights - Pakistan, 22 February 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁴²⁰⁾ USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Pakistan, 20 April 2018, [url](#), p. 1, pp. 19-20; HRW, World Report 2018 - Pakistan, 18 January 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁴²¹⁾ UNCAT, Concluding observations on the initial report of Pakistan [CAT/C/PAK/CO/1], 1 June 2017, [url](#), p. 2

⁽⁴²²⁾ UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the initial report of Pakistan, 23 August 2017, [url](#), paragraph 19

1.5.2. Anti-Terrorism Acts

On 24 February 2014, the Government announced an internal policy for a five-year period, the so-called Security Policy. This policy focused mainly on securing urban centres, while often not mentioning the situation in the FATA and Balochistan. It referred to dialogue with all stakeholders for *madrassa* reforms, militants' rehabilitation and deradicalisation ⁽⁴²³⁾. A prime target of the Security Policy was isolating terrorists. The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) was supposed to streamline the fight against terrorism and carry out tasks ranging from counterterrorism to political and operational interventions. In February 2014 the Government was still engaged in peace talks with the Taliban, and the Security Policy proved insufficient once the military operation in North Waziristan started, and the country fell victim to retaliatory attacks by the militants ⁽⁴²⁴⁾.

The December 2014 terrorist attack on the Peshawar Army Public School served as a catalyst for the political consensus when former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif convened an all parties' conference the day after the attack ⁽⁴²⁵⁾. This led, in the same month, to consultation with all political parties, to the establishment of a National Action Plan (NAP) to eliminate terrorism from Pakistan. Key features were:

- Establishment of speedy military trial courts for two years;
- Commitment to ensure that no armed militias were allowed to function in the country;
- Countering hate speech and extremist material;
- 'Choking financing for terrorists';
- Establishing and deploying a dedicated counterterrorism force;
- Strengthening and restructuring of NACTA;
- Registration and regulation of madrassas;
- Administrative and development reforms in the FATA with immediate focus on return of IDPs;
- Zero tolerance for militancy in Punjab;
- Taking the ongoing operation in Karachi to its logical conclusion;
- Empowering Balochistan government for political reconciliation with complete ownership by all stakeholders;
- Formulation of a comprehensive policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees, beginning with registration of all unregistered Afghans staying 'unlawfully' in Pakistan;
- Revamping and reforming the criminal justice system to strengthen counterterrorism departments including authorising the provincial Criminal Investigation Departments to intercept terrorist communications ⁽⁴²⁶⁾.

Later in December 2014 Nawaz Sharif announced the formation of a federal counterterrorism force with immediate effect ⁽⁴²⁷⁾. The political and security establishment set up temporary military courts to try terrorism-related offences instead of pursuing the cases via an

⁽⁴²³⁾ PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2014, 2015, [url](#), pp. 42-43

⁽⁴²⁴⁾ PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2014, 2015, [url](#), pp. 42-43

⁽⁴²⁵⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Fight against terrorism: Defining moment, 25 December 2014, [url](#)

⁽⁴²⁶⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Fight against terrorism: Defining moment, 25 December 2014, [url](#); CRSS, The NAP Tracker The Third Year Audit of the National Action Plan, June 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁴²⁷⁾ Dawn, Nawaz constitutes special committee to implement national Action Plan, 26 December 2014, [url](#)

independent judiciary (see information above included under [1.5.1. State protection, security forces and justice](#)) ⁽⁴²⁸⁾.

After three years, the implementation of the NAP, Pakistan’s mechanisms and interventions for dealing with the causes of extremism ‘remain largely ineffective’ according to different sources ⁽⁴²⁹⁾.

1.5.3. Detention and death penalty

Detention

USDOS stated in a report of April 2018 covering 2017 that harsh and sometimes life-threatening conditions and abuse occur in some prisons and detention centres. Furthermore, inadequate food and water, and poor sanitation facilities were common. Overcrowding in the prisons remains a serious problem due to the lack of facilities ⁽⁴³⁰⁾. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) reported in its annual report of 2018 that security in the jails, overcrowding, and health and hygiene conditions continue to be a challenge in prisons ⁽⁴³¹⁾.

The HRCP reported that Pakistan counted a prison population of 82 591 as per its April 2018 publication ⁽⁴³²⁾.

Death penalty

In December 2014, in the aftermath of the attack on a school in Peshawar, the Pakistan authorities partially lifted a moratorium on the death penalty that had been in place since 2008. On 10 March 2015, the Pakistani Government declared that executions would resume for all capital crimes ⁽⁴³³⁾.

In October 2017, Human Rights Watch expressed its concern that people were denied the right to a fair trial. Human Rights Watch further stated that:

‘Courts have also imposed the death penalty, in violation of international law, on people with mental disabilities, individuals who were below 18 years of age when the crime was committed, and those whose convictions were based on “confessions” extracted through torture or other ill-treatment’ ⁽⁴³⁴⁾.

In April 2018, Justice Project Pakistan a non-profit human rights law firm based in Pakistan, issued a report about death row prisoners. In this report, it stated by quoting the Ministry of Interior that the President’s Office had rejected 513 mercy petitions by condemned prisoners

⁽⁴²⁸⁾ Dawn, Military Courts part of National Action Plan: PM Nawaz, 30 December 2014, [url](#); Economist (The), The man with the plan: Pakistan after the school massacre, 24 January 2015, [url](#)

⁽⁴²⁹⁾ CRSS, The NAP Tracker The Third Year Audit of the National Action Plan, June 2018, [url](#), p. 16; Dawn, Govt blocks 937 URLs, 98.3m SIMs under National Action Plan, 9 December 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁴³⁰⁾ USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Pakistan, 20 April 2018, [url](#), p. 7

⁽⁴³¹⁾ HRCP, State of Human Rights in 2017, 16 April 2018, [url](#), p. 58

⁽⁴³²⁾ HRCP, State of Human Rights in 2017, 16 April 2018, [url](#), p. 4

⁽⁴³³⁾ Diplomat (The), Pakistan and the Death Penalty, 21 April 2016, [url](#); Economist (The), The man with the plan: Pakistan after the school massacre, 24 January 2015, [url](#); Justice Project Pakistan, Counting Executions, 6 July 2017, [url](#), p. 1

⁽⁴³⁴⁾ HRW, Pakistan: Election to UN Rights Body Spotlights Failings, 18 October 2017, [url](#)

- 444 of which were from the first 15 months after the resumption of executions in December 2014 ⁽⁴³⁵⁾.

A report published by AI in April 2018 about death sentences and executions in 2017 mentioned that since 2014 an estimated 500 prisoners have been executed while more than 7 000 inmates are on death row. In 2017, approximately 60 executions occurred according to AI ⁽⁴³⁶⁾.

⁽⁴³⁵⁾ Justice Project Pakistan, No Mercy: A Report on Clemency for Death Row Prisoners in Pakistan, 11 April 2018, [url](#), p. 4

⁽⁴³⁶⁾ AI, Death Sentences and Executions 2017, 12 April 2018, [url](#), p. 24


2. Security situation per region

2.1. Geographical overview of the violence 2017 – first half of 2018

2.1.1. Trends in regional violence

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) ⁽⁴³⁷⁾ provided two maps to assess the geographical spread of violent incidents. These maps are based on the ACLED dataset ⁽⁴³⁸⁾, which contains data about security-related incidents in Pakistan ⁽⁴³⁹⁾. Map 2 and Map 3 show an overview of the violence in Pakistan by type of event for 2017 and the first half of 2018: battles, remote violence, violence against civilians and riots/protests (see Map 2 and Map 3).

Events of Political Violence & Protests by Type in Pakistan, 2017



Map 2: Events of political violence & protests by type in Pakistan, 2017, ©ACLED ⁽⁴⁴⁰⁾

⁽⁴³⁷⁾ The figures of ACLED were not used in other sections because this source uses a different methodology to describe 'violence' that is more different than the other sources- for an explanation on the methodology of ACLED see: ACLED, ACLED Codebook, 28 December 2017, [url](#)


⁽⁴³⁸⁾ ACLED, South & Southeast Asia dataset-Pakistan, last updated on: 21 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁴³⁹⁾ ACLED, e-mail, 23 July 2018 – Map courtesy of ACLED (based on the events in the South & Southeast Asia dataset-Pakistan-<https://www.acleddata.com/data/>)

⁽⁴⁴⁰⁾ ACLED, e-mail, 23 July 2018 – Map courtesy of ACLED (based on the events in the South & Southeast Asia dataset-Pakistan-<https://www.acleddata.com/data/>)

According to Map 2 (see above), in 2017, in the provinces of Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh, fewer armed, organised instances of violence occurred in general, but a higher number of riots and protests took place. Balochistan saw a relatively large number of battles, incidents of remote violence and violence against civilians, but experienced less riots and protests.

Events of Political Violence & Protests by Type in Pakistan, January 1, 2018 to June 30, 2018



Map 3: Events of political violence & protests by type in Pakistan, first half of 2018, ©ACLED ⁽⁴⁴¹⁾

Map 3 shows the violence by type of event for the first six months of 2018. The same trend as in 2017 is visible. Again, the provinces of Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh experienced a high number of riots and protests. In the province of Balochistan the following types of events occurred: battles, remote violence and violence against civilians. Also in the FATA battles, remote violence and violence against civilians were documented. Smaller numbers of riots and protests were documented in Balochistan and in the FATA than in other provinces. Azad Kashmir experienced a higher number of riots and protests compared to 2017 (see Map 2).

⁽⁴⁴¹⁾ ACLED, e-mail, 23 July 2018 – Map courtesy of ACLED (based on the events in the South & Southeast Asia dataset-Pakistan-<https://www.acleddata.com/data/>)

2.1.2. Regional comparison of violence-related fatalities

Regional comparison of violence-related fatalities in 2017

This section provides figures of fatalities and attacks at regional level, according to the four sources as described in Section [1.4.1 Figures on civilian fatalities](#). It is impossible to present the figures in one comparative table, as the four main sources about the security situation use different parameters and definitions.

PIPS only gives regional details for ‘terrorist attacks’, which make up about 52 % of all violent incidents ⁽⁴⁴²⁾. PIPS focuses on the number of terrorist attacks (and consequent fatalities per province, and indicates percentage changes in 2017 compared to 2016 (see Figure 5) ⁽⁴⁴³⁾. Compared to 2016, PIPS observed a decrease in ‘terrorist incidents’ (16 % overall). The number of deaths also decreased but the number of injured increased. Balochistan and the FATA were most affected by these attacks in 2017. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa occupied the third position (see Figure 5) ⁽⁴⁴⁴⁾.

Region	No of terrorist incidents	% change	No of killed	% change	No of injured	% change
Balochistan	165	9% ↓	288	30% ↓	532	24% ↓
FATA	83	16% ↓	253	55% ↑	491	122% ↑
Islamabad	3	=	2	100% ↑	5	25% ↑
Karachi	24	49% ↓	25	58% ↓	16	79% ↓
KP	71	44% ↓	91	52% ↓	211	41% ↓
Punjab	14	100% ↑	61	24% ↓	194	19% ↓
Sindh (excl. Karachi)	7	=	94	3 003% ↑	277	855% ↑
AJ⁴⁴⁵	3	=	1	100 % ↑	10	100 % ↑
Total	370	16 % ↓	815	10% ↓	1 736	7% ↑

Figure 5: ‘Terrorist attacks’ by region - 2017 vs. 2016 (PIPS) ⁽⁴⁴⁶⁾

SATP gives data for fatalities per province in 2017, subdivided into civilians, security forces and terrorists/militants. The total number of fatalities in 2017, according to SATP, was 1 260. FATA was the most affected region, with 391 fatalities respectively. Balochistan and Sindh occupied the second and third position with 343 and 243 fatalities ⁽⁴⁴⁷⁾.

⁽⁴⁴²⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 17

⁽⁴⁴³⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 22

⁽⁴⁴⁴⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 19, p. 22

⁽⁴⁴⁵⁾ baseline data 2016

⁽⁴⁴⁶⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 22

⁽⁴⁴⁷⁾ SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2017, last updated on: 31 December 2017, [url](#)

CRSS recorded most of the fatalities in Balochistan, followed by Punjab, Sindh and the FATA (448). Overall, the decrease in fatalities can be largely attributed to a sharp decrease in violence-related fatalities in Balochistan and KP. A very slight increase in terms of fatalities, in comparison with 2016, occurred in the province of Punjab (449).

PICSS only gives regional details for militant attacks. In 2017, 950 militant attacks were observed. 1 395 people were killed and 1 965 others injured. PICSS documented most of the fatalities due to militant attacks in the FATA, followed by Balochistan and the province of Sindh (450).

Figure 6 presents a comparative regional analysis by CRSS of violence-related casualties in Pakistan in 2017 (451).




Figure 6: Comparative Regional Analysis 2017, © CRSS (452)

(448) CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 8

(449) CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 9

(450) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 13

(451) CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 9

(452) CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 9

Regional comparison of violence-related fatalities first half of 2018

SATP recorded for the first half of 2018 most fatalities of terrorist violence in Balochistan with 128 fatalities. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the FATA occupied the second and third position with 51 and 40 fatalities. In total for the whole of Pakistan, SATP recorded 278 fatalities ⁽⁴⁵³⁾.

Data from PIPS mentioned that most fatalities of ‘terrorist attacks’ in the first half of 2018 took place in Balochistan (118 fatalities), followed by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (31 fatalities) and the FATA (31 fatalities) ⁽⁴⁵⁴⁾. Overall, 207 people were killed in the first half of 2018 due to ‘terrorist attacks’, compared to 397 people killed in overall violent incidents ⁽⁴⁵⁵⁾.

According to the first and the second quarterly report of CRSS, most fatalities in the first half of 2018 occurred in Balochistan (307), followed by Punjab (183) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (179) ⁽⁴⁵⁶⁾.

2.2. Security trends per geographic subdivision

In the following sections, security trends are explained in greater detail, per geographic subdivision. In each provincial section, a general description of the province contains information on the geography and population, on the background of the conflict, including the actors of the conflict in the province. The subsections describe recent trends in the security situation, including the nature of violence, frequency, targets, locations, and victims within a timeframe from 1 June 2017 until 15 August 2018. A separate part is dedicated to displacements. Under the subsections several incidents are described. These should be read as illustrations of trends in the security situation and not as an exhaustive list of incidents.

2.2.1. Punjab

General description of the province

Punjab province (see [Map 1](#)) is located in the east of Pakistan. It borders the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir in the north-east, the Indian States of Punjab and Rajasthan in the east, the province of Sindh in the south, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces in the west, Islamabad federal capital area and Azad Kashmir in the north ⁽⁴⁵⁷⁾. Punjab can be distinguished in three zones: Central, North and Southern Punjab ⁽⁴⁵⁸⁾. The provincial capital of Punjab is Lahore. Lahore is the second biggest city of Pakistan, after Karachi (Sindh province) ⁽⁴⁵⁹⁾. The province of Punjab is seen as the ‘heart of political and economic activity’ in Pakistan ⁽⁴⁶⁰⁾. It is a province with strong development capacities and a good infrastructure ⁽⁴⁶¹⁾.

⁽⁴⁵³⁾ SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2018, last updated on: 29 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁵⁴⁾ Rana Amir, M., e-mail, 2 July 2018 - data (01/01/2018-30/06/2018) courtesy of PIPS

⁽⁴⁵⁵⁾ Rana Amir, M., e-mail, 2 July 2018 - data (01/01/2018-30/06/2018) courtesy of PIPS

⁽⁴⁵⁶⁾ CRSS, CRSS Quarterly Security Report Q1, 2018, 13 April 2018, [url](#); CRSS Quarterly Security Report Q2, 2018, 11 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁵⁷⁾ Diplomat (The), How Land Reform Can Help Reduce Terrorism in Pakistan, 21 June 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁵⁸⁾ Almeida, C., EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan; 16-17 October 2017, Rome, February 2018, [url](#), p. 21

⁽⁴⁵⁹⁾ Dawn, 20pc of Pakistanis live in 10 cities, census reveals, 29 August 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁶⁰⁾ South Asian Voices, What the case of Punjab says about Pakistan’s counterterrorism policy, 29 June 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁶¹⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Punjab ahead of K-P in human development, 18 May 2018, [url](#)

According to the latest population census figures published by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics in 2017, the population of the province is approximately 110 million ⁽⁴⁶²⁾.

Background of the violence and actors in the Punjab

Southern Punjab is considered as the region where militant networks and extremists are most present ⁽⁴⁶³⁾. Due to security operations the presence of LeJ diminished in the province in 2017. According to PIPS, in 2017 there was not a single sectarian attack reported that was claimed by LeJ in Punjab ⁽⁴⁶⁴⁾. Security analyst Mohammad Amir Rana stated in a Skype interview on 14 June 2018 that during 2017 JuA carried out most of the attacks in the province. Rana claimed that JuA has no presence anymore in Punjab due to security operations and internal rivalry. Still, in central Punjab militant groups have a presence and are capable to carry out attacks ⁽⁴⁶⁵⁾. Michael Kugelman stated in a Skype interview on 14 June 2018 the following about the presence of militant groups in Punjab:

‘Militants, particular secular ones, have been relocated from Punjab to Balochistan and Afghanistan. The militants’ infrastructure is not gone in Southern Punjab; there are religious facilities where you have militant influence. These anti-India groups have facilities in Southern Punjab’ ⁽⁴⁶⁶⁾.

The TTP, al-Qaeda and ISKP have ‘a high and active presence’ in the province as stated in April 2018 in an article in the newspaper The Nation ⁽⁴⁶⁷⁾. According to the Jamestown Foundation, also Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) has ‘a strong presence’ in Punjab ⁽⁴⁶⁸⁾.

According to security officials quoted in the Pakistani newspaper Dawn, the radicalisation of youth through social media by militant groups is still posing a security threat to Punjab. In May 2018, the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) advised to strengthen security around important installations and issued directives to keep vigilance in the province due to possible treats of militants ⁽⁴⁶⁹⁾.

Counter terrorism departments and the Rangers conduct security operations in the province in which militants have been killed or arrested ⁽⁴⁷⁰⁾. At the end of June 2018, the government of Punjab extended the presence of the Rangers with 60 days ⁽⁴⁷¹⁾.

⁽⁴⁶²⁾ Pakistan, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Provisional Summary Results of 6th Population & Housing Census-2017, 25 August 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁶³⁾ International Crisis Group, Pakistan’s Jihadist Heartland: Southern Punjab, 30 May 2016, [url](#); ACAPS, Politics and Security, last update 12 April 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁶⁴⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 139

⁽⁴⁶⁵⁾ Rana Amir, M., Skype interview, 14 June 2018. Mohammad Amir Rana is Security and Political Analyst and Director of the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS).

⁽⁴⁶⁶⁾ Kugelman, M., Skype interview, 14 June 2018. Michael Kugelman is Asia Program Deputy Director and Senior Associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

⁽⁴⁶⁷⁾ Nation (The), Qaeda, TTP, Daesh posing serious threat to Punjab: CTD head, 5 April 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁶⁸⁾ Jamestown Foundation (The), Pakistan’s Jamaat-ud-Dawa Positions Itself for Politics, 12 October 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁶⁹⁾ Dawn, ‘Afghan-based group carried out attacks in Punjab’, 21 May 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁷⁰⁾ Dawn, Militant threat in Punjab, 31 May 2018, [url](#); Nation (The), Punjab govt approves extension in Rangers deployment for 60 days, 23 June 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁷¹⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), pp. 141-142; Nation (The), Punjab govt approves extension in Rangers deployment for 60 days, 23 June 2018, [url](#)

Description of recent security trends

In 2017, PIPS counted 14 ‘terrorist attacks’ compared to 7 in 2016 ⁽⁴⁷²⁾. CRSS mentioned that in 2017 violent incidents increased in the province compared to 2016 ⁽⁴⁷³⁾. According to PICSS, the level of militant attacks in 2017 in Punjab remained ‘stable’ as compared to 2016. PICSS noted that in 2017, no militant attacks in the province took place after August 2017 ⁽⁴⁷⁴⁾.

In 2017, the provincial capital Lahore was the scene of four major attacks: on 13 February 2017, a suicide bombing targeted a pharmacists’ protest at the provincial assembly in Lahore, killing at least 13 persons and injured 83 ⁽⁴⁷⁵⁾. On 5 April 2017, six people were killed and 18 injured when a suicide bombing targeted a census team in Lahore ⁽⁴⁷⁶⁾. On 24 July 2017, a suicide attack targeting an anti-riot police unit deployed near Ferozepur Road caused 26 deaths ⁽⁴⁷⁷⁾. On 7 August 2017, a truck loaded with explosives detonated and injured 46 people ⁽⁴⁷⁸⁾.

Other types of violence mentioned by CRSS in 2017 were militant attacks, ‘terrorist attacks’, targeted killings, security operations and robberies. Especially targeted killings have increased in 2017, compared to 2016 ⁽⁴⁷⁹⁾.

In the first six months of 2018 PIPS counted three ‘terrorist attacks’ in Punjab ⁽⁴⁸⁰⁾. For example: on 14 March 2018, a suicide bomber affiliated with the TTP attacked a police check post outside Raiwind town near Lahore, killing nine people, of which five policemen and injuring 35 people ⁽⁴⁸¹⁾. On 3 May 2018, a vehicle carrying civilian employees of a security agency in Attock was attacked by a suicide bomber. ISKP claimed the attack ⁽⁴⁸²⁾.

Impact of the violence on the civilian population

CRSS counted 469 fatalities in Punjab in 2017, a slight increase compared to 2016 (425 fatalities) ⁽⁴⁸³⁾. CRSS reported that the highest number of fatalities in Punjab was because of security operations followed by targeted killings ⁽⁴⁸⁴⁾. According to different sources, most casualties were militants and civilians, followed by security forces and others ⁽⁴⁸⁵⁾. SATP recorded in 2017 a total of 158 fatalities (32 civilians, 27 security force personnel and 99 terrorists) ⁽⁴⁸⁶⁾.

⁽⁴⁷²⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 19, pp. 21-22, p. 56

⁽⁴⁷³⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 47

⁽⁴⁷⁴⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 36

⁽⁴⁷⁵⁾ Guardian (The), Lahore blast: several killed as 'suicide bomb' hits Pakistan rally, 13 February 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁷⁶⁾ Al Jazeera, Deadly bomb blast targets census team in Lahore, 5 April 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁷⁷⁾ Dawn, 26 killed in blast near Lahore's Ferozepur Road, 24 July 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁷⁸⁾ Dawn, Blast on Lahore's Outfall Road leaves 46 injured, 8 August 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁷⁹⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), pp. 49-50

⁽⁴⁸⁰⁾ Rana Amir, M., e-mail, 2 July 2018 - data (01/01/2018-30/06/2018) courtesy of PIPS

⁽⁴⁸¹⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Raiwind blast: Death toll rises to 10 as investigators call it suicide attack, 15 March 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁸²⁾ Dawn, 2 killed, 14 injured in attack on bus in Attock, 3 May 2018, [url](#)


⁽⁴⁸³⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 47

⁽⁴⁸⁴⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 49

⁽⁴⁸⁵⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 49; PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), pp. 57-58; PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), pp. 35-36

⁽⁴⁸⁶⁾ SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2017, last updated on: 31 December 2017, [url](#)

CRSS stated that in 2017, violent incidents were recorded in 31 out of 38 districts of the province of Punjab. Lahore was the city most affected by violence, followed by Sheikhpura and Multan in 2017 (see Figure 7) ⁽⁴⁸⁷⁾.



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Figure 7: Violence-related Fatalities in Punjab by district 2017, © CRSS ⁽⁴⁸⁸⁾

According to Mohammad Amir Rana, interviewed via Skype on 14 June 2018, the situation in and around Lahore in the first half of 2018 is better than in 2017. This is due to security operations carried out in the area ⁽⁴⁸⁹⁾.

CRSS counted 183 casualties (95 fatalities, 88 injured) in the first and second quarter analysis report of 2018. In the second quarter of 2018, fatalities decreased in the province with 24 % compared to the first quarter of 2018 ⁽⁴⁹⁰⁾.

In the first six months of 2018, SATP counted 37 fatalities. Among those killed, SATP observed 15 civilians, 7 security forces personnel and 15 militants ⁽⁴⁹¹⁾.

⁽⁴⁸⁷⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), pp. 47-48

⁽⁴⁸⁸⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 48

⁽⁴⁸⁹⁾ Rana Amir, M., Skype interview, 14 June 2018. Mohammad Amir Rana is Security and Political Analyst and Director of the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS).

⁽⁴⁹⁰⁾ CRSS, CRSS Quarterly Security Report Q1, 2018, 13 April 2018, [url](#); CRSS Quarterly Security Report Q2, 2018, 11 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁹¹⁾ SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2018, last updated on: 29 July 2018, [url](#)

Displacement

Among the consulted sources there was no information found about any conflict-induced displacement from areas in Punjab. UNOCHA did not report any conflict-induced displacement from areas in Punjab in 2017 or in the first half of 2018 ⁽⁴⁹²⁾.

2.2.2. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

General description of the province

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (see [Map 1](#)) is situated in the north of Pakistan and borders Afghanistan in the west and the FATA in the north, Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan in the east and north-east and Punjab province in the south-east ⁽⁴⁹³⁾. The provincial capital is Peshawar and is the largest city in the province. The city has an important geo-strategic location ⁽⁴⁹⁴⁾. The province is well known for its natural resources such as oil, marble, gem stones and wood ⁽⁴⁹⁵⁾.

The majority of the population speaks Pashtu, followed by the local language Hindko and the national language Urdu ⁽⁴⁹⁶⁾. According to the latest population census figures published by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics the population of the province is around 30.5 million ⁽⁴⁹⁷⁾.

Background of the conflict and actors in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

In 2009, the Pakistani army engaged in a series of military operations against the TTP in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This offensive was marked by human rights violations and arbitrary arrests ⁽⁴⁹⁸⁾. The army's counter-insurgency operations such as operation *Zarb-e-Azb* and *Radd-ul-Fasaad* in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa contributed to more security in the province in the long-run ⁽⁴⁹⁹⁾. An article of IRIN of July 2017 mentioned that members of Taliban factions formed militia groups in three districts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ⁽⁵⁰⁰⁾. In an October 2017 EASO COI meeting in Rome, Cyril Almeida, assistant editor and journalist of Dawn newspaper stated that:

‘The marked reduction in violence in KP is real, but it is difficult to argue that the province is no longer vulnerable to militant violence’ ⁽⁵⁰¹⁾.

Different actors operate in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. PIPS stated that the TTP, ‘local Taliban’, LeJ al-Alawi and JuA have staged attacks in the province during 2017 ⁽⁵⁰²⁾. According to PICSS, the TTP mainly carried out their attacks in Peshawar, Bannu, Charsadda, Swabi, Swat and Dir districts ⁽⁵⁰³⁾. In June 2018, the government of the province raised

⁽⁴⁹²⁾ Websites consulted: <http://www.unocha.org/pakistan>;

<https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/pakistan>; <http://reliefweb.int/country/pak>

⁽⁴⁹³⁾ Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Quick view of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, n.d., [url](#)

⁽⁴⁹⁴⁾ Alhasan Systems, Pakistan Development Perspective - City district Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 31 December 2015, [url](#), p. 17

⁽⁴⁹⁵⁾ Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Quick view of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, n.d., [url](#)

⁽⁴⁹⁶⁾ Daily Sabah, Pakistan: A land of many languages, 9 March 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁹⁷⁾ Pakistan, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Provisional Summary Results of 6th Population & Housing Census-2017, 25 August 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁹⁸⁾ Dawn, Swat: an unquiet calm, 21 September 2014, [url](#)

⁽⁴⁹⁹⁾ Almeida, C., EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan, 16-17 October 2017; Rome, February 2018, [url](#), p. 21

⁽⁵⁰⁰⁾ IRIN, Pakistan recruiting Taliban fighters into pro-government militias, 4 July 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁰¹⁾ Almeida, C., EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan; 16-17 October 2017; Rome, February 2018, [url](#), p. 21

⁽⁵⁰²⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 38

⁽⁵⁰³⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 44

concerns over the strengthening of IS in the border areas of Afghanistan and the activities of IS were described as an indicator of unrest in the region, according to the Pakistani newspaper Dawn⁽⁵⁰⁴⁾. Muhammad Amir Rana mentioned that the situation in the province is ‘stable’ but that there are some concerns about the areas around the strategic places Swabi and Charsadda. Sometimes militant groups regroup in these areas and the difficult terrain hinders security forces to carry out security operations in these regions⁽⁵⁰⁵⁾.

Description of recent security trends

PIPS documented a total of 91 incidents of violence in the province in 2017. This included ‘terrorist attacks’, anti-militant operational strikes by security forces, armed clashes/encounters between security/law enforcement personnel and militants, inter-militant clashes, and incidents of mob violence. PIPS counted 71 ‘terrorist attacks’ in 2017, a decrease of 44 % compared to 2016⁽⁵⁰⁶⁾. PICSS documented a decrease of 40 % in the number of overall attacks compared to 2016⁽⁵⁰⁷⁾.

PIPS observed that militants in 2017 used tactics such as suicide bombings, fire arms, IEDs, and hand grenades and rockets⁽⁵⁰⁸⁾. Targeted killings were also observed and were a major cause of fatalities in the province⁽⁵⁰⁹⁾.

The number of violent incidents compared to 2016 decreased in 2017 in the province. However, the trend of militants attacking educational institutions, government officials and institutions and policemen continued during 2017⁽⁵¹⁰⁾. For example, on 1 December 2017 gunmen attacked the Peshawar Agriculture Training Institute College in Peshawar, killing at least nine people⁽⁵¹¹⁾. In July 2017, a suicide bomber targeted a vehicle of the Frontier Corps, killing one and injuring ten people⁽⁵¹²⁾. In November 2017, a senior police officer and his guard were killed due to a suicide attack⁽⁵¹³⁾. Sectarian violence was also reported in the province. All reported sectarian attacks have taken place in Dera Ismail Khan district and targeted Shias and members of the Sunni community⁽⁵¹⁴⁾.

From 1 January 2018 to 30 June 2018, PIPS observed 30 ‘terrorist attacks’ and two of these attacks were sectarian-related⁽⁵¹⁵⁾. For example: in February 2018, eleven army soldiers were killed and 13 wounded in a suicide bombing carried out by the TTP near a Pakistani army camp in Swat⁽⁵¹⁶⁾. On 8 June 2018, an explosion targeted a police vehicle in Lower Dir District. Two

⁽⁵⁰⁴⁾ Dawn, KP concerned over presence of terror group on Afghan border, 1 June 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁰⁵⁾ Rana Amir, M., Skype interview, 14 June 2018. Mohammad Amir Rana is Security and Political Analyst and Director of the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS).

⁽⁵⁰⁶⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), pp. 38-39

⁽⁵⁰⁷⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 33

⁽⁵⁰⁸⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 38

⁽⁵⁰⁹⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 38; CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 42

⁽⁵¹⁰⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 39; EASO, COI Report: Pakistan Security Situation (August 2017), August 2017, [url](#), p. 59

⁽⁵¹¹⁾ BBC News, Pakistan attack: Gunmen storm Peshawar training college, 1 December 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁵¹²⁾ Dawn, Army major martyred in Peshawar suicide attack, 18 July 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁵¹³⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Senior K-P cop martyred in suicide attack, 24 November 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁵¹⁴⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 64

⁽⁵¹⁵⁾ Rana Amir, M., e-mail, 2 July 2018 - data (01/01/2018-30/06/2018) courtesy of PIPS

⁽⁵¹⁶⁾ Dawn, 11 soldiers martyred in suicide attack on army unit in Swat: ISPR, 3 February 2018, [url](#)

police officers and one civilian were killed⁽⁵¹⁷⁾. The same trend as in 2017 persevered in the first half of 2018. Targeted killings and sectarian attacks again occurred predominantly in Dera Ismail Khan district. Targets were police personnel and members of the Shia community⁽⁵¹⁸⁾. On 8 August 2018, three targeted killings occurred in Dera Ismail Khan. Following these attacks, the police enhanced security in the area and launched a search operation⁽⁵¹⁹⁾. A prominent member of the Sikh community was killed in a targeted attack in Peshawar at the end of May 2018⁽⁵²⁰⁾. On 11 July 2018, at least 20 people, including Awami National Party's (ANP) Haroon Bilour, were killed and 63 others injured in a suicide bombing targeting the ANP rally in Peshawar. The attack was claimed by the TTP⁽⁵²¹⁾.

Impact of the violence on the civilian population

According to PIPS, the number of deaths and injured of terrorist attacks showed a downward trend in 2017 compared to 2016⁽⁵²²⁾. The same trend was observed by PICSS, with a decrease of 47 % in deaths and 55 % decrease in injuries⁽⁵²³⁾.

CRSS documented a decrease in the number of fatalities especially among civilians (64) and security forces (64) in 2017 compared to 2016. The numbers of fatalities of militants (57) were slightly higher in 2017 than in 2016⁽⁵²⁴⁾. PICSS mentioned that the number of deaths among security personnel in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is slightly higher than in other provinces⁽⁵²⁵⁾. OSAC mentioned on 20 March 2018 that 'targeted attacks against government officials, property, military, law enforcement, judicial, and other soft targets (educational facilities) are common' and that:

'[t]he critical terrorist threat [...] touches all aspects of life in northwest Pakistan and dominates the overall security environment. Street robbery, burglary, extortion, revenge/honor killings, political violence, 'terrorist attacks', kidnapping, sectarian killings, targeted killing of security personnel, military actions, and civil disturbances are common events in Peshawar and northwest Pakistan'⁽⁵²⁶⁾.

In 2017, Peshawar was the most affected area of the province, just as in 2016. PIPS recorded 24 'terrorist attacks' in Peshawar, in which 33 people were killed and 105 injured. Dera Ismael Khan was the second most targeted area of the province in terms of 'terrorist attacks', followed by Charsadda and Bannu, according to PIPS⁽⁵²⁷⁾.

⁽⁵¹⁷⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Targeted attack: Three martyred in Lower Dir blast, 8 June 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵¹⁸⁾ Pakistan Today, Senate panel asks for report on targeted killings in DI Khan: report, 10 February 2018, [url](#); News (The), Cop martyred in DI Khan attack, 27 June 2018, [url](#); Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Policeman killed, another injured in DI Khan 'target attack', 25 May 2018, [url](#); Nation (The), Bomb blast kills 3 cops in DI Khan, 31 March 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵¹⁹⁾ Dawn, Three gunned down in Dera Ismail Khan, 9 August 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵²⁰⁾ Dawn, Sikh social activist shot dead in Peshawar, 29 May 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵²¹⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), TTP claims responsibility for Peshawar attack on ANP leader as death toll rises to 20, 11 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵²²⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 22

⁽⁵²³⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 36


⁽⁵²⁴⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 45

⁽⁵²⁵⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 36

⁽⁵²⁶⁾ OSAC, Pakistan 2018 Crime & Safety Report: Peshawar, 20 March 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵²⁷⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 39

CRSS reported that the fatalities from violence in Peshawar declined significantly in 2017 compared to 2016. Dera Ismael Khan was the second district in terms of fatalities followed by Swabi (see Figure 8). In these last two districts fatalities increased slightly compared to 2016 ⁽⁵²⁸⁾.



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Figure 8: Violence-related fatalities in KP by district in 2017, © CRSS ⁽⁵²⁹⁾

According to data in the first and second quarter analysis report of 2018 conducted by CRSS, 179 casualties (74 fatalities, 105 injured) were counted. In the second quarter of 2018, fatalities decreased in the province but the number of injured increased compared to the first quarter of 2018 ⁽⁵³⁰⁾.

In the first six months of 2018, 51 fatalities (mostly militants) were counted by SATP ⁽⁵³¹⁾. A decrease in the number of fatalities is observed, compared to the first six months of 2017 (80 fatalities) ⁽⁵³²⁾.

⁽⁵²⁸⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), pp. 42-44

⁽⁵²⁹⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 44

⁽⁵³⁰⁾ CRSS, CRSS Quarterly Security Report Q1, 2018, 13 April 2018, [url](#); CRSS Quarterly Security Report Q2, 2018, 11 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵³¹⁾ SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2018, last updated on: 29 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵³²⁾ SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2018, last updated on: 29 July 2018, [url](#)

Displacement

In May 2018, UNOCHA did not report any conflict-induced displacement from areas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which is only identified as an IDP hosting area⁽⁵³³⁾. Due to the operation Khyber-IV (see Section [1.3.1. Security operations and armed clashes](#)) and an increase of targeted killings in Khyber Agency (FATA), many families (former IDPs) displaced again to the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa⁽⁵³⁴⁾.

2.2.3. Balochistan

General description of the province

Balochistan (see [Map 1](#)) is located in the west of Pakistan. It borders Iran in the west, Afghanistan in the north-west, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in the north-east, Punjab province in the east, Sindh province in the south-east, and the Arabian Sea in the south⁽⁵³⁵⁾. Balochistan is the least economically developed province of Pakistan. The province is rich in natural sources such as gas and coal⁽⁵³⁶⁾. The province is of strategic importance to the government of Pakistan because of the CPEC project. The CPEC project includes a 3 000 km network of roads, railway and pipelines running from Balochistan's Gwadar Port to the Xinjiang region in China⁽⁵³⁷⁾.

The majority of the people are Baloch, but the second largest group are Pashtun. The provincial capital Quetta is also the home of a large part of the Hazara community in Pakistan⁽⁵³⁸⁾. Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan but the least populated⁽⁵³⁹⁾. According to the latest population census figures published by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, the population of the province is around 12.3 million⁽⁵⁴⁰⁾.

Background of the conflict and actors in Balochistan

The province of Balochistan copes with multiple problems such as major 'conflicts between the state and nationalists (between the military and armed militant groups); inter- and intra-tribal feuds and clashes; and ethnic and sectarian conflicts'⁽⁵⁴¹⁾. These conflicts are further complicated by the involvement of several foreign states, such as China, with an economic or political stake in the province⁽⁵⁴²⁾.

The nationalist conflict in the province started in 2006 with the death of Nationalist Leader and Tribal Head Nawab Akbar Bugti. Since 2006, nationalist groups, such as the BLA and the

⁽⁵³³⁾ UNOCHA, Pakistan: KP and FATA - Areas of Displacement, Hosting and Returns as of 31 May 2018, 13 June 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵³⁴⁾ Dawn, IDPs to return to Khyber's Rajgal valley after Eid, 12 June 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵³⁵⁾ Diplomat (The), A Brief History of Balochistan, 12 February 2016, [url](#)

⁽⁵³⁶⁾ United Kingdom Parliament House of Commons Library, Balochistan: Pakistan's forgotten conflict, 2 January 2018, [url](#), p. 2

⁽⁵³⁷⁾ BBC, China's Xi Jinping agrees \$46bn superhighway to Pakistan, 20 April 2015, [url](#)

⁽⁵³⁸⁾ AAN, The Crowded-Out Conflict: Pakistan's Balochistan in its fifth round of insurgency, 16 November 2015, [url](#); BBC News, Quetta's Hazara: The community caged in its own city, 12 December 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁵³⁹⁾ Asia Foundation, The State of Conflict and Violence in Asia, 18 October 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁴⁰⁾ Pakistan, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Provisional Summary Results of 6th Population & Housing Census-2017, 25 August 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁴¹⁾ USIP, Pakistan: Balochistan: Caught in the Fragility Trap, 27 June 2016, [url](#),

⁽⁵⁴²⁾ USIP, Pakistan: Balochistan: Caught in the Fragility Trap, 27 June 2016, [url](#), p. 2

BLF, have staged attacks on government targets and on Punjabi settlers⁽⁵⁴³⁾. The Baloch insurgency is sometimes referred to as a ‘low level insurgency’ according to different sources⁽⁵⁴⁴⁾. The authorities reacted strongly over the years. According to a report of International Crisis Group of June 2018, the military and the Frontier Corps tried to undermine the Baloch insurgency by abducting, torturing and killing hundreds, if not thousands, of Baloch nationalists and sympathisers. Even after the restoration of civilian rule, torture, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings continued, according to International Crisis Group⁽⁵⁴⁵⁾. The Human Rights Council of Balochistan and Baloch Human Rights Organisation wrote that between January and June 2018, 541 enforced disappearances and 135 extrajudicial killings occurred⁽⁵⁴⁶⁾. In 2017, Baloch insurgent groups frequently attacked police and paramilitary personnel. The BLF, BRA, BLA and Lashkar-e-Balochistan conducted 131 attacks in 20 districts claiming 138 lives and wounding 239 other people⁽⁵⁴⁷⁾. Baloch insurgents also threatened local civilians. They attack and interrogate civilians who are cooperating with the military⁽⁵⁴⁸⁾. According to BBC News in November 2017, local journalists were threatened by Baloch insurgents on suspicion of working together with the Pakistani army. The government of Pakistan intimidates the local press in Balochistan⁽⁵⁴⁹⁾.

The presence of the military didn’t prevent attacks or the presence of different militant groups in the province⁽⁵⁵⁰⁾. The operations of the army are underreported and there are large information gaps on their impact on the civilian population, according to the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS)⁽⁵⁵¹⁾. Religiously inspired violent sectarian and Islamist militant groups such as the TTP, JuA, LeJ, Jamaat-ul Ansar al-Sharia and ISKP have a presence in Balochistan⁽⁵⁵²⁾. In 2017, militant groups carried out 27 attacks, mostly on security force personnel⁽⁵⁵³⁾. The province is also affected by sectarian violence. Members of the local Shia community, mostly Hazara, have fallen victim of violent attacks, targeted killings and suicide attacks⁽⁵⁵⁴⁾.

Another factor contributing to the conflict in Balochistan in recent years is the international involvement in Pakistan’s efforts to build the Gwadar Port in collaboration with China. The Baloch insurgent groups have condemned the CPEC project. They interpret the project as an attempt by the state to exploit Balochistan’s resources while receiving little in return⁽⁵⁵⁵⁾. To

⁽⁵⁴³⁾ AAN, The Crowded-Out Conflict: Pakistan’s Balochistan in its fifth round of insurgency, 16 November 2015, [url](#); International Crisis Group, Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan, 23 January 2014, [url](#); Jamali, H., The simmering conflict in Balochistan, in: Herald, 14 July 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁴⁴⁾ Dawn, The path to peace in Balochistan, 28 September 2017, [url](#); Almeida, C., EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan; 16-17 October 2017, Rome, February 2018, [url](#), p. 20

⁽⁵⁴⁵⁾ International Crisis Group, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Opportunities and Risks, 29 June 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁴⁶⁾ Human Rights Council of Balochistan and Baloch Human Rights Organisation, bi-annual report 2018-The State of Balochistan’s Human Rights, 6 August 2018, [url](#), p. 2

⁽⁵⁴⁷⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 46

⁽⁵⁴⁸⁾ International Crisis Group, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Opportunities and Risks, 29 June 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁴⁹⁾ BBC News, Balochistan journalists caught 'between the stick and the gun', 26 November 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁵⁰⁾ International Crisis Group, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Opportunities and Risks, 29 June 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁵¹⁾ ACAPS, Politics and Security, last update 12 April 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁵²⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 46, pp. 147-148; Zahid, F., Jamaat ul Ansar al-Sharia: The New al-Qaeda Threat in Pakistan, in: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 15 Issue: 18, 22 September 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁵³⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 46

⁽⁵⁵⁴⁾ BBC News, Quetta’s Hazara: The community caged in its own city, 12 December 2017, [url](#); HRW, Pakistan’s Hazara Community Under Attack, 30 April 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁵⁵⁾ International Crisis Group, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Opportunities and Risks, 29 June 2018, [url](#); Dawn, How Gwadar’s CPEC development might leave its people behind, 28 June 2018, [url](#)

protect the CPEC project, Pakistan increased its security personnel in the region. Pakistan accused India and other countries of interfering and supporting the Baloch separatists ⁽⁵⁵⁶⁾.

Description of recent security trends

PIPS documented 237 incidents of various types of violence in the province in 2017: 165 ‘terrorist attacks’, 39 anti-militant operational attacks by security forces, 13 armed clashes and encounters between security forces and militants, 13 cross-border attacks, 5 inter-tribal clashes and 2 incidents of mob violence ⁽⁵⁵⁷⁾. Compared to 2016 (234 incidents), the overall number of incidents of violence increased slightly ⁽⁵⁵⁸⁾. ‘Terrorist attacks’ increased by 9 % compared to 2016 ⁽⁵⁵⁹⁾. PICSS mentioned that militants in 2017 used suicide bombings, fire arms, IEDs, hand grenades and rockets. Targeted killings and kidnappings were also observed ⁽⁵⁶⁰⁾.

Examples of major security incidents in 2017 in the province include: in June 2017, 14 people were killed in a suicide attack close to a police office in Quetta ⁽⁵⁶¹⁾. SATP documented multiple attacks on police personnel during July 2017 ⁽⁵⁶²⁾. On 5 October 2017, an explosion occurred at the shrine Dargah Pir Rakhel Shah in Jhal Magsi district, killing at least 20 people and leaving 30 injured. The attack was claimed by ISKP ⁽⁵⁶³⁾. On 18 December 2017, ISKP targeted a church in Quetta, at least nine people were killed and 56 injured ⁽⁵⁶⁴⁾.

From 1 January 2018 to 30 June 2018, PIPS observed in total 73 ‘terrorist attacks’ and six of these attacks were sectarian-related. 43 of these attacks were carried out by nationalist insurgents and 24 attacks by militants ⁽⁵⁶⁵⁾.

Some major attacks occurred in the first half of 2018. On 9 January 2018, seven people were killed due to a suicide attack carried out by the TTP targeting a police truck ⁽⁵⁶⁶⁾. In April 2018, three suicide bombers attacked police personnel and paramilitary troopers in Quetta killing at least five security force members and wounding seven others ⁽⁵⁶⁷⁾. On 13 July 2018, a suicide attack targeted a Balochistan Awami Party corner meeting in Mastung. The death toll of this attack was 149 (including BAP leader Siraj Raisani) and 186 were injured. Responsibility for this attack was claimed by ISKP. This attack was one of the attacks that caused the most casualties in years in Pakistan ⁽⁵⁶⁸⁾. On 25 July 2018, in an attack claimed by ISKP, a suicide attacker targeted a police vehicle near a polling station in Quetta, killing 31 people and injuring

⁽⁵⁵⁶⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 116

⁽⁵⁵⁷⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 47

⁽⁵⁵⁸⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2016, 10 January 2017, [url](#), p. 34

⁽⁵⁵⁹⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 46

⁽⁵⁶⁰⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 24

⁽⁵⁶¹⁾ Dawn, 14 killed in suicide attack on Quetta's Gulistan Road, 14 June 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁶²⁾ SATP, Major incidents of Terrorism-related violence in Pakistan – 2017, last updated on: 31 December 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁶³⁾ Dawn, 20 killed in suicide bombing targeting shrine in Jhal Magsi, Balochistan, 5 October 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁶⁴⁾ Dawn, Nine dead, over 50 injured in attack on Quetta church, 18 December 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁶⁵⁾ Rana Amir, M., e-mail, 2 July 2018 - data (01/01/2018-30/06/2018) courtesy of PIPS

⁽⁵⁶⁶⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Seven martyred in blast near Balochistan Assembly, 9 January 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁶⁷⁾ RFE/RL, Suicide Attacks Rock Pakistan's Quetta, At least Five Police Killed, 24 April 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁶⁸⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), With 149 martyred, Mastung is one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in Pakistan's history, 16 July 2018, [url](#); Dawn, PM, Balochistan CM offer condolences for Mastung attack victims as death toll rises to 149, 15 July 2018, [url](#)

at least 40 ⁽⁵⁶⁹⁾. On 12 August 2018, one person was killed and nine others, including three FC personnel, were injured in a blast in Chaman ⁽⁵⁷⁰⁾. The attack was claimed by the TTP ⁽⁵⁷¹⁾. A similar blast occurred in Chaman on 20 July 2018 ⁽⁵⁷²⁾.

In the first months of 2018, members of the Christian and Hazara community were also the targets of militants. On 2 April 2018, four members of a Christian family were shot dead by unidentified assailants ⁽⁵⁷³⁾. Human Rights Watch reported that in April 2018 four attacks were directed against Hazaras in Quetta ⁽⁵⁷⁴⁾.

Impact of the violence on the civilian population

PIPS reported that 430 people were killed and 624 injured in 2017, compared to 681 deaths and 744 injured in 2016 ⁽⁵⁷⁵⁾. PICSS recorded a decrease of 31 % in casualties and a 22 % increase of injured compared to 2016 ⁽⁵⁷⁶⁾. CRSS counted 489 fatalities in 2017, compared to 805 in 2016 ⁽⁵⁷⁷⁾. According to CRSS more than 54 % of the casualties in Balochistan were civilians and the majority of these were common people, followed by political and religious party activists ⁽⁵⁷⁸⁾. PICSS also observed that the majority of fatalities in the province are civilians ⁽⁵⁷⁹⁾.

CRSS documented that in 2017 the capital, Quetta, lost the highest number of lives due to violence. Compared to 2016, fatalities in Quetta decreased with almost 50 %. Other districts that suffered high fatalities from violence were Kech, Mastung and Jhal Magsi (see Figure 9) ⁽⁵⁸⁰⁾.

⁽⁵⁶⁹⁾ Al Jazeera, Quetta: Death toll jumps to 31 in election day blast, 25 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁷⁰⁾ Dawn, One dead, 9 injured in Chaman IED blast, 12 August 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁷¹⁾ Jeffery, F., [Twitter], posted on: 12 August 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁷²⁾ Dawn, One dead, 9 injured in Chaman IED blast, 12 August 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁷³⁾ Al Jazeera, Four killed in attack on Christians in Pakistan's Quetta, 2 April 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁷⁴⁾ HRW, Pakistan's Hazara Community Under Attack, 30 April 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁷⁵⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 47; PIPS, Security Report 2016, 10 January 2017, [url](#), p. 34


⁽⁵⁷⁶⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 24

⁽⁵⁷⁷⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 33

⁽⁵⁷⁸⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), pp. 35-36

⁽⁵⁷⁹⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 24

⁽⁵⁸⁰⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), pp. 33-34



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Figure 9: Violence-related fatalities in Balochistan by district in 2017, © CRSS ⁽⁵⁸¹⁾

According to data in CRSS' the first and second quarter analysis report of 2018, 307 casualties (150 fatalities, 157 injured) were counted. In the second quarter of 2018, fatalities and injured decreased in the province compared to the first quarter of 2018 ⁽⁵⁸²⁾.

In the first six months of 2018, 128 fatalities (mostly security force personnel and civilians) were counted by SATP ⁽⁵⁸³⁾. A slight decrease in the number of fatalities is observed, compared to the first six months of 2017 (133 fatalities) ⁽⁵⁸⁴⁾.

Displacement

In February 2017, the newspaper the Express Tribune writes that 'lawlessness' displaced people from the districts of Kech, Panjgur and Bolan to 'safer places' ⁽⁵⁸⁵⁾. The Pakistani newspaper Dawn reported in July 2018 that 'thousands of Baloch people are internally displaced due to target killings or forced disappearances of political workers' ⁽⁵⁸⁶⁾.

⁽⁵⁸¹⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 34

⁽⁵⁸²⁾ CRSS, CRSS Quarterly Security Report Q1, 2018, 13 April 2018, [url](#); CRSS Quarterly Security Report Q2, 2018, 11 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁸³⁾ SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2018, last updated on: 29 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁸⁴⁾ SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2018, last updated on: 29 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁸⁵⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Displacement In Balochistan: Mengal renews plea for census delay, 19 February 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁸⁶⁾ Dawn, BNP-Mengal vows to ensure people's rights in CPEC, 2 July 2018, [url](#)

No further information about IDPs could be found among the consulted sources during the reporting period ⁽⁵⁸⁷⁾.

In its Global Report on Internal Displacement for 2018, IDMC reported that 15.000 people were displaced due to tensions over territory between Afghanistan and Pakistan which included indiscriminate firing and shelling by Afghan forces' in Chaman, Balochistan ⁽⁵⁸⁸⁾.

ACAPS stated (based on the UNOCHA data) that 'displacement in Balochistan is highly likely, due to conflict and insecurity, but information is limited due to limited access' ⁽⁵⁸⁹⁾.

2.2.4. Sindh

General description of the province

The province of Sindh (see [Map 1](#)) is situated in the south-east of Pakistan. It borders the province of Balochistan in the north and in the west, the province of Punjab in the north-east and the Arabian Sea in the south. The provincial capital, Karachi, is the largest city in Pakistan and is divided in six administrative divisions and six cantonment areas ⁽⁵⁹⁰⁾. Karachi is the part of Sindh where significant sectarian, ethnic and political violence occurs. Karachi attracts migration from every major ethnic and linguistic group in Pakistan owing to the city's economic potential ⁽⁵⁹¹⁾.

The population consists of Muhajir and Pashtun, Punjabi, Sindhi and Baloch people ⁽⁵⁹²⁾. According to the last population census figures published by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, the population of Sindh is 47.8 million ⁽⁵⁹³⁾.

Background of the conflict and actors in Sindh

Since September 2013, a security operation is ongoing in the province, mainly focusing on the capital Karachi. The purpose of this operation is to tackle four categories of violent groups involved in violence in the city: the Pakistani Taliban, sectarian armed groups, armed wings of ethno-political parties and criminal gangs ⁽⁵⁹⁴⁾.

During 2017, the violence in the capital Karachi decreased almost by half due to security operations. According to sources 'a new trend' occurred in 2017. The city saw a rise of 'self-radicalised and educated' militants in the middle-class neighbourhoods of the city ⁽⁵⁹⁵⁾. Rural

⁽⁵⁸⁷⁾ Websites consulted: <http://www.unocha.org/pakistan>;

<https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/pakistan>; <http://reliefweb.int/country/pak>

⁽⁵⁸⁸⁾ IDMC, Pakistan. Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID 2018), 2018, [url](#), p. 3

⁽⁵⁸⁹⁾ ACAPS, IDPs and Returnees, last updated: 5 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁹⁰⁾ Fazli, S., EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan; 16-17 October 2017, Rome, February 2018, [url](#), pp. 87-88; Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Sindh's six divisions see fractional change in population, 28 August 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁹¹⁾ Fazli, S., EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan; 16-17 October 2017, Rome, February 2018, [url](#), p. 91

⁽⁵⁹²⁾ Fazli, S., EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan; 16-17 October 2017, Rome, February 2018, [url](#), p. 88; Diplomat (The), Karachi's Migrants and Militants, 14 November 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁹³⁾ Pakistan, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Provisional Summary Results of 6th Population & Housing Census-2017, 25 August 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁹⁴⁾ News (The), Once peaceful, Sindh now riddled with security challenges: CM, 26 October 2017, [url](#); PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 189

⁽⁵⁹⁵⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 189; CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 58

Sindh was the scene of some major attacks, mainly targeting Shia community and Sufi shrines. The militancy seems to have shifted from the FATA and Karachi to rural Sindh⁽⁵⁹⁶⁾. The TTP and sectarian groups such as SSP, JuA and LeJ have a presence in rural Sindh⁽⁵⁹⁷⁾. Mohammad Amir Rana stated in a Skype interview on 14 June 2018 that northern Sindh is ‘volatile’ because some groups that are active in the province of Balochistan hide and from there stage their attacks in Balochistan⁽⁵⁹⁸⁾. According to an article in September 2017 published by Combating Terrorism Center, the presence of al-Qaeda in Karachi has been growing in recent years⁽⁵⁹⁹⁾. Also militants affiliated with Jamaat-ul Ansar al-Sharia Pakistan staged attacks in Sindh⁽⁶⁰⁰⁾. According to PIPS, most attacks in the province in 2017 were carried out by factions of the TTP and Jamaat-ul Ahrar, al-Qaeda on the Indian Peninsula (AQIS), and ISKP affiliates, and Jamaat-ul Ansar al-Sharia Pakistan⁽⁶⁰¹⁾.

Besides militancy, the province and especially Karachi witness a lot of political and gang-related violence⁽⁶⁰²⁾. The power struggle remains between the political parties of the main ethnic groups, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM, Mohajir), the Awami National Party (ANP, Pashtun) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP, Sindhi)⁽⁶⁰³⁾. Apart, from this political violence, Karachi is the base of heavily armed criminal gangs⁽⁶⁰⁴⁾.

Security operations by the Rangers helped reducing the violence in Sindh. The Rangers have been given ‘special powers’ to tackle the variety of violence, not just ethno-political, but also sectarian violence and extortion⁽⁶⁰⁵⁾. In July 2018, these ‘special powers’ were renewed for another 90 days⁽⁶⁰⁶⁾. There are concerns about human rights violations such as extrajudicial killings and torture and the growing role of the Rangers in the political affairs of Karachi and in corruption⁽⁶⁰⁷⁾.

Description of recent security trends

In 2017, PIPS recorded 31 ‘terrorist attacks’ across the province, 24 of these attacks took place in Karachi and seven in interior Sindh. This is a decrease of 42 % compared to 2016 in the province⁽⁶⁰⁸⁾. Among those attacks, there were both sectarian-related and nationalist-inspired attacks⁽⁶⁰⁹⁾.

In terms of types of attacks, PICSS pointed out a pattern of attacks on security forces personnel (particularly targeted killings) in Sindh but compared to 2016, the targeted killings

⁽⁵⁹⁶⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 190

⁽⁵⁹⁷⁾ Isani, M., Preventing the Spread of Extremism by Understanding Sindhi Rural Society, 22 September 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁵⁹⁸⁾ Rana Amir, M., Skype interview, 14 June 2018. Mohammad Amir Rana is Security and Political Analyst and Director of the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS).

⁽⁵⁹⁹⁾ Combating Terrorism Center, Al-Qa`ida in Pakistan: A Metric Problem?, September 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁶⁰⁰⁾ Jamestown Foundation (The), Pakistan’s Tanzeem-e-Islami and Its Troublesome Extremist Links, 10 November 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁶⁰¹⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 53

⁽⁶⁰²⁾ Almeida, C., EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan; 16-17 October 2017; Rome, February 2018, [url](#), p. 21

⁽⁶⁰³⁾ Fazli, S., EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan; 16-17 October 2017; Rome, February 2018, [url](#), p. 89

⁽⁶⁰⁴⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Street crime: Operation failed to curb Karachi’s biggest problem, 4 January 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁶⁰⁵⁾ Fazli, S., EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan; 16-17 October 2017; Rome, February 2018, [url](#), p. 93

⁽⁶⁰⁶⁾ Nation (The), Rangers stay in Sindh extended, 14 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁶⁰⁷⁾ Fazli, S., EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan; 16-17 October 2017; Rome, February 2018, [url](#), p. 89; USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Pakistan, 20 April 2018, [url](#), p. 4

⁽⁶⁰⁸⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 52

⁽⁶⁰⁹⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), pp. 52-56

decreased ⁽⁶¹⁰⁾. CRSS also observed that targeted killings decreased. CRSS details further different types of security incidents in the province of Sindh. The number of targeted killings and security operations dropped significantly. On the other hand, militant attacks have significantly increased compared to 2016 ⁽⁶¹¹⁾. Grenade attacks, IEDs, other types of explosive devices, physical attacks and targeted killings were the methods of violence used in Sindh during 2017 ⁽⁶¹²⁾.

The most prominent terrorist attack which was responsible for the majority of casualties in 2017, occurred on 16 February 2017 when an attack took place at the Sufi shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar, killing over 80 worshippers and pilgrims, and injuring more than 200. ISKP claimed responsibility for this attack ⁽⁶¹³⁾. According to PIPS, in the months of June, July and August 2017 targeted killings on police personnel were reported ⁽⁶¹⁴⁾.

From 1 January 2018 to 30 June 2018, PIPS observed 6 ‘terrorist attacks’ in total. Nationalist insurgents carried out one attacks and militants 5 attacks ⁽⁶¹⁵⁾. Attacks on security personnel continued in the first half of 2018. In January 2018, a Senior Superintendent of Police survived a targeted attack, but four police officers were injured ⁽⁶¹⁶⁾. On 2 June 2018, two Rangers were injured while foiling an alleged suicide attack at a check post ⁽⁶¹⁷⁾.

Impact of the violence on the civilian population

According to CRSS, the fatalities of violence-related incidents were ‘high’ in the province. The highest number of fatalities reported in Sindh in 2017 were civilian (215), followed by militants and criminals (87 and 122) and security officials (31). Among the civilian fatalities, most were religious persons or political activists ⁽⁶¹⁸⁾. According to OSAC, militants and criminal groups targeted police and security forces in Karachi during 2017 ⁽⁶¹⁹⁾.

CRSS reported that Karachi was the most affected part of Sindh in terms of fatalities in 2017, just as the previous year. Compared to 2016, there was a slight decrease noticeable in terms of fatalities in Karachi. In the districts of Dadu, Sujawal and Khairpur respectively, 91, seven and six fatalities were recorded by CRSS (see Figure 10) ⁽⁶²⁰⁾.

⁽⁶¹⁰⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), pp. 38-39

⁽⁶¹¹⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), pp. 54-55

⁽⁶¹²⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 39

⁽⁶¹³⁾ AFP, Death toll from attack at Lal Shahbaz Qalandar shrine climbs to 83, 17 February 2017, available at: [url](#)

⁽⁶¹⁴⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 54

⁽⁶¹⁵⁾ Rana Amir, M., e-mail, 2 July 2018 - data (01/01/2018-30/06/2018) courtesy of PIPS


⁽⁶¹⁶⁾ Dawn, SSP Rao Anwar survives attempt on life in Malir, three attackers killed, 16 January 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁶¹⁷⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Two Rangers men injured in Hub suicide attack, 2 June 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁶¹⁸⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), pp. 55-57

⁽⁶¹⁹⁾ OSAC, Pakistan 2018 Crime & Safety Report: Karachi, 20 March 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁶²⁰⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), pp. 52-54



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Figure 10: Violence-related fatalities in Sindh by district in 2017, © CRSS ⁽⁶²¹⁾

According to data in the first and second quarter analysis report of 2018 conducted by CRSS, CRSS counted 164 casualties (114 fatalities, 50 injured). In the second quarter of 2018, fatalities decreased and the number of injured increased slightly in the province compared to the first quarter of 2018 ⁽⁶²²⁾.

SATP counted 22 fatalities (mainly militants) in the first six months of 2018 ⁽⁶²³⁾. A decrease in the number of fatalities is observed, compared to the first six months of 2017 (175 fatalities). The very high number of fatalities in the first half of 2017 is due to a major attack in February 2017 ⁽⁶²⁴⁾.

Displacement

UNOCHA did not report any conflict-induced displacement from the province of Sindh in 2017 or in the first half of 2018 ⁽⁶²⁵⁾.

⁽⁶²¹⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 54

⁽⁶²²⁾ CRSS, CRSS Quarterly Security Report Q1, 2018, 13 April 2018, [url](#); CRSS Quarterly Security Report Q2, 2018, 11 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁶²³⁾ SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2018, last updated on: 29 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁶²⁴⁾ SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2018, last updated on: 29 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁶²⁵⁾ Websites consulted: <http://www.unocha.org/pakistan>; <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/pakistan>; <http://reliefweb.int/country/pak>

2.2.5. Federally Administered Tribal Areas

General description of the FATA

The FATA (see [Map 1](#)) are situated on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border between the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Afghanistan, and border Balochistan in the south. The FATA comprise seven agencies and six frontier regions. The seven agencies are the following: Bajaur Agency, Mohmand Agency, Khyber Agency, Orakzai Agency, Kurram Agency, North and South Waziristan. The six frontier regions are: FR Peshawar, FR Bannu, FR Kohat, FR Lakki, FR Tank and FR D.I. Khan ⁽⁶²⁶⁾. At the end of May 2018, the FATA Interim Governance Regulation (2018) was signed by the president. This regulation applies in FATA until its territories merge with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ‘within a timeframe of two years’. Main changes include repealing the Frontier Crimes Regulations, declaring tribal agencies as tribal districts ⁽⁶²⁷⁾ and changing the nomenclature of political agents to that of deputy commissioners ⁽⁶²⁸⁾.

The terrain is mountainous with small valleys, surrounded by settlements and agricultural fields ⁽⁶²⁹⁾. According to the latest population census figures published by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics the population of the FATA is around 5 million ⁽⁶³⁰⁾. The population has grown by 57 % in the last 19 years despite the fact that most inhabitants have moved to settled areas because of military operations in the region, according to an article in the Pakistani newspaper Dawn ⁽⁶³¹⁾.

Background of the conflict and actors in the FATA

Since 2001, the area was inhabited with Taliban militants and al-Qaeda loyalists fleeing the conflict in Afghanistan. The FATA have seen the rise of the Pakistan Taliban, which has a base in the district of South Waziristan ⁽⁶³²⁾. Since 2004, the Pakistani army regularly carried out military operations ⁽⁶³³⁾. This led to a series of human rights violations and consecutive waves of displacement ⁽⁶³⁴⁾. These military operations had a major impact on socio-economic life in the region. Educational institutions were destroyed and agricultural output suffered ⁽⁶³⁵⁾. The United States also carried out drone strikes targeting militants in the area ⁽⁶³⁶⁾.

⁽⁶²⁶⁾ Shah, M. K., Too little, too late: The mainstreaming of Pakistan’s tribal regions, 28 June 2018, [url](#), p. 3; CRSS, FATA Tribes: Finally Out of Colonial Clutches? Past, Present and Future, 12 July 2018, [url](#), pp. 7-8; UNOCHA, Pakistan: FATA Fact Sheet - May 2018, 1 June 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁶²⁷⁾ This report refers to the agency names and not to the new names because it still are interim rules and will not be officially implemented until FATA officially merges with KP within two years and because of the fact that the sources consulted for this report are using the agency names.

⁽⁶²⁸⁾ Dawn, Mainstreaming Fata with interim governance law, 31 May 2018, [url](#); Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Interim rules for FATA mere eyewash, 14 May 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁶²⁹⁾ IPS, Displaced Pashtuns Return to Find Homes “Teeming” with Landmines, 26 April 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁶³⁰⁾ Pakistan, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Provisional Summary Results of 6th Population & Housing Census-2017, 25 August 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁶³¹⁾ Dawn, Fata population grows by 57pc, 30 August 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁶³²⁾ USIP, Mainstreaming Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas Reform Initiatives and Roadblocks, March 2018, [url](#), pp. 6-7

⁽⁶³³⁾ Dawn, Chronology of military operations, 16 June 2014, [url](#)

⁽⁶³⁴⁾ RFE/RL, ‘Stop This Cruelty’: Pakistan’s Pashtuns Want Answers About Missing Loved Ones, 9 April 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁶³⁵⁾ USIP, Mainstreaming Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas Reform Initiatives and Roadblocks, March 2018, [url](#), p. 14

⁽⁶³⁶⁾ Diplomat (The), The Drone Strike Narrative in Pakistan, 10 June 2014, [url](#)

Mainly due to the military Operation *Zarb-e-Azb* the situation in the FATA improved and many areas were cleared of militants⁽⁶³⁷⁾. In May 2017, it has been reported that the Pakistan Taliban resurfaced in the FATA⁽⁶³⁸⁾. The military has launched operation Khyber-IV in July 2017 in the Rajgal valley in Khyber Agency to stop the Islamic State making inroads into areas bordering Afghanistan⁽⁶³⁹⁾. In Wana, in South Waziristan, an armed group⁽⁶⁴⁰⁾ thrived by becoming a government-backed militia. It is composed of militants who are referred to as ‘good Taliban’ and have the support of the government⁽⁶⁴¹⁾.

Militant groups carrying out attacks in the region are the TTP, ISKP, the Khan Said and Hakeemullah group of Mehsud Taliban, the Wazir Taliban, the Haqqani Network, LJA and JuA, according to FATA Research Center (FRC)⁽⁶⁴²⁾.

Description of recent security trends

This section first describes the recent security trends for the FATA and secondly describes the recent security trends at the agency level.

General

According to PICSS, the security situation in the FATA deteriorated in 2017. The number of attacks (102 militant attacks in 2017) decreased but the number of casualties (339 deaths and 614 injured in 2017) increased compared to 2016. PICSS concludes that militant attacks in 2017 were ‘more lethal and well organised’⁽⁶⁴³⁾. PIPS documented 143 violent incidents which killed 537 people (195 civilians, 80 security personnel, and 262 militants) and injured 575 people in the FATA. Of those 143 violent incidents, 83 attacks were terrorism-related⁽⁶⁴⁴⁾. FRC states in its annual report of 2017 that compared to 2016 there was an increase of 16 % in ‘terrorist incidents’ and an increase of 95 % in counter terrorism incidents in 2017. In total FRC counted 325 violent incidents in 2017⁽⁶⁴⁵⁾.

Figure 11 (see below) gives an overview of the nature of violence in the FATA in 2017. This table shows that the nature of the attacks is diverse: from search operations carried out by the military to attacks on civilians and security force personnel by militants and drone attacks⁽⁶⁴⁶⁾. Methods used by militants included IEDs, suicide attacks, cross-border attacks, clashes between militant groups and militant ambushes on security personnel (see also Figure 12). These are observed in all seven agencies in the FATA. Pakistani security forces reacted with air strikes, ground operations and search operations in 2017⁽⁶⁴⁷⁾.

⁽⁶³⁷⁾ USIP, Mainstreaming Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas Reform Initiatives and Roadblocks, March 2018, [url](#), p. 7

⁽⁶³⁸⁾ Nation (The), Reversals in FATA, 27 May 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁶³⁹⁾ Reuters, Pakistan launches military operation in tribal areas targeting Islamic State, 16 July 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁶⁴⁰⁾ Successors of the deceased Mullah Nazir; RFE/RL, Waziristan Unrest Sheds Light On Lingering Taliban Influence, 8 June 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁶⁴¹⁾ RFE/RL, Waziristan Unrest Sheds Light On Lingering Taliban Influence, 8 June 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁶⁴²⁾ FRC, FATA Annual Security Report, 13 January 2018, [url](#), p. 23

⁽⁶⁴³⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 29

⁽⁶⁴⁴⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 38

⁽⁶⁴⁵⁾ FRC, FATA Annual Security Report, 13 January 2018, [url](#), p. 1

⁽⁶⁴⁶⁾ FRC, FATA Annual Security Report, 13 January 2018, [url](#), p. 1

⁽⁶⁴⁷⁾ FRC, FATA Annual Security Report, 13 January 2018, [url](#), pp. 3-4; PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 37

Nature of violent incidents in the FATA 2017	No of incidents
Attacks on civilians	71
Attacks on security forces	73
Attacks on peace forces	7
Clashes between militants groups	2
Search operations	136
Aerial strikes	12
Drone attacks	7
Curfew	17
Total 2017	325

Figure 11: Nature of violent incidents in the FATA in 2017 (FRC) ⁽⁶⁴⁸⁾

Militant tactics in the FATA 2017	No of incidents
IED	87
Target killings	20
Suicide	5
Cross border	13
Ambush	25

Figure 12: Militant tactics in the FATA in 2017 (FRC) ⁽⁶⁵⁰⁾

FRC observed in its quarterly analysis of the first three months of 2018, a decrease in terrorism and counter terrorism incidents in all agencies of the FATA. A total of 43 violent incidents were counted in the first three months of 2018, a decrease of 177 % in comparison with the first quarter of 2017 ⁽⁶⁵¹⁾. IEDs were the most frequently used tactic in this time period, followed by kidnappings and targeted killings ⁽⁶⁵²⁾. From 1 January 2018 to 30 June 2018, PIPS observed in total 32 ‘terrorist attacks’, carried out by militants ⁽⁶⁵³⁾.

Below there is a description of the recent security trends in the seven agencies of the FATA.

⁽⁶⁴⁸⁾ FRC, FATA Annual Security Report, 13 January 2018, [url](#), p. 1

⁽⁶⁴⁹⁾ FRC, FATA Annual Security Report, 13 January 2018, [url](#), p. 1

⁽⁶⁵⁰⁾ FRC, FATA Annual Security Report, 13 January 2018, [url](#), p. 28

⁽⁶⁵¹⁾ FRC, FATA security report first quarter 2018, 1 April 2018, [url](#), p. 1

⁽⁶⁵²⁾ FRC, FATA security report first quarter 2018, 1 April 2018, [url](#), p. 4

⁽⁶⁵³⁾ Rana Amir, M., e-mail, 2 July 2018 - data (01/01/2018-30/06/2018) courtesy of PIPS

Bajaur Agency

Bajaur Agency is located in the north of the FATA and shares a border with Afghanistan's eastern Kunar Province to the north-west, the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to its north-east and Mohmand Agency in the west. It is the smallest agency in the FATA ⁽⁶⁵⁴⁾. The population is 1 093 684 ⁽⁶⁵⁵⁾.

FRC documented 52 violent incidents in 2017 in Bajaur Agency. This is an increase of 79 % in terms of incidents compared to 2016 ⁽⁶⁵⁶⁾. Especially the third quarter of 2017 was volatile ⁽⁶⁵⁷⁾. According to PIPS, 13 'terrorist attacks' have taken place in 2017, killing 13 and injuring 55 ⁽⁶⁵⁸⁾.

In the first three months of 2018, FRC counted 7 casualties (4 deaths, 3 injured) ⁽⁶⁵⁹⁾.

Main targets of the militants in this agency are civilians, security force personnel, members of peace committees and anti-militant *Lashkars* ⁽⁶⁶⁰⁾. In August 2017, three people were killed and 26 others injured in an explosion ⁽⁶⁶¹⁾. On 31 October 2017, three Levies were injured in an IED blast targeting a polio team ⁽⁶⁶²⁾. In two separate incidents in February 2018, two tribal leaders were killed in IED blasts ⁽⁶⁶³⁾.

Khyber Agency

Khyber Agency borders Afghanistan to the west, Orakzai Agency to the south, Kurram Agency to the south-west and Peshawar in the east. This agency is divided into three sub-administrative units: Bara, Jamrud and Landi Kotal ⁽⁶⁶⁴⁾. Khyber Agency has a population of 986 973 ⁽⁶⁶⁵⁾.

In recent years, the Pakistani army carried out four military operations in Khyber agency ⁽⁶⁶⁶⁾. The last military operation occurred in July 2017. The Pakistani army announced that it had launched a new military operation in Khyber Agency's Rajgal Valley, the operation Khyber-IV. Hideouts and training camps of militants were destroyed in this offensive ⁽⁶⁶⁷⁾.

Compared to 2016, the violent incidents increased in 2017 with almost 105 % in Khyber Agency, according to FRC. FRC reported 115 violent incidents in 2017 which caused 177 deaths

⁽⁶⁵⁴⁾ CRSS, FATA Tribes: Finally Out of Colonial Clutches? Past, Present and Future, 12 July 2018, [url](#), p. 22

⁽⁶⁵⁵⁾ CRSS, FATA Tribes: Finally Out of Colonial Clutches? Past, Present and Future, 12 July 2018, [url](#), p. 22

⁽⁶⁵⁶⁾ FRC, FATA Annual Security Report, 13 January 2018, [url](#), p. 5

⁽⁶⁵⁷⁾ FRC, FATA Annual Security Report, 13 January 2018, [url](#), p. 10

⁽⁶⁵⁸⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 37

⁽⁶⁵⁹⁾ FRC, FATA security report first quarter 2018, 1 April 2018, [url](#), p. 3

⁽⁶⁶⁰⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 41; Dawn, Peace committee member killed in Bajaur IED blast, 16 February 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁶⁶¹⁾ TNN, Blast in Bajaur Agency kills three, 11 August 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁶⁶²⁾ Dawn, 3 Levies men injured in IED blast targeting polio team in Bajaur Agency, 31 October 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁶⁶³⁾ Pakistan Today, Tribal leader killed in Bajaur Agency IED blast, 16 February 2018, [url](#); Nation (The), Tribal elder killed in Bajaur blast, 8 February 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁶⁶⁴⁾ CRSS, FATA Tribes: Finally Out of Colonial Clutches? Past, Present and Future, 12 July 2018, [url](#), pp. 14-15

⁽⁶⁶⁵⁾ CRSS, FATA Tribes: Finally Out of Colonial Clutches? Past, Present and Future, 12 July 2018, [url](#), p. 14

⁽⁶⁶⁶⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 122

⁽⁶⁶⁷⁾ Dawn, Operation Khyber-IV: army clears terrorist strongholds in Rajgal valley, 23 July 2017, [url](#)

and 52 injured⁽⁶⁶⁸⁾. The first and the third quarter of 2017 were especially volatile⁽⁶⁶⁹⁾. PIPS recorded 24 ‘terrorist attacks’ in 2017. In those attacks 24 people were killed and 19 injured⁽⁶⁷⁰⁾. In the first three months of 2018, FRC counted 9 casualties (4 deaths, 5 injured)⁽⁶⁷¹⁾.

Lashkar-e Islam and the TTP were involved in targeting pro-government tribesmen in Khyber Agency⁽⁶⁷²⁾. Also, security personnel were frequently targeted in 2017. Four people, including one security official, were killed due to an IED explosion on 1 July 2017⁽⁶⁷³⁾. On 23 July 2017, one Khasadar was killed and one injured due to an IED blast⁽⁶⁷⁴⁾.

Attacks against educational institutions in Khyber Agency were also reported⁽⁶⁷⁵⁾. On 13 March 2017, a bomb explosion occurred near a school building⁽⁶⁷⁶⁾. On 30 March 2018, seven labourers were injured when an IED planted in an under-construction government school exploded⁽⁶⁷⁷⁾. Khyber Agency witnessed also several cross-border attacks on the border with Afghanistan during 2017⁽⁶⁷⁸⁾.

Kurram Agency

Kurram Agency shares its border largely with Afghanistan (Nangarhar and Paktia province). In the east this agency borders Orakzai Agency and Khyber Agency and North Waziristan Agency in the south. It is divided into three administrative units: Lower Kurram, Upper Kurram and Central Kurram. Parachinar is the main capital of Kurram Agency. Kurram is the only agency in the FATA with a significant Shia population. Kurram Agency has a history of sectarian violence between the Sunni and the Shia population⁽⁶⁷⁹⁾. Kurram Agency has a population of 619 553⁽⁶⁸⁰⁾.

In 2017, a ‘significant’ increase in violent incidents was observed in this agency compared to 2016 by FRC. In total, FRC counted 52 violent incidents in 2017 compared to 19 in 2016. A very high increase was observed in the number of casualties (664). The majority of these casualties were civilians (138 death and 437 injured)⁽⁶⁸¹⁾. According to PIPS, militants of the TTP, Jamaat-ul Ahrar, LeJ, LeJ-Alami, and some unknown militants carried out 11 terrorism-related attacks, causing the most casualties in the FATA⁽⁶⁸²⁾. FRC states that ISKP was also responsible for several attacks in this agency⁽⁶⁸³⁾. In the first three months of 2018, FRC counted 7 casualties (6 deaths, 1 injured)⁽⁶⁸⁴⁾.

⁽⁶⁶⁸⁾ FRC, FATA Annual Security Report, 13 January 2018, [url](#), p. 6

⁽⁶⁶⁹⁾ FRC, FATA Annual Security Report, 13 January 2018, [url](#), p. 13

⁽⁶⁷⁰⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 37

⁽⁶⁷¹⁾ FRC, FATA security report first quarter 2018, 1 April 2018, [url](#), p. 3

⁽⁶⁷²⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 42

⁽⁶⁷³⁾ Dawn, Security official, three civilians killed in mine blast in Khyber Agency, 1 July 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁶⁷⁴⁾ Dawn, Khasadar personnel martyred in IED blast near Peshawar, 23 July 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁶⁷⁵⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 45

⁽⁶⁷⁶⁾ Nation (The), Bomb targets school in Khyber Agency, 13 March 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁶⁷⁷⁾ Nation (The), 7 injured as under-construction school blown up, 30 March 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁶⁷⁸⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 79

⁽⁶⁷⁹⁾ CRSS, FATA Tribes: Finally Out of Colonial Clutches? Past, Present and Future, 12 July 2018, [url](#), pp. 16-17

⁽⁶⁸⁰⁾ CRSS, FATA Tribes: Finally Out of Colonial Clutches? Past, Present and Future, 12 July 2018, [url](#), p. 16

⁽⁶⁸¹⁾ FRC, FATA Annual Security Report, 13 January 2018, [url](#), pp. 6-7

⁽⁶⁸²⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 37

⁽⁶⁸³⁾ FR, FATA Annual Security Report, 13 January 2018, [url](#), p. 15

⁽⁶⁸⁴⁾ FRC, FATA security report first quarter 2018, 1 April 2018, [url](#), p. 3

Kurram Agency witnessed four attacks with a high impact on civilians in 2017. An IED exploded at a market in Parachinar on 20 January 2017, killing at least 25 persons⁽⁶⁸⁵⁾. On 31 March 2017, a suicide bomber targeted a Shia mosque near Parachinar, killing 23 persons and injuring more than 100⁽⁶⁸⁶⁾. On 25 April 2017, a roadside blast targeted a passenger's vehicle, killing at least 14⁽⁶⁸⁷⁾. On 23 June 2017, twin blasts occurred on a market in Parachinar, killing 67 and injuring more than 200⁽⁶⁸⁸⁾. On 30 January 2018, an IED explosion killed six people and injured one⁽⁶⁸⁹⁾. This agency also witnessed multiple drone attacks in 2017 and the first half of 2018⁽⁶⁹⁰⁾.

Orakzai Agency

Orakzai shares its borders with Khyber Agency in the north, FR Kohat in the east, the districts of Kohat and Hangu in the south, and Kurram Agency in the west. Administratively, it is divided into Upper and Lower Orakzai⁽⁶⁹¹⁾. The population is 245 356⁽⁶⁹²⁾.

Fourteen incidents of violence were counted by FRC during 2017 and most of the attacks occurred in the first quarter of 2017⁽⁶⁹³⁾. In total 15 persons were killed and 17 injured⁽⁶⁹⁴⁾. According to FRC, Orakzai Agency was 'the most peaceful' agency in the FATA in 2017⁽⁶⁹⁵⁾. PIPS counted five 'terrorist attacks' in Orakzai in 2017⁽⁶⁹⁶⁾. In the first three months of 2018, FRC counted five casualties (three deaths, two injured)⁽⁶⁹⁷⁾.

According to PIPS, the TTP and a 'local Taliban group' are responsible for attacks in this agency against civilians⁽⁶⁹⁸⁾. PIPS also documented attacks against security force personnel in this agency⁽⁶⁹⁹⁾. On 14 June 2017, a drone attack targeted a commander of the Haqqani network⁽⁷⁰⁰⁾.

Mohmand Agency

Mohmand Agency borders Bajaur Agency in the north and Khyber Agency in the south. In the east it borders Malakand and Charsadda districts and Peshawar District in the south-east⁽⁷⁰¹⁾. Mohmand Agency has a population of 466 984⁽⁷⁰²⁾.

⁽⁶⁸⁵⁾ Dawn, 'Terrorists will fail in their attempt to regain lost relevance,' army chief says, 22 January 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁶⁸⁶⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), 23 killed, over 100 injured as blast rocks Parachinar, 31 March 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁶⁸⁷⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), 14 killed as passenger van hits landmine in Kurram Agency, 25 April 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁶⁸⁸⁾ Dawn, Parachinar twin blasts toll rises to 67, 25 June 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁶⁸⁹⁾ TNN, Six of a family killed in Kurram Agency blast, 30 January 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁶⁹⁰⁾ Dawn, US drone kills three in Kurram, 1 December 2017, [url](#); Dawn, US drone kills two on Pak-Afghan border, 27 December 2017, [url](#); Reuters, Pakistan condemns U.S. drone strike inside its territory, 24 January 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁶⁹¹⁾ CRSS, FATA Tribes: Finally Out of Colonial Clutches? Past, Present and Future, 12 July 2018, [url](#), pp. 22-23

⁽⁶⁹²⁾ CRSS, FATA Tribes: Finally Out of Colonial Clutches? Past, Present and Future, 12 July 2018, [url](#), p. 22

⁽⁶⁹³⁾ FRC, FATA Annual Security Report, 13 January 2018, [url](#), p. 7, p. 15

⁽⁶⁹⁴⁾ FRC, FATA Annual Security Report, 13 January 2018, [url](#), p. 7

⁽⁶⁹⁵⁾ FRC, FATA Annual Security Report, 13 January 2018, [url](#), p. 15

⁽⁶⁹⁶⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 37

⁽⁶⁹⁷⁾ FRC, FATA security report first quarter 2018, 1 April 2018, [url](#), p. 3

⁽⁶⁹⁸⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 37

⁽⁶⁹⁹⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 37

⁽⁷⁰⁰⁾ Nation (The), US drone kills Haqqani commander in Orakzai, 14 June 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁰¹⁾ CRSS, FATA Tribes: Finally Out of Colonial Clutches? Past, Present and Future, 12 July 2018, [url](#), p. 22

⁽⁷⁰²⁾ CRSS, FATA Tribes: Finally Out of Colonial Clutches? Past, Present and Future, 12 July 2018, [url](#), p. 22

FRC counted 32 attacks during 2017, killing 66 people and injuring 55. Compared to 2016, the situation in this agency improved in 2017 ⁽⁷⁰³⁾. According to PIPS, 13 ‘terrorist attacks’ have taken place in Mohmand Agency in 2017 ⁽⁷⁰⁴⁾. In the first three months of 2018, FRC counted 6 casualties (three deaths, three injured) ⁽⁷⁰⁵⁾.

Mainly JuA is active in this region ⁽⁷⁰⁶⁾. Militants launched attacks on security posts and attacked security personnel ⁽⁷⁰⁷⁾. In September 2017, three people were killed and two wounded in a landmine explosion in Mohmand Agency ⁽⁷⁰⁸⁾. On 17 March 2018, two polio workers were killed and three others were abducted by unidentified assailants ⁽⁷⁰⁹⁾.

In April 2018, in light of the improving security situation in the agency, nine security check posts out of 17 have been removed ⁽⁷¹⁰⁾. In May 2018, mobile service was restored after being blocked for fourteen months ⁽⁷¹¹⁾.

North Waziristan Agency

North Waziristan borders Kurram Agency and Hangu in the north and Karak and Bannu districts in the east, South Waziristan Agency in the south and Afghanistan in the west ⁽⁷¹²⁾. North Waziristan Agency has a population of 543 254 ⁽⁷¹³⁾.

Before 2014, North Waziristan was considered as a home base of al-Qaeda, Pakistani and Afghan Taliban groups such as the Haqqani-network ⁽⁷¹⁴⁾. In June 2014, Operation *Zarb-e-Azb* was initiated in North Waziristan. In two years of fighting the army lost 872 men and believed it killed over 2 000 militants ⁽⁷¹⁵⁾. The area was cleared of militants according to the newspapers Dawn and The Nation ⁽⁷¹⁶⁾.

FRC stated that in 2017 the security situation improved despite a slight increase in violent incidents but a significant decrease has been observed in terms of casualties compared to 2016. FRC counted 28 violent incidents in 2017, causing 48 deaths and 27 injured ⁽⁷¹⁷⁾. PIPS documented eight ‘terrorist attacks’ in 2017 ⁽⁷¹⁸⁾. In the first three months of 2018, FRC counted eleven casualties (four deaths, seven injured) ⁽⁷¹⁹⁾.

Despite this security operation, militants still carried out attacks in 2017 and during the first months of 2018. Main targets of these attacks are security force personnel. On

⁽⁷⁰³⁾ FRC, FATA Annual Security Report, 13 January 2018, [url](#), p. 5

⁽⁷⁰⁴⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 37

⁽⁷⁰⁵⁾ FRC, FATA security report first quarter 2018, 1 April 2018, [url](#), p. 3

⁽⁷⁰⁶⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 37

⁽⁷⁰⁷⁾ FRC, FATA Annual Security Report, 13 January 2018, [url](#), p. 17; PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 40

⁽⁷⁰⁸⁾ Dawn, 3 killed in Mohmand landmine blast, 1 September 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁰⁹⁾ Dawn, 2 polio workers killed in Mohmand Agency, 3 abducted, 17 March 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷¹⁰⁾ TNN, Restoration of peace: army abolishes 9 check points in Mohmand Agency, 27 April 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷¹¹⁾ TNN, Mobile service resumption bring smiles to people in Mohmand Agency, 18 May 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷¹²⁾ CRSS, FATA Tribes: Finally Out of Colonial Clutches? Past, Present and Future, 12 July 2018, [url](#), p. 20

⁽⁷¹³⁾ CRSS, FATA Tribes: Finally Out of Colonial Clutches? Past, Present and Future, 12 July 2018, [url](#), p. 20

⁽⁷¹⁴⁾ BBC News, North Waziristan: What happened after militants lost the battle?, 8 March 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁷¹⁵⁾ BBC News, North Waziristan: What happened after militants lost the battle?, 8 March 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁷¹⁶⁾ Nation (The), Operation *Zarb-e-Azb*: Two years of success, 6 September 2016, [url](#); Dawn, After Army's clean-up of North Waziristan, locals want civilian govt to get in action, 18 May 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁷¹⁷⁾ FRC, FATA Annual Security Report, 13 January 2018, [url](#), p. 8

⁽⁷¹⁸⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 37

⁽⁷¹⁹⁾ FRC, FATA security report first quarter 2018, 1 April 2018, [url](#), p. 3

5 December 2017, six people were killed in a roadside bomb attack targeting a military vehicle ⁽⁷²⁰⁾. On 30 May 2018, two soldiers were killed due to an IED blast ⁽⁷²¹⁾. PIPS counted two drone attacks in North Waziristan in 2017 ⁽⁷²²⁾. On 4 July 2018, a US drone strike targeted a Pakistani militant commander ⁽⁷²³⁾. Since May 2018, North Waziristan is confronted with an upsurge of targeted killings. Locals protested against the military for failing to maintain peace in the area ⁽⁷²⁴⁾.

South Waziristan Agency

South Waziristan shares its border in the north with North Waziristan, and borders Bannu and Lakki Marwat districts in the north-east, the tribal area adjoining Tank district and Dera Ismail Khan district in the east, Zhob District of Balochistan Province and Dera Ismail Khan district in the south, and Afghanistan in the west. Geographically, it is the largest agency of the FATA ⁽⁷²⁵⁾. North Waziristan Agency has a population of 543 356 ⁽⁷²⁶⁾.

In November 2017, the military conducted a security operation to clear Shaktoi area in South Waziristan of militants. This caused the displacement of 200 families ⁽⁷²⁷⁾. At the end of November 2017, the HRCP expressed his concerns about the ‘possible revival of Talibanisation in South Waziristan’ ⁽⁷²⁸⁾. RFE/RL reported that there is a ‘renewed Taliban influence in Waziristan’ noticeable. Locals call this armed group the *Aman* (Peace) Committee, which operates as a government-backed militia ⁽⁷²⁹⁾. Mona Kanwal Sheikh, expert on militant movements in Pakistan stated about the presence of the Taliban in South Waziristan:

‘One ‘lump’ of the Pakistani Taliban is, however, still active in South Waziristan. They are organized in one of the peace committees in the district and are also called the “good Taliban”, the ones who the military is not targeting. They are no longer part of the larger umbrella of TTP, and they have been granted the right to control an area in South Waziristan’ ⁽⁷³⁰⁾.

According to Kanwal Sheikh, the ‘Taliban’ in Wana, in South Waziristan, is organised under four different commanders and with their own ‘police and public morality “corps” and their own justice system’. They also collect taxes from local businesses ⁽⁷³¹⁾.

⁽⁷²⁰⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Roadside bomb targeting military vehicle kills 6 in North Waziristan, 5 December 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁷²¹⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Two soldiers martyred in North Waziristan IED blast, 30 May 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷²²⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 37

⁽⁷²³⁾ RFE/RL, Drone Strikes Kill Two Key Pakistani Militant Commanders, 4 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷²⁴⁾ RFE/RL, Pakistani Official Killed In Waziristan Ambush, 2 June 2018, [url](#); TNN, North Waziristan people stage sit-in against target killings, 15 May 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷²⁵⁾ CRSS, FATA Tribes: Finally Out of Colonial Clutches? Past, Present and Future, 12 July 2018, [url](#), p. 17

⁽⁷²⁶⁾ CRSS, FATA Tribes: Finally Out of Colonial Clutches? Past, Present and Future, 12 July 2018, [url](#), p. 17

⁽⁷²⁷⁾ RFE/RL, Civilians Frustrated Over Latest Waziristan Displacement, 14 November 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁷²⁸⁾ HRCP, HRCP’s alarm over attempt towards the revival of Talibanisation of South Waziristan, 21 November 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁷²⁹⁾ RFE/RL, Locals Blame ‘Surrendered Taliban’ For Waziristan Murder, 24 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷³⁰⁾ Kanwal Sheikh, M., New conflict lines in Pakistan’s tribal areas, 6 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷³¹⁾ Kanwal Sheikh, M., New conflict lines in Pakistan’s tribal areas, 6 July 2018, [url](#)

FRC recorded 30 violent incidents in 2017, compared to 2016 (28 incidents), which is a minor increase ⁽⁷³²⁾. A decrease of 4 % in casualties was observed in 2017, compared to 2016 ⁽⁷³³⁾. PIPS documented nine ‘terrorist attacks’, which caused 23 deaths and 16 injured ⁽⁷³⁴⁾.

In South Waziristan, attacks on security force personnel were reported during 2017 ⁽⁷³⁵⁾. On 31 October 2017, one FC soldier was killed and one injured due to a bomb blast ⁽⁷³⁶⁾. On 23 June 2018, six militants and two government soldiers were killed in a gun battle ⁽⁷³⁷⁾. In May 2018, a local tribesman was shot dead by militants belonging to the Mulla Nazir group of the Taliban ⁽⁷³⁸⁾. One drone attack was reported in South Waziristan in 2017 ⁽⁷³⁹⁾. In June 2018, protesters were killed and injured in a dispute between former armed ‘Taliban’ (the local, unaffiliated, armed group that controls Wana) and mostly unarmed members of the Pashtun Tahafuz (Protection) Movement in Wana, the administrative capital of South Waziristan ⁽⁷⁴⁰⁾.

Impact of the violence on the civilian population

FRC documented 1 207 casualties (539 deaths and 668 injured) in the FATA in 2017. This is an increase of 37 % in terms of casualties compared to 2016 ⁽⁷⁴¹⁾. The biggest part of these fatalities were civilians (760 casualties), followed by militants (290 casualties) ⁽⁷⁴²⁾. According to FRC, the high rate of civilian casualties is due to the four ‘high profile, coordinated and complex terrorist attacks’ in Kurram agency during the first half of 2017 ⁽⁷⁴³⁾.

CRSS counted 436 fatalities in 2017 ⁽⁷⁴⁴⁾, compared to 495 fatalities in 2016, is a slight decrease ⁽⁷⁴⁵⁾. The most affected regions of the FATA were Kurram Agency, Khyber Agency and Mohmand Agency (see Figure 13) ⁽⁷⁴⁶⁾.

⁽⁷³²⁾ FRC, FATA Annual Security Report, 13 January 2018, [url](#), p. 8

⁽⁷³³⁾ FRC, FATA Annual Security Report, 13 January 2018, [url](#), p. 8

⁽⁷³⁴⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 37

⁽⁷³⁵⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 40

⁽⁷³⁶⁾ Dawn, FC soldier martyred in South Waziristan blast, 31 October 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁷³⁷⁾ RFE/RL, Two Pakistani Soldiers, Six Militants Killed In Tribal Region, [url](#)

⁽⁷³⁸⁾ Dawn, Tribesman gunned down in South Waziristan, 25 May 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷³⁹⁾ Dawn, Drone kills four IS men before US senators visit South Waziristan, 4 July 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁴⁰⁾ RFE/RL, Waziristan Unrest Sheds Light On Lingering Taliban Influence, 8 June 2018, [url](#); RFE/RL, Pakistani Tribal Area Tense After Deadly Clashes, 7 June 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁴¹⁾ FRC, FATA Annual Security Report, 13 January 2018, [url](#), p. 4


⁽⁷⁴²⁾ FRC, FATA Annual Security Report, 13 January 2018, [url](#), p. 4

⁽⁷⁴³⁾ FRC, FATA Annual Security Report, 13 January 2018, [url](#), p. 4

⁽⁷⁴⁴⁾ Fatalities according to CRSS are persons killed

⁽⁷⁴⁵⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 38

⁽⁷⁴⁶⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), pp. 38-39



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Figure 13: violence-related fatalities in the FATA by agency, © CRSS ⁽⁷⁴⁷⁾

For the first quarter of 2018, FRC reported 43 terrorism and counterterrorism incidents, resulting in 24 deaths and 28 injured. Most casualties were civilians, followed by security force personnel ⁽⁷⁴⁸⁾.

In the first six months of 2018, SATP counted 40 fatalities in the FATA (15 civilians, 15 security forces and 10 militants). A high number of fatalities was observed in the month of April 2018 ⁽⁷⁴⁹⁾.

CRSS counted 171 casualties (92 fatalities, 86 injured) in the first half of 2018. In the second quarter of 2018, fatalities and injured increased in the FATA compared to the first quarter of 2018 ⁽⁷⁵⁰⁾. Agencies most affected with casualties in the first half of 2018 were North Waziristan, South Waziristan and Kurram Agency ⁽⁷⁵¹⁾.

Displacement

According to a strategy paper of UNOCHA published in January 2018 from 2008 to 2014 more than 5 million people were displaced from the FATA. This was due to the security operations

⁽⁷⁴⁷⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 39

⁽⁷⁴⁸⁾ FRC, FATA security report first quarter 2018, 1 April 2018, [url](#), pp. 3-5

⁽⁷⁴⁹⁾ SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2018, last updated on: 29 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁵⁰⁾ CRSS, CRSS Quarterly Security Report Q1, 2018, 13 April 2018, [url](#); CRSS Quarterly Security Report Q2, 2018, 11 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁵¹⁾ CRSS Quarterly Security Report Q2, 2018, 11 July 2018, [url](#)

by the military against non-state armed groups in the region ⁽⁷⁵²⁾. Due to the operation Khyber-IV in July 2017 many were displaced from Khyber Agency ⁽⁷⁵³⁾.

An article in the Express Tribune in March 2018, which cited the governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, stated that 96 % of the total displaced population has returned to the FATA while repatriation of the remaining 4 % was in progress ⁽⁷⁵⁴⁾. 29 442 families remain displaced, according to a report of UNOCHA of 31 May 2018 ⁽⁷⁵⁵⁾. The government announced in June 2018 that the return of 1 100 registered and around 2 000 unregistered displaced families was likely to start on 22 June 2018. Around 14 000 displaced families are still waiting to return to North Waziristan. The increase in targeted killings and uncertainty has forced many families to move back to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ⁽⁷⁵⁶⁾.

The government of Pakistan took initiatives to restore and improve daily life in the FATA ⁽⁷⁵⁷⁾. However, the displaced people in the FATA who return to their homes are still confronted with problems. More than 800 schools have been closed or are non-functional due to poor law and order situation. A large number of schools were damaged or destroyed by militants when they were in control of major parts of the FATA ⁽⁷⁵⁸⁾. Returnees in North and South Waziristan and Khyber Agency complained that the infrastructure has not been fully repaired yet and that there are problems with food supplies ⁽⁷⁵⁹⁾. Another problem remains the issue of unexploded landmines ⁽⁷⁶⁰⁾.

2.2.6. Islamabad Capital Territory

General description

Islamabad Capital Territory (see [Map 1](#)) is situated in the north of Pakistan between the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab and includes the capital of Pakistan, Islamabad ⁽⁷⁶¹⁾.

Islamabad has a population of different ethnic backgrounds including Punjabi, Pashtun, Sindhi and Urdu-speaking people. Islamabad has a relatively big proportion of religious minorities compared to other parts of the country, with 10 % of the inhabitants being non-Muslims ⁽⁷⁶²⁾.

⁽⁷⁵²⁾ UN OCHA, Pakistan Humanitarian Pooled Fund (PHPF) Allocation Strategy Paper 2018, 18 January 2018, [url](#), p. 1

⁽⁷⁵³⁾ Dawn, IDPs to return to Khyber's Rajgal valley after Eid, 12 June 2018, [url](#); RFE/RL, For Waziristan's Displaced, A Life Still In Limbo, 9 August 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁵⁴⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Free from fear: Displaced tribals return to 'peace', 9 March 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁵⁵⁾ UNOCHA, Pakistan: KP and FATA - Areas of Displacement, Hosting and Returns as of 31 May 2018, 13 June 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁵⁶⁾ Dawn, IDPs to return to Khyber's Rajgal valley after Eid, 12 June 2018, [url](#); RFE/RL, For Waziristan's Displaced, A Life Still In Limbo, 9 August 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁵⁷⁾ IPS, The New Normal in Fata, 11 February 2016, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁵⁸⁾ TNN, Absenteeism of teachers, damaged buildings make 900 schools non-functional in FATA, 17 February 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁵⁹⁾ TNN, Returnees and displaced families from FATA seek food security, 14 December 2017, [url](#); TNN, Non-transparent surveys deprive many from compensation against damaged houses in FATA, 30 April 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁶⁰⁾ TNN, Planted landmines: The hidden enemies of FATA repatriated populations, 16 September 2017, [url](#); IPS, Displaced Pashtuns Return to Find Homes "Teeming" with Landmines, 26 April 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁶¹⁾ Islamabad Capital Territory Administration, Geography, Climate & Demographics, n.d., [url](#)

⁽⁷⁶²⁾ Friday Times (The), Battleground Islamabad, 22 June 2018, [url](#)

According to the last population census figures published by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics the population of Islamabad Capital Territory is 2 million ⁽⁷⁶³⁾.

Background of the conflict and actors in Islamabad Capital Territory

In 2017, PIPS mentioned that ‘terrorist attacks’ in the region were carried out by LJA and unidentified militants ⁽⁷⁶⁴⁾. At the end of September 2017, unidentified persons have put up an Islamic State flag on Islamabad’s main road, indicating the presence of IS ⁽⁷⁶⁵⁾.

According to a report by OSAC published on 21 May 2018, the level of security in Islamabad is higher than in other regions. Still, the presence of Pakistani government buildings, government officials and foreigners make the region a ‘high profile target for terrorist attacks’ ⁽⁷⁶⁶⁾. In January 2018, security officials warned for potential attacks against police personnel and foreigners in some areas of Islamabad Capital Territory ⁽⁷⁶⁷⁾. Security measures by the Islamabad police have been installed at public places, places of worship and other important buildings around Eid-ul-Fitr 2018 ⁽⁷⁶⁸⁾.

Description of recent security trends

The PIPS report of 2017 mentions three ‘terrorist attacks’ in this region in 2017. This is the same number as in 2016. Two of these attacks were sectarian-related and targeted ‘high profile’ members of the Shia community ⁽⁷⁶⁹⁾. Unidentified militants also attacked a news reporter in the capital ⁽⁷⁷⁰⁾.

For the first half of 2018, PIPS recorded not a single terrorist attack in Islamabad Capital Territory ⁽⁷⁷¹⁾.

Impact of the violence on the civilian population

In 2017, the annual security report of CRSS reported 16 fatalities from violence in Islamabad Capital Territory ⁽⁷⁷²⁾. Among these fatalities were 12 civilians, 3 security officials, and 1 criminal ⁽⁷⁷³⁾. Violent clashes between the police and supporters of Khadim Hussain Rizvi broke out in Islamabad in November 2017 ⁽⁷⁷⁴⁾. At least six persons were killed during these clashes ⁽⁷⁷⁵⁾.

⁽⁷⁶³⁾ Pakistan, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Provisional Summary Results of 6th Population & Housing Census-2017, 25 August 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁶⁴⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 86

⁽⁷⁶⁵⁾ Diplomat (The), The Islamic State’s Support Base in Pakistan Continues to Grow, 28 September 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁶⁶⁾ OSAC, Pakistan 2018 Crime & Safety Report: Islamabad, 21 May 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁶⁷⁾ Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Security beefed up in Islamabad after threat alerts, 16 January 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁶⁸⁾ Nation (The), Security on high alert for Eid in capital, 11 June 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁶⁹⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 58

⁽⁷⁷⁰⁾ Dawn, Journalist Ahmed Noorani attacked by knife-wielding assailants in Islamabad, 27 October 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁷¹⁾ Rana Amir, M., e-mail, 2 July 2018 - data (01/01/2018-30/06/2018) courtesy of PIPS

⁽⁷⁷²⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 9

⁽⁷⁷³⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 59

⁽⁷⁷⁴⁾ New York Times (The), Pakistan Deploys Military Troops After Violent Clashes in Islamabad, 26 November 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁷⁵⁾ RFE/RL, Pakistan Government Calls In Army After Islamabad Clashes, 25 November 2017, [url](#)

According to data in CRSS' the first and second quarter analysis report of 2018, 10 casualties (8 fatalities, 2 injured) were counted ⁽⁷⁷⁶⁾. In the first six months of 2018, SATP did not observe any fatalities from violence in this region ⁽⁷⁷⁷⁾.

Displacement

UNOCHA did not report any conflict-induced displacement from Islamabad in 2017 or in the first half of 2018 ⁽⁷⁷⁸⁾.

2.2.7. Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan

General description of Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan

The Pakistan-controlled territory of Kashmir consists of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (commonly called Azad Kashmir, AK or AJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) (see [Map 1](#)), previously named the Northern Territories ⁽⁷⁷⁹⁾. Both regions have a partially autonomous administration ⁽⁷⁸⁰⁾. However, the influence of the government of Pakistan is far-reaching ⁽⁷⁸¹⁾. AK has a population of about 4.45 million ⁽⁷⁸²⁾. GB has approximately around 1.8 or 2 million inhabitants ⁽⁷⁸³⁾.

Background of the conflict and actors in Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan

The Pakistan-India relationship has been tense for years. Cross-border shelling intensified in 2017 and the first half of 2018. Militant attacks on Indian army bases have complicated relations further. India claims that Pakistan-based militant groups are responsible for these attacks ⁽⁷⁸⁴⁾. Militant groups such as Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), LET and JEM are active in the region ⁽⁷⁸⁵⁾. The Long War Journal reported that Pakistan permits those groups to have their bases in the area. The Pakistani army has created the United Jihad Council, an umbrella organisation led by Syed Salahuddin, the leader of HM. The United Jihad Council coordinates the activities of militant groups operating in Jammu and Kashmir ⁽⁷⁸⁶⁾. A February 2018 article of Combating Terrorism Center mentions that 'the presence of Islamic State in the region progressed gradually during 2017' ⁽⁷⁸⁷⁾.

⁽⁷⁷⁶⁾ CRSS, CRSS Quarterly Security Report Q1, 2018, 13 April 2018, [url](#); CRSS Quarterly Security Report Q2, 2018, 11 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁷⁷⁾ SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2018, last updated on: 29 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁷⁸⁾ Websites consulted: <http://www.unocha.org/pakistan>; <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/pakistan>; <http://reliefweb.int/country/pak>

⁽⁷⁷⁹⁾ OHCHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Kashmir: Developments in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir from June 2016 to April 2018, and General Human Rights Concerns in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, 14 June 2018, [url](#), p. 41

⁽⁷⁸⁰⁾ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018 - Pakistani Kashmir, 28 May 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁸¹⁾ OHCHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Kashmir: Developments in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir from June 2016 to April 2018, and General Human Rights Concerns in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, 14 June 2018, [url](#), p. 41, p. 42

⁽⁷⁸²⁾ Nation (The), Census 2017: AJK population rises to over 4m, 27 August 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁸³⁾ HRCP, Aspirations for identity, integration and autonomy. Report of an HRCP's fact finding mission to Gilgit Baltistan, 28 February 2017, [url](#), p. 8

⁽⁷⁸⁴⁾ ACAPS, Pakistan, Politics and Security, last updated: 12 April 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁸⁵⁾ Nelson, M., EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan; 16-17 October 2017, Rome, February 2018, [url](#), pp. 66-69

⁽⁷⁸⁶⁾ LWJ, Pakistani terror groups launch multiple attacks in Jammu and Kashmir,

14 February 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁸⁷⁾ Combating Terrorism Center, An Idea or a Threat? Islamic State Jammu & Kashmir, 9 February 2018, [url](#)

A fact-finding report by HRCP in March 2017 documented human rights violations by intelligence and law enforcement agencies in Gilgit-Baltistan ⁽⁷⁸⁸⁾.

Description of recent security trends

According to PIPS, three ‘terrorist attacks’ occurred in Azad Kashmir in 2017. All three attacks have taken place in Muzaffarabad, the capital of Azad Kashmir ⁽⁷⁸⁹⁾. PICSS reported two militant attacks in 2017 and described the security situation in Azad Kashmir as ‘stable’ ⁽⁷⁹⁰⁾.

However, the situation at the LoC remained volatile in 2017, according to PIPS. PIPS counted 131 cross-border attacks from the border with India ⁽⁷⁹¹⁾. In the first half of 2018, PIPS recorded one terrorist attack ⁽⁷⁹²⁾. In the same time period PIPS recorded 76 incidents of violence at the Pakistan-India border ⁽⁷⁹³⁾. In a telephone interview on 15 June 2018 Matthew Nelson stated that the numbers of attacks at the LoC are increasing, despite occasional ceasefires, and he did not deem this situation likely to change ⁽⁷⁹⁴⁾.

According to PICSS, not a single militant attack was reported in 2017 in Gilgit-Baltistan ⁽⁷⁹⁵⁾. PIPS recorded not a single ‘terrorist attack’ in Gilgit-Baltistan in the first half of 2018 ⁽⁷⁹⁶⁾. On 3 August 2018, at least twelve schools have been burned down in Diamer district in Gilgit-Baltistan ⁽⁷⁹⁷⁾. In reaction to these arson attacks, a search operation was carried out. During this operation thirty people were arrested and one suspect was killed. One police officer was killed and another one injured during this operation ⁽⁷⁹⁸⁾. On 11 August 2018, three policemen were killed and two others were injured when unidentified gunmen opened fire on a police check post in the Kargah Nala area ⁽⁷⁹⁹⁾.

Impact of the violence on the civilian population

In 2017, CRSS documented no fatalities of violence in Azad Kashmir ⁽⁸⁰⁰⁾. PIPS mentioned that the three ‘terrorist attacks’ in 2017 resulted in one person killed and ten injured ⁽⁸⁰¹⁾. In 2017, in Pakistan, cross-border attacks with India claimed the lives of 69 people while 245 got injured ⁽⁸⁰²⁾. Most cross-border attacks occurred in Bhimber, Kotli and Poonch ⁽⁸⁰³⁾. The cross-border shelling has an impact on the civilians living near the LoC. The civilian government

⁽⁷⁸⁸⁾ HRCP, Aspirations for identity, integration and autonomy. Report of an HRCP's fact finding mission to Gilgit Baltistan, 28 February 2017, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁸⁹⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 58

⁽⁷⁹⁰⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 41

⁽⁷⁹¹⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 71

⁽⁷⁹²⁾ Rana Amir, M., e-mail, 2 July 2018 - data (01/01/2018-30/06/2018) courtesy of PIPS

⁽⁷⁹³⁾ Rana Amir, M., e-mail, 2 July 2018 - data (01/01/2018-30/06/2018) courtesy of PIPS

⁽⁷⁹⁴⁾ Nelson, M., telephone interview, 15 June 2018. Scholar at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London.

⁽⁷⁹⁵⁾ PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2017, 6 January 2018, [url](#), p. 41

⁽⁷⁹⁶⁾ Rana Amir, M., e-mail, 2 July 2018 - data (01/01/2018-30/06/2018) courtesy of PIPS

⁽⁷⁹⁷⁾ Dawn, 12 schools burnt down overnight in Gilgit-Baltistan's Diamer district, 3 August 2018, [url](#); RFE/RL, At Least 12 Schools Burned Down In Northern Pakistan, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁹⁸⁾ RFE/RL, Suspects Arrested In School-Torching Incidents In Northern Pakistan, 5 August 2018, [url](#); Dawn, Suspect behind torching of Diamer schools killed in search operation: police, 5 August 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁷⁹⁹⁾ Dawn, 3 policemen martyred in militant attack on Gilgit-Baltistan checkpost, 11 August 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁸⁰⁰⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 59

⁽⁸⁰¹⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 58

⁽⁸⁰²⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 71

⁽⁸⁰³⁾ PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, [url](#), p. 75

remains absent in these areas ⁽⁸⁰⁴⁾. According to a report of Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) in May 2018, cross-border shelling has an impact on education in the area, particularly because it has led to the closure of many schools ⁽⁸⁰⁵⁾.

According to data in the first and second quarter analysis report of 2018 conducted by CRSS, no casualties were counted in AK ⁽⁸⁰⁶⁾. According to SATP, there were no fatalities from terrorist violence documented in AK in the first six months of 2018 ⁽⁸⁰⁷⁾.

CRSS documented no casualties of violence in Gilgit-Baltistan in 2017 and the first half of 2018 ⁽⁸⁰⁸⁾. SATP also did not document any fatalities among civilians from insurgent violence in GB in the first six months of 2018 ⁽⁸⁰⁹⁾.

Displacement

In its Global Report on Internal Displacement for 2018 the IDMC stated that between July and September 2017, 57 000 people have left their homes due to cross-border shelling in Abbasur and Sialkot sectors in Azad Kashmir ⁽⁸¹⁰⁾. No further information about IDPs could be found among the consulted sources during the reporting period ⁽⁸¹¹⁾.

⁽⁸⁰⁴⁾ Dawn, This Kashmir Day, who will stand up for Azad Kashmiris?, 5 February 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁸⁰⁵⁾ AOAV, The Impact of Explosive Violence on Students and Education in Kashmir, 24 May 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁸⁰⁶⁾ CRSS, CRSS Quarterly Security Report Q1, 2018, 13 April 2018, [url](#); CRSS Quarterly Security Report Q2, 2018, 11 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁸⁰⁷⁾ SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2018, last updated on: 29 July 2018, [url](#)

⁽⁸⁰⁸⁾ CRSS, Annual Security Report 2017, February 2018, [url](#), p. 59; CRSS, CRSS Quarterly Security Report Q1, 2018, 13 April 2018, [url](#); CRSS Quarterly Security Report Q2, 2018, 11 July 2018, [url](#)

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⁽⁸¹⁰⁾ IDMC, Pakistan. Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID 2018), 2018, [url](#), p. 3

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Annex II: Terms of Reference

The reporting period for incidents and events illustrating the general trends of the conflict is from 1 June 2017 to 15 August 2018. Data on security incidents includes the period from 1 January 2017 to 30 June 2018.

The content of the report should contain information on the following topics:

General description of the security situation

- Background of the conflict
 - Overview of recent conflicts
- Actors in/Parties to the conflict
- Recent security trends and security trends
- Impact of the violence
 - Civilian population: casualties, IDPs, refugees
 - State ability to secure Law and Order: security forces, justice, detention
 - Geographical overview of the security situation
 - Regional description of the security situation
- Punjab
- Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
- Sindh
- Balochistan
- Federally Administrated Tribal Areas
- Islamabad
- Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan

For each region, a short description of the region (terrain, urban areas, population) should be included, followed by information on:

- General description of the region
- Background of insecurity in the region: actors, type of violence
- Recent security trends (focus on 2017 and first half of 2018) according to the four main sources (number of incidents, example of the kind of violence, effects of the violence)
- Displacement/return

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